have the accounts of the state of the Grand Army in Bohemia much better than I can, and may perhaps learn the reason of an inactivity which, if not interrupted by an attack of the enemy, has continued through this whole month; but to me it appears that this inactivity, so dishonourable to such an army, which allows itself literally to be besieged in the mountain passes of Bohemia by detachments from the French army, is sufficient ground for the inactivity of this army, which could not, in common military prudence, throw itself on the other side of the Elbe, without the possession of a single strong point on its banks, unless it was sure of being supported in its movements by the operations of the Bohemian army. This state of things has been the cause of the Mémoire, which has been sent with my despatches of this date, and in which, I think, your lordship will agree with me that the question is very fairly put.

Your lordship will see, by the orders of the day which I transmit, a transposition of a part of the force blockading Magdeburg, in order to join it to the corps of Count Wallmoden, for the purpose of attacking Marshal Davoust and eventually the Danes. This division of force towards objects which may be regarded as the peculiar views of the Prince Royal and of Swedish interests is cited as a proof of the wish of the Prince to draw off from the general cause towards the accomplishment of his own views, and perhaps it is so: but why do the Allied Sovereigns, by their own inactivity, force him into the same state, and invite an active and restless spirit to seize the occasion of pursuing his own advantages? He would not, perhaps, though the object is of great importance, if the movements of the Grand Army gave him scope for combination of plans and co-operation in their execution.

The question of these orders gave occasion to a scene, the day before yesterday, of a most violent kind, as I learn; for my illness has prevented me, for eight or ten days past, from assisting at these discussions. General Pozzo di Borgo, it appears, was the day before yesterday preparing, in concert

with the other Military Commissioners, to put some question to the Prince on the subject of these detachments, and perhap to make some remonstrance against them; when the Prince suspecting that there was a settled plan to counteract him, o offended that his views against the Danish troops should b penetrated, flew into a most violent passion, and allowed him self to speak of himself and of the Allied Sovereigns in a ton and language which, as it was represented to me, I have neve yet witnessed, and which disgusted every one present. As hi vivacity cooled, he went into the other extreme, to counteract the effect, of which he is the first to see the bad consequences Yesterday and to-day, he has been, as I learn, indisposed; and Baron de Wetterstedt, in speaking to General Pozzo di Borgo ascribed his illness to the chagrin of that conversation. Nobody has spoken to me on this subject but the latter, to whom it was principally addressed, but who received it with the utmost calmness and sang-froid. He is extremely mortified at it, however; though I trust he will not experience any repetition of such scenes.

On the other hand, my lord, I can assure your lordship that the Prince Royal has a hard game to play with the commanders and troops of the different nations, particularly the Prussians, under his orders; and I do not wonder that he is quick in expressing his mortification. It is with the utmost difficulty, and by dint of repeated positive orders, that General Bülow has at last undertaken the siege of Wittenberg, almost in spite of himself, and after repeated remonstrances against it, and proposals of other plans in the place of it. A day o two ago, Count Tauenzien informed the Prince Royal that he had been invited by General Blücher to join his troops to his. for the purpose of making an attack on the enemy at Grossenhayn; and that, in consequence, he should march with fifteer thousand men for that purpose. But, as this movement would leave a great point in his line open, he desired General Bülow to detach the division of General Borstel to close it up, which

the former promised to do. Your lordship will hardly imagine that I am speaking of three Prussian Generals under the orders of the Prince Royal, (I do not include General Blücher) nd that all these movements are contemplated and ordered, without the smallest reference to the Commander-in-Chief, or any view to his plan of operations.

The Prince Royal wrote, I understand, with great propriety, and even delicacy, to Count Tauenzien on this conduct; and I am now given to understand, by way of extenuation, that Count Tauenzien is not under the orders of the Prince Royal, but has only been directed to act with the army under the command of the Prince Royal-an extenuation which shifts the blame from the shoulders of the General to that of the Sovereign for nothing can be more manifestly ruinous than such a state of insubordination and disobedience. General Bülow is avowedly, however, under the orders of the Prince Royal, and yet he acts in the same manner.

I beg your lordship to have the goodness to pardon this long detail, which brings me nearly up to the present day; and your lordship is, I trust, persuaded of the constant zeal and watchfulness which I shall exert, on any circumstances which may excite suspicion. I ought to add, that the death of General Moreau has, in this particular, been a great inisfortune; for it has removed from before the eyes of the Prince a check on his projects, and a formidable rival to them. I have positive proof that Moreau would have acquiesced in, and perhaps have promoted, the restoration of the Bourbons, as thinking it the only medium of restoring tranquillity to France. I will not say so much of the Prince Royal, though I would willingly believe that events would lead him at last to that point.

