official conversations with the heads or seconds in the departments of State. They hope to get out of the war with a safe conscience, by saying that, the war in Europe having ceased, the causes of their quarrel with us have ceased also.

I don't believe I have wished you joy on the fortunate termination of your labours on the Continent, which I do most sincerely. I only wish I could have shared a few of them with you. Should you wish to aboucher with any one on subjects not easily written upon, and not be willing to part with Robinson, you may give me your commands; though, for more than a few days, I should not even yet like to leave all the bother of the detail in Cooke's hands. He is getting much better.

Louis XVIII. comes to town on Wednesday next, dines at Carlton House Thursday, and on Friday or Saturday starts for Dover, to which place the Prince Regent will have accompanied him from Stanmore.

Yours,

W. C. HAMILTON.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, April 19, 1814.

My dear Liverpool-In the present state of things, I am anxious as far as possible to put you personally au fait of nuances here, and to possess myself of your ideas, before I am driven to the necessity of acting upon them.

And first, as to our peace-we have agreed to enter upon its negociation with Talleyrand, under full powers from Monsieur, in order that it may be ready for signature on the King's arrival. With respect to the nature of the arrangement, we shall all be agreed to take our Chatillon projet as the basis; but, in the present state of things, there is just cause for some modification; and there is disposition in the Emperor of Russia inconveniently to favour a relaxation in our demands.

As far as I can judge, we shall be unanimously disposed to strip the arrangement of any thing bearing upon it the character of particular distrust. We propose to admit the French

Ambassador to the general Congress; and, having the English restitutions necessarily in hand as a security for the peace, we are disposed, by the Convention for the suspension of hostilities, to allow the evacuation of old France by the Allied troops, and of the fortresses beyond those limits by the French troops, to go hand in hand.

In this part of the case, I foresee the fleet at Antwerp will make the practical difficulty. I see the general feeling will be against our refusing to France liberty, as circumstances now stand, to withdraw those ships. The Emperor of Russia has already expressed to me his hope that this would not be pressed. In the other instances of fortresses to be surrendered, the French garrisons are to be allowed to evacuate as friends, and not as enemies, taking with them their arms and military equipment, leaving only what is considered, in military phrase, les dotations de la place. The reasoning will beif the army is suffered so to retire, why not the navy? The former keeping their arms, the latter, in parity of reasoning, are entitled to retain and retire with their ships. This is not very correct logic; but the maintenance of the opposite principle will be unpleasant, against the temper of the Allies, and the enforcing it by siege now still more so. I wish, therefore, to know your feelings upon this point-whether you are disposed to reserve it as a distinct question for negociation, meaning to give it up ultimately, if every thing else is satisfactorily settled, as a mark of generosity to the nation-or, whether you see any and what modification to the question.

You will recollect, we never claimed the ships for ourselves -we considered them as the right of the captors. The engagement I obtained was, that they should follow the fate of the place, and not go to France; but this stipulation was against Buonaparte, not against the Bourbons. I am afraid we cannot now press this point without much odium. The value of the ships is, in itself, no great object. I understood from the Brabant deputies they were perishing fast, being built of green wood. If you can reconcile feelings to the measure, I myself

doubt the expediency of making this point a sine quá non, as matters now stand in Europe. It is a pity they have survived to raise this unpleasant discussion.

With respect to the future limits of France-I hope the Emperor will not be disposed to press any departure from the ancient frontier which, in a military point of view, can be objectionable. The flat part of Savoy, not affecting the line of the Alps and Avignon, are the augmentation to which, from the first discussions at Chatillon, it was thought France might be suffered not unreasonably to aspire. I believe, upon similar principles, something in the Palatinate had been thought of; but this must depend upon German arrangements.

With respect to the power of France so augmented, I see no present cause for alarm; and there is a strong motive for giving to our peace with the Bourbons somewhat of a more liberal complexion.

With respect to our own peace, I consider Malta, the Cape, Mauritius, and Tobago, as sine quá non; also the regulations limiting the French to a commercial occupation of their factories in the East Indies.

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I should wish, as at present circumstanced, not to press the Saintes. It is not worth swelling the catalogue with a demand of this nature. It is easily reduced, at the outset of a war, and will not be strengthened by the Bourbons: their finances years will be deplorably deranged. They have an army of officers to pension, and will find it difficult to keep things going. Points may occur in the discussions upon which I can refer, but I wish to know your wishes as to the spirit in which we should conduct ourselves. I am myself inclined to a liberal line upon subordinate questions, having secured the Continent, the ancient family, and the leading features of our own peace. I am, my dear Liverpool, in haste, ever yours, Let me have an answer to this as soon as you can. PS. I still feel great doubts about the acquisition in sovereignty of so many Dutch colonies. I am sure our reputation on the Continent, as a feature of strength, power, and con

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fidence, is of more real moment to us than an acquisition thus made. The British merchants ought to be satisfied, if we secure them a direct import. Holland cannot well refuse this, nor Sweden, if she acquires Berbice, which ought to satisfy. More than this I think Holland ought not to lose, even though compensated on the side of the Netherlands.

Prisoners of War in Great Britain.

Transport Office, April 19, 1814.

Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh.

Genoa, April 19, 1814. My dear Lord-I have received your lordship's despatches and private letters of the 3rd and 5th April, brought by Mr. Werry and Major St. Laurent.-I am sorry you do not approve my proceedings with regard to Murat; but, if I could bring the whole case before you, and could fully impress you with the full knowledge I have had such ample opportunity of obtaining from his confidential adherents of his character, I think I might almost say you would entertain a different opinion. He resembles more the old Queen of Naples than any other person I ever saw. The result of both their characters amounts to a uselessness actively pernicious to all with whom they are concerned, and above all to themselves.

Your lordship perhaps thinks that he is offended by the decided language held by me. I take the liberty of enclosing a letter written me by Marshal Minutolo, with whom I have had a long conversation respecting Murat, and to whom I fully explained my regret at the course which he had pursued, so contrary to his honour and interests. The Marshal I had known well in the King of Sicily's service, and our conversation was private. He immediately reported it, and he sent me the King's answer.

The King is perfectly unmanageable. He is too weak to direct himself, and too distrustful to be guided by another. I am, however, confident that, had I been supported by General Bellegarde and Count de Milia, who is completely his creature, we could either have made him act, or placed his insincerity beyond all doubt.

I am happy to inform your lordship that Genoa was put this morning into our possession, at least partly, and will be evacuated the day after to-morrow: the garrison, consisting of at least 4,000 men, to march to France. In twenty-four hours the place would have been assaulted.

It is reported that General Bellegarde has concluded an