to the operations of the crown prince; to whom, as has been already stated, was allotted the task of defending Berlin. On the 21st of August he learnt by his spies that Bonaparte was concentrating the corps of the dukes of Reggio, Belluno and Padua, and of generals Bertrand and Regnier, near Bay. reuth; the whole force amounted to nearly 80,000 men. From this movement the crown prince suspected that their object was to march rapidly on Berlin; and he took his reasures accordingly. The Sd Prussian corps, under the command of Bulow, was placed between Hernersdorf and Klein Beren; the 4th Prussian corps was situated at Blankenfelde. The Swedish army was posted at Ruhlsdorf; and the Russian army was in its rear. The Cossacks and light infantry, under the command of general Czerni cheff, who had distinguished himself by the extreme rapidity of his movements, were directed to hover round the rear of the enemy's columns.

The battle commenced, on the morning of the 22d, by the French attacking one of the advanced posts of the crown prince's army: as they were greatly superior in numbers, the Swedish troops retired; and the enemy advanced and occupied a large space covered by woods and flanked by marshes. In the morning of the 23d, Bertrand made a desperate attack on the 4th Prussian corps; but he was repulsed, and some prisoners were taken. The principal scene of contest, however, this day, was the vil lage of Grosberen: against it the 7th French corps and a strong reserve proceeded; but here also the 4th Prussian corps were successful, and the village was retaken. By the occupation of this village, the enemy were at the distance of 1000

toises from the centre of the camp. The crown prince sent orders to general Bulow to attack it: in executing these orders, the Prussian forces proved that they were the worthy descendants of the soldiers of Frederic the Great: for some hours the cannonade was warm; but the Prussians advancing under protection of the artillery, charged the 7th French corps with the bayonet, and put them to the rout. Hitherto the engagement had been principally between the Prussians and the enemy; for, the other corps of the French remaining in the woods, there had been no occasion for the Swedes and Russians to move from their position in front of the camp. About this time, however, the village of Ruhlsdorf, which was situated in front of the camp, was threatened by the enemy; and the crown prince deemed it necessary to order some battalions of the Swedes, along with a few pieces of artillery, to reinforce the advanced posts, while the enemy were taken in flank with a battalion of flying artillery. These operations completely decided the fate of the battle: the crown prince was vic torious; and, as the result of his victory, obtained possession of 26 pieces of cannon, 1500 prisoners, among whom were 40 officers, and a great quantity of baggage. The enemy retreated beyond Trebbin, whither they were closely pursued by the light Russian cavalry.

Bonaparte was extremely cha grined at the result of this engagement: besides the mortification of having his troops beaten by the crown prince of Sweden, the result of this battle disarranged all his plans, and exposed part of his army to the attack of the victorious troops; for, Berlin being now safe, the crown prince, if he were not kept in check, would advance to Co-operate

co-operate with the allies in the vicinity of Dresden, It was therefore necessary to send another general to replace Oudinot, who had commanded the French forces in the battle with the crown prince; and Bonaparte selected Ney for that purpose. He had under him 70,000 men; and as the Prussian army, at this period, was at some distance from that of the crown prince, the French general hoped to surprise it before the latter could advance to its assistance, The Prussian army under Bulow was only 40,000 strong; yet they sustained, undaunted and unmoved, the attack of Ney's corps. General Bulow, before the enemy came up with him at Juterboch, had received information of their approach, and he accordingly announced the circumstance to the crown prince, who had just begun to move for the purpose of crossing the river Elbe and marching towards Leipsic. But as soon as he learnt that the Prussians were likely to be attacked, he changed his route, and arrived at Juterboch, by forced marches, just as the Prussian army, after having sustained the unequal combat for a long time, were nearly overpowered by the enemy. For a moment the Russians and Swedes halted, in order to form in the order of battle: as soon as this was accomplished, 70 battalions and 10,000 horse, supported by 150 pieces of artillery, advanced in columns of attack; 4000 Russian and Swedish cavalry having preceded them, at full speed, for the purpose of supporting some points against which the enemy principally directed his attacks. At the sight of this immense army coming up to the assistance of a foe against whom they had scarcely made any impression, the French first wavered, and then fled with

