this operation succeed, and a considerable quantity of schuyts and boats be collected, it might then be investigated how far it was practicable to take advantage of a flowing tide, and, by an embarkation from the point of South Beeveland highest up the river, to attempt Antwerp by a coup de main, landing at the same time smaller bodies of troops at Sandvliet on the right, and some corresponding point on the left bank of the Scheldt, to spread alarm, and to operate as a diversion in favour of the more serious operation.

The flotilla, in its progress up the Scheldt, would necessarily be accompanied by gun-boats, which should attempt to check the forts and batteries on either side of the river. The capture of forts Lillo and Liefkenshoeck would be of great importance to the security of a retreat. Such an operation, it is evident, would be attended with great risk to the force employed, without, perhaps, any adequate security to the attainment of its object at the same time, if executed with decision, immediately after the occupation of South Beeveland, supposing the enemy unprepared, it might have some chance of success.

It is material to observe that the possession of Walcheren is pre-supposed, at least so far as to have the command of such batteries as might affect the entrance of the fleet into the Scheldt; Flushing and Middleburg being, if not captured, placed in a state of blockade. It is, however, to be presumed that the intention of possessing these islands would not be limited to the possibility of this operation, the practicability of which would be ascertained within a few days of landing, such an enterprise not requiring the complete equipment of the army. A continental operation, for which the islands of Zealand were the intended depôt, would render it expedient to possess the island of Tolen, in addition to those named, thereby to obtain a command of the narrow passage between that island and the main land, in the vicinity of Bergen-opZoom.

The disadvantage of such a line of operation upon Antwerp would be the vicinity of that fortress: on the other hand, if it could be masked, the line is shorter, the country more open for cavalry, and presenting altogether fewer obstacles to the march of an army in all its branches, than that between Antwerp and the coast of Flanders. The capture of Bergen-opZoom, by blockade or otherwise, would ensure the tranquil possession of the islands of Zealand, and open views of a nature more extended than it is the object of this paper to consider.

Ostend is 66, and Nieuport 75 miles, in the shortest line from Antwerp. Bergen-op-Zoom is 24 miles only from the latter place. Further, let it be considered that the risk and serious difficulties of the army commence upon the coast of Flanders, where it lands; in the other case, that the army proceeds in comparative security, until it crosses from the island of Tolen. In the Flanders plan, the die is cast at landing, and the risk of losing the army cannot but be run. But, in what is proposed for Zealand, no continental risk arises until the army quits Tolen, before which, time is gained to acquire information; and the operation against Antwerp need not be undertaken, if it is deemed that any very serious consequence is likely to attend its failure.

Lastly, upon the general subject it may be remarked that, should an expedition end with the temporary possession of the islands of Zealand, a considerable diversion to the cause of the Continent would still be effected, from placing an army in a situation from which it alike threatens Holland and Flanders, while it necessarily must capture the enemy's maritime resources in such islands of Zealand as are occupied, and possibly afford the opportunity of attempting from thence his smaller arsenals, upon the left bank of the Scheldt. A. H.

Lieutenant-General Brownrigg to the Commander-in-Chief (Sir David Dundas).1

Horse Guards, June 2, 1809. Sir-In obedience to your orders, directing me to put on paper, in a cursory manner, general circumstances that occur relative to landing an army of 30,000 men, with their equipment, on the Flemish coast, and hence proceeding by land to Antwerp, by the route of Malines; and the probability of their return either by the same route or by any other—I have the honour to state, with the greatest deference, what appears to me would be those circumstances, and the probable result.

I shall suppose the force to consist of 5,000 cavalry, and 25,000 infantry, and that Ostend is seized upon as the most convenient point of debarkation, affording the only place calculated for a depôt on the coast, and from whence the army could most easily commence its operations.

Supposing the army attended by the most contracted proportion of artillery and commissariat train, and taking it for granted that the army would be able to forage itself on the route, that the troops are without tents and blankets, and that the soldiers carry their camp-kettles, the number of horses to be taken with the expedition would be necessarily as follows:

Commissariat train, sufficient to carry four days' bread, being 90 waggons, at four horses each

Hospital waggons, two to every 1,000 men, with four horses each

General officers, general and regimental staff

5,000

1,500

360

240

700

7,800

1 In consequence of the Parliamentary inquiry, in which Mrs. Mary Anne Clarke figured so conspicuously, the Duke of York, early in 1809, resigned the office of Commander-in-Chief, and Sir David Dundas was appointed his successor.

A period of five days would probably elapse before the army found itself in a state to move forward, after having possessed itself of Ostend; as that time would be occupied in landing horses and stores, collecting boats, and making other necessary arrangements.

The route would lie as follows, advantage being taken of the canal at Bruges:

To Ghent, by Belem, keeping the line of the canal

The citadel of Ghent being a respectable fortification, and the town difficult to approach, from the defence that its high ramparts, dikes, and canal afford, its reduction ought not to be calculated upon in less than

Leagues. Days.

61

But if the enemy is enabled to assemble a force sufficient materially to obstruct the progress of the march at particular points, and that the people of the country are hostile, which may also be expected, it is hardly probable that the army can reach Antwerp in less than fifteen days after its landing.

That it may penetrate that distance, under the presumption of the absence of the French armies in Germany, cannot be doubted; but so much time would be afforded to the enemy to assemble troops from Holland and the fortified places immediately in the vicinity of Antwerp, that its being able to effect its object is by no means certain: should it not do so, a retreat by the route which it took in its advance seems nearly impos

sible, as an army must be expected to be formed in its rear of the militia and the gendarmes of the country, and from the garrisons of at least twenty fortified towns of West Flanders, none of which are at a greater distance than seven days' march from Ghent, which would be retaken, and would probably be the point of assembly, while it would be pursued by that which opposed it at Antwerp.

If I am justified in the foregoing reasoning, it appears that the loss of the whole force is risked by such an undertaking. But if the destruction of the enemy's arsenals at Antwerp and his fleet in the Scheldt is the object in view, I am humbly of opinion that this can only be effected by our fleet being able to sail up the Scheldt, having 10,000 troops on board, to land occasionally, to possess forts and batteries placed to obstruct the navigation. Should this be deemed impracticable, the possession of the island of Walcheren seems the most likely step to lead to the accomplishment of what is so much to be desired. By possessing the anchorage of Flushing, the enemy's fleet in the Scheldt would be rendered useless and exposed to such modes of attack as might, from that point, be decisive for its destruction. It would operate as a diversion in favour of the north of Germany, by preventing the Dutch from sending troops to that quarter, and might encourage the spirit of discontent which, it is believed, must still exist in the United Provinces. Probably, 15,000 men would be an ample force for the capture of Walcheren; 10,000 might be sufficient to maintain it, with the assistance of the navy; and a disposable corps would remain to be employed against the enemy in the Scheldt and neighbouring islands, as opportunity offered.

Should it be thought right from thence to attempt the destruction of the arsenals at Antwerp, a force, passing over to South Beeveland, would take possession of Sandfleet, on the main land; and from thence, the distance being about six leagues, might succeed in taking it by a coup de main; or,