XXXI. To illustrate the apostle's meaning, we must observe these things: 1st. It is very clear to any not under the power of prejudice, that when the apostle affirms that all have sinned, he speaks of an act of sinning, or of an actual sin; the very term, to sin, denoting an action. It is one thing to sin, another to be sinful, if I may so speak. 2dly. When be affirms all to have sinned; he under that universality likewise includes those who have no actual, proper, and personal sin, and who, as he himself says, have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, verse 14. Consequently these are also guilty of some actual sin, as appears from their death; but that not being their own proper and personal sin, must be the sin of Adam, imputed to them by the just judgment of God. 3dly, By these words ip a Távres pagtor for that all have sinned, he gives the reason why he had asserted that by the sin of one man death passed upon all. This, says he, ought not to astonish us, for all have sinned. If we must understand this of some personal sin of each, either actual or habitual, the reasoning would not have been just and worthy of the apostle, but mere trifling. For, his argument would be thus, that by the one sin of one all were become guilty of death, because each in particular had, besides that one and first sin, his own personal sin: which is inconsequential. 4thly. The scope of the apostle is to illustrate the doctrine of justification he had before treated of. The substance of which consisted in this, that Christ, in virtue of the covenant of grace, accomplished all righteousness for his chosen covenant people, so that the obedience of Christ is placed to their charge, and they, on account thereof, are no less absolved from the guilt and dominion of sin, than if they themselves had done and suffered in their own person, what Christ did and suffered for them. He declares that in this respect, Adam was the type of Christ, namely, as answering to him. It is therefore necessary, that the sin of Adam, in virtue of the covenant of works, be so laid to the charge of his posterity, who were comprised with him in the same covenant that, on account of the demerit of his sin, they are born destitute of original righteousness, and obnoxious to every kind of death, as much as if they themselves, in their own persons, had done what Adam did. Unless we suppose this to be Paul's doctrine, his words are nothing but mere empty sound..

XXXII. The last words of this verse, ep' távra naglor, are differently explained by divines, because the Greek phraseology admits of various significations. The principal explanations are three: 1st. Some render them, in so far, or, because all have sinned. For, it is allowed, that i' frequently admits this sense; and thus it seems to be taken, 2 Cor. v. 4. ¿p' à où ééλoμev éxdvoadai,

"not for that we would be unclothed;" as if written, as Frobenius prints it, in, though Beza here greatly differs. 2dly. Others observe, it may be explained, with whom, i. e. who sinning, hall have sinned. For in a similar construction denotes a time, in which something was done. Thus we say in Greek, ša šuod pziganíw tõro ykyove, when I was a boy this happened, and inov in the dog days; and the apostle Heb. ix. 15. śxi sñ «gŵln dianan, under the first testament. And then the meaning would be, that upon Adam's sinning, all are judged to have sinned. 3dly. Augustine, and most of the Orthodox have explained it, in whom. Which Erasmus in vain opposes, saying, that is when signifying upon, or, in, is joined to the genitive case; as i' δικα και ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας; also when denoting time, as ἐπὶ καίσαρος Oxley. In all this he is strangely mistaken. For, not to say any thing now of time, it is certain, that when joined to the dative denotes in as Matt. xiv. 8. ii Tívaxı, in a charger; and in this very context of Paul, verse 14. iTi Tú opowμalı, in the similitude. And which is more, 76 ép ŵ, cannot sometimes be otherwise explained, than by in which, [or in whom]: as Matt. ii. 4. éợ' ŵ ò тagaλulinos nalınıilo, wherein the sick of the palsy lay, and Luke v. 25. άρας ἐφ ̓ ὦ καλεμέιλο took up that whereon he lay. Nor is it taken in this light, in the sacred writings only, but he might learn from Budæus, Commentar. ling f. Græc. p. 506. that Aristotle used this phraseology in the same sense, ἐφ' ὦ μεν η θήλεια, ἐπι θατέρω δὲ oagny swag, on the one the female, on the other the male broods. However, we reckon none of those explanations to be impertinent as they are almost to the same purpose; yet, we give the preference to the last, because most emphatical and very applicable to the apostle's scope; it is a bad way of interpreting scripture to represent it as declaring what is the least thing intended. For, the words are to be taken in their full import, where there is nothing in the context to hinder it.

XXXIII. Grotius really prevaricates, when he thus comments on the passage before us. It is a common metonomy in the Hebrew, to use the word sin, instead of punishment; and to sin, instead of to undergo punishment, whence extending this figure, they are said, by a metalepsis, or to sin, who suffer any evil, even though they are innocent, as Gen. xxxi. 36. and Job vi. 24. Where Nur is rendered by dus gayi v to be unhappy, 'Ep' here denotes through whom, as in with the dative is taken, Luke v. 5. Acts iii. 36. 1 Cor. viii. 11. Heb. ix. 17. Chrysostom on this place says, On his fall, they who did not eat of the tree, are from him all become mortal.

