of their sovereigns; now they were COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF THE frontier to defend her independence: but she was at war with England and the Porte, and soon after with Sweden. 5. This latter power was in a state of neutrality with France; and Napoleon offered her subsidies to induce her to declare herself for him. 6. Napoleon had an army of 500,000 veterans upon the Oder and the Vistula to attack Russia: this war drew more than 600 millions out of his treasury, and 2,000 pieces of artillery from his arsenals. The Poles supplied him with 80,000 men, and 100 millions. He brought into this war 70,000 cavalry. 7. Napoleon had in his own hands the monopoly of colonial products throughout almost all Europe. This monopoly brought him in 100 millions. 8. Napoleon drew contributions from Austria, from Prussia, and from Illyria. He had the revenue of all Italy, from the confederacy of Germany, from Poland, and IN THE YEARS 1812 and 1813. that of the French empire, which JANUARY 1812. 1. Napoleon was in absolute possession of the French empire, the kingdom of Italy, Illyria, and the southern part of Spain. 2. He was undoubtedly master of the states of the confederation of the Rhine, of Prussia, of the kingdom of Naples, and the grand duchy of Warsaw; he had possession of the fortresses on the Oder, and a limited alliance with Denmark. 3. Austria dreaded his power; her military system was reduced; circumstances rendered her his ally; she consented to give him 30,000 men. 4. Russia kept her ports shut; she had 120,000 men upon her amounted to nearly 1000 millions. Notwithstanding those resources, the deficiency for the year 1812 was doubled. 9. Notwithstanding the battles of Aspern and Eylau, Napoleon had preserved the reputation of being invincible; he enjoyed an opinion that nothing could resist him: it was sufficient for him, to order, and every thing gave way to his will,-to order, and it was done,-to direct, and every thing bended to his wish,-to announce an event, and the prediction was fulfilled. Spain alone formed an exception; which however had not dissipated the belief. AUGUST 1813. 1. Napoleon has lost a part of the the 32d military division, a part of Illyria, all Spain, and the Dalmatian islands. 2. Prussia, Mecklenburgh, and the grand duchy of Warsaw are now no longer his dependencies; Prussia and Mecklenburgh are, on the contrary, in arms against him, 3. Austria has an army of upwards of 400,000 men; she is no longer allied to France, but has acceded to the new alliance against her. 4, Russia has beyond her frontiers 200,000 men: she occupies the grand duchy of Warsaw; her ports are open; she is united with England, Prussia, Sweden, and Spain; she is at peace with Turkey, which considerably increases her moral force, and it has been proved by facts that she cannot be conquered. 5. Sweden, having entered into the new war, furnishes more than 30,000 men, who are acting on the continent. 6. Those 500,000 veterans of Napoleon have disappeared; he has lost all his cavalry, several marshals,-80 generals;-of this army only some thousands of officers remain to him. The cannon, arms, effects, the 600 millions are lost, together with Prussian and Polish contingents. He has only of the latter 15,000 men, with the. maledictions of the country. 7. That monopoly has almost entirely disappeared since the ports of Russia and Prussia have been opened, since the war terminated between the Russians and Turks, and the English occupied the Dal matian islands. 8. The Austrian, Polish, and Prussian contributions have ceased. Illyria is exhausted, The war and army expenses have doubled. What then will be the deficit for the year 1813? There no longer · 1812, exists a continental system against England; it is, in fact, destroyed. 9. The battles of Smolensk and Borodino, of Krasnoi, of Lutzen, and all the last campaign, prove that with inferior forces he can be resisted and beaten; and that, consequently, he must be beaten with equal forces, and destroyed with superior ones. From this comparative statement it results that Napoleon's power and glory have sensibly declined since the year 1812. His army had then besides 110,000 auxilia ries,-viz. 50,000 Poles, 30,000 Prussians, and 30,000 Austrians his enemy now has an auxiliary force of 330,000,-viz, 200,000 Austrians, 100,000 Prussians, and 30,000 Swedes. His revenues have decreased 100 millions; and the diminution will be still much greater, if we take into consideration what he drew by requisitions from Prus sia and the countries of the confederation of the Rhine, and the war contributions of Prussia, Poland, and Austria. There was no alliance against him, except that of England and Spain; no other power that could make war against him, none other than Russia which was able to re sist him, A new alliance now subsists between four powers, which are in a condition to oppose him with 500,000 combatants:whole nations will, should it be necessary, be under arms. Napoleon so fully feels the difficulty of resisting them, that he almost abandons the peninsula, which exposes the southern