the utmost precipitation; the allied cavalry charged them, as they retreated, with great impetuosity, and threw them into the utmost disorder, The result of the battle of Juterboch was upwards of 5000 prisoners, three standards, 30 pieces of cannon, and 200 ammunitionwaggons. On the field of battle 6000 of the French lay dead. The enemy, after their defeat, in vain endeavoured to rally, or even to effect their retreat in tolerable order besides the prisoners taken in the battle, upwards of 2500 were taken, on the evening of the day on which it was fought, in a village on the road to Dresden: so that, before they completely effected their escape, it was calculated that they lost, in killed, wounded, and pri soners, from 16,000 to 18,000 men, more than 50 pieces of cannon, and 400 ammunition-waggons. The loss of the Prussians was severe, amounting in killed and wounded to upwards, of 5000. The crown prince, in his official account of this battle, mentions, that general Regnier remained a long time exposed to the fire of the sharp-shooters in the situation of a man desirous of death. He, as well as most other of the French generals, must have been convinced, that the rank and for tune which they had acquired, as well as their military glory and conquests, were placed in the utmost jeopardy by the insane obstinacy of their emperor.

The situation of Bonaparte was now every day becoming more critical; and yet he did not seem to be sensible of his danger, but still continued at Dresden. The allies, having been defeated in their at tempt to take this city, altered their plan; but it was still a plan of the most consummate skill, and it was carried into execution with the most creditable

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creditable activity, decision, and promptitude. Their grand object was to gather all their forces in the route between Dresden and Leipsic; or, if this could not be effected, to unite before Leipsic, so as completely to cut off Bonaparte's retreat into France. But, in order to carry this plan into execution, it was necessary to distract the attention and the forces of their adversary and this they accomplished most effectually; for by advancing from the valley of Toplitz, on the side of Bohemia, towards Dresden, and another time from the side of Silesia towards the same place, they obliged Bonaparte to weaken and harass his troops; and as soon as he came nearly up with them they retreated. While he was in pursuit of one branch of the allied army, another threatened Dresden; so that at last his troops were completely exhausted. In the mean time, the allies were receiving great reinforcements, especially from Russia; the emperor Alexander exert ing himself to the utmost to bring the campaign to a successful termination. Besides large bodies of regular troops, the Cossacks were greatly reinforced; and in the situation of the French army they were of most essential service, intercepting the communication with France, and cutting off the supplies. At this time, and by their means, many letters from the French officers to their relations and friends in France were intercepted, in all of which a most deplorable picture was drawn of their distressed situation: most of them, indeed, represented their condition as equally dreadful with what it had been in the Russian campaign; nor did they hold out any prospect of extricating themselves from it.

Nor were the affairs of Bonaparte

more prosperous in Italy: Beau. harnois had collected a large army, but it was dispirited: the people of the country where it was stationed manifested strong symptoms of dis satisfaction: and when the Austrian general Nugent advanced, he found himself compelled, after some inef fectual attempts to keep his ground, to retire from the head of the Adria tic towards Venice, Davoust, also, who had advanced from the vicinity of Hamburgh into Schwerin, probably for the purpose of co-operat ing with Oudinot, being held in check by count Walmoden, and having learnt the fate of Oudinot's army, deemed it expedient to commence his retreat.

These, however, which in ordi. nary times would have been consi dered as important events, in the present situation of the continent scarcely attracted the attention of the public; all thought and conjecture being absorbed on what was likely to happen in the vicinity of Dresden; for that city Bonaparte persisted in retaining, notwithstand, ing the allies were gradually draw ing round him in immense force, and notwithstanding that his own armies were greatly weakened both in numerical and in physical force. On the side of Bohemia prince Schwartzenberg continued to advance; while Blucher, by pressing forward on the side of Silesia, about the 7th of September effected a junction with the grand army; by this junction a powerful force was thrown on the right of the French in Lusatia; while several other Austrian divisions, together with the Russians and Prussians under the command of Barclay de Tolly and Wittgenstein (in all about 80,000 men), having re-entered Saxony, moved on Pirna, within eight miles of Dresden. Thus threatened,

threatened, Bonaparte was again compelled to leave that city; but as soon as he approached the main Austrian army, it gradually retired, drawing him towards the mountains of Bohemia. Taught, however, by the fate of Vandamme, he did not cross the frontier to any great distance, urging, in his official bulletin, as an excuse for not following them, that he could not get his cannon down the declivities. On the 11th of September he again returned to Dresden. By these movements of the allies, not only did prince Schwartzenberg open a communication with general Blucher at Gobel, but the crown prince also communicated with the same general at Bautzen. At the former place prince Poniatowski was posted; but he was compelled to retire within 15 miles of Dresden, while Macdonald was forced to take up a position on the Spree, within 50 miles. of the same city. Marmont also, who had occupied the left bank of the Elbe with the 6th corps, was recalled, and sent, together with the cavalry under Murat, to Grossen Hayn, about 20 miles to the north of Dresden, to check the Swedes, who were advancing in that direction. Marshal Ney, after his defeat by the crown prince at Juterboch, took shelter under the cannon of Torgau. Such were the positions of the armies, and the state of affairs, about the middle of September, to the northward and eastward of Dresden. On the 14th the grand army of the allies again advanced from the valley of Toplitz in Bohemia, driving back the 1st, 2d, and 14th French corps, which, with the guards, were posted on the frontiers. Again was Bonaparte compelled to leave this city, in order to reinforce his advanced divisions, and to repair the blunders of

