allowed by the French Government to remain in the country, cannot well be employed. It is not the same in Hesse, where the subaltern officers of cavalry are still in the country, and will do very well for the beginning; besides, the officers of the militia, all of them veterans, may be employed.

A train of artillery, with the proper officers, is wholly wanting; and, though they may be dispensed with in the beginning, yet they are of the utmost consequence afterwards. There are numerous artillery privates, who all remained in the country after the regiment, 1,500 strong, was disbanded.

5. Though we are both convinced that, should any unforeseen misfortune happen, England will not refuse an asylum to us, our families, and such a party as we may at that time have assembled, and grant a proper subsistence to every individual, yet, to make ourselves perfectly easy on that score, and not to expose ourselves to any reproach from our families, being both married, and having estates in the country, we must request a written assurance on this subject, including, at the same time, the promise of a pension to our wives and children, in case we should perish in the attempt.

Having received a decisive answer on all these points, and after another interview with Captain Kuckuck at the rendezvous appointed, where I shall further report to him the situation of our affairs, then every one is to hasten to the place assigned him, in order to strike the following blows, if possible, on or about the very same day when the English troops will land, or undertake any thing against the Dutch army.

The towns of Minden and Cassel, both the residences of the French Governors of those countries, and a castle in the former place, must be attacked and carried together. Two other columns must disarm the military in Bückeburg and LippeDetmold, in order to get possession of some thousand stand of arms which are in store there.

Should circumstances be favourable, every effort must be made against Hameln. With regard to the first two opera

tions, the only difficulty is to keep all the preparations secret, so as not to be discovered before every thing is ripe for execution, because the gendarmes are spies not easily to be misled or deceived. The execution itself will be no great matter, both places having but weak garrisons. An attempt upon Hameln can only be undertaken as soon as it is known that the garrison is not strong, and composed of troops of the Confederation of the Rhine, who generally are not well disposed towards the French army, and may be gained; but then the attack must be as vigorously and as well supported as it possibly can be. An understanding with the inhabitants, as well as the garrison, must determine this coup de main.

If matters are thus far advanced, particularly if we should have the good fortune to carry Hameln, but even without that, it will certainly not require a master-stroke of strategy to effect a junction with the English army. It would then prove very advantageous if the insurrection were to be joined by a small English corps, in order to facilitate its final formation; and the more so, if it were to receive again its former regulations. The most severe discipline only can secure the existence of this corps.

I, as well as my friend, shall then very willingly serve under an able and experienced general, in expectation how and in what rank we shall be employed after our conduct has been approved of. A desire to shine and to act a conspicuous part does not tempt us to this undertaking: we are influenced solely by the wish to contribute as much as is in our power towards a restoration and rescue of our much wronged and oppressed country, or to perish in the attempt. V. LOSSBERG.

Altona, May 22, 1807.

In consequence of a proposition of our friend, Captain Kuckuck, concerning a supply of horses and other necessaries for the army which is destined to land in Pomerania or elsewhere, we hereby comply with his wish, by proposing the following articles.

We are of opinion that magazines of no kind can be established before the army has landed on the Continent, because the enemy will not allow stores to be amassed any where, unless the purpose of them were satisfactorily accounted for. Horses can be procured as soon as the army has landed; but then it is absolutely necessary to know the place of landing a fortnight beforehand, to provide ourselves with them in the neighbourhood of the army, because a long transport through a country in possession of the enemy would be suspicious.

The small number of the enemy in the neighbourhood of the coast renders it very probable that the army will advance with rapidity, and this circumstance will be sufficient to diminish every obstacle to its subsistence.

As we are both native Hanoverians, it is not necessary to speak of our attachment to our King and native country. We thought it right to premise thus much to the following articles, because nothing would be more disagreeable to us than if difficulties which we are obliged to mention could be considered as motives for lucre and profit.

Horses are at present very scarce and dear in every part of Germany, because every province has been obliged to supply the French with a great number; and this is the case above all in our unhappy country, for four years past in the possession of an insatiable enemy; and a considerable number for the Saxon army has also been contracted for. It is, therefore, very probable that horses fit for cavalry service cannot be delivered at a lower price than 24 or 25 pistoles, and those for the transports and artillery than 19 or 20.

Every kind of forage is at present not very dear: it is, however, very probable that the price will rise as soon as the news of a landing is published. Captain Kuckuck told us that he should probably come back soon: we assure to make such contracts with him as will satisfy both parties.

C. AR. WEDDIG. JULIUS WITTE.

Explanation of a Proposed Expedition against the Texel.

1. Objects of the Expedition.

June 6, 1807.

In the first place, it appears that the occupation of the Texel, and the other small islands in front of the Zuyder Zee, embraces a variety of distinct and important objects. The mere taking possession of these islands, for which 3,000 troops are conceived to be sufficient, ensures, at all events, the destruction of the works and shipping on them-the latter amounting to many hundreds, and of the most dangerous description to this country in case of invasion, as the Dutch craft are all capable of carrying a number of men under deck, and of keeping the sea in all weather.

It holds out also a most reasonable prospect either of destroying the Dutch fleet by fire-vessels, carcasses, and firerockets, in the Mars Deep and New Deep; or, of compelling it to surrender by continually harassing it with mortar-boats, &c., in the narrow channels of the Zuyder Zee, where it cannot act with effect. The naval force at the Helder is at present stated to be two ships of the line ready for sea, in the Mars Deep, and four or five fitting in the New Deep. The latter cannot have their guns on board, and consequently the first two alone are capable of any defence.

It embraces further the destruction of the arsenal. This arsenal has been constructed at an immense expense in the New Deep, and will be found, on reference to the Survey, not to be at all protected by the batteries of the Helder, but to be entirely open in the rear, having no defences of its own to prevent a continual repetition of attacks from mortar and rocketboats. In this arsenal all the stores of the Dutch fleet are collected, and near it lie the four or five ships of the line abovementioned, together with one ship on the stocks; so that the whole seems to be greatly exposed to the effects of fire-rockets and carcasses, and to hold out great temptation for such an attack.

The possession of the Texel gives, moreover, the power of bombarding the town and works of the Helder, which are now carried to a great extent for it will be seen, by reference to the Survey, that the whole of this line is within range of 13-inch sea-service mortars, from a headland on the Texel island, from which it may night and day be bombarded, by placing there ten or more mortars, to be carried for that purpose, and without any corresponding risk; for, while our shells are directed against an extensive town and works, theirs have only a few men and mortars to retaliate upon, scattered on the open sands, and completely out of gun-shot.

It gives also the greatest facility, at any time during its occupation, of blocking up the Dutch fleet, and, at all events, neutralizing it for a season, if we should not succeed in destroying it. This was proposed to have been done at the close of last war, by sinking a number of large old vessels in the channels; but it is evident that the possession of the Texel and Vlie passage would render it a work of greater ease and certainty.

It opens also the way to extend the destruction of the Dutch craft throughout the Zuyder Zee. It has already been observed that this description of craft would be highly useful to the enemy in case of invasion; and, when it is further considered that there are some thousand of them spread about through the different ports of this inland sea, and what facilities they thereby possess of embarking large bodies of troops, and of collecting them so embarked, without observation, or danger of attack, these vessels in the Zuyder Zee ought ever to be considered as objects of the greatest jealousy to England.

Finally, the occupation of the Texel and these islands may be considered, in the present moment, as of the greatest importance in a military point of view, as establishing a most central post on the enemy's frontier, and in the rear of his armies. If it be determined to maintain it, in defiance of him,