those innovations made by time, the greatest of all innovators, according to Lord Bacon,) sits down contented with its ancient state of ignorance and blind credulity, willing to connive at all those gross and glaring absurdities that have long beset it, and been suffered to continue in so many learned and religious societies. But it is hoped, that most of these are already seen through, and will shortly be discarded by the laudable endeavours of the University of Cambridge in particular; which is labouring to reform such abuses, and restore its credit to that first degree in arts, and the exercise preparatory to it, which was once the peculiar glory of this place; and whereupon not only the academical character of each candidate, but likewise his success in life, does still very much depend; well aware that this longdesired piece of reformation can never be secured effectually, but by a careful and impartial distribution of those honours which usually attend the said promotion,-a prospect whereof is found to be the great object of ambition to many of these young men from the very time of their admission into College: to this they often sacrifice their whole stock of strength and spirits, and so entirely devote most of their first four years to what is called taking a good degree, as to be hardly good for anything else, least of all for a proper discharge of that important duty to which the greatest part of them were originally destined, and which ought to be the chief business of their future lives; but to which, alas! they have hitherto been utter strangers. A sad truth! of which we are made very sensible in the mortifying office of examining such persons for holy orders."

All who are conversant with the ecclesiastical history of those times will understand the meaning of the good Bishop, when he deplores the notorious weakness of the human mind, which, instead of exert ing its own native powers of examining and judging in points of faith, is ever apt to shelter itself under some sorry system of opinions acci

dentally thrown in its way," &c.; and the vast prevalence of Arian darkness among his personal friends, from Carlisle to Richmond and Catterick, leaving scarcely one of the intervening places unvisited, will explain the source of the Bishop's dissatisfaction. The quotation is valuable on another account: it serves to show, by implication at least, that the much-traduced mathematics are not, necessarily and per se, inimical to religion; on the contrary, an inference fairly dedu. cible from Bishop Law's lament is, that a devotion to those studies fortifies the youthful mind against yielding too easily to the attacks of heretical pravity. Other remarks, unavoidably brief, connected with the chief purpose for which I have quoted these words, are reserved for another part of this note.

While writing these lines I am reminded of an expression employed by the late Archbishop Markham. The respectable Vicar of a large and populous parish in Yorkshire, with whom it was my happiness in very early life to live on terms of intimacy, had written to his Grace in behalf of a clever Cambridge man, who had taken a high degree, and whom he was desirous of engaging as his Curate, after he had received Deacon's orders. The reply of the Archbishop, dignified, yet playful, was read to me the morning after its arrival; and as two hopeful Oxford graduates had likewise been mentioned in my aged friend's communication, he was told, without any appearance of acrimony, though his Grace was himself an eminent Oxonian, that Cambridge men were usually well qualified to excel as clever excisemen, but that few of them ever became good Divines. There may be some shrewdness in this piece of pleasantry; but it is unaccompanied with those incontrovertible essentials of truth which never mislead, as the reader will perceive when he has perused the candid and sensible observations of that highly-gifted and very amiable man, Archbishop Whately, which form a part of the "Preface" to his celebrated "Elements of Logic," and

which I here subjoin, in proof that Oxford scholars are not insensible of some defects in their system:

"It was doubtless from a strong and deliberate conviction of the advantages, direct and indirect, accruing from an acquaintance with logic, that the University of Oxford, when re-modelling their system, not only retained that branch of study, regardless of the clamours of many of the half-learned, but even assigned a prominent place to it, by making it an indispensable part of the examination for the first degree. This last circumstance, however, I am convinced, has, in a great degree, produced an effect opposite to what was designed. It has contributed to lower, instead of exalting, the estimation of the study; and to withhold from it the earnest attention of many who might have applied to it with profit. I am not so weak as to imagine that any system can ensure great proficiency in any pursuit whatever, either in all students, or in a very large proportion of them: we Sow many seeds to obtain a few flowers but it might have been expected, (and doubtless was expected,) that a majority at least of successful candidates would derive some benefit worth mentioning from their logical pursuits; and that a considerable proportion of the distinguished candidates would prove respectable, if not eminent, logicians. Such expectations I do not censure as unreasonable, or such as I might not have formed myself, had I been called upon to judge at that period when our experience was all to come. Subsequently, however, experience has shown that those expectations have been very inadequately realized. The truth is, that a very small proportion, even of distinguished students, ever become proficients in logic; and that by far the greater part pass through the University without knowing anything at all of the subject. I do not mean that they have not learned by rote a string of technical terms; but that they understand absolutely nothing

whatever of the principles of the science.

"Theology, not being a science, admits of infinite degrees of proficiency, from that which is within the reach of a child, up to the highest that is attainable by the most exalted genius; every one of which degrees is inestimably valuable as far as it goes. If any one understands tolerably the Church Catechism, or even the half of it, he knows something of divinity; and that something is incalculably preferable to nothing. But it is not so with a science: one who does not understand the principles of Euclid's demonstrations, whatever number of questions and answers he may have learned by rote, knows absolutely nothing of geometry: unless he attain this point, all his labour is utterly lost; worse than lost, perhaps, if he is led to believe that he has learned something of a science, when, in truth, he has not. And the same is the case with logic, or any other science. It does not admit of such various degrees, as a knowledge of religion. Of course I am far from supposing that all who understand anything at all of logic stand on the same level; but I mean, what is surely undeniable, that one who does not embrace the fundamental principles of that or any other science, whatever he may have taken on authority, and learned by rote, knows, properly speaking, nothing of that science. And such, I have no hesitation in saying, is the case with a considerable proportion even of those candidates who obtain testimonials, including many who gain distinction. There are some persons (probably not so many as one in ten, of such as have in other respects tolerable abilities) who are physically incapable of the degree of steady abstraction requisite for really embracing the principles of logic or of any other science, whatever pains may be taken by themselves or their teachers. But there is a much greater number to whom this is a great difficulty, though not an impossibility; and who, having, of course, a strong disinclination to

such a study, look naturally to the very lowest admissible standard. And the example of such examinations in logic as must be expected in the case of men of these descriptions, tends, in combination with popular prejudice, to degrade the study altogether in the minds of the generality."

