for, in the very short and unsatisfactory notices which they gave of these defeats, they urged as their cause and excuse, the great number of troops which were withdrawn from the peninsula to supply the war in the north of Europe. The French armies in Spain, however, though they were greatly weakened, and altogether scarcely made up one considerable army, still retained their distinctive appellations of the north, the centre, Portugal, and the south: according to one calculation, the whole of them amounted to 55,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry: but this is evidently below their real force, and it is much more probable that their force was nearly if not quite 80,000 men. If, however, they were inferior in numerical force to the allies, and still more inferior to them in respect to general and moral feeling, they had greatly the advantage of them in the positions which they occupied. They were indeed formidable: they were supported by fortresses and fastnesses, all along the line of their retreat, beginning with Zamora and Toro, and thence extending through the valleys of the Pisuerga and Arlan zon, to Burgos, Pancorvo, and Miranda. On account of the strength of these positions, and of the incredible activity which the enemy displayed in repairing the fortifications of Burgos, it was expected that the progress of the allies, at the beginning of the campaign, would be slow, tedious, and difficult: and ministers, in the expectation that it would be found necessary regularly to besiege Burgos, sent off a battering train for that purpose. But the French, from some cause not explained, and certainly not easily conjectured, resolved to abandon all their strong positions; and the British public were agreeably sur prised to learn, a very short time after lord Wellington had put his army in motion, that it had actually crossed the Ebro. On the 2d of June lord Wellington reached Toro; and moving up the course of the Douro, the Pisuerga, and the Alançon, he arrived at Burgos on the 13th; the French rapidly retreating before him, and evacuating all their strong positions. Even at Burgos they did not deem it prudent to make a stand; but blew up the inner walls of the castle and works with so little skill and caution, or with so much precipitation, that 30 of the garrison perished by the explosion. From Burgos they continued their flight (for it resembled a flight rather than a retreat) for about 48 miles, on the main road to the Ebro. Their object was to cross this river, and thus to place it between themselves and lord Wellington's army: but his lordship, aware of their intention, and knowing how difficult it would be to cross the river if they were in force on the opposite bank, ordered sir Thomas Graham to make a movement on the left, towards the upper part of the Ebro; which he crossed at the bridge of Arrano on the 15th. On the following day the remainder of the army crossed at Quintana: no halt was made: the enemy were evidently panicstruck, and lord Wellington resolv. ed to give them no respite. The intelligence of these events, though they were justly regarded as only preparatory to something grand and decisive, inspired the nation with still higher ideas of lord Wellington's military talents: he had indeed, in his pursuit of the enemy, traversed 84 miles instead of 72; but by his judicious movements he had avoided the strongly forti fied defiles, which he would otherwise have been obliged to force. There was another advantage resulting from his plan: he had succeeded in cutting off Palombini, with an Italian division of nearly 4000 men, on the road to Bilboa, and against these he detached part of the Spanish troops, with some British cavalry and artillery. Between the arrival of the dispatches announcing these events, and the next dispatches which were received from lord Wellington, the public mind, though not anxious, (for anxiety implies doubt, and there was no doubt,) was extremely interested in a very short period, the enemy had been driven nearer the Pyrenees, without even the semblance of a battle, than he had ever been before, even in the whole course of a campaign, and after severe and obstinate fighting. It was then natural to ask, did he mean at length to evacuate the peninsula? was the time at length approaching in which all our fond hopes were to be realized? and were they to be realized without the shedding of any more British blood? Some people fondly che tished this expectation; but others, though they did not less confidently expect the expulsion of the French from the peninsula during the campaign of 1813, yet could see no reason to flatter themselves that this object would be accomplished without a battle; and those who were well acquainted with the military topography of this part of Spain, were of opinion that the French army would make a stand in the plains of Vittoria. Such indeed was the fact: on the evening of the 19th of June' the French army took up a position in front of Vittoria: Joseph Bonaparte had the nominal command of it, but marshal Jourdan acted as major-general: the left rested on the heights of Puebla de Arlanzon, and stretched across the valley from thence, in front of the village of Arunez: the right of their centre was posted on a height which commanded the valley of Zadora; and the right of the whole army was stationed near Vittoria, for the purpose of defending the passage of the river Zadora: besides these troops, there was a body of reserve in the rear of the left division. Lord Wellington, in his pursuit of the enemy, had been obliged, from the nature of the