SERMON II. The Goodness of GoD, proved from his Works. SERM. Mark x. 18. There is none good but one, that is God. A S goodness, in general, is a most amiable fubject of meditation, it is impoffible for the human heart defignedly and deliberately to think of it without pleasure. The goodness of the Deity is in a peculiar manner, above his other perfections, attractive of our highest esteem and delight. They are all excellent in themselves, abfolute, independent of any other being, neceffary as his existence, and infinite: But beneficence finishes his character, which is the just object of our adoration our reverence and love, the foundation of our hope and confidence in him, and most worthy to be imitated by us, as far as our limited capacity and the frailty of our nature will allow. The confideration of eternity and immenfity, of power power and wisdom, nay, and of holiness and SER M. justice, abstracting from love and kindness, II. may strike the mind with admiration and awe; but the bounty of God to all fenfitive, and especially rational creatures, his opening his hand liberally, and giving them that which is convenient for them, fuitable to their feveral natures,―This infpires the heart of man with hope and joy, excites the best affections, and makes all the reft of the divine attributes appear most lovely. I intend afterwards more particularly to explain this subject. My prefent design is to prove that God is good. Some have endeayoured to prove all his moral attributes, and particularly his goodness, from his natural perfections; and their reasoning seems to be very strong. As morality has a neceffary foundation in the nature and reafon of things, independently on, and antecedently to all will, and pofitive appointment; (for the effences of things being different, there must be different relations, an agreeablenefs and difagreeableness of fome to others, and particularly a fuitablenefs of certain conditions and circumstances to certain perfons, or their characters and qualifications ;) So this neceffarily appears to the human understanding; and we cannot help thinking it appears to every unVOL. II, derstanding D II. SER M. derftanding, more or lefs clearly, according to the measure of its perfection; and every intelligent agent muft of neceffity, (not natural but moral, confiftent with the most perfect freedom,) direct his actions by that diftinction of fit and unfit, so far as it is known to him, unless he be hindered by impotence or wrong affection. Now the fupreme cause of all things being abfolutely perfect, felfexiftent, independent, and unchangeable, hist understanding infinite, his power almighty; as he discerns all the relations and even poffibilities of things; no reafon can poffibly be imagined why he should not always act according to these invariable refpects, which he has made every intelligent creature capable of feeing, and thereby capable of approving and praifing his administration. He can never mistake evil for good, or fail in diftinguishing the true limits of fit and unfit. There is no fuperior power to controul or reftrain him in doing what he thinks most reafonable to be done. He is infinitely above all indigence, or want of any thing to make him perfectly easy and happy; and therefore his mind cannot be biaffed by any selfish or partial affections, which are in other agents the fources of offence against the eternal rule of right. In particular, the fupreme Being must be II. be good, or inclined to communicate happi-SER M. nefs, because he is in himself, and was from eternity, perfectly and unchangeably happy, and therefore cannot be fuppofed to have defigned the production of any kind or degree of unhappiness, unless his wifdom should foresee it might be a means of greater good in the end. Nor indeed can it be fuppofed, that such a Being could have another motive to make any creatures at all than to communicate good in such variety, and always in fuch proportion, as to his infinite wisdom fhould feem meet. That God is beneficent alfo appears from his abfolute all-fufficiency, whereby he is at an infinite distance from malice, envy, and all temptations to do evil. For thefe malevolent difpofitions, and every difpofition contrary to goodness, as they are known to be tormenting to the mind in which they are feated, fo they always proceed, and in their nature must proceed, from weakness and imperfection. But tho' this reafoning may be very convincing to fome attentive perfons, yet another, and a larger method of illuftrating the fubject before us, may be more generally ufeful, which therefore I fhall endeavour in the following difcourfe; namely, by confidering the genuine fruits of goodness apparent in the works D 2 SERM. Works and ways of God, or in his conftitu→ II. tion of things, and administration of provi dence. To which purpose it is only neceffary to obferve, that the evidence of the divine goodness is the fame with the evidence of that difpofition in any other being, as the principle itself is the fame in kind tho' different in the degree of its perfection. If a defigning cause actually produces those effects, which in their nature and tendency are beneficial to other beings, and we see no reason to think that he acts upon felfish principles, we cannot help concluding that he is beneficent. Now it has been proved, that God is the fupreme intelligent defigning cause of all things in the univerfe; he has difpofed its form, fixed its order, the relations, the connexion and dependence of all its parts, and the harmony of the whole; that he continually fuperintends and irresistibly governs it, being every where present, and every where exercifing his power and wisdom. And therefore if in the intire state of things, and feries of events, it appears that there are many benefits actually conferred, and much happiness actually communicated to beings which are capable of it, (various happiness suitable to their various natures and conditions, either in their poffeffion, or placed within their reach |