Emperor. However it ends, I fear that I shall lose the credit

of a voluntary refusal.

Believe me most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

PS. It is said that Ney has entered Basle; but the news is not confirmed, nor do I believe it.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, December 13, 1813. My dear Lord-By the breaking up the head-quarters at Frankfort, and return of Charles to Hanover, you will see that we have blundered your despatches to him after all. We have acted, however, for the best; all our intelligence led us to expect that both Lysle and Camino would still catch him at Frankfort.

I have sent you all that I have strength and power to send in my public despatches, except a map of Holland by Krazenoff, in six sheets: it was intended that there should have been twelve; but the map was so perfect that Buonaparte had the plates seized, with as many copies as he could find, and prohibited the progress of the work.

What with the correspondence with two Admirals, four Generals, British and Allied, and four foreign Ministers, and your lordship, I am kept so well employed that I have scarcely time to sleep and eat. God bless you!

Yours most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, December 14, 1813. My dear Lord-I take a large sheet, meaning to write a large letter.

In the first place, let me beseech you to hurry off Graham 1 to us, in any manner, without delay. Bergen-op-Zoom and Antwerp are, as you may perceive by my despatches, actually 1 General Sir Thomas Graham (Lord Lynedoch).

VOL. IX.

H

at our feet, but we have as yet no means of acquiring them. Whether they will continue unsupported by reinforcements, should we lose the present opportunity, it is impossible to tell. No doubt, every practicable exertion will be made by the French to save these places. Hitherto, they have had no means wherewith to reinforce them.

I am next to beseech you to tranquillize Charles's mind by a private letter. In my opinion, his views upon the late subjects of controversy are correct: if he has erred, I have the misfortune to err with him. Surely you never could have seen that Minute of M. de St. Aginan, at the time you acceded to the basis. I know not in what shape the basis reached you: the heads of it do not seem to me to have ever been committed to writing, except in that Minute.

Upon the maritime question-on the concealment from Sweden, I cannot help agreeing with Charles: the latter, Aberdeen says in his last despatch, (which he sent here under a flying seal for my perusal) has been satisfactorily explained. I hope it has been so; but, as to the first, it still, in my view. stands in a very awkward position. Aberdeen tells you that. in a conversation with Nesselrode, this Minister expressed himself as wishing nothing better than to wave the discussion of it altogether but is this the tone to be adopted by us upon such a vital question, not only to ours, but to the interests of all Europe? Your views upon this subject, I understood to be, that the points relating to navigation were so clear, so fixed and so established by the law of nations, as not to admit o discussion, and therefore that Great Britain would not suffe them to be discussed. This appears to me to be the prope tone for England to take, and I cannot but admire at the cold ness with which this matter seems to affect the Allies, and th desire expressed by Nesselrode to wave the subject.

After all that has passed in Europe for the last twenty years one would have hoped that Russia and the other Allies woul have been cured from their attachment to the principles of th

armed neutrality. Had these principles been acquiesced in by Great Britain as a general regulation, at the time they were so pressed, particularly by Russia, Holland, Prussia, and Austria, what would have become of all those very powers in their later contests with France? Had they been adopted, the whole world would have been placed at the feet of Buonaparte: the commerce of France, and consequently her resources, would have remained entire, as far as her commerce was concerned, increased rather than diminished by war. And there is nothing in my mind more clear than that to the vigorous opposition of Great Britain to the views of the Empress Catherine and others of the Allies, in this respect, the world is now indebted for the chances which still present themselves for its salvation. Are your Ambassadors at Frankfort properly impressed with this great truth? and have they urged it home in argument? I hope so-and yet it is strange that it should have had no greater effect than eliciting from Nesselrode a cold avowal that he wished nothing better than to wave the discussion of the subject. Timeo, multum timeo. It seems also somewhat strange that Aberdeen should not be certain whether so material a point as this should have formed part of the instructions read to him in extenso from Prince Metternich to the Baron Wessenberg.

With respect to the declaration of the Allies, I differ both with Charles and Aberdeen, inasmuch as I think that the substance, style, and manner, of it are well calculated to make an impression upon the people of France; but how Aberdeen can say that, though feeble, the Declaration is unobjectionable and exempt from blame, is to me incomprehensible. What can be more objectionable, or a greater object of blame, than that the Allies should, in the very outset of a negociation, gratuitously pledge themselves to the admission of a greater portion of territory to France than she ever enjoyed under her kings?

Charles sent me all his despatches and his private letter to you, all under flying seal with respect to the first, General

Pfühl is here, having accompanied us from England; and, I must own, his talents seem to me very much overrated at this Court.

I have no apprehension of any embarrassment arising respecting the command in this quarter: it will be long before the Prince of Orange can have an army sufficiently qualified for the field, and even if he had, (which it is my endeavour to forward as much as possible) he will probably, for a long time, be so occupied in the details of his new Government, as to render it little likely that he should head them in person. It is true that the Crown Prince, according to his letter to General Bülow, which was forwarded to you in a former public despatch, may be expected hereafter. I think it, however, improbable, from a letter received from his Royal Highness by the Prince of Orange to-day, (and of which, with an abstract with the Note enclosing it, a copy goes herewith) that his arrival will soon take place, or that, when it shall, he will be likely to meddle with Graham, who will probably take his orders for England.

The Russians have not created dislike in this country: except from Rotterdam, I have heard of no complaints of them, and there the only complaint exhibited was that the officers' table was too expensive.

Upon Charles's private letter I have no remark to make but to deprecate an ill-weighed suggestion of his respecting myself: happily, he has, in the very next paragraph, recom mended a much more eligible course. It is easy to see tha the Prince of Orange would much rather that the Pays Ba Autrichien should be annexed to his domains, than that a thir power should be interposed between him and France. Hi ambition seems to get the better of his judgment in thi respect. The annexation would be very unpopular at Am sterdam, whose ruin would be its inevitable consequence, fron the great natural advantages possessed by Antwerp as a com mercial entrepôt; and this may, in some degree, account fo

the reluctance at first displayed by him to an establishment for his family at Amsterdam, and occasional residence there.

I heard a history yesterday, from the mouth of one of the principal gentlemen of the place, who was present at it, of the evacuation of Breda by the enemy. The day was foggy; fifteen Cossacks presented themselves before one of the gates; this was immediately magnified into 800 Cossacks; the gate was hastily closed. The same fifteen Cossacks, without delay, presented themselves at another of the gates: all were then shut, and all was confusion among the French within. It was said by them, and universally believed, that the town was cernée par ces gueux de Cossacks: all things were immediately packed, and put in motion by the French from the town, by the gate of Antwerp. The other gates were then opened, and the fifteen Cossacks admitted and well received by the inhabitants. This is the summary of the gentleman's story; which, I think, may at once entertain and serve to show you the state of terror with which the French who occupy the remaining parts of the Dutch territory are impressed.

In Aberdeen's private letter to me, he mentions having sent a Mr. Johnson, as an emissary, to stir up the Dutch and Flemings to revolt, and that this person would wait on me, to take my directions. He has accordingly been here to-day, and showed me a letter from Aberdeen, authorizing him to draw for £25,000 sterling; and said that a person from Antwerp would wait upon me, to acquaint me with the state of that place, and other parts of Brabant and Flanders. I told this gentleman, as is most true, that I conceived that things were going on extremely well without the expenditure of a single shilling; that we had accounts from all parts of these countries; that we knew the disposition of the inhabitants to be sufficiently ripe for revolt; and that troops were only required to cover the insurrection, which were immediately expected; and that I thought more harm than good might be expected to result from our tampering with them; that I should, however, have