country, to spread and extend his columns: as soon, therefore, as he perceived that the French were determined to risk a battle, he halted, in order to close them up: on the 20th he reconnoitred their position, and fixed on his plan of attack. Early on the morning of the 21st the battle of Vittoria commenced; sir Rowland Hill's division marching to gain posses sion of the heights of of La Puebla: here the left of the enemy were posted, but not in great strength: sir Rowland Hill, not deeming it necessary to employ a large force for this purpose, detached one bri gade of the Spanish division under general Murillo, and ordered the other to keep the communication open with the main body. Scarcely however had the Spanish troops begun their march, before the enemy became sensible of the importance of the heights, and reinforced their troops there to such an extent that general Hill was under the neces sity of detaching a strong body of troops to the same point: on these heights an obstinate contest took place; the allies gained possession of them; but the enemy poured in fresh troops, and endeavoured to recover them. For a short time they they were partially successful; but at length the allies secured firm possession, which they retained during the whole period of the battle. General Hill, having secured these heights, lost no time in taking advantage of his success; for under cover of them he first passed the Zadora, and afterwards the defile formed by the heights of that river: his next object was to gain posses sion of the villages in front of the enemy's line, which he accomplished in spite of their repeated and obstinate resistance. So far the plan and arrangements of lord Wellington had been completely successful; but there was a short delay in executing another part of them: the difficult nature of the country prevented the communication between the different columns, moving to the attack from their respective stations, at as early an hour as his lordship had expected and calculated upon: the column composed of the 3d and 7th divisions, under the command of the earl of Dalhousie, was particularly retarded from this cause. As soon however as the 4th and light divisions had passed the Zadora, they moved towards the divisions under the earl of Dalhousie and those under sir Thomas Picton. These divisions, when united, formed the centre of the army; and it was lord Wellington's intention that they should attack the heights on which the right of the enemy's centre was placed, while general Hill attacked the left: but the enemy, having been under the necessity of weakening his line for the purpose of strengthening his detachment on the hills, abandoned his position in the valley as soon as he perceived that it was the intention of the British army to attack it: as soon as he left this position, he 1813. directed his march towards Vitto- ' ria, and arrived there in good order. The British troops, notwithstanding the difficulty of the ground, followed the retreating foe in admirable order, while the left advanced to the same point by the high road from Vittoria to Bilboa. On this road the enemy had a division of infantry and some cavalry, resting with their right on some strong heights, while they also occupied in considerable strength two vil lages, as têtes-de-pont to the bridges over the Zadora. It was of the greatest consequence either to drive them from these heights, or to turn their position; and for this purpose general Pack's Portuguese brigade, and a Spanish division, supported by a brigade of British light dragoons, and the 5th division of infantry were dispatched: in executing this service, the Portuguese particularly distinguished themselves; nor did the Spaniards behave in a manner unworthy of their companions in arms. As soon as the heights were gained, a brigade of the 5th division advanced to the storming of the village in their immediate vicinity, the possession of which was necessary for the future movements and operations of this part of the British army: the brigade advanced in columns, in the most masterly style, under a very heavy fire of artillery and musketry, without firing a shot. Here the loss of the enemy was very considerable, and three pieces of cannon fell into our hands. No time was lost in proceeding from this village to attack the next; but for this, it was judged expedient to form a strong battery, under the cover of the fire from which colonel Halkett's brigade advanced to the attack: the village was soon carried; and the enemy being pursued to the T bridge bridge were there charged by the light battalion, who took three guns and a howitzer. While these operations were going on, the enemy made repeated and desperate efforts to regain possession of the first vil lage, which had been taken from them; but they were gallantly repulsed by the troops of the 5th division under the command of ma jor-general Oswald. The next movement was the crossing of the Zadora; but this could not be made, while the reserve of the enemy continued on the heights on the left of that river: as soon however as they were driven from thence, and through the valley of Vittoria, the whole army co-operated in the pursuit. By this time the defeat of the French was most decisive and glorious; and in their retreat they discovered the utmost uncertainty and confusion. General Graham moved his division in such a manner, and took up such a position as effectually intercepted the enemy's retreat by the high road to France: in consequence of this, they were compelled to turn towards the road leading to Pampeluna; but they were so