Brought forward To which will be added, in the course of the Total Dutch Troops 7,609 3,878 11,487 You will observe that in this communication the Prince says nothing of the 20,000 men stated to have been ordered to assemble in that quarter by the 3rd of April. I am nevertheless satisfied he will endeavour to have them there as soon as can be; and, if he fails, it will not be for the want of the best intentions and strong exertions to have the greatest possible force ready; but he seems desirous of not throwing out to me more to raise hopes than he is assured of being able to satisfy. Farewell, my dear lord. I trust I have said enough, and perhaps have reason to fear that I may have said more than enough. Yours very sincerely, CLANCARTY. 1 Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh. Aix-la-Chapelle, March 25, 1814, 7, P.M. My Lord-The messenger Fisher passing through this place, with the mails to the 18th, enables me to inform your lordship of my arrival here, and that the Prince Royal may be probably expected in the course of the night. He set off from Liege for Verviers, for the purpose or pretext of reviewing the troops, and he will proceed with the same pretext hither; for no person, as far as I can find, at Liege is apprized of his intended journey. I saw the Prince this morning about eleven o'clock, at which time no intelligence of any importance had reached I have the honour to be, &c., Liege. EDWARD THORNTON. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh. Head-quarters, Fere Champenoise, March 26, 1814. My Lord-Napoleon having failed in his attempt to debouch from Plancy to Arcis, across the Aube, and having abandoned his idea of attacking Prince Schwarzenberg in his position of Mesnil les Comtesses, seems to have been guided in his next operations by the desire of preventing the junction of the armies of Prince Schwarzenberg and Marshal Blücher. Did he not succeed to the utmost in this object, it was evidently his best policy to force their union and their communication as far to the rear, and to make it as circuitous as possible. It is further manifest, by intercepted letters, that Bonaparte was of opinion that the movements he had determined on on the right of Prince Schwarzenberg might induce him to fall back towards the Rhine, for fear of losing his communications; that he thus would be enabled to relieve his places, and be in a better situation to cover Paris. It generally occurs that manœuvres are made with the advance or head of an army, but Bonaparte, in his present undertaking, seems to have pushed his object so far, by the passage of the Aube with his whole army near Vitry, as to have left himself completely open to that bold and magnificent decision which was immediately adopted. Napoleon put his whole army in motion on the evening of the 21st for Vitry; that night he remained at Lomenessins; on the following day the advanced corps of his army arrived at Vitry, and succoured the place. It had been placed by Colonel [blank] in a very tolerable state of defence, and there it had a garrison of between 3 and 4,000 Prussians. Marshal Ney endeavoured by every menace to obtain a surrender, but the brave Prussian Colonel [blank] resolutely refused, and held the town, which reduced the French commander to cross the Marne river by bridges constructed near Trignecourt. Napoleon here passed his army on the 23rd and 24th, and was immediately ascer These ob tained to have taken the direction of St. Dizier. jects might be now in his view by the movement round our right to force us back, if this failed to operate upon our communications, and even proceed to form a junction with Marshal Augereau, or finally by moving to his fortress of Vitry. and to prolong the war by resisting on a new line, while he placed us in the centre of France, having taken the best precautions in his power for the defence of the capital, while there such is a hasty outline of the movements of the French army. The Allies, on the 22nd, having crossed to the right of the Aube, lost no time in adopting the bold resolution of forming the junction of the two armies to the westward, placing themselves thus between the French army and Paris, and proceeding with a united force of at least 200,000 men to the capital of the French Empire. In order the better to mask this movement, the march of the combined army was made from Pougy, Tesmont, and Arcis, on Vitry; and his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, by two extraordinary marches of eighteen and twelve leagues, established his head-quarters with those of the Field-Marshal at Vitry, on the 24th inst. A very brilliant capture of several pieces of cannon, 1,500 prisoners, and a large number of caissons, &c., was made by General Augerouski, of the