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ture, where the inequality of sins and punishment, is so often
inculcated. ... . . . . . . . **
WI. There is a plain passage, Gal. v. 3, which confirms, that
even by the promulgation of the new covenant, the
breakers of the covenant who are without Christ, are not set free
from that obligation of the law, which demands perfect obe-
dience, but continue debtors to do the whole law.
VII, Nay, even in a human, court, the penal compact is
deemed an additional compact, adding to the principal conven-

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tion, and consequently not abrogating, but accumulating the .

former obligation. Much less at the bar of God, can the obli-
gation, to punishment, arising from the violation of the cove-
nant, abrogate the primary and principal obligation of the law,
whereby the covenant was ratified. -->
to VIII. Arminius therefore, (in Epist. Praestantium viro-
rum, p. 178) very basely refuses, that: God, when man once
fell from the state of innocence, and became obnoxious to pu-
nishment, even of right required obedience of man, as if God
had forfeited his right by man's disobedience. He makes use
of these arguments: 1st. Because when man is in a state of
sin, he is not in covenant with God; therefore there is no
contract between God and man, by which he can require
obedience; for by what reward, what punishment, can he give
sanction to the law, since man, for the disobedience already
committed, has forfeited the reward, and is become obnoxious
to punishment? 2dly. As God has, because of sin, deprived
man of ability and power to fulfil the law, so by this very
thing; he has signified, that he will no longer require man to
fulfil it, unless he restore his ability, nay he cannot in justice
do it. If any shall, say, Could therefore the creature be ex-
empted from the right or authority of the Creator, as no longer
to be bound to obey him He answers, Yes, indeed, if the
creature be o, and the Creator reckon it unworthy to
require obedience from it; for it is the highest punishment
sdito conclude the sinner under sin, as not to require any more
obedience from him, that * an evidence of irreconcileable
anger, namely, in that state. , 3dly. The law itself, to be per-
formed, is such, as it would be unbecoming, it should be per-
formed by a sinner who is out of the favour of God.... He is
, commanded to have God for his God, to love, honour, and adore
him, to put his trust in him, to use his name with reverence, &c.
is it probable that such an obedience is required of him who is
under the curse of God? Thus far Arminius, whose arguments
deserve to be carefully examined.

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char. Ix.] COVENANT OF WORKS. - 153

IX. We begin with the first. Arminius supposes a great many things in this argument, which we cannot admit; such aS, H. all the obligation of man arises from the covenant, that the law does not oblige, but in so far as it is enforced by rewards and punishments; that God cannot threaten a punishment, after man is once become obnoxious to the penalty; now, since we deny all this, so if we prove them to be false, as we hope to do, there will not remain the least appearance of force in this argument. The obligation of man to obedience is not founded first and principally on a covenant, but in the supereminent sovereignty, majesty, and holiness of God; and cvery rational creature, from a consideration of these, is bound to be subject to his sovereignty, adore his majesty, and form himself according to the example of his holiness. God would not be the absolute sovereign, if any rational creature existed which was not bound to take the rule of its actions from him, and therefore in regulating its actions was not subject to God. God would not be the supreme Majesty, if there was any rational creature who was not bound to acknowledge, worshi adore, and be subject to him in every respect.” God .# not be perfect in holiness, if any rational creature existed, who was not bound to acknowledge that holiness as most worthy of imitation. As God is such a being, he cannot but require to be acknowledged to be so. The creature cannot acknowledge him in this manner, without owning its obligation at the same time to obey him, who is the first, the most high, and most holy God.” Which we have here explained and proved more fully, chap. iii., § VIII. Moreover, it is not true that the law is not binding, but because of the sanction of rewards and punishments. The principal obligation of the law arises from the authority of the lawgiver, and the perfect equity of all his commands. Though God had enforeed his law neither by rewards nor punishments, we had been no less bound to obedience ; ; lest self-love, whereby, we are led to obtain the reward, and avoid the penalty, should be the only motive to stir us up to obey God: the reverence of the Supreme Being, and the love of holiness are to hold the chief place here; in fine, it is also false, that no further pumishment will be inflicted, after that man having once en the covenant, is become obnoxious to the ty; forthere are degrees in condemnation. “And if that was true, it would not take off the obligation to obedience. It would not be lawful for a robber, condemned to be burnt alive, or broken on the wheel, or to the most cruel death that man can devise, to commit, in the mean time, a new capital crime; for

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as we have said, the obligation arises neither primarily nor
chiefly from the penal sanction, but from the authority of the
lawgiver. . . -
X. To the second, I answer, 1st. Man himself is not only
the meritorious, but also the physical cause of his own impo-
tence, which he brought upon himself by his misconduct; as
if an insolent and naughty servant should put out the candle
by which he ought to carry on his master's business, or by
drinking to excess, willingly render himself unfit for the ser-
vice of his master. In this case, the master does by no means

