much stronger on the right bank of the river. The centre would be at the confluence of the Zezene with the Tagus: it would extend by the right to Lisbon; and, as it would seem impossible to force the right, the greatest strength of the army would be drawn towards Thomar, Ourem, and Leyria, where an intelligent officer would probably find excellent defensive positions in the nature of the country.

Admitting always that the left of his position might be forced, it would retire between Santarem and Peniche, where the ground being studied and reconnoitred beforehand, would probably afford powerful means of repelling an attack. Not far from thence would also be found the excellent position of Alenquer and Torres Vedras, the right of which would be extended to the Tagus, the left to the sea.

To come at last to that lamentable state of affairs, in which the army should be reduced to the necessity of retiring from the position of Alenquer and Torres Vedras, its retreat could only be made upon Lisbon. It would still have in front of the town a fine position, the right supported by the rivulet of Sacarem, the left by the heights of Bellas. This position being placed in a short time in a state of defence, and leaving to the enemy no resource to turn it, or for any diversion, would absolutely oblige him to carry it by main force; an operation extremely delicate, and affording scarcely any probability of success to the troops, in all likelihood not much inured to war, who might risk the attempt.

The mode of defence which we have just considered leaving Alentejo at the disposal of the enemy, we must reasonably apprehend that he would direct his troops and artillery to the occupation of the heights of Almeida, from whence he could do infinite mischief to the town and to the ships: it is, therefore, indispensably necessary to provide against this danger by securing a good position to cover Almeida and to ensure its defence.

The first line herein mentioned, the right of which extends

from the mouth of the Zezene to Lisbon, being supposed to be well established, it is not probable that the enemy will be able to pass to the right bank of the river at this part of its course. He will perhaps attempt it above the mouth of the Zezene, but we should be informed of it, and, moving along the right bank of that river, we should dispute his passage; at least, as far as Pedrogas, a considerable height, where it would become difficult to prevent his effecting a junction with the corps which would come from Upper Beira, and from Oporto and Coimbra.

But, supposing this junction effected, the defence would become precisely the same as that which we have before discussed; and, without waiting for new combinations of defence, if we suppose 2 or 3,000 men between Leyria and Maffra, this force, which could easily concert its operations with the 6,000 men charged with the defence of the right bank of the Tagus, and of the line of Thomar and Leyria, would, in all probability, be sufficient to cover the approaches of the capital, while the troops left in the interior would be occupied in the important duty of preserving tranquillity.

In order, however, to comprehend all the combinations more or less probable, and even most fatal to the army-a duty which must be fulfilled, however painful to the imagination— let us suppose the army compelled to evacuate Lisbon. Traval's division will fall back upon Belem, preserving the heights of Memoria Necessidad, to assist in securing the tranquillity of the town. The army depôts of every description will be withdrawn to the right bank of the river, which it will not have been possible to attack. Sacarem will be the rallying point; and the army, forced to a retreat, will commence it from this point, to retire by Santarem to Thomar; from thence, passing the Zezene at Villa del Rey, it will re-ascend it at Belmonte Guarda and Almeida, by Cortesado, Montegardo, and Atalaya.

We are not aware of any obstacle likely to interrupt the

army in its retreat, which may be made en masse, as far as Thomar; but, when it arrives at this point, or even sooner, it may be divided into several columns, to reach its destination by the Upper Beira. On its reaching Almeida, the army will probably preserve sufficient force to traverse Spain, or, which is still more probable, to effect a junction with the nearest corps of troops.

We only suppose the retreat to be made upon the provinces of Beira and upon Almeida, the only possible retreat, if the river should fall into the power of the enemy; but it is much more likely that, in the contrary event, it would be ordered upon Elvas. The passage of the river, which would have been foreseen, would probably present no difficulty: a considerable number of small vessels would be collected in the river of Sacarem, and along the right bank occupied by the army; the troops entrenched at Almeida would fall back, to cover the debarkation on the left bank; and the army would retreat by the finest road in Portugal, which would afford every hope of its being effected in the best order—an advantage which we are entitled to hope will never be the object of our ambition. VINCENT, Colonel of Engineers.

