activity, he succeeded, by the beginning of April, in collecting a large numerical force on the banks of the Elbe; though that force, as we have already remarked, was of a very different description from the veteran army which he had lost in Russia. His cavalry and artillery were particularly inferior; and it was on these two branches, especially the artillery, that the French used to depend for their victories: it is even said that, in consequence of his having lost upwards of 1000 pieces of cannon in Russia, he was under the necessity of supplying his army in a great measure with cannon from the ships at Antwerp, which were of course of a description by no means suited for military purposes.

Before Bonaparte left Paris, to take the command of his army, he judged it expedient to settle the form of a provisional government during his absence: he had so narrowly escaped destruction in his Russian campaign, at a time when he had taken no measures respect ing the government of France while the king of Rome was a minor, that he resolved to guard against all accidents for the future. Accordingly his empress was regularly declared regent during his absence; and the king of Rome was nominated, in a more solemn manner than heretofore, his successor. It is probable that the appointment of the empress as regent had other objects in view: Bonaparte knew well the temper and disposition of the Parisians; he knew that the best mode of drawing off their thoughts and speculations from the disasters that had occurred, or might occur, was by keeping up the splendour, bustle and pageantry of a court; and this could be done with the best effect by investing his empress with

the name and dignity of regent, Having thus taken what he con ceived to be all due precau tions, and. sent on before him immense bodies of troops, he closed the session of the legislative body in a speech full of his usual confidence and haughtiness, in which he led them and the French nation to expect, that on the banks of the Elbe he should regain all those laurels which he had lost amidst the snows of Russia.

Having thus detailed the preparations which Bonaparte made for the commencement of a German campaign, it will be now proper to advert to the condition and preparations of those powers who were to oppose him. The emperor Alexander, fully sensible of the importance of pushing forward with his army while the enemy were in a state of confusion and weakness, lost no time in advancing into the north of Germany. As soon as he crossed his own boundaries into Prussia, he ordered a declaration to be issued, explanatory of his motives and views:-the Russian army came not as the foes, but as the friends, of the Prussians: they came to assist them in their efforts to free themselves from the tyranny of France; to raise Prussia to that rank and importance among the nations of Europe which she had held previous to her subjugation by Bonaparte. Already had one of her generals emancipated himself, and the army which he commanded, from the degradation of a foreign yoke; and, instead of ñghting under the command of the enemy of Germany, had joined the standard of Russia. The emperor Alexander felt no hostility against the king of Prussia; he knew well the embarrassing and compulsory situation in which he had been

placed;

placed; he could make due al lowance for that situation; and he had good reason to hope that, as soon as circumstances would permit him, he would extricate himself from it. In this hope he was not disappointed: the French at first, when they perceived that they would be under the necessity of quitting Berlin, seemed to have had a plan of carrying off this monarch with them; but not being able, or not deeming it politic, to carry it into execution, he, as soon as he was his own master, joined the emperor of Russia.

It is impossible to describe the joy and congratulations of the inhabitants of Berlin when the Russian troops entered that city: Prussia indeed had been more degraded, and had perhaps suffered more by the tyranny of Bonaparte than any other part of Germany: and in no other part was there such deadly hatred of the French; it pervaded all ranks and classes of the people; and they prepared to display and exercise that hatred in its full vengeance as soon as they were freed from the French. Prussia indeed was almost exhausted; and had not the mass of the people taken a deep interest in the contest, it might have been impossible to have rendered her an effectual ally of Russia: but with the popular feelings and sentiments which pervad ed every bosom, Prussia was destined to act a conspicuous and most honourable part in avenging her own wrongs and those of Germany. Her armies were put on the best footing: Blucher, who had immortalized himself by his conduct after the battle of Jena, had a leading and extensive command. Indeed it seems to have been the wise policy of the continental sovereigns, in the arduous

and awful contest in which they were engaged, to select those generals against whom Bonaparte had displayed the greatest rancour : they thus secured themselves from treachery, while they called forth all the talents of their commanders. Besides the regular army of Prussia, the landwehr or militia were called out: nothing more was necessary to form them than permission from their sovereign; they were all so anxious to co-operate in the deliverance and defence of their country.

