with the conduct of the expedition, and to give him his own brigade as a part of the force to be employed, it seems very desirable not to lock up so efficient a corps in a garrison in the island after the service is performed; but to bring the General and his brigade back immediately, and to attach them to the six regiments now coming from Ireland to the Downs, which would then form, under Sir John Moore, a moveable corps of about 8,500 men, ready to execute any active service which might be determined on.

With a view to securing Walcheren, at the least possible hazard to the flower of our army, an excellent brigade for this service might be formed of the following garrison battalions:

which might be prepared, and sent to relieve Sir John Moore's brigade.

The conquest of Walcheren would then only tie up, of our disposable infantry, strictly so called, whatever it might be deemed prudent to leave at Walcheren, in addition to the Veteran Battalions, which, with strong naval protection to Flushing, probably need not exceed two regiments, or about 1,500 men.

The above arrangements for effecting an attack upon the Yssel, by an army of 40,000 men, the reduction of Walcheren, and the holding an active corps of 8,500 men ready in the Downs to take advantage of any opening, does not suppose the application, in any case, of above 15,000 of our disposable British infantry, and does not calculate upon more than 7 or 8,000 of these being on service after Sir John Moore's return from Walcheren, unless some further operation should be attempted this winter against Holland by sea. This arrange

ment does not appear to place too much at hazard, compared with the importance of the objects to which it is directed.

Whatever force is sent in cavalry to the Elbe, or in Veteran Battalions for securing Walcheren, during the winter, is not considered as any reduction of that portion of our army disposable for general service, which forms, in fact, the limit, as well as the means, of undertaking future operations.

Memorandum relative to an Attack on Walcheren.1

BY LORD CASTLEREAGH.

The grounds of objection stated to an attack upon Walcheren, at the present season of the year, may be considered under the following heads :-first, the naval difficulties of effecting a landing, and placing the fleet in safety, without much delay, after their arrival off the coast; secondly, the obstacles to be encountered on shore by the troops, after they shall have been landed.

With respect to the naval part of the enterprise, it seems to have been ascertained that the landing cannot be attempted within the channel between Walcheren and Cadsand, in the present state of the defences. It is also admitted that a fleet cannot enter the Veer Gate channel, until the Fort den Hack has been previously carried. Information is rather contradictory with respect to the nature of this battery, whether it is open or close to the river; but it seems to be admitted that it is not capable of opposing resistance to an enemy when once landed.

The landing must be made on the external coast, between East and West Capell, and can only be attempted in clear and moderate weather, with a wind more or less off shore. With a south-west wind, ships are much exposed, when at anchor, in the channel between Walcheren and Cadsand, even as high up as Flushing. Supposing a force landed as above, in carrying

This paper is not dated; but, from the mention made of Sir John Moore, who fell on the 19th of January, 1809, it cannot belong to a later period than that.-EDITOR.

the sea-batteries as high up on the Cadsand side as the Nolle, a position for disembarking the heavy artillery, stores, &c., while the weather continued moderate, might be secured; it would not, however, open a safe retreat for the ships, in case it came on to blow; whereas, in directing the first operations against the other side of the island, including the Fort den Hack, a channel is opened, in which it is supposed they may lie in safety.

Supposing the two objects of a landing and a roadstead provided for, the remaining naval desideratum is, the being able to establish a line of circumvallation round the island, capable of cutting off all communication, and the introduction of supplies, reinforcements, &c.

This depends on and necessarily supposes the previous reduction of the fortified posts within the island, which are three, viz., Flushing, Rammekens, and Campveere. The landing on the outer coast depending at this season on the contingency of favourable weather, the chance of being disappointed in this, and of being obliged to return without having effected anything, has been suggested as a further objection.

Supposing the intelligence from the Continent should announce that such an effort was to be made against Holland, aided by Prussia, as rendered a further co-operation on our part, in addition to that now proceeding to the Elbe, important to the common cause, and that it was thought desirable, in case no preferable line of operations presented itself, to send an additional force, either to the Elbe, the Weser, or the Ems, into the North of Germany, if the reduction of Walcheren, all circumstances considered, should be deemed more advantageous than the extension of our force in the above quarter, the fleet might, without any apparent abandonment of its purpose, go off Walcheren in the first instance, and take its chance of the weather being such as the service might require: if disappointed in this, it might proceed on to its ulterior destiWith an ulterior purpose, and with instructions not

nation.

to attempt to land, unless under the most favourable appearances of weather, both of the above objections seem, in a great measure, removed. The chance of the attempt not being made on Walcheren at all may be considerable, but the risk of making it, as far as the naval question is concerned, is reduced to the chance of an actual change of weather taking place during the progress of the operation, which would probably be completed during the course of the day, so far as landing and securing an anchorage.

The second branch of the question is that which seems to have been hitherto least examined, viz., what obstacles a corps, having landed near Dorberg, having carried the Fort den Hack, and thus introduced their fleet into the Veer Gate, is likely to meet with in making themselves masters of the rest of the island, and within what time there is reason to expect that this can be accomplished.

This would seem to depend on a few leading facts, not very difficult to be ascertained from persons who have a general knowledge of the island and its defences: 1st. Whether the posts of Flushing, Rammekens, and Campveere can be carried by assault, without bringing up cannon and making a breach. 2nd. Whether these places can be approached at this season but by the great roads. 3rd. Whether the land immediately round the works will now admit of troops taking post on it, and erecting batteries; and, if not, whether, with so small a front as the roads afford, possibly bearing on the strongest and not the weakest part of the defences, a practicable breach is likely to be quickly effected. 4th. What covering the troops can depend on during this interval, and what influence this may have upon their health. 5th. What means of manning the defences the enemy have, in addition to the regular troops, what sailors or burghers. 6th. What the delay is likely to be of receiving small reinforcements from Bergen-op-Zoom, or the Hague, supposing the troops at those places not previously occupied by an attack from the side of Hanover or Westphalia.

In the present reduced state of the enemy's force, the reinforcements which they could supply may possibly be of an extent to improve their actual means of resistance, but cannot be of a magnitude to enable them to act offensively against a corps of 5,000 men once landed. In this view of the question, the attempt seems limited to the chance of failure and retreat, and the injury the troops may experience in point of health: serious loss is not to be presumed.

Upon the whole, it seems necessary that the line of operations to be adopted, after a landing is effected, against the three fortified posts, should be examined and reported on by Sir John Moore and the officer who is to command the artillery, in case the service is ordered to be undertaken. All the requisite preparations should be prosecuted with the utmost activity in the interim, as if the attack was absolutely resolved on.

The next advices from the Continent will probably ascertain whether the Court of Berlin is disposed to concur actively in measures for the expulsion of the enemy from Holland, or whether, if expelled by the British, Russian, and Swedish troops, Prussia would subsequently protect its independence. We may also learn to what extent the allied army in the North of Germany is likely to be carried, either upon the supposition of a Prussian army actively taking the field, or the secondary powers, such as Denmark, Saxony, and Hesse, with the acquiescence of Prussia, entering into subsidiary arrangements with us. The presumable effects of a diversion on the external coast of Holland may depend, in a considerable degree, on the above circumstances, as well as the moment when it may be undertaken with the least risk and the greatest chance of success.

Upon the military estimate, above recommended to be obtained, of the probability of carrying Walcheren, after the landing has been effected, coupled with the motives for reinforcing the British army in the North of Germany, must pro