closely pursued that it was utterly impossible for them to occupy any position for a sufficient length of time to allow their baggage and artillery to be drawn off: they were there fore compelled, either to expose themselves to the certainty of the utter ruin of their army, or to abandon their baggage and artillery; and preferring the latter alternative, the whole fell into the possession of the British. Never was victory more decisive or glorious: and thus the army of Joseph Bonaparte, which consisted of the whole of the armies of the south and the centre, and of four divisions, and of all the cavalry of the army of Portugal, besides some troops from the army of the north, was weakened and scattered in such a manner, as presented little prospect that it would again be able to oppose the British in the peninsula. Nor were those divisions of the enemy's troops, which had not been present at the battle of Vittoria, in a much better condition; for the result of that battle had cut them off from all communication with each other, and exposed them to almost certain ruin. The trophies of the victors were numerous and splendid: 151 pieces of cannon and 415 ammunition waggons were captured, as great a number as ever were taken on the field of battle. Our loss was great, amounting to upwards of 4000 men in killed and wounded: that of the enemy in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was at least three times as great. The joy and congratulation with which the intelligence of the victory of Vittoria was received in Britain, it would be in vain to attempt to describe: every person was sensible that this victory bore, on its very front, more decisive marks of use. fulness, as well as of glory, than any of the former victories which lord Wellington had gained. In most of his former victories, there had been much hard fighting; and though the enemy, whether they attacked, or sustained the attack, were always defeated, yet their defeat was not followed by any disorderly rout, nor accompanied by the loss of much of their artillery: besides, after most of their former defeats, they had so soon rallied in good order, and in considerable force, that lord Wellington had never been able to rescue much of the country from them. But the victory of Vittoria presented a hap ру py and glorious contrast in all these respects; the rout of the enemy was complete, extensive, and sig. nal; each succeeding day, instead of showing him recovered from its effects, was more likely to show him suffering more severely: he had lost all his artillery, which, with a French army, is of the most material importance: but above all, the moral effect of this victory would, from all the circumstances attending it, be much greater than that which had followed from any of lord Wellington's previous victo ries. The British government and people displayed their sense of his high deserts in the most marked and gratifying manner: the staff of marshal Jourdan having been taken and sent over to the prince regent, he in return made lord Wellington a field marshal; while a grand fête was given at Vauxhall on this glorious occasion. The Spanish government, too, as a proof of their obligations to him, created him duke of Vittoria. His lordship was not a man to neglect any opportunity of reaping every possible advantage from the victory which he had gained: he therefore pursued the beaten enemy closely and unremittingly: on the 24th of June their rear reached Pampeluna with only one howitzer. The French general Clausel, ignorant of the defeat of his countrymen, approached Vittoria with part of the army of the north on the 23d; but as soon as he learnt the result of the battle, and moreover found in the vicinity of that village a division of the British forces, he retired precipitately. Lord Wellington, on the receipt of this intelligence, conceived the idea of cutting off his retreat; and for this purpose, four divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry, were moved towards Tudela, and two divisions and two brigades upon Logrono. Clausel, however, not thinking himself secure, pushed forward to Tudela, and ultimately to Saragossa, by forced marches: the Spanish generals Mina and don Julian pressed closely on the line of his retreat, and succeeded in capturing 300 French, 2 guns, and some stores. tions were going on against Clausel, the main body of the defeated army continued their flight beyond Pampeluna; and general Hill, leaving a sufficient force to blockade this place, moved the principal part of his division to the head of the Bidassoa, the rivulet which divides France from Spain. When he ar rived there, he had the satisfaction to find that the enemy had actually quitted the peninsula, and retreated into France. While these opera Besides Clausel's division, there was another considerable body of French troops under general Foy, who had not been engaged in the battle of Vittoria, and whom lord Wellington judged it proper to pursue: against them sir Thomas Graham was sent: they took the high road leading through Toloza. On the 24th and 25th of June the British advanced guard came up with the enemy, when some sharp fighting took place, which was succeeded on the evening of the latter day by a general attack on them in the town of Tolzo, from which they were driven with considerable loss: in this attack the German and Portuguese troops were principally engaged, and they both behaved in a very gallant manner. As soon as general Graham had driven the enemy from their position, he advanced towards Irun on the confines of France, and on the 2d of T 2 July |
