deign to return the fire till she came within half pistol-shot, when her crew gave three cheers, and commenced the action by firing her starboard broadside. It was now a few minutes past thrée o'clock; and in a very few minutes afterwards, the Americans returning five chcers, the action became most obstinate. At twenty minutes past three the American commander fell; and while lying on deck, (having refused to be carried below,) he raised his head, and requested that the flag might never be struck. Nor was his opponent less distinguished for his heroic bravery so that this engagement, though between vessels of small force, derives considerable interest from the circumstances attending it. Within ten minutes after the American commander fell, the officer who succeeded him ordered his vessel to be ranged a-head of the, Boxer, for the purpose of raking her with her starboard broadside. About this time captain Blyth fell. The situation of the vessels was now such, that the American could command any position which it might be deemed advisable to take; while the Boxer, having suffered considerably both in her masts and rigging, could neither be managed nor fought to advantage, but was exposed to a most destructive raking fire this fire the enemy continued to pour in till forty-five minutes past three, when the British finding further resistance impracticable ceased firing and called for quarter, as their colours being nailed could not be hauled down. The loss of the Boxer was much more considerable than that of the American brig; but the most surprising circumstance attending this action was the contrast between the damage done to the Boxer and that

which the American, suffered; and which confirms the remark which we have more than once made, that the Americans seem to excel us in the management and manoeuvring of their ships in an engagement. The hull, sails, rigging, spars, &c. of the Boxer were nearly cut to pieces; while the Enterprize was left in a condition to commence another action of the same kind immediately, only some parts of her rigging being very slightly injured.

In dwelling thus long and minutely on these single actions, we are well aware that we are exposed to the charge of allotting them a space, and giving them an importance, to which at first they may ap pear to have no claims: but as suredly in the history of such a country as Britain, whose power and prosperity, if not her very existence as an independent nation, depend on her maritime superiority, those events and transactions ought to be deemed of the highest importance and interest which in the least relate to her peculiar character: and when we recollect that the actions which we have recorded present checkered success and defeat; that they prove that there is still room and occasion for im provement in the administration of our naval affairs; and that one of them discloses a most gratifying and brilliant instance of British bravery, an instance certainly not surpassed even in the days of Nelson; we are convinced that we shall not be accused of having allotted a greater number of our pages to them than their importance unquestionably deserves.

Ever since the commencement of the war in the peninsula, the British naval officers who were stationed off that coast seem to

have been particularly anxious to render every service in their power to the cause of the patriots; and our former volumes contained many proofs that this cause was greatly indebted to them. From the events of 1813 we shall select one further proof of their zeal and activity, though in this case the usual success was not obtained.

The French had been twice repulsed before the walls of Castro; but as it was of great importance for them to obtain possession of this place, a renewal of the attack was expected. The Spanish governor having communicated his apprehensions to captain Bloye, of his majesty's ship Lyra, that of ficer in company with the Royalist and Sparrow took measures to assist in its defence. Accordingly some guns were landed from the ships, and a battery erected in a convenient and advantageous situa tion; while all the seamen who were sent ashore were animated with the most resolute determination to support the Spaniards. The enemy on their part recollecting the resistance they had already experienced, and anticipating a still more formidable resistance now that British seamen were to be among their opponents, advanced against the place in very great force, and constructed a battery, from which they greatly annoyed it: in these attempts they were too successful; but in some of their other arrangements, where they were more immediately opposed by our seamen, they suffered very considerable loss. Captain Bloye how ever was soon sensible that the place must fall, and he therefore resolved that the reduction of it should cost the enemy very dearly, and that every exertion should be made to bring off the garrison. 1813.

As soon as the French had made a breach large enough to admit twenty-one men abreast, they advanced against the town in great numbers; and having destroyed the walls, they turned, their guns on the town and castle, and endea voured to cut off the retreat of the garrison: after continuing the fire for some time, nearly 3,000 of them rushed into the town from every 'quarter, where they were most gallantly resisted by the Spaniards and English seamen, till, overwhelmed by numbers, they were obliged to retreat by the castle. It now became absolutely necessary to secure the retreat of the garrison on board the British ships; and this was effected in such a manner as did great credit to the cool and undisturbed bravery of our seamen. Notwithstanding the confusion necessarily attendant on a number of troops retreating under such circumstances, and that a most tremendous fire was incessantly kept up by the French, all the Spaniards were embarked by companies, except those which were left behind to defend the castle till such time as the guns should be destroyed. This last was a most dangerous and hazardous enterprise, as the enemy advanced in great force against the castle; but they were successfully resisted till every gun was thrown into the sea. Such was the zealous exertion of captain Bloye on this occasion, that every soldier was brought off, and many of the inhabitants. The merit and value of this enterprise will be fully appreciated, when it is stated that the French had brought 13,000 men against Castro; and that they seemed determined to take it let it cost them what it might: it is supposed that their loss was nearly 3,000 men. Perhaps

