even in presence of the Swedish troops, I felt it my duty to intimate to him that this had occasioned comments, and that he would do well to apprise the Prince Royal confidentially of it.

In approving of the step you have taken towards myself, I cannot in fairness blame your military colleagues for not concealing it from their respective Courts: I wish, however, the secret was not in so many hands. I have always lamented the Prince Royal's intercourse with Paris, as giving a double aspect to his politics. I have supported him from a belief, founded on his conduct throughout the Russian war, that he was sincere, and from a conviction that the best means of making him so was to uphold him against those who distrusted him. His hostility to Buonaparte cannot be doubted upon any ordinary rule of conduct. His weak side, I should fear, is a desire to make a party in France and in the French army. If an explosion can safely be avoided, it is of the last importance it should not be hazarded at such a moment. The effect would be most injurious to the cause. His name and

talents as an officer, his successes, his Swedes even, are of the greatest importance. He must be stimulated to renewed exertions, and made to feel that he has lost in point of impression by not exposing his own troops more.

I don't know that I can add more on this most delicate and important subject, than to desire that you will be vigilant without betraying distrust, and, if possible, preserve to his Royal Highness the means of being useful. At the same time, till all reasonable doubt on this head is allayed, I trust the military combinations may not materially augment his command. I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Zerbst, September 26, 1813.

My Lord-Since the departure of the messenger from Jüterbock, on the 8th of this month, I have had none till this time

to whom I could give my letters, with perfect confidence of their reaching your lordship's hands in safety. Immediately after the departure of that messenger, I was at pains to discover from Baron de Krusemark and from Baron de Vincent what opinion they entertained of the events of the 6th; how far there was a real delay in the support of the Prussian troops by the Swedish and Russian, which had the effect of saving great part of the French army; and whether they could penetrate the motive of this conduct to be any desire of saving the French army, or of sparing the Swedish troops. On the latter of these motives, I must observe that, if it existed, it is very ill advised and ill-judged on the part of the Crown Prince; as the major part of the Swedish officers and troops—Baron Adlercreutz himself particularly-are furious at having been kept out of action, in a manner which almost reflects disgrace on them for it has so happened that they have not been yet fairly in fire since the commencement of hostilities.

I found Baron Krusemark and Baron Vincent perfectly d'accord as to the fact of the delay of bringing the Swedish and Russian troops into action, and of the effect of that delay, which, consuming to the Allies two or three hours' more daylight, saved, in the same degree, the more complete rout and capture of the enemy's army. The former, however, on my putting the point to him, could not, he said, bring himself to believe that this conduct arose from any other motive than that of an extreme caution and prudence on the part of the Prince Royal, though he feels, in common with all the Prussians, that they have been exposed to the whole brunt of these battles. Baron Vincent, I rather think, entertains more suspicions of the Prince Royal, and feels more in the same way with General Pozzo di Borgo; but he himself is extremely cautious and measured, and would not be easily induced to hazard himself much on a point which depends so much on opinion.

If I were to form a judgment from the tenour of my own

observations, made after the departure of my letters to your lordship, and in part before, I certainly should be inclined to ascribe this conduct of the Prince, in a very considerable degree, to the motive assigned to him by General Pozzo di Borgo, and to believe that a reluctance to push the French troops to extremity, and to exterminate them when occasion offered, did really form a part of the system of the Prince in the views which he may have towards France (for views he certainly has). On my first seeing the Prince Royal at Jüterbock, after the battle, there certainly appeared a consciousness about him of having done something for which he could not give a satisfactory explanation; and this is evident from the tone of eulogium taken in the bulletin towards the Prussians, as a sort of amendment for his conduct.