~forfeit his right of requiring every piece of service properly

due to him, and of punishing that naughty servant for non-
performance. . .3dly. Though God as a just judge had depriv-
ed man of ability to fulfil the law, yet, on that account, he
both will in point of right, and can require the performance of
it by man. He can very justly, because no wickedness of
man, justly punished by God, can diminish God's authority
over him, otherwise it would be in man's power, at his own
leasure, either to extend or limit the authority of God, which
is contrary to the immutable perfection and blessedness of
God. He also does require this for wise reasons, of which this
is one, that sinful man may by that o: be convinced of his
irreparable misery, upon finding such, things justly required
of i. ojo o . .
And since he is as unwilling as unable to obey God, he is the
more inexcuseable, the more o the duty of the law is, in-
culcated upon him. 3dly. It is absurd to say, that it is the
test punishment that God inflicts on man, not to require
obedience from the rebellious creature. It is indeed true, that
the creature ought to reckon it a part of its happiness to have
the glory of obeying. And it is the punishment of the crea-
ture, if, by the just judgment of God, it is condemned never
to perform what is incumbent, and may be acceptable to God.
But it is another thing to say, that God will not require obe-
dience from it. If God requires: not obedience, the creature
owes none; if it owes none, it does not act amiss, by disobey-
ing, and if it does not amiss by disobeying, that cannot be the
highest punishment for it. And thus Arminius destroys his
own argument; who would have spoke rightly, had he said,
that it is, instead of the highest punishment to the creature, to
be condemned by the just judgment of God not to perform that
obedience, which God consistently with his justice and holi-
ness requires of it. 4thly. Should we deal more closely with
a bold disputant, we might say, that there is a contradiction in

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~ char. IX.] COVENANT OF WORKS. 155

the adjunct, when he supposes God addressing himself thus: I will not have thee to perform any obedience to me: for if any calls for obedience, he presupposes not only some authority by which he can require it, but also a command, which requires obedience, and which must be obeyed. Whoever by his authority gives such a command, requires that ience be ~ yielded to it. If he should give another command to this pur- se, I will not have you to obey me, he would then contradict imself; nay, contradict the nature of the command, which consists in an obligation to obedience. 5thly. It is the highest absurdity imaginable, that a creature shall, by its sin, obtain, exemption from the authority of the Creator, and be no longer i. to obey him. If this is true, then the first of all deceive ers spoke truth, that man, by eating the forbidden fruit, would become as God, Whoever is exempted from the authority of the Creator, is under the authority of mone, is at his own dis; in fine, is God. For to be at one's own disposal, is to God.' Ah! how ridiculous is this - w XI. The third argument is no less weak. For, 1st. The sum of the law is to love God with all the heart, mind, and strength, and our neighbour as ourselves. As this is reasonable in itself, so it cannot but be proposed as such by God to man; for conscience itself, even that of the most abandoned, will bear witness with God to the reasonableness of this. . What? is it not certain that God is the chief good, consequently the most amiable? Can he be unwilling that an j. acknowledge him as the chief good, or to be what i. really is, what he cannot but be? Is he not the supreme Majesty?, Can he be unwilling to be honoured as such with the most submissive reverence? 2dly. Arminius urges, that the law also commands us to trust in God. It does so; what can be more right, what more becoming, than that man, even a sinner, should be bound to believe the testimony of God, should give him this glory, namely, that he alone {..., can and will justify the ungodly, that he should seek him even when angry, hunger and thirst * after his righteousness, and willingly endeavour to be for his glory; namely, that God may be glorified and admired in him - by his justification and so. by free grace; and that he should neither neglect the salvation which God has most surel revealed, and neither despise nor reject,the Saviour? This is to trust in God; and will any pious person ever doubt of | the probability, nay, even of the most infallible certainty of

this, that man under the curse of God till now, is not called
upon to this? 3dly, He will still urge, that when he speaks

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156 THE ABROGATION OF THE [Book 1. --

of trusting in God, he means thereby that full assurance of
mind, whereby we hold God to be our God; that at least this
is also enjoined by the law. We are to consider this more
distinctly. When the law enjoins us to take God for our
God, it is to be understood in this manner, viz. to take him
for our Creator, preserver, lawgiver, and Supreme Pord; this
is absolutely and without distinction enjoined upon all men: --
but if we understand it thus, to take him for our saving good,
this is enjoined upon none, but in that method which the re-
vealed will of God prescribes. , And this is the way; either
that men shall obtain the salvation of God by a most personal
obedience, as proposed to Adam in innocence, which is now im-
possible for the sinner; or, that sinful man be converted, and
united by faith to Christ, then examine himself whether he
be in the faith, and in Christ, which being discovered, he may
then indeed glory and exult in God his Saviour; this is the
way that is now proposed in the jo. But the law enjoins
us to embrace every truth by faith, which God either has re-
vealed, or shall reveal, and to walk agreeably to that truth.
But the law no where enjoins the impenitent sinner to look
upon God as the God of his salvation. Nay, the law, as it
was given to Adam himself, enjoins him to believe the con-
trary. And thus I imagine I have fully dispatched the quaint
subtilties of Arminius, that it is of immutable right, that
man, even, under sin, and guilt, is still under obligation to
obey the law. -
XII. We proceed a step farther, to shew that man, even
after the violation of the covenant, continues bound, not only
to obedience, but to a perfect performance of duty. Paul said
of those who are without the covenant of grace, Gal. v. 3,
that “they are debtors to do the whole law.” Nor can it
otherwise be; for the law of o: covenant, as to the natural
precepts, is immutable, being the transcript of the image of
{..., is no less so than §. himself: o: if
the image which had the nearest resemblance is changed, and
yet continues still to resemble its archetype, or original, the
archetype itself must also necessarily be changed. But the -
law of the covenant did o, require perfect obedi- *-
ence. , -
XIII. Besides, if we imagine any abatement and relaxation
of the law after sin, we are to conceive, that God addressed
sinful man after this manner: “I formerly commanded thee
to esteem as the supreme truth, thy chief good, and thy sove-
reign Lord, and consequently to assent with the fullest assur-

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