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accurate perusal of Mr. Wordsworth's remarks on the Imagination, in his preface to the new edition of his poems, I find that my conclusions are not so consentient with his as, I confess, I had taken for granted. In an article contributed by me to Mr. Southey's Ompiana, On the soul and its organs of sense, are the following sentences. “ These (the human faculties) I would ar. range under the different senses and powers: as the eye, the ear, the touch, &c.; the imitative power, voluntary and automatic; the imagination, or shaping and modifying power; the fancy, or the aggregative and associative power; the understanding, or the regulative, substantiating and realizing power; the speculative reason, vis theoretica et scientifica, or the power by which we produce, or aim to produce unity, necessity, and universality in all our knowledge by means of principles à priori ;43 the will, or practical reason; the faculty of choice (Germanice, Willkühr) and (distinct both from the moral will and the choice) the sensation of volition, which I have found reason to include under the head of single and double touch.”:44 To this, as far as it relates to the subject in question, namely, the words (the aggregative and associative power), Mr. Wordsworth's "objection is only that the definition is 100 general. To aggregate and to associate, to evoke and to combine, belong as well to the Imagination as to the Fancy." I reply, that if, by the power of evoking and combining, Mr. Wordsworth means the same as, and no more than, I meant by the aggregative and associative, I continue to deny, that it belongs at all to the Imagination; and I am disposed to conjecture, that he has mistaken the co-presence of Fancy with Imagination for the operation of the latter singly. A man may
43 This phrase, à priori, is in common, most grossly misunderstood, and an absurdity burdened on it, which it does not deserve. By knowledge à priori, we do not mean, that we can know anything previously to experience, which would be a contradiction in terms; but that having once known it by occasion of experience (that is, something acting upon us from without) we then know that it must have pre-existed, or the experience itself would have been impossible. By experience only I know, that I have eyes; but then my reason convinces me, that I must have had eyes in order to the experience.
44 [Literary Remains, i.)
work with two very different tools at the same moment; each has its share in the work, but the work effected by each is distinct and different. But it will probably appear in the next chapter, that deeming it necessary to go back much further than Mr. Wordsworth's subject required or permitted, I have attached a meaning to both Fancy and Imagination, which he had not in view, at least while he was writing that preface. He will judge. Would to Heaven, I might meet with many such readers! I will conclude with the words of Bishop Jeremy Taylor: “He to whom all things are one, who draweth all things to one, and seeth all things in one, may enjoy true peace and rest of spirit."46 46 Jer. Taylor's Vra pacis. Sunday. The First Decad., 8. S. C.]
On the Imagination, or esemplastic power.
O Adam, One Almighty is, from whom
“ Sane si res corporales nil nisi materiale continerent, verissime dicerentur in fluxu consistere, neque habere substantiale quicquam, quemad. modum et Platonici olim recte agnovere.
“Hinc igitur, præter pure mathematica et phantasiæ subjecta, collegi quædam metaphysica solaque mente perceptibilia, esse admittenda : et massæ materiali principium quoddam superius et, ut sic dicam, formale addendum : quandoquidem omnes veritates rerum corporearum ex solis axiomatibus logisticis et geometricis, nempe de magno et parvo, toto et parte, figura et situ, colligi non possint; sed alia de causa et effectu, actioneque et passione, accedere debeant, quibus ordinis rerum rationes salventur. Id principium rerum, an èvredensiav an vim appellemus, non
i Par. Lost. Book v., l. 469.
refert, modo meminerimus, per solam Virium notionem intelligibiliter explicari.”
Ου καταχυθέν.3 DES CARTES,4 speaking as a naturalist, and in imitation of Archimedes, said, give me matter and motion, and I will construct you the universe. We must of course understand him to have meant; I will render the construction of the universe intelligible. In the same sense the transcendental philosopher says; grant me a nature having two contrary forces, the one of which tends to expand infinitely, while the other strives to apprehend or find itself in this infinity, and I will cause the world of intelligences with the whole system of their representations to rise up before you. Every other science pre-supposes intelligence as already existing and complete : the philosopher contemplates it in its growth, and as it were represents its history to the mind from its birth to its maturity.