Draft.

Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-Colonel Doyle.

Downing Street, July 2, 1808. Sir-His Majesty having been pleased to direct that the Spanish prisoners of war in this country should be immediately sent back to Spain, and to such port as the Deputies from Spain may point out, it has been thought expedient that such soldiers and sailors as are fit for service should be selected from the remainder, and conveyed back, in the first instance, although the whole are ultimately to return to Spain.

With this view, and to facilitate the arrangement of this service, I have to acquaint you that you have been selected by his Majesty, as an officer well acquainted with the Spanish

language, to proceed, in the first instance, to Portsmouth, being furnished from hence with authority from the Deputies of the Provisional Government of Spain to explain to the Spanish prisoners the state of affairs in their country, and to rouse in them the inclination of aiding and taking an active part in the noble struggle in which they are engaged.

You will communicate with the Agent of Transports at Portsmouth, who will have the necessary orders relative to their embarkation; and from Portsmouth you will proceed to Plymouth, and there act in a similar manner. The prisoners embarked at Portsmouth will touch at Plymouth; and, as the Spanish Deputies are of opinion that your services will be useful in accompanying these men to Spain, you will proceed with them to the port they may be directed to, and, after delivering them up to such persons as the Deputies may point out, you will, after informing yourself of the state of affairs there, return to England for any further orders that may be given to you. A supply of articles of clothing, &c., as enumerated in the margin, has been demanded by the Deputies, and will be sent in a transport, together with the prisoners, and consigned to your care. Two Spanish serjeants that have been sent for to Portsmouth will accompany you on this service; and, as these have been seen and been instructed by the Deputies, it is hoped that you may derive assistance from them.

An advance of £200 will be made to you, in the first instance you will communicate with me from Portsmouth or Plymouth, if you stand in need of a further supply; and you will keep an account of your expenses for my information.

You will not fail to apply to me, on your arrival at Portsmouth or Plymouth, for any further instructions on any points that may arise, upon which you may require directions. You will be permitted to take Captain Kennedy, of the 96th Regiment, as an assistant to you upon this service. You will communicate, on your arrival at Portsmouth and Plymouth, with the admiral and officer in command of his Majesty's forces,

naval and military, at those stations, who will afford you any assistance that may be necessary in carrying the service into effect. CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Cork, July 7, 1808.

My dear Lord-I arrived here last night, and I find that the 20th Dragoons and the 3,000 tons of shipping for the infantry have not yet arrived. The Irish Commissariat horses for the draught of the artillery are not yet all arrived, and will not be on board till Saturday. I propose to wait till that day for the Dragoons and the additional tonnage, and, if they should not then have arrived, I shall sail with what is ready, and let the rest follow.

By some accident, which, from not having seen the Agent of Transports, I cannot yet account for, we have four transports, as stated underneath, have not been returned to me in any statement from the Transport Board, or from your brother. These vessels have enabled General Floyd to embark the 95th, and make some provision for the embarkation of the 36th. But it appears to me that the whole are too much crowded; and, if the additional tonnage does not arrive to-morrow, I shall settle to leave behind the Veteran Battalion or the 36th, to follow with the additional tonnage and the 20th Dragoons, and give more space to all the troops in the transports. If the additional tonnage should arrive, and I should find that I do not want these four ships, I will leave them here.

Upon a review of your instructions and intentions, and a consideration of the state of affairs in Spain, according to the last accounts, I rather think that I shall, as soon as I have got everything away from Cork, best serve the cause by going myself to Corunna, and joining the fleet off Cape Finisterre or the Tagus. I propose, accordingly, to go on board one of the craft, and I expect to be at the rendezvous before the troops. Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely, ARTHUR WELLESLEY.