A day or two after the departure of the messenger, being alone with him, and talking incidentally over the events of the battle, he observed some French prisoners in the street, wounded, and in waggons, whom the Swedish soldiers were helping into the house. "C'est inconcevable," he exclaimed to me, "que la tendresse avec laquelle le soldat Suédois soigne les prisonniers Français! Quel instinct!" He then checked himself, as if he had said too much, and your Lordship will, I think, be of that opinion; for the word was an extraordinary one to be used and to me.

In the course of the same morning, other persons being present, he said he would show me a letter which he was going to write to the Maréchal Ney, for my opinion of it, and which he thought might have a good effect. It It appears that an aide-decamp of this General, named Clouet, had been made prisoner in the battle of Dennewitz; and the Prince Royal thought this a good occasion to address a letter to Ney, mentioning the capture of his aide-de-camp, and promising every attention to him which the merit of belonging to so distinguished a captain could entitle him to. The last paragraph of the letter was to the following effect-that, for twenty years past, they had been

ravaging Europe with continual wars; that it was time for the world to have repose; and whether it was not possible, with the aid of such men as himself, to procure it.

On a common occasion, I should have paid little attention to this letter, and should have regarded it as having no more than the avowed object of exciting a sentiment of discontent against the war in a person of so much influence as Ney, and perhaps of gaining a partisan. But my suspicions were excited by all that had been intimated to me, and I was not very willing, at any rate, to countenance an intercourse which might extend much further than to its ostensible object. I therefore expressed myself against the sending of this letter, observing that, as the turn of the last paragraph might be construed into a sort of pacific overture, I thought it would be much better that any such overture should only be made in concert with the other Allied Powers. He answered this observation with a good deal of vivacity; uttered the word suspicions; said he would not send it; but that I did not know the French marshals and the French military, and he did; and the letter was calculated to have a good effect on them. I did not deny that, but persisted in the first observation I had made.

The letter was not then sent; and at Coswig, a few days after, he gave orders, in my hearing, that it should be sent by a trumpet to the other bank of the Elbe, and to the nearest French quarters; but I am not certain that it was ever sent. The letter, I have since learned, was shown to the other gentlemen whom I have had so frequent occasion to mention, and who approved of this intercourse as little as myself; but they did not think it right to make any observations upon it to the Crown Prince.

The evening on which this conversation passed at Jüterbock, the French aide-de-camp of the Prince, M. Camps, whom I have much more reason to regard as not attached to the cause for which he is fighting, was sent to Berlin—a circumstance which excited new suspicions. But, with all the means

of inquiry I have been able to set on foot, I cannot find whe ther he had an interview with the aide-de-camp of Ney.

As I have learned, however, since, and from good authority it should seem that the attempts made upon this man, of what ever kind they were, have not met with a very courteous re ception. The money which M. Camps sent him was received without an acknowledgment; and I learn from a good quarter that, the Prince Royal having offered him his liberty upon his parole, this offer was received with an impertinent remark, that he did not thank him for it, as he expected very soon to be released by the arrival of his companions in arms at Berlin. It is added to me, from the same authority, that the Prince was so much offended with this impertinence, that he ordered the aide-de-camp to be sent as a prisoner into Russia.

I should not have troubled your lordship with all this narrative, if it did not tend to show that the Prince Royal has certainly some views towards France, and beyond Sweden, in what he is doing. I never doubted that he had certain views of personal ambition, which, if they even went so far as to the place of Bonaparte itself, could not but even be turned intoaccount, provided his mode of attaining them did not influence unfavourably his conduct while acting with us. If he can aid Europe to unthrone its present oppressor, he will do a great service; but it is very material that, in the pursuit of his own views, he should not be allowed to endanger the failure of ours: such as would be the act of sparing a French army in his power, lest he should render himself unpopular in France. Whether this is really his system, I have as yet no further ground for supposing; but it must be counteracted by every possible means.

The other gentlemen, Military Commissioners here, wish to regard the delays which have hindered and which still hinder the passage of the Elbe, as some indication of the same unwillingness to proceed directly against the French; but I can hardly see this in the same point of view. Your lordship will