his generals: the 15th and 16th he spent in driving the allies back to Bohemia; or, to speak more correctly, the allies, having succeeded in drawing him out of the city. and in harassing his troops, retired on those days into Bohemia.

Bonaparte could no longer conceal his critical situation from the people of France: he had, indeed, in his bulletin respecting the battle of Dresden, represented the allied army as utterly defeated on that occasion, exaggerating their loss as high as 60,000 men, and boasting that they would not be able to resume offensive operations:-it was with a very bad grace, therefore, that he acknowledged his inability either to advance, or even to make head against an enemy, who, if his former accounts were correct, were so much weakened and disorganized. But the truth must be told: theré was no possibility of escaping out of his perilous situation, unless large reinforcements were sent to him: and, besides, the real state of the case could not be so alarming as that which the Parisians app:e hended; for the intercourse with France was so precarious and dangerous, that information respecting the army was obtained only at considerable intervals, and of a very meagre and unsatisfactory description.

On the 4th of October an extraordinary meeting of the French senate was held, at which Cambaceres, after laying before them the long-delayed report concerning the war with Austria and Sweden, distinctly avowed that Bonaparte's means were not adequate to the emergency of his situation, and called on them for a fresh conscription. But it was too late to be of much service to Bonaparte: the allies, long before it could possibly be raised, had carried into full exe

cution their grand plan. By the 9th of October the head quarters of prince Schwartzenberg were esta blished near Leipsic; the prince royal of Sweden and general Blucher, having crossed the Elbe at different points, were in communication with the main army: thus a complete chain was drawn across this part of Saxony, while general Benningsen advanced towards Dresdren on the great road from Toplitz. The Cossacks under Platoff were in advance at Lutzen. Thus the communication of Bonaparte with France was completely destroyed; while his army was in great distress, his magazines were nearly exhausted, and the country which he occupied was utterly destitute of the means of replenishing them.

At length, on the 7th of October, Bonaparte left Dresden, taking with him the royal family of Saxony. It is absolutely impossible to assign any rational motive for his very long continuance in that city; nor can his conduct be accounted for, unless we suppose that he was under the same infatuation which seized him during the Russian campaign, and led him to advance, at the approach of winter, into a hostile and barren country, and to continue at Moscow till retreat was almost impossible. For his conduct in the Russian campaign, however, something like a rational motive may be assigned he had often, by rapid and daring advances into the heart of his enemy's territory, and especially by occupying their capital, forced them to make peace: he had once already intimidated or cajoled the emperor Alexander into a disgraceful treaty; and he might hope that he could again effect the same object. But what hope could he, possibly have that, by his stay at Dresden, either the fortune of war

would become favourable, or peace would be obtained? To every man of common sense, to every man not blinded by passion and obstinacy, it must have been apparent, that by staying at Dresden his own forces would be gradually reduced in numbers and strength, while those of the enemy would be accumulate, ing; and that they would be enabled to cut off his communication with France.

The positions of the two armies, soon after Bonaparte left Dresden, were as follows:-The line of the French fortresses on the Elbe, including Dresden, Torgau, Wittemberg, and Magdeburgh, extended about 120 miles, the course of that river being nearly north-west. Tor gau is about 45 miles, and Wittem berg 70, from Dresden: 17 miles below Wittemberg, on the left, the Elbe receives the Mulda; and 18 miles further, the Saale: both these rivers in the higher part of their course flow nearly parallel with the Elbe; and Leipsic stands between them, being distant from the Saale 18 miles, from the Mulda 13, and from the Elbe 35. As therefore the united army of the crown prince and Blucher occupied a line along the left bank of the Saale, from its mouth nearly to opposite Leipsic, they cut off all communication be tween the force collected round Leipsic and the country westward of that line. At the same time, the communications of the enemy, on the same line further to the south, were cut off by the army which was marching from the neighbourhood of Dresden. On the IIth of October the advanced posts of these two armies were in communication, and they greatly outnumbered the army of Bonaparte.

Under these circumstances, the object of the allies was to force Bonaparte