there, Colonel Harding, had ordered the removal of all the accumulated filth, and the port of Balaklava offered the spectacle of a cheerful, busy seaport town.

The news of the death of the Emperor Nicholas had arrived out. Lord Raglan sent Lord Burghersh with a flag of truce to announce it. The news was not credited. But long ere this the gallant garrison of Sebastopol must be aware that their leading star has sunk.

On the 4th March a council of war was held, at which it was decided to resume active operations, but no day was fixed. At the request of Lord Raglan, that experienced veteran and brave officer, General Burgoyne, remains in the Crimea.

On the 22nd February, the French steamer Fulton, and English steamer Leopard, captured and destroyed ten fifty cwt. 6-inch guns, and burnt seven large boats, two ranges of barrack buildings, also a quantity of military stores and provisions, near Boghaz, on the Kuban Lake. They had been sent to reconnoitre off Kaffa, and proceeded towards Anapa. On passing Boghaz, they observed numbers of troops crossing the passage in boats from Anapa to Taman. The ships ran in and anchored in four and a-half fathoms. A few rounds of shot and shell drove the troops to the hills. The enemy brought some field batteries on the hills, and opened a heavy fire of shot and shell on the ships and boats. The Fulton received one shot in her hull.

The steamers then returned to Kamiesch Bay.

Prospects of peace are gradually developing themselves on diplomatic ground. The new emperor is peacefully inclined. The best proof of his pacific inclinations is the circular he has issued to his diplomatic agents at foreign courts. In this circular, after announcing that Prince Gortschakoff had been fully empowered to treat upon the four points of the protocol of 8th August, the Emperor states the objects of the negotiations actually pending at Vienna, as follows:

"To restore to Russia and to Europe the blessings of peace; to consolidate the freedom of worship and the welfare of the Christian populations of the East without distinction of rites; to place the immunities of the Principalities under a collective guarantee; to assure the free navigation of the Danube, to the advantage of the commerce of all nations; to put an end to the rivalries of the great Powers in the East, so as to prevent the return of new complications; finally, to come to an understanding with them on the revision of the treaty by which they recognised the principle of the closing of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, and thereby to arrive at an honourable arrangement for all parties."

The first two points, relating to the Danubian Principalities and to the free navigation of the Danube, have been settled at the Conferences. The third point refers more especially to the treaty of the Dardanelles and the fortress of Sebastopol. On this point, Alexander II. distinctly states that he is willing to come to reasonable terms, if the conditions should not exceed the just limit compatible with his dignity as a great sovereign.

In other words, he will never consent to the razing of Sebastopol, though such concessions are held out as would guarantee Turkey from future aggression from a Russian fleet in the Black Sea. The star of

peace is in the ascendant for the moment, but meantime-THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL CONTINUES.

Since the above was written, the telegraphic wires have brought the intelligence that, on the 13th of March, the Russians opened the fire of the batteries they had established on the heights of Balaklava, when they were attacked by the English, assisted by a French division, and routed. On the 17th, the Russians attacked the whole line of the allies, and are reported to have been driven back with great loss.

Omar Pasha arrived at the camp of the allies on the 12th March, to confer with Lord Raglan and General Canrobert.

It is not improbable that some severe fighting has taken place. The report that the bombardment had taken place is not improbable.

On the 5th instant, a gallant little affair occurred at Eupatoria. Iskender Bey (or Skender Beg), the sabreur par excellence of the Turkish cavalry, made a sortie from Eupatoria with 300 irregular cavalry and 100 Tartar Bashi-Bazouks, to make a reconnaissance, and came upon four strong squadrons of Russian cavalry. The gallant Pole (for such he is), despite the disproportion of numbers, charged them, and a most obstinate struggle ensued. Hard pressed at last, he was compelled to retreat fighting. He himself received a sabre cut on his right hand, which necessitated the amputation of a finger; he also received the thrust of a spear in the chest, and a very severe sabre cut across the forehead. It is hoped, however, that his life will be saved. The Russian official account states the Turkish loss to be forty killed, and their own loss one Cossack; the Turks declare thirty Russians killed, and only eleven on their side. The skirmish was well fought on both sides, and the loss on either side probably equal.

We learn from Turin that a portion of the Sardinian contingent has already sailed for the Crimea.