provinces of France to invasion, His army is no longer composed of veterans; his cavalry is no longer formidable, nor the most warlike in Europe. Four fifths of his army are composed of young men, im. Z perfectly perfectly disciplined, and torn from the arts and agriculture, which produces an enormous deficiency in the total revenues of his states. The allies, or rather the slaves of Napoleon, especially Saxony and Bavaria, are no longer able to furaish the contingents he had im posed on them. Deprived of the greater part of his former resources, he no longer possesses either the means or the right of dictating the conditions of peace: he will not be able to procure new states; he can only obtain it by sacrificing a part of those he possesses, which will augment the relative power of his opponents. If he continues the war, the chances are against him; the loss of several states, which he has al ready sustained, has not been counter-balanced by any new conquests. In losing 600,000 of his troops, he acquired new enemies, who will combat him with the same forces which have before supported his cause and his interests. Six millions of Prussians, nineteen millions of Austrians, and four millions of the duchy of Warsaw, in all twenty-nine millions of men, who were under his control or his allies, are now united against him. The deficit in his finances will aug. ment without measure, and force him to aggravate the state of constraint and the sufferings of his subjects, which he can no longer relieve by his foreign receipts. All those considerations should have induced him to make peace; but it now remains for the allies to conclude it on such a basis as will render it solid and honourable. They will augment their physical and moral force; draw closer their reciprocal ties; whilst he, directed by the same ambition, the same destructive objects, will be obliged to pay, with his own finances, those who serve him; and maintain at home an army which will increase the malady which is undermining his gigantic empire, and which will crush him under its ruins. We have already stated that Bonaparte preserved a profound si lence as long as he possibly could respecting the Austrian declaration of war: he was equally silent respecting the crown prince of Sweden: but equally from this silence, and from his invectives against him when he could no longer pass him over un. noticed, it might be inferred that he dreaded his talents. Hitherto indeed the crown prince had done little or nothing for the common cause: while the Austrians and Prussians were combating Bona parte at the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, the Swedish army was stationed at a great distance from the scene of action, in Pomerania: even here, however, they were of some service, for they kept in check the army of Davoust. But as soon as it was determined to recommence hostilities, the crown prince pre pared to take a more active parts and much was anticipated from his talents; from the excellent state of discipline into which he had brought the troops under his command; and from the confidence with which his junction would inspire the allies. According to the plan laid down by the allies, the protection of Ber lin was assigned to him; and for that purpose, about the middle of August he removed his head quar ters to Potsdam: at the same time he issued a most energetic and ani mating proclamation to the troops under his command. He told them that the extraordinary events of the last twelve years, of that period dur ing which Bonaparte had ruled over France, France, had rendered it necessary for him to conduct them into Germany: had it not been for those events, Europe would still have remained as one great family, convinced of their mutual dependence, and anxious for their mutual welfare. But those events had render ed it necessary for Sweden to cross the sea that divided her from Germany: the cause of Europe was intrusted to the protection of soldiers from the banks of the Wolga and the Don; from the shores of Britain, and the mountains of the north. At such a time, when the happiness of a large portion of the civilized world was at stake, rivalry, national prejudices, and antipathies ought to disappear before the grand object of the independence of nations. Why were they called to arms? Not to gratify ambition, or to achieve conquest; but for a more justifiable, a nobler, object. The emperor Napoleon could not live in peace with Europe unless Europe was his slave; and to prevent this, to oppose the restless and unsatisfied desire of conquest which dwelt in his bosom, they were called to arms. Did they doubt that such was the character of Napoleon? were they afraid to combat with him? He had proved that this was his character, and that he was not unconquerable, by the 400,000 men whom he carried 700 miles from their country, and the greatest part of whom fell victims to his mad ambition. Had he been a man of common humanity, or even of common policy, after this signal disaster he would have been disposed for peace: but neither his misfortunes in Russia, nor the defeats which