Hameln) you will, in that case, until your lordship shall receive orders to the contrary, continue to concert measures of general defence and precaution with the Prussian, Russian, and Swedish forces; it being distinctly understood that the British troops, so long as they conform to the system laid down by Prussia of abstaining from previous aggression, are entitled not only to fall back on Prussia, but to the protection and support of the Prussian forces.

3. Should no arrangement have been concluded, providing for the security of the North of Germany, nor the Court of Berlin have either proceeded to act offensively against France, or made any explicit declaration of its determination to act in case the French troops shall attack Hanover, as, in that case, his Majesty's means of protecting his Electoral dominions against the power of France would be narrowed to the strength of his own immediate corps, aided by the dubious support of the Swedish troops, (the Russian troops being now placed under the orders of the King of Prussia) it will, in that case, be necessary for his Majesty to regulate the measures to be taken for the protection of the Electorate, with a due attention to the ultimate means of securing the retreat of his troops now there.

Including the recruits which the German Legion has received since its arrival in Hanover, his Majesty's forces on the Continent, independent of the reinforcement last sent, now amount to about 17,000 men, which number may be expected progressively to increase; of which a certain proportion, however, cannot yet be considered as in an effective state for fieldservice. It is obvious that a force of this extent and description, unless assured of Prussian aid, cannot pretend to oppose, even with the aid of the Swedes, any effectual resistance against the enemy's army now assembling in Holland, if it should be pushed forward in force to raise the blockade of Hameln, and be afterwards directed to advance against the King's troops in the open part of the Electorate.

In order to be prepared for such an event, I am to suggest to your lordship the propriety of removing the new Hanoverian levies, which are yet unfit for service, (with the exception of the mere depôts necessary for carrying on the recruiting service) immediately to Stade, or to some other point where the transports may be stationed; so that, upon the first advance of the enemy, they may be directed to embark and drop down the river, out of the way of the other troops, and to a place of safety.

Should your lordship have reason to understand that a movement against the Electorate is actually determined on by the enemy, and be of opinion, from your relative means of defence, that all resistance must be ultimately ineffectual, it is the King's commands that the safety of his troops should not be hazarded by the evacuation of the Electorate being too long protracted.

In withdrawing the troops, it certainly would be desirable that they should be embarked in the Elbe or Weser, and returned directly to England. But, as this retreat may be denied to them, should the river be obstructed by ice, or the enemy press too closely on their rear, your lordship will take the necessary measures in due time for concerting your retreat either upon Stralsund or Magdeburg, taking previous precautions with respect to the subsistence of the troops, and directing such proportion of the transports to proceed round to the Baltic (so soon as the season will permit) as may be necessary for the reception of the troops.

You will not fail to advert to the critical situation in which his Majesty's Electoral subjects, both officers and men, who have entered into the British service, must be placed upon the return of the enemy, should they fall into their hands. They can, in that case, have no mercy to expect; and I am therefore to direct that your arrangements may be taken with a special view to their security and protection.

The latter part of this despatch proceeds upon the supposi

tion of no arrangement with respect to the North of Germany having taken place, and of no active interference for its protection being held out on the part of Prussia.

As, in this case, (presuming upon an early attack from the enemy in force) the main point for your lordship's consideration will be the time and the mode of withdrawing without loss from the Electorate, I should recommend that, if only part of the troops can be embarked on the Elbe or Weser under the circumstances of the moment, although the transport tonnage already there is more than sufficient to receive the whole number, that the Hanoverians should be embarked in preference, in the first instance, as I consider the British troops more capable of effecting their retreat by the interior, without loss of numbers; that they individually hazard less if they fall into the enemy's hands; and that the chance is thereby improved of saving the greatest proportion of the whole corps now in Hanover, to be employed hereafter in some other quarter against the enemy.

Upon the whole, it is his Majesty's wish to continue his troops on the Continent, so long as their remaining there may afford a reasonable prospect either of contributing essentially to the general welfare, or to the immediate protection of his Majesty's Hanoverian dominions. But, as his Majesty has already been deprived of the services of many of his most valuable officers by a capitulation forced upon them by the enemy at the commencement of the war, his Majesty is peculiarly solicitous that a similar misfortune should not be again sustained by a retreat being too long delayed, after all effectual means of defence may appear hopeless.

Your lordship will confer confidentially with Count Münster on this subject, who will receive from the King the necessary instructions for the direction of his conduct, and act without further orders from hence, in such manner as the information you may receive from Lord Harrowby, or from any other quarter, may induce you to consider most for the advantage of

his Majesty's service. And your lordship will not fail to communicate, in such manner as may appear to you most suitable to the officers in the chief command of the other armies, the nature and motives of any movements you may think fit to make; applying to them for such aid and support as the case may require, and it may be in their power to afford.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby.

Downing Street, January 10, 1806.

My dear Lord Harrowby-I enclose a copy of the instructions which I have addressed to Lord Cathcart, together with a private letter, which is no otherwise material than that you should be in possession of every thing I have written which may in any way influence his lordship's judgment.

Lord Cathcart's last letters were dated from the Russian head-quarters, at Neuburg, on the 25th ult.; he was not then in possession of Hardenberg's letter to you of the 23rd; consequently, as you will see by the extract of his letter which I enclose, would have deemed it his duty, as things then stood, to have returned the troops last sent.

Upon a review of our prospects on the Continent, perhaps we should not regret that Lord C., under his former instructions, had taken upon him to send the troops back; but the additional assurance since obtained from the Prussian Government, and other considerations which I need not enumerate, have induced the Cabinet to modify the instructions in the manner stated in the draft. The reference to you will enable you to make the continuance of this corps an instrument for bringing the Court of Berlin to a precise decision with respect to the North of Germany, if you should think favourably enough of their resolution, to consider an engagement on this point likely to be made, or, if made, acted up to; if not, you will have it in your power to explain that these troops, having

been sent for a special purpose, must be returned; and pursue your explanations with a view to the disposal of the rest of the army.

Our solicitude about this corps arises from considering that their presence augments the risk to us in a greater proportion than it adds to the strength of the Allies. There is little reason to hope that this part of the army, after it has suffered at sea, and with a portion of each regiment on this side of the water, can be for some time in a state of equipment to make them very moveable in the field. Indeed, I much doubt whether General Don's force, which has been so much longer there, is yet well appointed. This consideration not only bears upon the efficiency of the army opposed to the enemy, but, in a degree, on its faculty of effecting a retreat towards Stralsund or Magdeburg, in presence of a hostile force; but of this Lord Cathcart will be best able to judge.

It is enough for me to state, for the purpose of explaining the value we are bound to attach to the preservation of the army now on the Continent, that, in the event of our being obliged to maintain a separate contest against France, during the remainder of the war, I look upon our ability to carry on any offensive operations of importance against the enemy absolutely to depend on the return of the force now there without any material defalcation, and I even consider the internal power of our defence may be materially affected by any disaster that may happen to it, particularly in the by no means improbable case of our being called on for reinforcements both for the East and West Indies.

These considerations would certainly, in the present state of things, determine us not to hazard 25,000 troops, were it now a question whether they should be sent from hence; but, being on the Continent, they must not be withdrawn in a manner unbecoming the character of the country, or inconsistent with what we owe to the feelings as well as the interests of the Continent. I have stated the prudential considerations

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