After all this bitter folly on our part, concentration was determined on, and these conquerors found out that they may out-manœuvre themselves, and that simple, uncomplicated movements with all your forces together and in hand is the way for great unlettered generals to succeed. Had our Leipzic plan been persevered in, had each army been together, Blücher, collected, would have retired, and Schwarzenberg would have been on Bonaparte, if he had followed him; but we must e'en manœuvre and alarm ourselves, right, left, and centre. Our total loss exceeds, I should think, 35,000 men, and sixty or seventy pieces of cannon. However, I am not sure this will not in the end be of advantage. I am clear our military position is better now than it ever has been, if turned with judgment to profit. We have suffered perhaps a moral defeat, but in every other sense we are more powerful than ever. The reserves of the grand army are all within a few days' march, and they are very numerous; and Blücher, joined by Winzingerode, Bülow, Strogonoff, and Woronzow, will have an army of 100,000 men, on that side alone, stronger than the French. You will have, however, from Robinson, such full details of what has passed, that it is absurd in me to write much, except upon the present moment.

With respect to our marche politique-at one time Bourbonists, at another grasping at any probability of peace-no fixed system of action. What Castlereagh has achieved is really wonderful; but for him, I do believe all would fall. It might be judicious to keep Caulaincourt a little in play, until you entered France, and saw what spirit you actually could rouse. Whatever of bad happens to us, we richly deserve; for whatever of good, we must thank Providence and Castlereagh.

Now, as to our work here-Caulaincourt individually wishes and works tooth and nail for a peace, as far as depends on him. He dreads Bonaparte's successes even more than ours, lest they should make him more impracticable. We have seen,

since the turn in affairs, that Napoleon has our disorder, and he talks now of successes altering terms. We must get back to the Frankfort basis. He cannot treat until we are out of France.

March 1, 1814.

I send you the result of our Conference yesterday with Caulaincourt, and I am happy in being able to close my despatch with an account of a victory of Schwarzenberg. You will see the details of it in Burghersh's despatch. I have just received the enclosed private letter from Castlereagh, and I must be off to Chaumont, so have no time for more. I hear Napoleon has given up all the political considerations, and the painful ones, in settling the armistice; and as the Commissioners are at it again, I think one will be concluded. God bless you. I hope you get on.

Yours ever most affectionately,

CHARLES STEWART.

Minute of the Fifth Conference.

Chatillon, March 10, 9 o'clock in the evening.

The Plenipotentiaries having met, the Protocol of the last Conference was signed in the usual form.

M. de Caulaincourt then said-I have to make a complaint relative to the arrest of a courier.

Count Stadion.-Are you sure of the fact?

M. de Caulaincourt.—I am certain he was stopped, and his despatches taken from him: they were taken by General St. Priest.

He reads his paper.

Count Stadion.-It appears your couriers take a different route from that indicated in the passport.

M. de Caulaincourt.-This one was conducted to the Russian advanced posts by the Cossacks, where his despatches were taken from him: he was afterwards sent to Chaumont.

Count Stadion.-I know he came from Chaumont.

M. de Caulaincourt.-I owe my thanks for his being sent from Chaumont.

Count Razumowski.—Do you wish this note to be inserted on the Protocol?

M. de Caulaincourt.-Certainly. I now wish to have the following observations inserted on the Protocol.

Reads his observations.

Count Stadion. Is this your answer to our projet? I suppose we are to take it as a refusal.

M. de Caulaincourt.-It is not a refusal; they are only observations; I request you to examine them.

Count Stadion.-After waiting so long, we expected to have had a precise answer.

M. de Caulaincourt.-I refuse nothing. You perceive the objects upon which the observations particularly apply: I request you to consider them: they are not offensive in any manner; they are founded on facts.

Count Stadion.-We must take this as a refusal.

M. de Caulaincourt.-In no wise. I have observed on every point I could at present. You know the difficulties with regard to couriers; this will account for any delay on my part.

Ces

Baron Humboldt.—We demand an acceptance or a refusal. M. de Caulaincourt.-La négociation tout en tout. observations sont une espèce de réfutation.

Lord Cathcart.-Is it possible an answer may arrive before midnight?

Count Stadion.-It is certain the Duke's observations do not advance the negociations.

M. de Caulaincourt.-You know all that has passed in the interval. I have received an instruction to make these observations; there is nothing offensive in them; I hope they will conduce to moderate ideas.

Count Stadion.-Is it your intention to give us an answer— an acceptance or a refusal?

M. de Caulaincourt.-It appears to me that my observations are leading to an explanation of the modifications. I insert them on the Protocol, and I request you to consider them.

Count Stadion. These observations are very far from advancing "la besogne."

M. de Caulaincourt.-I am persuaded, however, you will take them into consideration.

Count Razumowski.—It is "un tableau historique," and nothing more.

M. de Caulaincourt.-You have inserted observations in the different Protocols: it appears to me, that in an affair of so much importance you cannot refuse to admit mine.

Count Stadion. We have positive instructions, and must follow them.

M. de Caulaincourt.-You have allowed of modifications: I have made these observations to bring them on.

Count Stadion. The question is, are the wishes of our Courts to be fulfilled?

M. de Caulaincourt.-You cannot refuse to examine my observations.

Count Razumowski.-Your observations reject our projet. M. de Caulaincourt.-No; I have not rejected your projet. Baron Humboldt.-We have orders to demand an answer. Our Conference must break up: we cannot discuss upon nothing.

M. de Caulaincourt.-I have made some observations: examine them; fix a time. When you propose a question, you cannot deny me the right of making observations on it. I am ready to enter into discussion afterwards.

Count Stadion.-Your word was given that on the 10th we should have a clear and precise answer.

M. de Caulaincourt.-You cannot refuse to consider my observations: to arrive at our end, we must enter into explanations. In an affair of this importance, I cannot be tied to

an hour, or a day. I am the most interested to bring things

to a close the war is in my country.

:

Count Stadion.-We cannot continue the Conference.
Lord Cathcart.-Our answer is in our Declaration.

M. de Caulaincourt then gave Count Stadion his observations and the enclosures.

Lord Aberdeen here stated, in reference to one of the enclosures, that M. de St. Aignan's paper was not an official one.

Here Count Stadion put up his papers, and we were all rising to depart, leaving ourselves completely at liberty, without declaring we would even refer to our Courts, or insert anything on the Protocol, to break up the Conferences to-morrow; when M. de Caulaincourt drew from his portfolio a paper, and said|—“ J'ai encore une déclaration à faire," which he read as follows, and said he did it verbally, to pursue our own form. "Le Plénipotentiaire de France déclare verbalement que l'Empereur des Français est prêt

"A renoncer par le Traité à conclure à tout titre exprimant de rapports de souveraineté, de suprématie, protection, ou influence constitutionnelle, avec les pays hors des limites de la France;

"Et à reconnoitre l'indépendance de l'Espagne dans ses anciennes limites sous la souveraineté de Ferdinand VII.;

"L'indépendance de la Suisse, sous la garantie des grandes

Puissances;

66

L'indépendance de l'Allemagne ;

"Et l'indépendance de la Hollande, sous la souveraineté du Prince d'Orange.

"Il déclare encore que si pour écarter des causes de mésintelligence, rendre l'amitié plus étroite et la paix plus durable entre la France et l'Angleterre, des cessions de la part de la France au-delà des mers peuvent être jugées nécessaires, la France sera prête à les faire moyennant équivalent raisonnable."