cavalry of the Russian Guard, on the 23rd, and on this day and the preceding several advanced guard affairs took place between General Wrede's corps, the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg, and the enemy. At the passage of the Marne by the enemy, owing, as it is said, to the late arrival of orders, Marshal Wrede with the Bavarians missed an opportunity of attacking Ney with advantage, as he defiled under the heights where the Marshal was in position, and the French army had the Prince Royal's corps following their rear at the same moment. So soon as the Prince Marshal took his decision, he made his dispositions by forming a corps on Bar sur Aube, since which he has com Duca mitted to the care of General Dura, to protect the headquarters of the Emperor of Austria, his supplies, &c., and carry them, if necessary, towards the army of the South, and also, by vigorously pressing forward in his operations towards the capital, to secure his rear while he pursues his objects in front. The combined army marched in three columns to Fere Champenoise on the 25th; all the cavalry of the army formed the advance, and were to push forward to Sezanne. The 6th and 4th corps formed the advance of the centre column; the 5th was on the right; and the 3rd corps and the reserves and the Guards on the left. Marshal Blücher was reported to have arrived with a great part of his army at Chalons. General Winzingerode and General Czernicheff, with all their cavalry, entered Vitry on the 23rd, and were immediately detached to follow up Napoleon's march on St. Dizier, threatening his rear. General Winzingerode's infantry had remained at Chalons with Marshal Blücher, together with Woronzow's and Sacken's corps. General Bülow had marched to attack Soissons, and Generals York and Kleist had moved on Montmirail. By these general, combined, and well directed movements, your lordship will perceive that, had Bonaparte even not crossed the Marne, and passed between our two armies, he probably would have found himself in a similar position to that at Leipzig, and the result would have been, I have no doubt, of the same nature. The army was to have bivouacked on the 25th at Fere Champenoise. It appears that the corps of Marmont and Mortier, who had been retiring from before Marshal Blücher, were moving down towards Vitry, to connect themselves with Napoleon's operations: ignorant, perhaps, of his intentions, which may not have been fully formed until he found himself too far committed, these corps of his army were much perplexed when they found themselves close to Prince Schwarzenberg's army, when they expected to meet their own. It is a singular but curious fact that Marmont's advance was within a very short distance, on the night of the 24th, from Vitry, with out the enemy's knowing it was in the occupation of the Allies. On the morning of the 25th, the 6th corps, under Genera Riefski, fell in with this advance, drove them back from Haussemont, Connandray, and through Fere Champenoise: in the former place, a large number of caissons and waggons and baggage were taken. In the mean time, on the left, the Russian cavalry of the reserves, under the Grand-Duke Constantine, were equally successful, charging the enemy, taking eighteen cannon and many prisoners. But the principal movement of this day occurred after the Allied troops in advance had passed through Champenoise. A detached column of the enemy, of 5,000 men, under the command of General Ariani, had been making its way, under the protection of Marmont's corps, from the neighbourhood of Montmiral, to join Napoleon with his grand army: this corps had in charge an immense convoy, with 100,000 rations of bread and ammunition, and was of immense importance, from the force attached to it. It had left Paris to proceed to Bonaparte, and the cavalry of Marshal Blücher's army were the first to discover and observe this corps, on their march from Chalons. My aide-de-camp, Captain Harris, was fortunate enough, looking out with some Cossacks, to give the first intelligence to Marshal Blücher of their position. The cavalry of Generals Korf and Basilschikoff's corps were immediately detached after them, and they were driven upon Fere Champenoise as the cavalry of the grand army were advancing. Some attacks of the cavalry were made on this corps, who formed themselves in squares, and, it is but justice to say, defended themselves in a most gallant manner, although young troops, and being Gardes Nationales. When they were completely surrounded by the advanced cavalry of both armies, some officers were sent to demand their surrender, but they still kept marching and firing, and did not lay down their arms. A battery of Russian artillery opening on them, and renewed charges of the cavalry, |