Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Dijon, March 29, 1814 My Lord-My despatches of the 15th from Chaumont, and of the 22nd from Bar-sur-Aube, addressed to the Earl of Liverpool, will have relieved your lordship's mind from all apprehension as to the Conferences at Chatillon being suffered to linger on, to the prejudice of the general interest.

lord

I regret my having desired Lord Aberdeen to forward by my messenger, passing through Chatillon, the proceedings up to the latest period, under these circumstances necessarily unaccompanied by explanations from myself, should have given occasion to the misconception under which your ship's letter of the [blank] appears to have been written. You will perceive, from the fourth case provided for in the general instructions of the 14th to the Allied Plenipotentiaries, that it never was intended to allow the French Plenipotentiary to present a counter-projet in the ordinary sense of that term, his Excellency was restricted, in doing so, substantially to adhere to the Allied projet, which was in spirit deemed to be an equivalent to an alteration. The allowing, or rather the requiring, him to state his modifications in the form of a counter-projet, was, upon full deliberation, adopted as the course best calculated to avoid delay. It compelled him to give an ensemble to his demand, which enabled the Allies at once to negative the whole, as trenching upon the substance of their ultimatum, without being obliged to discuss the projet itself in detail, under a pretext of modifying it. The object was to throw the proposition on him, and to reserve the affirmative or negative to the Allies.

Conceiving the projet in question not to have been one to which, in all its parts, an acceptance or rejection could have been peremptorily required, I apprehend no course could have been pursued better calculated than that I have described, to bring the matter to an immediate issue, with a due attention. to the good faith and decorum of our proceedings.

An unforeseen delay of forty-eight hours certainly arose from the reference made to head-quarters of the counter-projet. This delay was altogether unforeseen, because the French proposition clearly fell within the first case provided for in the instructions of the 14th, namely, being one utterly inadmissible in the unanimous judgment of the Plenipotentiaries, and consequently one which they were authorized to reject at once without reference. The majority of the Plenipotentiaries, however, thought it desirable, and, upon the whole, I believe, they acted judiciously, to enter upon the Protocol a reasoned rather than a dry rejection of so elaborate a counter-projet.

Such was the simple cause of the short delay which took place, and I trust your lordship will find no occasion to regret, so far as the reputation of the Prince Regent's councils is concerned, that this limited interval was afforded to the Sovereigns themselves authoritatively to pronounce upon the concluding act of the negociations at Chatillon, instead of suffering so important a result in appearance to rest upon the judgment of their Plenipotentiaries.

I have now the honour to enclose to your lordship, for the Prince Regent's information, the declaration which has been issued by the Allied Sovereigns upon the rupture of these discussions.

Draft.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh. Head-quarters, Bondy, March 29, 1814. My Lord-On the 28th, the grand Allied Army and that of Silesia continued their advance to Paris. The 6th and 4th corps, the Austrian Grenadiers, the guards, and reserves, and the cavalry of the Grand Duke Constantine, took up their ground in the neighbourhood of Coulley and Nanteuil. The 3rd corps was this day at Mouson. The 5th remained at Chailly with the advanced guard in the direction of La Petite

Gaucher, observing the routes of Sezanne and Provens. T head-quarters of the army were established at Cuencey.

The passage of the Marne at Meaux was effected by the 6th corps with little resistance. Part of Mortier's corps under the immediate command of the French General Vincent who retired through the above place, broke down the bridge his retreat, and detained the Allies in their pursuit. Abent 10,000 of National Guards, mixed with some old soldiers endeavoured to make a feeble stand before the army of Marshal Blücher between Ferte Jouairie and Meaux. But General Horn attacked them, and placing himself gallantly at the head of some squadrons, he pierced into a mass of infantry, taking himself the French General prisoner. The passage of the river was also disputed at Fripport, where the army of the Marshal passed, but, notwithstanding the fire of the enemy, the bridge was soon completed, and the whole of the army passed the Marne to-day. The French, on their retreat from Meaux, caused a magazine of powder of an immense extent to be blown up, without the slightest information to the inhabitants of the town. They thought themselves by the monstrous explosion buried in the ruins of the place. Not a window of the town that was not shivered to atoms, and great damage was done to all the houses, and to the magnificent Cathedral. The corps of York and Kleist advanced this day to Claye. The corps of Langeron was on their right, and Sacken in reserve. The corps of Woronzow was in the rear at Meaux. Different bridges were constructed on the Marne, to enable the grand army to file over in various columns.

