had the means of making both parties yield in part. Denmark giving Drontheim, was to be ensured as to the rest of Norway; and Sweden, receiving Drontheim, was to forego all future claims at a peace: however, the Prince Royal, backed by existing treaties, and the King of Denmark, determined to hold Norway to the last, are neither so easily inclined to yield, and I do not see any issue but a resumption of hostilities. The war may probably then be carried on in Holstein until the Spring. It will employ a large army, even if the Prince Royal is contented with a defensive warfare. And I feel much surprise and alarm that his Royal Highness does not seem to be considering the magnitude of the enterprise in the manner that becomes a great military mind. He talks of the surrender of Glückstadt, the storming of Rendsborg, &c.; but the means he has produced against the former are really too trifling. He has even obliged the rocket brigade to fire their field rockets, which are completely useless, against the place. He has no efficient siege apparatus, and there is a great want of arrangement throughout his present undertakings. His état-major seems to be dispersed in every quarter. General Adlercreutz is very ill in the rear; Baron Tavast is negociating at Copenhagen, and Count Löwenhjelm has been sent to London. The duties have devolved on his Royal Highness's aid-de-camps, who are wholly inexperienced; and, from all I witnessed when in Holstein, I cannot help entertaining considerable anxiety for the result of his Royal Highness's campaign. The corps of Walmoden is not fit for the field, and since my arrival at this place I have had so much representation about it, that I have written another letter to the Prince Royal, proposing its coming at least to the left bank of the Elbe, to be placed before Haarburg, relieving it by Count Strogonow's. However I might have been desirous to take so strong a measure as to insist positively on the repose so necessary for these troops, had I proceeded to greater extremities, I have no doubt the Prince Royal would have availed himself of such a stress on my part to declare Great Britain was deserting him, as well as Austria deceiving him, and he might at once have turned round. I hope, therefore, your lordship will think I have done as much as I could, under the present critical aspect of affairs. The differences have been so great between the Prince Royal and General Walmoden, that I am afraid they will never go on smoothly. The latter is not of a contented disposition, and the former is by no means an easy character to act with. But to find a remedy at such a crisis is not so easy. Great decisions must be made by the great Allied Powers at headquarters. To soften differences and to make the machine go on as well as we are able, notwithstanding all the impediments that arise, must be the duty of all employed as myself. I have cautioned General Walmoden, whom I met here, against encouraging the Duke of Cambridge to augment the difficulties in his own mind with which he has to contend. I do not diminish them; they are undoubtedly great. Still, his Royal Highness's great attention, experience, and ability, will very shortly overcome them. Time is all that is required, and to keep his Royal Highness up to the mark. The counsels of either General Walmoden or Decken are not very inspiring; and if I might venture to make a suggestion, it would be that the duke should be armed with the feeling that he ought to take more responsibility on himself; and with this I am persuaded business would go on much better, as his Royal Highness is more able than those who surround him. I have the honour to be, &c. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Mr. Edward Cooke. Dear Cooke-Since closing my private letters to Castlereagh, I hear from Mr. Jackson, who has been out this evening, that he has seen Hatzfeldt, who is just returned from his mission to Paris. He was sent there, as you will remember, to explain D'Yorck's capitulation. The account he gives is that Bonaparte will certainly join his army. He does not want for men, and he has got great supplies of horses for his cavalry. But the miserable deficiency he will experience is in the formed material; every thing is new levy, conscript, and indisciplined. The general meeting of officers of state, marshals, &c., at Paris, Hatzfeldt describes, as you have already heard; every one giving his opinion, and Talleyrand alone advising treaty for peace, with the Rhine, Alps, and Pyrenees, as their boundaries. Bonaparte would not hear of any territory incorporated with the French Empire being given up. Count Stadion is to arrive at Dresden in a day or two: this looks well. There is no doubt entertained here of a great (and if great it must be decisive) action in the course of a few days. I do not hear the King of Saxony has taken a decided part. Tell Bunbury I can procure all the best maps here that are in existence. I will send him a list, next time I write, with the prices, and he had better mark what he wants. Colonel Cooke leaves this for Stralsund, to meet the Prince Royal on his landing to-morrow. Ever yours, &c., CHARLES STEWART. