posture of our affairs naturally divides itself into two branches, our domestic and foreign relations; and our foreign relations are subdivided into three distinct parts, relating to the three wars; in the result of which we may be deemed more or less parties concerned. 1. The contest in the north of Europe, in which we are rather cheering, but deeply interested and anxious spectators, than immediate agents. 2. The conflict in the peninsula, carried on wholly by our own resources, though aided by our allies. 3. The war with the United States, in which we are principals, and for the management of which we are exclusively responsible. With respect to the first of these, the war in the north of Europe, (truly denominated the child of the great effort in the peninsula, which enabled subjugated Europe to reflect on and to arouse its energies,) there can be but one feeling of unqualified admiration of the heroism of the great nation that sustains the conflict. There can be but one sentiment of joy, that at a time when the tyrant of the world anticipated an easy conquest; when he vainly thought that one decisive battle would subdue his foe; when he imagined that he knew his man, and forgot that a change of circumstances might rouse a nation in arms against him; when he fancied, that if he bullied and cajoled the court, the crown was at his mercy; but, advancing in the full confidence of victory, he found a countless population to dispute his road; I say, when we look at all these circumstances, there is no man that must not feel his heart burn with transportthere is no man that can avoid rejoicing at the overthrow of those false philosophical principles, which,

having long misled the world, have ended in misleading those who professed them. The effort the Russian nation is now making may ripen their condition into freedom. Bonaparte idly flattered himself, that the pepple whom he had denominated barbarians and slaves were dead to all patriotic feelings; that their minds were degraded even below the love of liberty: but, to his bitter disappointment, he discovered that there is a senti ment of patriotism, an instinctive love of soil triumphant over the vices of positive institutions; he found, that what for the last twenty years has been advanced is utterly false; that before a nation enters into foreign wars, it begins to speculate on domestic polity, and to pry into the mysteries of the comparative anatomy of its own frame. He has been taught, that habit and custom are sufficient to resist an adversary approaching with the specious offers of freedom, of happiness: they are sufficient to resist him, not because he is unable to fulfil his promises, but because he is a foreigner and an invader. The contest will not be fruitless, if we obtain the re-establishment only of this great axiom in national character, which some convulsions of the world have almost shaken to its base. This, however, fortunately, is not all that we may fairly expect. It is futile to deny him wonderful abilities, which on former occasions have delivered him from almost inevi table aestruction; yet it is impossible, looking at his present perilous condition, for any man so to chastise his feelings as not, at least, to hope. Contemplating the subject in this point of view, and giving ministers full credit for being governed by the soundest principles

of

of policy with regard to Russia; admitting that they intended, and have accomplished what was best, yet every individual must see that a question arises (to which I do not now require a reply, because a fit occasion may in future be appointed), a question of great magnitude, viz. How happens it, that after this treaty with the court of Stock holin has been concluded, and after hearing for six months the dreadful note of preparation,' Sweden has not yet brought a soldier into the field to assist Russia in a mutual struggle? This, I say, is a que. stion of much importance. I do not ask now for information; but looking at the congratulatory address upon the point, I think it necessary to notice the subject before I give my vote. I most unequivocally applaud the language held out by ministers at the commencement of the northern conflict. • Engage,' said they, in this war for your own interest-we will aid you, as far as we can-but depend not on our pecuniary or military aid in the north; but we will employ the French forces in the peninsula, and then we shall, in fact, contribute more to your suc, cess than if we paid a subsidy into your treasury, or sent an army into your territory.' Such was the inducement held out to the emperor Alexander, to strain every nerve in Russia, and should not such language be equally an inducement to us to strain every nerve in the peninsula? (Hear, hear!) My bosom echoes back every word of applause that is applied to the distinguished exploits of our gallant army and its immortal leader; but when I am called upon to say that any hopes, properly indulged at the commencement of the campaign, are fully gratified, I must guard my

