Memorandum for consideration, on Measures projected in the present State of Affairs in Spain and Portugal. [BY LORD CASTLEREAGH.] August 10, 1808. The reduction of Dupont's army, the return to Madrid of the remains of Moncey's corps, and the retreat of Bessieres' from Leon and Benevente, indicate the intention of the enemy to be either to concentrate themselves on Madrid, or to fall back on Burgos. The Spanish forces in the southern provinces being thus liberated, and likely to move upon the capital, it is not probable (unless powerful reinforcements should arrive) that the enemy will venture to support Junot in Portugal. Should Junot's retreat have been delayed till the arrival of the whole of the British force in Portugal, the fate of his army may be considered as decided; and the question for the Cabinet to determine will be what is next to be undertaken. Should the French attempt to maintain themselves at Madrid, the mass of force which is likely to close in upon them from Andalusia, Murcia, Valencia, Estremadura, and Gallicia, it is hoped, will compel them, if not by force, at least by famine, to retire from that position. To assist the efforts of the Spaniards, it may, however, be of the utmost consequence to send them from Portugal all the cavalry that can be spared, both British and Portuguese. If a light corps of 8 or 10,000 British infantry would give solidity to their efforts, and serve as a protection to our own cavalry, a corps of this amount might be speedily equipped and advanced, without materially interfering with other operations, perhaps of more importance than a forward movement with the entire of the British army on the side of Portugal, delayed, as it necessarily must be by equipments, and exposed to have the very object for which it is undertaken disappointed by the previous retreat of the enemy from Madrid. Assuming the view above taken of the relative situation of the contending armies to be tolerably correct, in order to embarrass the advance of reinforcements from France, and to accomplish, if possible, the ultimate surrender of the entire French army, it seems of the most pressing importance to give strength, by every means in our power, to the efforts of the northern provinces, particularly to those of the Asturias and the provinces to the eastward, whose being prevailed upon to take up arms in a great measure depends on the presence and protection of a British corps. For this purpose it may be desirable to detach a considerable force from hence of both infantry and cavalry to act in connexion with the Spanish levies in that quarter, so as to menace at once the flank and rear of the enemy's line of operations. This corps may be made by troops from home sufficiently substantive to embarrass the French operations considerably, without prematurely weakening the army in Portugal; but, should all chance of attack on that country disappear, and the force moving against Madrid compel the enemy to retire towards their own frontier, it might then be of moment to embark as large a proportion of the force in Portugal as could be spared from Lisbon without exposing the internal security of the country, and with it to join the British corps in the north of Spain. If, by such a movement, 30,000 British troops, supported by the Spanish armies of Asturias and Aragon, could be brought to act on the line of the enemy's communications, pressed, as they probably would be, in front by the forces which had driven them from Madrid, it is, perhaps, not too much to hope that such divisions of the enemy's army as should endeavour to retire by the Western Pyrenees, might either be compelled to surrender, or to seek a retreat across Spain, under circumstances of extreme danger and embarrassment. Lord Castlereagh has deemed it his duty to bring these considerations under the view of his colleagues, in order that they may now determine on the principle on which the war in Spain Portugal is hereafter to be conducted. The Cabinet will feel that an early decision is the more pressing, as Sir Hew Dalrymple has no precise instructions beyond the occupation of Lisbon, the security of Cadiz, and the reduction of Dupont. It was considered that ulterior measures could not well be decided on till these objects, if not actually accomplished, were in train of being so. The intelligence of the last few days necessarily forces this important question upon the attention of Government. Transports are now ready for embarking a corps of 10,000 men; the proportion for the 5,000 men to embark at Cork has already sailed. The tonnage for the additional 5,000 men, being part of the 10,000 under orders in England, will be completed in about ten days. Cavalry transports for 2,300 horses have been ordered back from Portugal, leaving provision for about 800 horses with the force there, for the purpose of moving the artillery horses of any corps it might be deemed expedient to detach from thence. Exclusive of the above 2,300, there are now taken up at home transports for 534 horses, which supply is increasing daily, but by slow degrees. Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh. Caldas, August 16, 1808. My dear Lord I have but little to add to my letters of this day. We are going on as well as possible—the army in high order and in great spirits. We make long marches, to which they are becoming accustomed; and I make no doubt they will be equal to any thing, when we shall reach Lisbon. I have every hope of success. The affair of the advanced posts of yesterday evening was unpleasant, because it was quite useless, and was occasioned contrary to orders, solely by the impatience of the officers, and the dash and eagerness of the men. They behaved remarkably well, and did some execution with their rifles. VOL. VI. D D I send you the history of our separation from the Portuguese army, that you may communicate upon it with De Souza. If you should determine to form a Portuguese army, you must, if possible, have nothing to do with General Bernardin Freire, or a General Fourgas, who is Chef de l'Etat Major, his adviser. The fact is, they are afraid of the French; they are incapable of making any arrangement to feed their troops, and they are not a little afraid of them. Our artillery horses are not what we ought to have; they have great merit in their way as cart-horses, dragoons, and Irish car-horses, bought for £12 each; but not fit for an army that, to be successful and carry things with a high hand, ought to be able to move. Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely, ARTHUR WELLESLEY. Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh. Camp at Lourinha, August 18, 1808. My dear Lord-My despatches of yesterday and this day will inform you of the state of our affairs here. I never saw such desperate fighting as in the attack of the pass by Lake, and in the three attacks made by the French on our troops in the mountains. These attacks were made in their best style, and our troops defended themselves capitally; and, if the difficulties of the ground had not prevented me from bringing up a sufficient number of troops and of cannon, we should have taken the whole army. La Borde is desperately wounded, and another French General is killed. They say that the French lost 1,500 men, which is a large account; but I think they had more than 6,000 men in the action. As soon as Anstruther shall be landed, I hope that I shall give you a good account of the remainder of the French army; but I am afraid that I shall not gain a complete victory, that is, I shall not entirely destroy them, for want of cavalry. Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely, ARTHUR WELLESLEY. I enclose a letter for Mr. Borough about Lake's death, and one for Lord Longford, to tell him that his brother is quite well. Draft. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple. Stanmore Park, August 20, 1808. Sir-As the moment is not, I trust, remote when your force will be liberated for the objects to which it was, in the first instance, destined, I am anxious to be informed of your sentiments with respect to ulterior operations. Portugal being recovered, our objects seem to be two: 1st, to aid the Spaniards in expelling the enemy; 2nd, in the mode of doing so, to aim, if possible, at the destruction or capture of the whole or a part of the French army. The means we have to apply, (exclusive of 16,000 men in Sicily, 10,000 of which may be deemed disposable) are the 30,000 men assembled in Portugal, and 10,000 men now ready for embarkation here. I speak in this estimate of infantry. Our means of furnishing cavalry are limited principally by the power of transporting them. When the horse transports ordered home arrive, together with those coming forward here, we shall be enabled to send four complete regiments from hence, exclusive of the artillery and staff horses attached to the 10,000 men now under orders, and further supplies of cavalry upon the second return of the same transports. In directing your attention to the points which appear most deserving of investigation, I conceive we may dismiss, for the present, the whole line of coast from the Tagus to the French frontier of Roussillon. With the exception of Barcelona, the enemy appear to hold no position in the south of Spain; and, |