In the mean time the Russian army continued to advance; and, having liberated great part of Prussia, directed their efforts towards the liberation of Saxony. To the inhabitants of this fairest portion of Germany count Wittgenstein, who commanded the Russian army, addressed a most noble and inspiriting proclamation: he entered their country, not as an enemy, but as a friend: he came in the name of his emperor to release all Germany from their shameful yoke. They had been forsaken by their king, who still continued attached to the French, and who had commanded them to remain quiet: but did they not perceive that their king was in fact a prisoner? that he durst not declare his real sentiments? could they suppose that a German king, who had been long compelled to sacrifice Saxon blood to French ambition, would order them to reinain quiet at a period when inactivity was a crime-a crime against themselves, against the human race? They ought not to look to his proclamations at present; but to his former conduct and character before he became the prisoner of the French. Judging from that conduct and character, they must be convinced that he was desirous of the inde

pendence

pendence and prosperity of Saxony: but could Saxony be prosperous or independent, while her soil was polluted by the presence of a Frenchman? Now was the time of delivery from their accursed yoke. Could they forget their Saxon ancestors, who had combated with so much glory to themselves an ambitious emperor of the Franks, who was called Charlemagne? But they had been oppressed by a modern Charlemagne; by one who had all the ambition, and much more cruelty than the former Charlemagne. Did they recollect what was the condition of their country before the French entered it? how peaceful, how flourishing, how happy! Did they witness in what a state it was now? did they feel no desire to contribute to its restoration to its former state'? Was every spark of liberty and patriotism extinguished in their bo-, soms? He trusted, not: but if they remained inactive, they were no longer, in his estimation, Germans: he would not treat them as such. "Whoever is not for liberty, is against her. Therefore choose! accept either my fraternal offer, or meet my sword. Join me to restore your king, and you shall have a free king, and be called free Saxons. Up! up! and arm yourselves; were it even only with sickles and scythes and cudgels: drive the stranger from your soil. You shall always find me and my Russians with the valiant Prussians wherever danger is most prominent. Already has the vengeance of God manifested itself on the insolent. Believe me, we shall conquer! The long forbearance of God is exhausted. We shall conquer! I speak not this out of idle boasting, but in reliance on God

and you, and in the just and sacred

cause!!"

This proclamation, though it undoubtedly made a deep impression on the Saxons, did not at the time produce the consequences which were expected from it: the circumstances of their sovereign being still with the French, and of a large portion of the country being occupied by them, naturally prevented many who were well disposed towards the allies from joining them: but all must have felt the justice of the observations which the proclamation contained: and when the opportunity did occur, it will be seen that the Saxons proved themselves worthy of the name of Germans and of their ancestors.

In our last volume we remarked on the suspicions conduct of the crown prince of Sweden: so suspicious indeed had it been, that many could not give credit either to his professed enmity to Bonaparte or his attachment to the cause of the allies: from certain official papers, however, which the Swedish court published in the beginning of this year, respecting their relations with the government of France, it was evident that the crown prince had committed himself so far with Bonaparte as to have exposed himself to the indignation of the tyrant. The hope again excited by these papers, that the military talents and the army of Bernadotte would at length be brought into action in fa vour of the allies, was considerably strengthened by treaties which were concluded between the court of Sweden and the courts of Russia and Great Britain. By these treaties, the army under the command of the crown prince was immediately to be employed in the

common

common cause and in return for this accession of force, Great Britain, besides granting a subsidy to Sweden, agreed to give up to her the island of Guadaloupe, and to guaranty the kingdom of Norway when it should be conquered from the Danes. This treaty with Great Britain gave rise to much discussion, both in parliament and out of it: with regard to the cession of Guadaloupe, it was urged, that it was against the law and usages of nations, to give away any conquest before it was confirmed to the conqueror by a definitive treaty of peace. In reply to this, it was successfully shown by an appeal to the clear and decided authority of the most esteemed writers on the law of nations, that whatever was conquered belonged from the very moment of conquest to the nation who acquired it by force of arms; and that that nation had an undoubted right to dispose of the conquest in any manner she might deem proper: if she chose to give it away for an equivalent, or as free gift to another nation, the latter might accept, liable however to the risk of its being taken from her by that nation to which it had previously belonged. This however was entirely an affair between the nation who disposed of the conquest and the nation who accepted it; and neither the law of nations, nor any claim of the nation from whom it had been wrested, could justly interfere.

