tion of our force, and how little comparatively useful, and possibly dangerous, might be the division of it.

The right light to consider our force in is as a first army of reserve. It is the more necessary to keep it entire, and not to hazard its existence or efficiency by a plan of detachment, when it is recollected that, of the whole combined force, it is the only part that is really disciplined, and, upon military principle alone, superior to the French army. It certainly would be much to be wished that it could be increased to such a force as to be sufficient of itself to cope with the enemy. The position of Valladolid, or any other keeping the communication with Portugal, Corunna, and Gallicia, open, puts the army in complete safety, makes the union of all reinforcements easy, and is equally advantageous for the defence of Spain.

There

I have pressed the advance of the army in Portugal as much as possible. There will be no difficulty in moving the army on, at this season, by small detachments in succession. will be no more want of accommodation or of subsistence. Colonel Lopez will leave this for the English head-quarters the day after to-morrow. He has the requisite authority to make every arrangement, and he takes with him officers and commissaries, who will be stationed on both the routes of Almeida and Badajoz, in readiness to make every preparation, as soon as a decision shall have been made. All the military opinions here are in favour of the Almeida route for the whole. Such is the state of the cross-roads and the direction of the mountains, that the corps going by Madrid could not join the Almeida corps at any point nearer than Valladolid. In the event of misfortune, there would be great risk that the junction would not be made at all.

The gain of 6 or 8000 British in the Spanish army would be trifling, while its loss to the British army would in a material degree affect the consequence and power of it as a solely British army. I trust that the same sentiments will have been entertained by you. I am perhaps more convinced of their truth

by being on the spot, and I only lament that this concentration has not taken place. The reinforcements which cause so much alarm would not be of the same consequence.

I remain, &c.,

W. BENTINCK.

Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Sir John Stuart. St. James's Square, October 13, 1808.

Draft.

My dear Sir-I cannot suffer my official letter of this date to proceed without a private letter, sending you the outline of what we are about.

Portugal being secured, though not altogether in the manner which our hopes led us to expect, we are looking to Spain as the great feature of the war. A case may exist in Italy, which may render the employment of your disposable force there an object of equal policy and perhaps superior duty; but it must be one of a very special nature to supersede the advantage of throwing every effort at this moment into the scale of Spain.

It is impossible to say what a British corps of 8,000 men might not do in the theatre of my Lord Peterborough's wars, where, with a force not superior, he might have probably decided the fate of the Spanish monarchy, had not the evil genius of the Government at home superseded him in the command.

It is my earnest wish, therefore, that you may be enabled to show yourself in that quarter. Spencer's corps did much, by its being moveable along the coast, early in the Spanish struggle, without ever committing itself. Yours might follow the progress of the enemy along that coast, if he should make that one. line of his operations; and you could throw your weight upon any point in which the scales might be balanced.

It might also be of the utmost importance, in case of disaster, to have a corps applicable to the security of Cadiz, the great point, from which the best hopes and interests of the Spanish monarchy must look to retire to South America. It is desirable that a separate provision should exist for this object,

independent of what may be applicable to the defence of Portugal, on which country our army operating in the north of Spain will probably fall back. In the case supposed ever unfortunately arising, should you feel yourself enabled to direct your efforts to Spain, we shall then have a British force of nearly 60,000 men, operating to this one great object—that is, Sir John Moore will have in the North above 40,000, rank and file; we shall have 8,000 in Portugal; and your corps in the South this ought to do much.

I shall not fail to fulfil your wishes, with respect to the recompence which you propose for your friend, whose claims to the Maida medal were disappointed by the letter of the Regulation, and not by any inferiority of merit on his part. I hope my brother conducts himself to your satisfaction.

I am, yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Holyhead, October 19, 1808.

My dear Lord-Although recent events may not encourage you to pay much attention to my military opinions, I will not omit to communicate to you the result of a good deal of reflection on the present situation of the Spaniards.

It appears to me that Bonaparté is about to adopt the means most likely to ensure success in his military operations, and I fear that the Spaniards are not aware of the extent of their danger. We must expect that, towards the close of this month, the French will have an army of 100,000 men assembled at Toulouse; besides those already in Spain, which may be reckoned at 40,000 or 50,000 more.

The attention of the Spaniards appears at present to be directed to drive the latter from their position in Spain before the former can come to their assistance; but the operations to be carried into execution for this purpose must not be of the

same desultory nature with those which they have adopted hitherto. Either the Spaniards must succeed in dislodging the French armies already in Spain, before the end of this month, when Bonaparte's reinforcements will be at Toulouse, or they will be exposed to be attacked by the reinforcements while engaged in the operations against the original army. If the Spaniards cannot accelerate these operations, they should forthwith relinquish them, and should take up a new defensive position, in which they may be able to maintain themselves for some time longer. I believe that the Ebro affords no military position, and that, to stop the progress of the enemy to the southward, they must look to positions in his front, on the mountains of Castille, and on his flank in Biscay, the Montana, and the Asturias.

It is scarcely necessary that I should illustrate what I have above pointed out, as the probable fate of the Spanish armies, if they are not able to accelerate and bring to a conclusion at an early period the operations in which they are now engaged; as it must be obvious to every body, that an army employed in an operation against any particular corps cannot be in the best situation to resist the attack of another corps, of twice the strength of the first, which may be brought against it; but, if any illustration were wanting, I could quote the case of the Austrian ariny, whose defeat at Marengo was occasioned and aggravated by the situation in which it was placed by the operations in which it had been engaged with Massena at Genoa. If it could have brought those operations to a conclusion at an earlier period, or if it had discontinued those operations, and had been placed in a situation in which it would not have been obliged to fight in order to regain its communication with Germany, its defeat at Marengo, if it had occurred, would not have been followed by the loss of all Italy.

So much for the Spaniards, and now for the operations of the British army in Spain. I don't agree with the Marquess de Romagna, that our army ought to begin its operations

from Corunna. The distance from Corunna to the nearest point of the Ebro is above 300 miles; and the British troops will not reach that point till the end of December. It may be true that the Asturias and La Montana are not capable of equipping and supplying an army of the strength of that which will be employed in Spain; but it does not follow, of course, that its equipments and supplies should be drawn only from the country in which it should be stationed; or that, if it had been landed in Asturias, La Montana, or Biscay, Gallicia should not have contributed to the means of its equipment and support. In whatever country it may be landed, commissaries must be employed in those provinces which surround that country, to purchase or hire the means of equipment and movement, and of subsistence; and the choice of the landing-place must depend on other considerations.

In my opinion, a great and leading object of the operations of the French army must be to obtain possession of Biscay, La Montana, Asturias, and Gallicia, and I believe that there is no natural obstacle to their march, and no defensive position from St. Sebastians and Bilbao to St. Andero and Gijon, exepting what the general nature of the country will afford. I mean that there is no chain of mountains, as there is between Asturias and La Montana and Leon, between Castille and Aragon. I am convinced that, as long as those countries can be held, the French can make no progress to the southward, and they would probably be stopped in the mountains of Castille. If these provinces are lost, it is probable that even the positions in the Sierra Morena will not stop them.

If all this be true, it is surely most important to throw the best troops into these important provinces, and that at an early period. If the British infantry should be landed at St. Andero, they are at their station; they could be immediately brought into action; they could be supported from this country; and, if acting in co-operation with the armies of Blake and