Your lordship will perceive that so soon as the passage was effected, the Allied armies, who had abandoned their communications, immediately opened another more advantageous, considering the manner in which the country they left was exhausted. It must always be distressing to great armies to be without direct communications, and to depart from the base of their operations; but the line of Brussels, the Low

Countries, and along the coast, would now afford so many facilities, that, from the moment of the passage of the river, I conceive the armies may be deemed in security. It is not that Napoleon may not attempt by an operation on our rear, by Chateau Thierry or some other point, to act in the above direction; but, with the army of the Prince of Sweden and the army in Holland, Bonaparte would be much exposed by such an attempt. an attempt. General Bülow's corps has blockaded Soissons, and is in march towards the Marne. He will afford an additional security. General Winzingerode, who had pursued Napoleon's rear towards St. Dizier, seems to have been assailed on the evening of the 26th and the morning of the 27th, by a very preponderating force of the enemy, especially as to infantry. The details of the affair are not arrived, but it appears the general was obliged to retreat in the direction of Bar-le-Duc. From the most recent reports, Napoleon was himself at St. Dizier on the 27th, and it is said his advanced guard is at Vitry. It would thus appear that he is marching after the Allies, or directing himself on the Marne, but it is hoped this is now too late. On the 29th, the army of Silesia, leaving a corps on the Marne, was directed to its right, to advance on the great road of Soissons to Paris. Count Langeron was on the right, near the village of La Vilatte. Generals York and Kleist moved from the Meaux route into that of Soissons, to make room for Prince Schwarzenberg's army. Generals Sacken and Woronzow were in their

rear.

On the 28th, in the evening, a very sharp affair occurred at Claie, between General York and the enemy's rear; the ground they were posted on was very favourable for defence, and in a very severe tiraillade General York lost some hundred men; but the enemy were driven back at all points. The 6th corps passed at Fripport, and reached Bondy at night and the heights of Pantin. The 4th corps crossed at Meaux with the guards, reserves, and cavalry: the former was

immediately directed to gain the high road from Lagny to the capital, and to take post on the heights of Chelle.

The 3rd corps was to support the 4th; the 5th moved t Meaux, and remained on the left of the Marne, having the cavalry at Crecy and Colomiers. On the advance of the 6th corps, some slight resistance was made at Villaparis; and, as i was necessary to relieve Generals York and Kleist, and mor them more to the right, a cessation of hostilities for four hours was agreed on by mutual consent, which delay prevented the march forward being so rapid as usual. The armies this night may be stated to have their right towards Montmartre and their left near the wood of Vincennes.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

Lord Clancarty to Lord Bathurst.

C. S.

Amsterdam, March 29, 1814. My dear Lord-I send you a private letter, which I received the day before yesterday from Sir Thomas Graham, and think, from the tone of it, that, without in the least adverting to the circumstance of any hint upon the subject having been received from me, it might be advisable to impress upon his mind not only how great an object the capture of Antwerp is, particularly to Great Britain, and generally to all the Allies, but the great consequence also of time in this matter, and that what can be done ought to be quickly done.

I agree with him in thinking that it is probable Taylor's mission with the Crown Prince may not succeed; but it should seem, to my ignorance perhaps, that with 18,000 men between the Hanoverians and British, with 11 or 12,000 Dutch troops, the enterprise might be undertaken. I think also that Sir Thomas rather underrates the numbers of effective, in comparison to their force on paper, of the Dutch troops. It is most true, they are far behindhand in drill instruction and field discipline, and that, for active operations of manœuvre in the field, they might very correctly be stated according