The guarantee, on the part of Great Britain, of the kingdom of Norway involved a question of much more difficulty: there could be no doubt, as Denmark still adhered to the cause of Bonaparte, and consequently was the enemy both of Sweden and this country, that either of them had a most complete and

unequivocal right to conquer any part of the Danish possessions: but the policy of the conquest was a different consideration. The allied powers professed to be making war against Bonaparte, in defence of the rights and happiness of mankind; by no means with views of ambition, or for the purposes of conquest or aggrandizement. It was therefore highly desirable and proper that they should most scru pulously guard against every thing like the appearance of selfish or ambitious views. The emperor Alexander, after having freed his own dominions from the presence of the French, lent the aid of his powerful and victorious armies to liberate Germany: might it not then have been expected, that the crown prince would gratuitously join the common cause, at least till he had regained Pomerania? or was it necessary to bribe him in order to gain his co-operation? He himself seemed so sensible of the construction which would naturally be put upon his conduct, that he declared his object in wishing to gain Norway, was not the extension of the Swedish territory, or the gratification of his ambition, but solely the security of Sweden itself; for he contended, as Norway adjoined Sweden, the king of Denmark might take advantage of this circumstance, and, while he was employed in the cause of Europe, invade Sweden. This plea, though futile in the extreme, was admitted by many who laid claim to the title. of politicians: but most assuredly they did not weigh it well. Norway at this time was struggling with famine and most extreme misery: she had an army indeed; but it was so ill provided, and so destitute of provisions, that it could not act on the offensive. Nor was

there

there any possibility that Norway could be a formidable neighbour to Sweden while Britain was so pow. erful at sea; for this country had, and could as long as she pleased, cut off all communication between Norway and the other parts of the Danish dominions, and consequent ly keep the Norwegians in such a state of weakness and misery as to render them quite impotent against Sweden.

It must be acknowledged however, that when the crown prince found that Denmark was averse to cede Norway to him, he declared he would be satisfied with the bishopric of Drontheim, on the ground that, from this part of Norway, Sweden was most accessible and vulnerable: but Denmark absolutely refused to give up even this; justly conceiving that, if Sweden was most accessible and vulnerable from the bishopric of Drontheim, if that were ceded to Sweden the whole of Norway would be placed at the mercy of the crown prince. At length Bernadotte consented to wave his pretensions to any part of Norway till the grand object of the allies were accomplished, and to co-operate with all his means and talents towards the liberation of Germany. In these remarks which we have offered on his conduct at the beginning of 1813, we have no intention or wish to call in question the sincerity of his hatred to Bonaparte, or of his devotion to the cause which he at length espoused; but we must think that he would have shown himself a more disinterested friend of that cause if he had embarked in it, sooner, and without bargaining so skilfully and keenly for his co-operation.

The situation and the prospects of Denmark, when the affairs of

Bonaparte began to assume an unfavourable appearance, were very critical and perplexing: our attack on Coperhagen in, the year 1807 still rankled in the heart of the Danish sovereign; and it is highly probable that in this feeling a large portion of his subjects sympathized with him: indeed we cannot otherwise account, for the extreme bit terness with which they carried on the war against this country. But, on the other hand, the misery which they had suffered in consequence of that war; the crimes of Bonaparte; the subserviency to his power, by which they were degraded; and the conviction that, when they had served his purpose, and when he had leisure to turn his arms against Denmark, it would be changed in to a department of the great empire,-must have weighed with the thinking part of the Danish nation, and must sometimes have alarmed the apprehension of the Danish monarch. When therefore the Russian campaign had proved so fatal to Bonaparte, a favourable opportunity seemed to present itself for throwing off his alliance: besides, the Danish court might reasonably be afraid, that, as they were no longer protected by the French, they would be attacked by the allies, unless they made peace with them. It is much to the honour both of Denmark and of Britain, that the former made the proposal of joining the allies to the latter: count Bernstorff, the Danish minister, came to London for that purpose; but, after continuing there for some time, he returned without being able to accomplish the object of his mission. The grounds of the difference between the two courts are not exactly known, though it is generally supposed, that the treaty which we had pre

viously