According to advices from the Crimea of the 12th March, the Russian forces there were distributed as follows:

"At Perekop are encamped the corps of Dragoons, a division of light cavalry, and various other detachments, amounting in all to 20,000 men, under the command of General Pawloff. At Simpheropol, there are about 45,000 men, commanded by General Read. Near the Belbeck, General Osten-Sacken's head-quarters have been placed with 50,000 men, including the garrison of Sebastopol. On the Tchernaya is encamped General Liprandi, with 18,000 men; and in the valley of Baidar is General Wagner, with 9,000 men. It appears that the first operation which General Osten-Sacken had executed, on his appointment to the chief command, was to have all the heights along the coast occupied and fortified from Karabelnaya to the mouth of the Tchernaya. The heights on the left bank of the Alma have also been fortified, and this defensive system seems to show that not only is Baktchisarai the ntre of the General's operations, but that a greater importance is ached to the communications of Baktchisarai with Sebastopol and th Arabat, than to those of that town with Perekop. The Russians, fact, seem determined to defend to the last extremity the basin of he Salzir, as well as the ground extending from Simpheropol to Kaffa."

NAVAL GUNNERY.*

"NAVAL GUNNERY" is a famous book. Every European Government, from Russia to France, has made its translation a national undertaking, and handsomely rewarded the persons employed on the task. Across the Atlantic, the United States naval authorities present a copy to every vessel of war, as a part of its equipment; and we believe the same rule is followed in our own service. Thus Sir Howard Douglas has plenty of fame, but we have never heard of his receiving from o ur Government any of those rewards which his translators acquire in foreign countries. But when did a British Minister ever do anything for literature, whether general or professional? There is plenty of talk about elevating the soldier, increasing the acquirements of the officer, and leading both, by new incitements, to raise and improve themselves; but when an officer of high scientific attainments produces a work of the first order, on a subject of the very greatest importance to the military profession, afloat and ashore, it is to the Army and Navy alone, not to the Government, that he must look for support. It is in this field that Sir Howard Douglas has sought for readers, for pupils, and for students; and a fourth edition of his celebrated Treatise, which has lately issued from the press, proves that he has found, in England as elsewhere, a wide audience.

To specify the improvements and additions in this new issue of "Naval Gunnery," would be almost to enumerate the whole contents; for, in point of fact, it is a new work, embracing all the recent extensions and inventions in the science of which it treats. During the long peace, scientific officers, and even non-professional men, devoted great attention to the improvement of the powers of artillery, in every possible and impossible manner; and Sir Howard Douglas has been a close observer and, in many cases, an actual participator in the experiments which have tested the value, or demonstrated the impracticability, or even the utter worthlessness, of these numberless devices. He now gives us the result of his experiences, and points out the inutility of many things which have found favour in official quarters, and still hold their ground in the service. Jobbery, of course, is at the bottom of the business, though that is a question into which the gallant author does not enter. We have ourselves, from time to time, called attention to some of these matters; and we may especially instance the subject of Colonel Blanchard's pontoons, referred to in Sir Howard's "Military Bridges; " but all our remarks have failed to produce any effect. You cannot root out a job. One might as well try to pluck up the gates of the Horse Guards, as Samson did those of Gaza, and carry them bodily to Woolwich. A job is an integral part of the official system, and lives and throbs in it, as regularly and as naturally as a man's heart in his breast. Let us, then, content ourselves with grumbling, with exposing, with holding up such iniquities to public contempt; and then submit to them in sullen scorn.

Sir Howard Douglas gives an interesting account of the experiments made respectively at Shoebury Ness and Woolwich, with the projectiles

A Treatise on Naval Gunnery. By General Sir Howard Douglas, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., D.C.L., F.R.S. London: John Murray.

of Mr. Lancaster, Dr. Kinesinger, and Captain Thistle. The experiments with Lancaster's projectiles were not, in the first instances, satisfactory; but those made in the course of last year ended in results highly favourable to the principle of this kind of ordnance. Dr. Kinesinger's balls were a complete failure; but those of Captain Thistle, which were of a conoidal shape, with curvilinear grooves, were partially successful; though, on the whole, the trials established the superiority of the spherical form of projectiles.

At the present moment, the observations of Sir Howard in reference to the bombardment of fortified places will be read with peculiar interest; and recent events show how justly they are entitled to this consideration. On this subject, however, we shall not now dwell, since his admirable remarks appeared in these pages some months ago, before the new edition of the "Treatise" had issued from the press. But we would recommend a careful study of that portion of the work, particularly from page 174 to page 180, and from page 335 to page 355. The gallant author forcibly urges the necessity of accompanying the Baltic fleet with a strong force of gun-boats; and we cannot but regret that these representations were not earlier attended to by the Admiralty, in which case we should, in all probability, have shown the craven squadrons of the Czar, that the granite batteries of Sweaborg and Cronstadt, with their tier upon tier of heavy guns, could not protect them from the daring and indomitable intrepidity of British

seamen.