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great change in the opinions of those who at first had more than doubted of the policy of our ministers in encouraging and supporting the war there. These events, indeed, had been highly gratifying to every true lover of his country. In the peninsula, the hitherto vic. torious armies of France had been first completely baffled and defeated in their projects; the most celebrated and successful of the French marshals had opposed lord Wel. lington only to add fresh laurels to his fame and the economy, discipline, and skill of the British army had reached a state of perfection hitherto unexampled. The war, indeed, had been very expensive to this nation; some of her best blood had been shed in carrying it on; and the Spanish nation, or at least the Spanish government, seemed by no means impressed with a due and adequate sense of gratitude for what Britain had done and suffered in their behalf. These were undoubtedly drawbacks to the general satisfaction; but they were greatly counterbalanced by the prospect of effectually liberating the peninsula from the dominion of France, and by the certainty that already the character and fame of the French marshals and soldiers had fallen very considerably in the estimation of Europe. These points we merely touch upon;-but, before we proceed to the events of the campaign in the peninsula in 1813, we shall examine more closely and minutely the advantages which the British army derived from their operations and exploits there.

In the first place, by the uncommon activity of lord Wellington, united to a degree of comprehensive and penetrating sagacity not often found in the same person, he had beer enabled to detect and remedy

all those faults which had hitherto prevented British soldiers from being as certainly and uniformly victorious as British seamen: he was convinced that the materials were good, but that they were ill sorted, and not arranged in due order or on a regular system. He especially

found that British commanders-inchief had done too little themselves, and trusted too much to their inferiors: he therefore resolved to examine into every department of the army himself; to convince the offiçers and men that he was resolved that they should discharge their respective duties; while, at the same time, he would take care that every thing necessary for their comfort, and for the due and regular discharge of that duty, should be provided for them. But above all, it was necessary that he should gain the confidence of his soldiers; and this he accomplished by his attention to their wants, by his valour and success, and especially by a kind of fatherly care which he displayed. He was thus enabled to mould the men to any thing he pleased; and certainly, by considering and treating them as human beings actuated by the same sentiments and feelings as himself, instead of treating them as mere machines, he organized an army as perfect in all its branches as ever took the field. He had, however, many difficulties and obstacles to struggle with and overcome. In the first place, when he took the command he was only known as a successful general in Indian warfare; and it was naturally imagined that talents, which in India might have been amply adequate to the command of an army and to the securing of victory,-in Europe, when opposed to French commanders and troops, would be found deficient.

In the second place, the prejudice against lord Wellington, or rather the disinclination to give him credit for military talents, was much increased by the part he took in the convention of Cintra: but the greatest obstacle he had to surmount arose from the nature and proceedings of the government and people in whose cause he was fighting. Soldiers are not given much to reason, or to inquire into the justice or policy of the war in which they are engaged;-but it was absolutely impossible that the soldiers of lord Wellington's army should not perceive and feel that they were fighting in defence of men whose prejudices were strong against them, and who treated them either with indifference, or,where they could do it with safety, with aversion: they could not help noticing that the Spanish troops, who ought to have been the principals in the war, acted only as auxiliaries; and seldom, even in that capacity and character, with any effect, or credit to themselves. These sentiments and feelings on the part of lord Wellington's army must have stood greatly in the way of his plans for its improvement; and nothing short of his uncommon perseverance, and of the confidence which his soldiers reposed in him, could have effected what he did.

In the second place, by the operations of the British army in the peninsula, the hope of again becoming independent and free was kept alive in Europe. We have already adverted to this circumstance in a previous chapter; but it deserves and requires a more serious and enlarged consideration. The long and arduous contest in which Europe was engaged, the French government was fond of representing as a contest begun and cherished by Great

Britain: this, by many people, was considered as false and calumnious; but it was undoubtedly true; nor is it a charge which many among us now will regard as calumnious. However the character and views of the French government may have been formed-whether they arose from the opposition given to the revolution at the commencement, or whether this event merely brought them, already existing, into regular and complete operation, it is certain that they are utterly at variance with the independence, the repose, and the happiness of Europe. Great Britain, on the contrary, was the friend of the independence, repose, and the happiness of Europe; not from any disinterested motives or views, (for nothing disinterested can operate on the views or proceedings of nations or governments;) but, as depending for her rank and power, perhaps for her very existence, on commerce, Great Britain was necessarily and wisely the enemy of the French government. That the British ministry had on every occasion manifested or conducted their hostility against France in a politic or judicious manner, we are very far from asserting it undoubtedly would have been more wise not to have goaded on the nations of the continent to premature and unequal contest; but as we had thus goaded them on, till at length they all in their turns had suffered from French tyranny, it was but fair and proper that, when we had an opportunity, we should try our strength against the same power to which we had exposed them. On no occasion had we such a good opportunity as on the breaking out of the Spanish revolution; and this opportunity that part of the British ministry and people who had all along been the

strenuous