2 Leibnitz. Op. T. ii., P. ii., p. 53.–T. iii., p. 321.
[The first sentence of this quotation is from the treatise of Leibnitz De Ipsa Natura, sive de Vi insita Actionibusque creaturarum, $ 8, ed. Erdmann. P. i., p. 157:--the second is from his Specimen Dynamicum, pro admirandis Naturæ legibus circa corporum Vires, et mutuas Actiones detegendis et ad suas causas revocandis. Ex Actis Erudit., Lips., ann. 1695. In the second extract, Mr. C. has substituted the word phantasie for imaginationi, and, in the beginning of the last sentence, rerum for formam. He quoted from the edition of Lud. Dutens, a Frenchman resident in Britain, as I learn froin Erdmann's Preface, in which it is mentioned that neither his collection nor that of Raspe, who added posthumous works of Leibnitz, contains all his philosophical writings, and that both the one and the other frustro a bibliopolis quæres, imo in publicis bibliothecis desiderabis. The former however is at the British Museum, presented by himself in 1800. The new edition comprehends only the philosophical works,-the Specimen Dynamicum is classed among the mathematical,but, as Erdmann himself observes, it is often very difficult to judge utrum scriptio aliqua philosophicæ indolis sit an non sit. See Appendix S. S.C.]
3 Synesii Episcop. Hymn. iii., 1. 231.
4 [This first paragraph of Chap. xiii., with the exception of the second sentence, is freely translated from Transsc. Id. first of Section C., p. 147 S.C.]
The venerable sage of Koenigsburg has preceded the march of this master-thought as an effective pioneer in his essay on the introduction of negative quantities into philosophy, published 1763. In this he has shown, that instead of assailing the science of mathematics by metaphysics, as Berkeley did in his ANALYST, or of sophisticating it, as Wolf did, by the vain attempt of deducing the first principles of geometry from supposed deeper grounds of ontology," it behoved the metaphysician rather to examine whether the only province of knowledge, which man has succeeded in erecting into a pure science, might not furnish materials, or at least hints, for establishing and pacifying the unsettled, warring, and embroiled domain of philosophy. An imi. tation of the mathematical method had indeed been attempted with no better success than attended the essay of David to wear the armor of Saul. Another use however is possible and of far
5 [Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen. An attempt towards introducing the idea of negative magnitudes into philosophy, 1763. Works, vol. i., p. 19. S. C.]
6 [The Analyst was published soon after Berkeley's promotion to the see of Cloyne, March 17, 1734. It is said that the Bishop addressed it to Dr. Halley on learning from Mr. Addison that he who dealt so much in demonstration," had brought Dr. Garth into a state of general scepticism or even unbelief on religious subjects, as appeared in the latter's last illness. It's whole title is “ The Analyst ; or, a Discourse addressed to an infidel Mathematician: wherein it is examined whether the object, principles and inferences of the modern Analysis are more distinctly conceived, or more evidently deduced, than religious mysteries and points of faith.” He endeavored to show that the doctrine of fuxions furnished a strong example of mathematical uncertainty and fallacy.]
7 [Cousin represents Wolf as having improved the Leibnitzian philosophy by qualifying it in some directions and filling it up in others. He seems to consider his mathematical method as at once his strength and his weakness--for he says—“Son mérite principal consiste dans l'unité, la solidité, et l'enchainement systématique qu'il sut donner à tout l'ensemble à l'aide de la méthode appelée mathématique, méthode qui, selon lui, n'étoit autre chose que l'application la plus parfaite des lois du raisonnement.” Then after enumerating the defects of his philosophy he sums them up thus—“Enfin” il “ négligea la distinction des caractères propres qui séparent la philosophie et les mathématiques dans leur forme et leur matière.” (Manuel., vol. ii., 175-6.) I suppose that no man before Kant's day had seen this distinction so clearly, and laid it down so determinately, as did the sage of Koenigsburg. S. C.]