XXXIV. This illustrious person seems to have wrote without attention, as the whole is very impertinent. 1st. Though we

allow, that sin does sometimes metonomically denote the punishment of sin, yet we deny it to be usual in Scripture, that he who undergoes punishment, even while innocent may be said to sin. Grotius says, it is frequent, but be neither does nor can prove it by any one example; which is certainly bold and rash, Crelli is confuting his book on the satisfaction of Christ, brings in the saying of Bathsheba to David, 1 Kings i. 21. I and my son Solomon shall be counted offenders; that is, says he, we shall be treated as offenders, or, be ruined. But a sinner, or even sin and to sin are different things. The former is said of Christ, 2 Cor. v. 21. but not the latter on any account. Moreover, to be a sinner, does not signify, in the passage alleged, to undergo punishment, without any regard to a fault or demerit, but to be guilty of aiming at the kingdom, and of high treason, and as such to be punished. The testimonies advanced by Grotius are so foreign, that they seem not to have been examined by that great man. For, neither in the Hebrew do we find sun to sin, nor in the Greek version, duagay; nor do the circumstances admit, that what is there said of sin, or mistake, can be explained of punishment. It is necessary therefore to suppose, that either Grotius had something else in his view, or that here is a typographical error. 2dly. Though we should grant, which yet we do not in the least, that to sin sometimes denotes to undergo punishment, yet it cannot signify this here; because, the apostle in this place immediately distinguishes between death, as the punishment, and sin, as the meritorious cause, and death by sin. And by this interpretation of Grotive, the apostle's discourse, which we have already shewn is solid, would be an insipid tautology. For, where is the sense to say, "So death passed upon all, through whom all die." 3dly. Grotius discovers but little judgment in his attempt to prove, that ip signifies through whom: certainly Luke v. 5. ni ghali os, does not signify through thy word, but at thy word, or as Beza translates, at thy command. And Heb. ix. 17. én vexport does not signify through the dead, but when dead, and rather denotes a circumstance of time, Acts iii. 16. is alleged with a little more judg ment; and 1 Cor. viii. 11. not improperly. But it might be insisted, that i' is signifies, it is owing to me, that the meaning shall be," to whom it was owing that all sinned. Which interpretation is not altogether to be rejected. Thus the sholiast, ip' Adà, di óv. And if there was nothing else couched under this, I would easily grant Grotius this explanation of that phraseology. 4thly. It cannot be explained consistent with divine justice, how without a crime death should have passed upon Adam's posterity. Prosper reasoned solidly and elegantly against Coll

lator, c. xx. "Unless, perhaps, it can be said, that the punishment, and not the guilt passed on the posterity of Adam, but to say this is in every respect false; for it is too impious to judge so of the justice of God; as if he would, contrary to his own law, condemn the innocent with the guilty. The guilt therefore is evident where the punishment is so, and a partaking in punishment shews a partaking in guilt; that human misery is not the appoinment of the Creator, but the retribution of the judge." "If therefore through Adam all are obnoxious to punishment, all too must have sinned in Adam. 5thly. Chrysostom also is here improperly brought in, as if from Adam he derived only the punishment of death, without partaking in the guilt; for the homily from which the words are quoted begins thus: "When the Jew shall say, How is the world saved by the obedience of one, namely, Christ? you may reply, How was the world condemned by one disobedient Adam? Where it is to be observed, 1st. That he supposes the miseries of mankind to proceed from God as a judge, who cannot justly condemn but for sin. 2dly. That he compares the condemnation of the world by Adam's disobedience, with its salvation by Christ's obedience. But this last is imputed to believers, and deemed to be theirs, and therefore Adam's. sin is in like manner imputed to all. As also Gregory of Nazianzen, quoted by Vossius, Hist. Pelag. lib. ii. P. ii. p. 163. said, that Adam's guilt was his. "Alas! my weakness," says he," for I derive my weakness from the first parent."

XXXV. But we only understand this of Adam's first sin. We no wise agree with those who absurdly tell us, that Adam's other sins were also imputed to us; for Paul, when treating on this subject, Rom. v. every where mentions transgression in the singular number; nay, expressly verse 18. one transgression, by which guilt passed upon all; and the reason is. manifest, for Adam ceased to be a federal head when the covenant was once broken, and whatever sin he was afterwards guilty of, was his own personal sin, and not chargeable on his posterity, unless in so far as God is sometimes pleased to visit the sins of the fathers on the children. In which Adam has now nothing peculiar above other men. So much for the viola tion by the covenant of man.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Abrogation of the Covenant of Works on the part of God.

1. HAVING sufficiently considered the violation of the covenant by sin; let us now enquire, whether, and how far it is madevoid, or abrogated by God himself.

II. And first, we are very certain, that there are many things in this covenant of immutable and eternal truth, which we rec kon up in this order: 1st. The precepts of the covenant, excepting that probatory one, oblige all, and every one to a perfect performance of duty, in what state soever they are. 2dly Eternal life, promised by the covenant, can be obtained upon no other condition, than that of perfect, and in every respect complete obedience. 3dly. No act of disobedience escapes the vengeance of God, and death is always the punishment of sin. But these maxims do not exclude a surety, who may come under engagements in man's stead, to undergo the penalty, and perform the condition. But we shall speak of this afterwards, and now proceed to what has been proposed.

III. It is indeed a most destructive heresy to maintain, that man, sinful and obnoxious to punishment, is not bound to obe dience. For by no misconduct of man, can God forfeit his. right and supremacy; but the right and supremacy of God requires, that man, and even every creature, be subject in all respects to God, so far as possible. Moreover, the rational creature, such as sinful man is, and does continue to be, can be subject, not only to the natural, but also to the moral provi dence of God; nor only to his vindictive justice, but also to his legislative authority; and as he can, so he ought to be subject to him, as to the obligation of obedience, because every possible subjection is essential to the creature.

IV. If the sinner who deserves punishment was not subject to the law, he could no longer sin, and therefore by one sin he would set himself free from the danger of farther sinning; for where no law is binding, there is no transgression, no sin, which John defines to be the transgression of the law, 1 John iii. 4. But nothing can be imagined more absurd, than that man by sin has acquired an impeccability.

V. Moreover, according to this hypothesis, all sinners would be equal, and an equal degree of punishment remain for every one; which is contrary, both to sound reason and scrip