University of Cincinnati Studies, Volume 8, Part 4University of Cincinnati., 1914 |
Common terms and phrases
absolute abstract idea affirmed answer aqua regia bodies chapter character claim color comprehensive conceive conception concerning conclusion connection considered constructs contention denominations deny dependent determination distinct distinguish doctrine duration Essay essential exists but particulars experience fact further gold Hence Ibid ideas of substances inherent involved Italics knowl knowledge less Locke's meaning measure and boundary mind mixed modes modes and substances moral namely nature noble savage nominal essence notion objects original parcel of matter particular thing perception philosophy positive primary qualities principle of relativity priori problem produce propositions rationalistic real constitution real essence reality reason rela relations relativistic secondary qualities sensationalistic sense senses fail simple ideas simple modes sort specific stances T. H. GREEN term-relation motive theory thought tion triangle truth turn ultimate union unity UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI visible whereby wherein words
Popular passages
Page 92 - The common problem, yours, mine, every one's, Is not to fancy what were fair in life Provided it could be,— but, finding first What may be, then find how to make it fair Up to our means— a very different thing!
Page 94 - With notes and nothing else to say, Is this your sole praise from a friend, "Greatly his opera's strains intend, But in music we know how fashions end!
Page 9 - Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks; and that which his mind is applied about whilst thinking being the IDEAS that are there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas, — such as are those expressed by the words whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and others: it is in the first place then to be inquired, HOW HE COMES BY THEM?
Page 46 - Secondly, we can know the truth, and so may be certain in propositions, which affirm something of another, which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it.
Page 19 - The better to understand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the ideas we have; and that is, that some of them are simple, and some complex. Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and unmixed. For though the sight and touch often take in from...
Page 36 - I confess power includes in it some kind of relation (a relation to action or change,) as indeed which of our ideas of what kind soever, when attentively considered, does not? For our ideas of extension, duration, and number, do they not all contain in them a secret relation of the parts...
Page 38 - ... concerned, nor intended to be meant by any such propositions, than as things really agree to those archetypes in his mind. Is it true of the idea of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right ones ? It is true also of a triangle wherever it really exists. Whatever other figure exists that is not exactly answerable to that idea of a triangle in his mind, is not at all concerned in that proposition.
Page 85 - For, though it may be reasonable to ask, Whether obeying the magnet be essential to iron? yet I think it is very improper and insignificant to ask, whether it be essential to the particular parcel of matter I cut my pen with; without considering it under the name, iron, or as being of a certain species.
Page 33 - Every part of duration is duration too ; and every part of extension is extension, both of them capable of addition or division in infinitum.
Page 44 - We can know then the truth of two sorts of propositions with perfect certainty ; the one is, of those trifling propositions which have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but not instructive.