self from any supposed concurrence. Had the battle of Salamanca, in its consequences, not stretched beyond the field on which it was fought, it still should meet my warmest praise: such was the ever-glorious conflict of Talavera:-but to the heroes who achieved the first of these triumphs, I must measure out (if indeed its glory be not be yond all measure) a very different meed of applause, for its consequences were such, as to raise the most sanguine hopes in the most desponding bosom. I know that it is impossible for any man not filling an official station to show that more strenuous efforts might have been made, or that, if made, they would have been successful; and on a former occasion I specially guarded myself from giving any decided opinion upon the subject. Thus much, however, I must say, that if there remain in the power of ministers any effort yet unemployed, or any aid not yet afforded, by the accumulation of forces, to push our exertions in the peninsula to the utmost stretch, it ought to have been applied to that best of all purposes at the commencement of the war. All I require is, that I should be convinced that every practicable attempt has been made. This truth at least is obvious, that the imagination of man could scarcely conceive a situation of affairs more favourable for a great and decided effort than at the present moment. Never since the commencement even of the revolutionary war were the powers and resources of France so fully employed; the hazard on her part so great, the advantage on our side so decided, or the object for which all Europe has long looked in vain, so near its accom plishment. While the forces of Bonaparte

Bonaparte are wasting, and his strength withering in the north, O that we had the means of following up our glorious achievements in the peninsula! What might not be the result with such a general fighting in such a cause? a general of whom it is not too much to assert, that if all Europe were his theatre of action, and if all Europe could supply him with means, he would not be unworthy of the command; -a general of whom it is not the offspring of wild imagination to say, that a small augmentation of force would not only have made Madrid the centre of his operations, but he would have penetrated beyond the Ebro, and from the Pyrennees would have beheld with triumph the free and fertile provinces of Spain, that to him were indebted for peace, happiness and liberty. Enough has transpired to show us that discontents of a serious nature prevail in France; and while the emperor Alexander is detaining Bonaparte far beyond his calculation in the north, a blow might be struck in Spain that would shake the tyrant's throne to its foundation. What is called the oeconomy of war, which restricts and husbands efforts, I have always believed the most mistaken policy. The great and bold efforts that bring a war to a speedy termination, are not only the most advantageous for the nation, but the most beneficial to mankind. If the doctrines that I have stated apply to the contest in the peninsula, I confess they appear to me to be still more applicable to the third contest in which we are engaged, and of which we possess the exclusive management, I mean the war we are waging with America. I will not detain the house by expressing what every man feels, an anxious wish that two nations allied

to each other by so many ties, by consanguinity, by common language, should have a common interest. But with regard to the United States, as well as other powers, I must observe, that when once the die was cast, and war was inevitable, it was our duty to be more prompt and vigorous in our measures, in order to attempt to bring the disputes to an early termination, When urged upon the subject of America, I know that ministers will reply, that their motives for clinging to the last to conciliation were two-fold: 1st, That they had friends in the United States; 2d, That before we venture on hostilities, we ought to take care that we are indisputably in the right. In both these points I concur; for I have ever thought that the most splendid victories that ever glittered on the page of history were tarnished and obscured, if justice did not hallow the cause in which they were achieved. I admit that it is also right to temper your conduct by a consideration of the party that favours your cause in the hostile state. The hon. gentleman hav→ ing entered at large into the American question, next referred to the case of the catholics in Ireland, and concluded a most eloquent speech with saying, I give my cordial assent to the general tenour of the address; the object of which is, to pledge the heart and soul of the house, and the heart and soul of the country, by all the means and resources that belong to it, to prosecute contests which, I believe on my conscience, there is no honourable mode at the present moment of terminating; and that, in order to conclude them hereafter with due regard to the character of the nation, it is necessary to pursue them with energy, and spirit, and resolution ;

resolution; for, as the honourable seconder has ably stated, the more strenuous the attempts, the more speedily the end desired, a safe and honourable peace, will be attained. Vigorous efforts will ever be found the best economy; for the expenses of war are to be terminated, not by indecisive and mitigated hostility, but by exertions in which the whole soul of the nation is engaged and interested.

Lord Castlereagh very ably vindicated the measures of government, and declared that every where, and in every quarter, the prospects of this country were most brilliant and happy.

Mr. Whitbread showed the propriety of taking the opportunity of a time at which the different contending powers had all experienced reverses, to set on foot negotiations for peace, and proposed as an amendment to lord Clive's address, that the warlike parts be omitted, and that his royal highness the prince might be entreated to attempt the general pacification of Europe.