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh. Hamborough, April 28, 1813. My dear Castlereagh-Being much hurried yesterday, I was unable to write to you by the despatches. I now send a few lines by post, although we have no news here this morning. I could not obtain a farthing of money here, yesterday being a holiday; so was forced to delay my departure till to-day but I hope now to be off in an hour. : The news I gave Cooke, in my private letter of yesterday, as coming from Vienna, was written by Gentz1 to General 1 Gentz, one of the most eminent political writers of his time, was a native of Silesia; entered at an early age into the civil service of Prussia, which he exchanged for that of Austria, where he proved a most useful Tettenborn. You know, I dare say, much better than I do, what great influence the former has with Metternich, and what good authority he is. I omitted inadvertently yesterday to mention from whom General Tettenborn's information came. I hear the Prince of Orange is expected to land with the Prince Royal: the former was not at all pleased with what passed between him and the King of Prussia before he left him; and it is owing to this circumstance that he has attached himself to the Prince Royal. I am uneasy about our northern friends, Swedes and Danes, and much apprehend that you will have more difficulties to contend with than I think Cooke apprehended. The Danes offered their services here to Tettenborn at a critical moment, when it was believed that Davoust was advancing again on Hamburgh, and when much alarm prevailed. But he gave no encouragement, nor will he let a soldier into the town, which he is putting in a state of defence, without the Emperor's positive orders. Believe me ever yours, CHARLES STEWART. Lord Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stewart. St. James's Square, May 4, 1813. My dear Charles I write a few lines by Hope, whose departure has been delayed by contrary winds, although they will probably not reach you as quick as by a more direct conveyance. The state of affairs on the Elbe will not permit us for the present to risk any despatches of importance by that route; and I hope none from your side may fall into the assistant to Prince Metternich. A decided enemy to the revolutionary principles of France, Gentz wrote the manifestoes issued by Prussia in 1809 and 1813. He attended at the Congress of Vienna, the negociations at Paris in 1814 and 1815, and at all the subsequent Congresses, in the capacity of chief secretary, and drew up the Protocols. He died in 1832, very poor, and, alas! is not remembered as his great talent, and especially in the composition of State papers and despatch writing, deserve. enemy's hands, as we must be aware how great an object it would be either to the Danes or French at this moment to lay hold of an English courier. The Prussian Treaty with Sweden is highly satisfactory, as giving a uniformity to the principles of the alliance at a moment when Dolgorueki had thrown us into a momentary embarrassment. I hope the Convention of Breslau will be amicably explained: my letters to Lord Cathcart will have put you into possession of my views on that question. Count Münster and the Hanoverians appear to me to have taken an exaggerated alarm upon its meaning; assuming that the revenues and territories of all the German States (for example, Saxony, Bavaria, &c.) that might join the Allies, must necessarily still remain under the administration of the Central Council; the revenues, by Article IV., being the property of Russia, Prussia, and Hanover, and not of the sovereign of the particular State. This is a construction too unjust, impolitic, and absurd, to be credible; and I yesterday received a note from Hambro', which proves I was right; for, whilst the Council does take upon itself, and necessarily, to prescribe the rate of duties which shall, for the present, be collected on imports into the Elbe, placing them on the same footing as those in the Baltic ports, the produce of the duties so to be collected is expressly declared to belong to the local Government. Baron Ompteda's and Count Münster's construction appeared to me to be too unwise to be credible. At a moment when the policy is to encourage converts, provided you believe them sincere in embracing your cause, to announce to them that they could only come in upon the principle of a temporary surrender of their authority, subjects, and resources, would be to consolidate Germany against the Allies, and not against the French. At the same time, to admit that hostile States have any claim to change sides when it suits their convenience, and to set up a right by such change at once to repossess themselves |