his armies experienced in Spain, effected any beneficial alteration in his character or views. Peace was offered to him; that peace, which all other governments anxiously desired, and which was necessary for the establishment of his own power, and for the wellbeing of France; but he had indignantly rejected it." Soldiers! it is to arms then we must have recourse, to conquer repose and independence. The same sentiments which guided the French in 1792, and which prompted them to assemble, and to combat the armies which entered their territory, ought now to animate your valour against those who, after having invaded the land which gave you birth, still hold in chains your bre thren, your wives, and your chil dren. Soldiers! what a noble prospect is opened to you! The liberty of Europe; the re-establishment of its equilibrium; the end of that convulsive state which has had 20 years duration; finally, the peace of the world will be the result of your efforts. Render yourselves worthy, by your union, your discipline, and your courage, of the high destiny which awaits you!" Besides the crown prince of Sweden, another Frenchiman entered the lists against Bonaparte. General Moreau, after he was liberated by him, had gone over to the United States of America, where, in peace, quiet, aud retirement, he spent some years of his life: but whether he grew weary of his condition there, or whether he considered himself called upon by the voice of patriotism and the duty he owed to his fellow-creatures, or whether both these motives acted upon him, is not certain; but it appears that the emperor Alexander, as soon as he found that war with Bonaparte was inevitable, sent over a confidential person to America, with whom general Moreau. returned to Europe. He joined Z 2 the 1 allied army soon after the congress at Prague was dissolved. On two accounts his presence with the allies was deemed of importance: in the first place, his military talents were undoubtedly of the first order; they had been proved such by his conduct in every campaign in which he had been engaged, and most conspicuously so by his celebrated retreat out of Germany. His military talents were indeed of a different class and description from those of Bonaparte; perhaps there was in him less quickness of conception and combination; but, on the other hand, he possessed a cool and comprehensive judgement, which penetrated the most obscure and difficult parts of the most in tricate plan. On him and on the crown prince the allied powers depended for the arrangement of the campaign; and as they each had great military talents and experience, and besides were well acquainted with the favourite plans of Bonaparte, and with the principles on which he conducted his campaigns, it was hoped that they would be able to oppose him with success. In the second place, some expectation seems to have been entertained that the presence of Moreau with the armies of the allies might induce the French troops to withdraw their allegiance from Bona parte, or at least might render them discontented with the war in which they were engaged. Moreau had undoubtedly been a great favourite with the French soldiers: but those who indulged this expectation do not appear to have been aware, or recollected, that soldiers of all nations soon lose any attachment which they may have formed to a general; and that, even if it did continue to exist, it could operate but feebly under the strict discipline of an army, and among men who have scarcely any opportunity either of knowing one another's sen-. timents, or of acting together. It is foreign to our purpose to examine minutely or elaborately whether Moreau was justified in taking up arms against his country; we shall, however, offer one or two remarks on the subject. In the first place, those who contended that he was perfectly justified, grounded their argument on this consideration, that it was not against but for his country he was about to fight: but by thus arguing they admitted virtually, though not directly, that the person himself was the proper judge of what was for the benefit of his country: or, in other words, they admitted that in some cases it was lawful to oppose the regal authority; for it will avail them little to contend that Bonaparte was an usurper and a tyrant: still the question recurs, If it be lawful to oppose an usurper and a tyrant, who can be the judge, whether the sovereign deserves those appellations, but the person who is about to oppose him? But, In the second place, those who exclaimed against the conduct of Moreau, for taking up arms against Bonaparte, and yet retained their doctrine, that resistance to tyrants was lawful, were equally inconsistent, unless they were prepared to assert that the rule of Bonaparte was beneficial to France. perhaps, in no former wars was there observable such inconsistency of opinion as in the French revolu tionary wars: very many who ad vocated the cause of the revolution at its commencement, because they conceived it to be advantageous or necessary to France, very strongly and absurdly transferred their ad miration |