Mr. Ponsonby began by assuring the gentlemen opposite, that it had never been his intention to offer any amendment, neither did he know until that evening any thing of the amendment of his honourable friend (Mr. Whitbread). There was no man in England more a friend to peace than he was; but then he must be convinced, before he adopted it, that the mode pointed out was the way of attaining it. His conscientious opinion was, that should his honourable friend's address be carried, instead of the address of the noble lord, the effect would be to place peace at a much greater distance than it now was. When we talked of the distresses of the people, and made

them a reason for wishing for peace, should we not be told that we were anxious for it, not because we wished peace, but because we could not carry on the war? And if such was the inference, would not this cause the French government to insist on much higher terms before peace could be obtained? He believed there was scarcely an instance, except during the American war, where parliament interfered, and made a peremptory call on government, or on the ministers of the crown, to offer terms of peace. But these things did not stand on the same footing as they did in the present instance. The war was not then a war between two independent countries, but between this country and a distant part of our possessions, the inhabitants of which were anxious to procure their independence, and by acceding to whose wishes our king must have given away a great part of his own empire. He (Mr. Ponsonby) doubted much if a king could make such an alienation of his territorial domi nions, without the advice of his parliament. An alienation of territory naturally and necessarily required the advice of parliament to give it validity; and he did not believe that any minister would have ventured on such a measure, without the advice and consent of parliament.

Some other members spoke, after which the address was carried.

Dec. 1.-On the question of bringing up of the report of the address, previous to its being pres sented to the prince regent,

Mr. Creevey objected to it till. further time was given for the con sideration of the subjects contained in it. In the times of William and Anne, five, six, or eight days were allowed between the speech and the

answer.

answer. Under the present circumstances, such a delay was more important than ever. But it was not merely on account of the variety of matter, being no less than three wars, that he protested against the carly introduction of the report, but on account of a most remarkable omission. He alluded to that part of the speech which spoke of the supplies. It did not say one word with respect to the revenue, nor to the state of the commerce of the country: a cool and laconic demand of assistance was made, unaccompanied with one syllable of financial statement. To show that such a style was perfectly new, he would beg the clerk to read the part of the speech to which he alluded, and the corresponding parts of two other speeches. It was not his intention to go through all the speeches which had been made by all our kings (a laugh). He should content himself with referring to two, one delivered at the beginning of the French war in 1794, and the other in the year 1804. (The clerk here read the three passages.) He thought that the house would agree with him that these statements were much more satisfactory than the present, which appeared to him a novel and extraordinary method of making a demand. Was it possible that the prince could be acquainted with the finances and the commercial distress of the country? It would be much better to acquaint the regent with this distress, than quietly and immediately to obey the novel suggestion contained in this speech. He would move, therefore, that the address be brought up this day week.

Captain Bennet seconded the amendment.

Mr. Wortley professed to feel as

much anxiety as any other gentle man could do, that peace might be procured as soon as possible, consistent with our honour and safety. He was satisfied, however, that whenever it was to be made, it must be by the act of the government, and that it ought not to appear a measure forced upon his majesty's ministers by the vote of that house, or by the mere consideration of the distresses of the people. No person could shut his eyes to the situation and interests of our manufacturers; and the ministers must feel that they were incurring a serious responsibility, if they omitted to proffer peace, should a favourable opportunity present itself.

After an extended debate or conversation, Mr. Creevey's motion was negatived, and the address agreed to.

Dec. 3.-Earl Bathurst, in mov. ing the thanks of the house of lords to lord Wellington, for the victory of Salamanca, observed, that whatever opinions might be entertained of the conduct, on the part of government, of the campaign of the peninsula, he was satisfied there could be but one sentiment on the ability and skill, the brilliant talents and sound judgement, displayed by the marquis of Wellington: nor could he for a moment entertain a doubt that the motion with which he should have the ho nour to conclude, would be unani. mously agreed to. It would be necessary for him to take a short retrospect of the campaign, and of the object lord Wellington had in view. Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida being in our possession, his plan was, after Badajoz had fallen, to march without delay into Andalusia, in order to raise the siege of Cadiz, and to compel the enemy to

evacuate