I beg your lordship to be assured of the perfect respect with which I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWD. THORNTON.

Count de Hardenberg to Count de Münster.

Prague, le 12 Octobre, 1813. Pour mettre sous les yeux de votre Excellence les idées du Comte de Metternich rélativement à l'arrangement futur des affaires de l'Allemagne, il m'est beaucoup plus facile de faire mention des différens plans discutés jusqu'ici, et qu'il n'approuve pas, parcequ'à son avis, ils ne remplissent pas le but que leurs auteurs ont en vue, que de détailler le plan positif que le Comte Metternich voudroit leur substituer.

Un obstacle presque insurmontable pour tous ceux qui voudroient rendre à l'Allemagne son ancienne constitution, ou en créer une plus forte sur les débris de celle-là est le défaut d'un chef qui pourroit se charger du pouvoir exécutif—l'Empereur de l'Autriche, bien que celui des Souverains Allemands qui seroit le plus qualifié à se charger de ce poste eminent, le refusant décidément et quoique le Comte de Metternich met encore quelque fois en avant que si, dans la suite des tems, les Princes Allemands, sentant eux-mêmes la nécessité de s'assujettir à des lois positives, vouloient librement charger l'Empereur d'Autriche de la suprématie et de l'exécution de ces lois, il pourroit alors peut-être prendre un parti, pour lequel, sous les circonstances actuelles, il avoit le plus grand éloignement, je n'en suis pas moins convaincu que si aussi dès à présent le vœu des Princes d'Allemagne que l'Empereur d'Autriche reprenne la Couronne Impériale d'Allemagne se manifestoit librement et unanimement, que le Comte Metternich conseilleroit pourtant à l'Empereur de la décliner. Les raisons de cet éloignement de l'Empereur de se charger de la dignite Impériale d'Allemagne sont faciles à concevoir; il prévoit des obstacles et des jalousies, dès l'introduction de la question, et des difficultés non interrompues dans l'exécution des fonctions dont il se seroit chargé.

Quant aux obstacles du premier genre, le Comte Metternich ne nie pas que même la Cour de Berlin a manifesté son ac quiescement à ce que l'Empereur d'Autriche remonte sur le

trône impérial d'Allemagne, mais il n'ignore pas non plus l'idée toujours encore accuellie par un parti en Prusse, et que l'Autriche rejette décidément, d'une division de pouvoir par Sud et Nord, et craint ainsi, peut-être avec raison, voir renaître les anciennes jalousies de la Prusse contre l'Autriche, écartées depuis que la rivalité de domination sur l'Allemagne a cessé.

Quant au reste de l'Allemagne, le Comte Metternich craint qu'en voulant par des loix positives restreindre à présent la souveraineté dont ses Princes ont au moins cru jouir sous la protection de la France, et ce ci est le cas surtout dans le Sud de l'Allemagne, on n'en feroit que des amis secrets de la France, toujours prêts à secouer le joug, si on vouloit et pouvoit même de force leur en imposer un dans ce moment, plus pésant, à leur avis, que celui dont on leur offre de les affranchir. Il n'est pas douteux que la protection de la France pésoit essentiellement plus sur eux que ne le feroient des lois justes et la suprématie d'un Empereur constitutionnel : mais toujours ils se croyoient et ils étoient effectivement souverains chez eux, et ceci adoucissoit le joug que leur imposoit Napoléon; ils cédoient avec résignation à une force majeure à laquelle rien ne résistoit, dans l'espoir que cet état des choses ne pouvoit durer, et qu'alors ils rentreroient dans l'exercice non restreint de la souveraineté acquise sous la protection de la France; et le Comte Metternich est convaincu que plutôt que de voir crouler cet échafaudage ambitieux, qui leur a couté tant de sacrifices, tant au physique qu'au moral, les dits Princes préféreroient de courir encore une fois toutes les chances possibles en commun avec le fondateur de leur souveraineté.

L'exemple récent de la Bavière est venu fort à propos pour appuyer la thèse du Comte Metternich. Si on n'avoit pas garanti à la Cour de Munich sa souveraineté et toutes les dimensions de son territoire, elle n'auroit pas hésité à faire marcher contre l'Autriche les 40,000 hommes, qui maintenant combattent pour les Alliés. Mais ce n'est pas seulement sur la question même du rétablissement de la dignité impériale en Allemagne que le Comte