The new mode of arming our ships has attracted the special attention of Sir Howard Douglas, and he has devoted some space to a careful and deliberate consideration of this subject, in all its multiform bearings. His conclusions have, we must confess, filled us with alarm. It is not to be expected that the present war, even if it should continue, will be signalised by any great naval encounter; but, should such a result accrue, one cannot but entertain misgivings as to the effect of the shell arınament. Sir Howard well observes:

"It has already been stated (Art. 97) that it may be doubted whether the appropriation of 8-inch shell-guns to the broadside batteries of ships of all classes has not been carried too far, some ships being armed chiefly with that description of ordnance; and whether it would not be more advantageous to limit, in all cases, the number of shell-guns to a lower proportion, and to combine them with others by a judicious selection of those best adapted to the circumstances of each case.

"All vessels, according to their displacement, can only carry a certain weight of metal, of which their armament is to consist, and can afford only a limited tonnage for the stowage of their ammunition, projectiles and stores. The weights of the 8-inch shell-gun and of the 32-pounder gun are respectively 65 cwt. and 50 cwt., while the weights of the shot for the 8-inch and the 32-pounder gun, supposing an equal number to be distributed to each, are as 56 to 32, or as 7 to 4: hence it will be found that eleven 8-inch guns are nearly equal in weight to fourteen 32-pounders, their complements of shot being included. Thus a vessel which could carry on her broadside only eleven 8-inch guns might be armed with fourteen 32-pounders.

"In engaging an enemy's ship the aggregate magnitude of the fractures made in her side by the shot from the eleven 8-inch guns of her antagonist will be to that produced by the shot from the fourteen 32-pounder guns, (assuming that the magnitudes of the fractures made by the shot from the

two natures of ordnance, supposing all to hit, are proportional to the pumber of shots fired and to the squares of their diameters,) as 704 to 546; which no doubt is an important advantage in favour of the 8-inch shot. But is not the greater number of discharges made, in equal times, by the fourteen 32-pounders relatively with the discharges of the eleven 8-inch guns, and therefore the greater probability of damage to the opponent, a very important consideration, which should enter into the question of armament? In this case the number of discharges and the proportion of hits, supposing equal skill in gunnery and that both ships fire equally quick, will be as 14 to 11; a disparity which could scarcely be compensated by the greater magnitude of the fractures.

"In this proportion, nearly, have the number of guns in many of the ships of the British Navy, new as well as old, frigates, corvettes, and small vessels in particular (the Thetis, Inconstant, Castor, Cambrian, and Dædalus, for instance), been reduced, in order that they may carry the heavy 32-pounders of 56 or 58 cwt. with the 8-inch guns. Some frigates have been reduced from 42 guns to 24; others from 46 guns to 24, 26, and even to 19 guns (see Return to an Order of the House of Commons, April 29, 1850).

"The author ventures, with great deference, to think that in many of the combinations of 8-inch guns with 32-pounders in the armament of ships and vessels, too much consideration has been shown to the weight, and too little to the number of guns. He thinks that the number of shell-guns has been made too great in the broadside batteries of some ships and vessels, several of which, indeed, have the whole of the batteries on one deck so armedthe Rodney,' 26 8-inch guns; 'Prince Regent,' 32; Albion,' 26; 'Indefatigable, 28. These, he believes, are exceptions, permitted for experiment, as in the case of the French frigate Psyche, in consequence of special applications made by their captains. All experiments with such ordnance are, no doubt, extremely desirable, and cannot but be beneficial.

6

"Judging from the armament of their ships, the problem concerning the relation between weight of gun and number of guns is solved by the naval * The "Psyche" frigate is an exception to this regulation. Her armament, as she was fitted out at Brest, in 1845, was as follows:

This frigate, although rated in the Budget as a 40-gun ship, was built to carry but 32 guns: she had, in 1845, but 30. Her complement of crew was the same as that of a 40-gun ship, viz. 326 men on the war establishment. Her scantling is much stronger than that of any 46-gun frigate.

The eighteen 80-pounders on the main deck of the "Psyche" are the Paixhans canons-obusiers of 80 No. 2 (see Art. 221), weight only 53 cwt. 2 qrs. 14 lbs. (the Paixhans gun No. 1 is 71 cwt. 2 qrs. 15 lbs.), charge 6 lbs. 9 oz.; the chamber which, in No. 1 gun, is a cylinder of the diameter of a 24-pounder gun, being in gun No. 2 enlarged to that of a 30-pounder; so that the contraction being less, the operation of sponging is more readily performed, the cartridge more easily got into its place, and the charge simultanée facilitated. The canons-obusiers of 80 No. 2 are deficient in powers of range; they are intended for moderate ranges; their largest scales are only graduated to 1300 yards, which admits that they are not efficient beyond that distance, and consequently that the "Psyche" should avoid action at greater distances.

The observation made in Art. 97 on the reduction of the number of guns in a ship's armament relatively to the displacement, is verified in recent practice by what is related of the "Pique" frigate, which was long under repair in Pembroke Dockyard, when she was rendered capable of carrying 40 guns, her former rating being 36 only.