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limits, when it experiences this limitation of its activity it also posits a non-ego, and so originates the objective world. The ego, therefore, cannot posit itself without at the same time projecting a non-ego, which, consequently, is in so far the mere creation of the ego."

In like manner the ahankára of Kapila, which is the radical activity' (prakriti) modified, creates out of itself the 'subtile elements' (tan-mátra), the bases of the gross elements-so that the world of sense, formed out of these, is, in this, as in Fichte's system, "the mere creation of the ego." This process is what the fifth of the aphorisms of our text book enunciates as 'development' (sanchara). The reversal of the process-the práti-sanchara of the sixth aphorismthe dissolution of the phantasmagoria-follows, according to Kapila, the Soul's attainment of the knowledge that "neither I am, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist."

It is in the Metempsychosis, we imagine, and in the desire for liberation both from pain and pleasure-without annihilation-that we must look for the reason why Kapila, differing here from Fichte, makes the creativeEgo' to be something else than 'Soul'-which latter, by confounding itself with the active principle, gets entangled in the distresses of life. The motive of the Brahman's enquiry at Kapila, it will be remembered, is this-that he wishes he may not be "again obnoxious to the three sorts of pain"in the shape of disease, damage from natural causes, and affliction through causes supernatural-in other words, that he may escape being born again. Of the metempsychosis, Prof. Wilson (Sánkhya Káriká p. x.) says-" This belief is not to be looked upon as a mere popular superstition; it is the main principle of all Hindú metaphysics; it is the foundation of all Hindú philosophy."

The doctrine of the Metempsychosis is, in fact, the Hindú theory on the great question of the "origin of evil." The theory may be thus stated. Evil exists, and it is not to be supposed that evil befals any one undeservedly. When, therefore, for example, a new-born child, who has had no opportunity of acting either rightly or wrongly, is found suffering evil, it is inferred that the evil is the fruit of evil deeds done in a former state of existence. If you ask how the person became disposed to do evil in that former state of existence, the answer is ready-it was the consequence of evil deeds done in a state of existence still anterior, and so on. You have only now to apply the Newtonian principle-that what is true at every assignable point short of the limit, must be true at the limit-and then, as there is no assignable point

in the existence of evil in past time at which point its existence cannot be accounted for by the hypothesis of antecedent evil-doing, it follows (argue the Hindús) that the existence of evil is accounted for on this hypothesis;-and further, they contend, it is accountable on no other.

If one will take the pains thoroughly to grasp this conception, and to view the matter, as a German would say, from the same stand-punkt as the Hindú, who, holding the past eternity of soul, denies that the regressus in infinitum' here involves any absurdity, he will probably acknowledge that the doctrine of the metempsychosis, however false, is not to be treated as a fiction of the poets, when we are arguing with a Hindú. We try to make the Hindú give up the tenet-and we do well-but we shall also do well to bear in mind that we are calling upon him to give up, without an equivalent, what he has been accustomed to regard as a complete solution of the greatest mystery in the universe-short of the primal mystery of Being' itself. The Hindu's explanation we regard as a delusion, and we must tell him so-but we must beware how we allow it to appear as if we were provided with a substitute. The origin of evil' has not been revealed. The requirement that we shall maintain our entire reliance on the goodness of God, in the absence of such revelation, is one of the trials-rather it furnishes the substance of all the trialsof our faith. This we have to teach-but we have no equivalent solution of the mystery to offer. On this point the words of Whately should be treasured by every missionary among the Hindús. We quote from the preface [p. xii.] of his "Essays on some of the peculiarities of the Christian religion."

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"The origin of evil, again, not a few are apt to speak of, as explained and accounted for, at least in great part, by the Scripture-accounts of sin entering the world, and death by sin; whereas the Scriptures leave us, with respect to the difficulty in question, just where they find us, and are manifestly not designed to remove it. He who professes to account for the existence of evil, by merely tracing it up to the first evil recorded as occurring, would have no reason to deride the absurdity of an atheist, who should profess to account for the origin of the human race, without having recourse to a Creator, by tracing them up to the first pair."

We have taken no notice of such things as the machinery of the triad of qualities,' by means of which Kapila seeks to explain the evolution of the perceptible world from the Absolute'-our design being limited to the exhibiting in some measure how the conceptions involved in

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this perhaps the most ancient of Hindú speculations, correspond with those which have been evolved by some of the boldest speculation of modern Europe. We might have carried out this design in further detail-pointing out, for example, such things as the anticipation of the so often misunderstood Cartesian "cogito ;-ergo sum" in the opening argument of Kapila's sixth chapter-" by the fact that I know,' the existence of soul is established, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary"-but our aim was, by avoiding details, to give the plainest outline of the leading conceptions. From that bare outline it may be readily gathered that the Sánkhya philosophy is not Baconian :and this brings us to another question, the consideration of which we shall remit to a (possibly) subsequent paper on "India and the Baconian Philosophy-how they stand towards one another-and why."

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K.

GREEK ANTHOLOGY.

(From Callistratus.)

Would, oh would that I might be
A beauteous lyre of ivory;
That beauteous boys might bear me
To Dionysian quires!

Would, oh would that I might be
A wreath of fine gold filagree,
That beauteous maid might wear me

Preserving pure desires !

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*"Cotopaxi with its dazzling cone of silvery whiteness-that knows

no change, except from the action of its own volcanic fires."

VOL. III.

PRESCOTT'S PERU.

G

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ERRATUM.-In "Locke's last Summer" fifth Stanza, first line-For "bush flowers," read lush flowers.

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