The conclusions deducible from these important remarks of the very learned Archbishop are strikingly in accordance with those of Bishop Law; though the latter speaks in a tone of bitter vituperation concerning “the dull, crabbed system of Aristotle's Logic,” and the former, in a manner the most skilful and judicious, points out the great utility of that system, when properly applied. From each of these famous masters in Israel we may learn, that both mathematics and logic are only instruments; that many youthful students regard them as an end, rather than as means; that others, who are adepts in them, seem to possess no capacity for applying them to suitable and legitimate purposes, but handle them in a manner quite as harmless as that in which an infant plays with a gilded toy; that "these assistants, these comparatively meager instruments, eat up all that is good and wellfavoured' in the sciences themselves; "" that they usurp the place of those very sciences to which they were originally designed to be subservient, and for which station they are sufficiently qualified;" "that these helps for conducting an inquiry through the whole Cyclopædia, instead of continuing to perform such useful offices, are, by the mere force of fashion, set up for a capital branch of it, and the best part of the scholars' time spent in speculating on these same instruments; that" a very small proportion even of distinguished students ever become proficients; " that they have learned by rote a string of technical terms, but understand absolutely nothing whatever of the science" which has long been the chief object of their attention; that "some persons are physically incapable of the degree of steady ab

straction requisite for really embracing the principles of any science; and that "there is a much greater number, to whom this is a great difficulty, though not an impossibility, and who, having a strong disinclination to such a study, look naturally to the very lowest admissible standard."

The preceding admissions are creditable to the honourable and cultivated minds of these distinguished Prelates; but the results which they severally deplore are easily accounted for on the common principles of human nature. Were an accurate and extensive knowledge of polite learning, of what is usually included in the term Belles Lettres, or were an acquaintance with any other science, made the general test of scholarship in our Universities, the change would not abate the evil, nor lessen the causes of complaint. In this view, much might be said in defence of those good and wise men who, at various periods of our literary history, have instituted the several tests which some may seek to alter; but my circumscribed limits prevent me from adverting to this topic, and to others of still greater moment. Norris, however, notwithstanding the occasionally large admixture of Platonism in his lucubrations, has, with great truth of nature, described some of the reasons why all men cannot attain to true learning, and why the poetic axiom is not found to be in all cases correct :

Ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes
Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros.

"However strong and universal is the desire of knowledge, men are generally more in love with the fame and reputation of it, than with the thing itself. But, though the generality of men be so passionately and keenly set upon the fame of being learned and knowing, yet, so little hath nature designed to gratify this ambitious humour, there are but very few that have either a genius and inclination for learning itself, or a capacity of attaining to it.Not an INCLINATION, because there is a great variety in the speculative

as well as moral inclinations of men, one being naturally disposed to this sort of study and another to that; whereas true knowledge is of one determinate kind or nature in general, and consequently must require a certain peculiar frame and disposition of mind.-Not a CAPACITY, because the generality of mankind are known to have but indifferent intellectuals, suited to the exigencies of common life; whereas true knowledge must be supposed to be a thing of uncommon difficulty, and the study of it a work fit only for sublimer wits, the more elevated and awakened part of mankind. Few may succeed well in the search of what they were naturally qualified for; and, having attained to a competency of true knowledge, such as is perfective of the understanding, they find themselves under no tempta tion to place it in anything else, or to bring into credit any other sort of knowledge. But what shall we do with the others? Are they to be persuaded, that they are not of a make for the study and attainment of learning? You will find it tough work to convince them of that. They have but one way left, and that is, to cry up something or other for learning which they are capable of. No matter whether it deserve that name; it is enough if they can reach it. For, those who cannot compass true riches, and yet will have the name and credit of it, are put upon the necessity of coining and counterfeiting. True learning ought to be placed in the knowledge of necessary truth, in the comprehension of those arts and sciences whose foundations are not arbitrary, but stable and immutable, and in understanding the eternal and unchangeable laws and measures of reason and consequence. He therefore is the truly learned and knowing man, who has furnished his mind with bright and clear ideas, lodged them orderly and regularly in his head, and settled the relations and consequences of one to another; he that is able to think clearly and distinctly, (for so much a man knows as he distinctly understands, and no more,) to judge truly

and solidly, and to reason dependently and consequentially. But the world does not esteem him a learned man, whose learning has cleared his understanding, who is arrived to clearness and distinctness of conception, and is a thorough master of notion and discourse. No; it will cost great pains, great labour of mind, and anxiety of thinking, to arrive to this pitch. Nor will all the pains in the world do, unless a man be naturally made for it, unless he be of a notional complexion, and has had his head cast in a metaphysical mould: whereupon, this attainment is like to be the lot of

a very few. This, therefore, must not be learning; but something else must, that lies more within common reach, though of no real moment to the perfection of the understanding: such are contingent truths; and yet learning is generally 'placed in the knowledge of these. It is reckoned a notable point of learning, to understand variety of languages. This alone gives a man a title to learning without one grain of sense. Words are purely in order to thought and sense; and therefore are of no further value than as they serve as helps ei ther to learn or to communicate the other. To affect them therefore for themselves, is to turn the means into the end. Another thing there is which passes for wonderful learning, and that is our sophistical way of disputation. I think Monsieur Gassendi, in his Paradoxical Exercitations, has given us a true image and representation of it, when he tells of the six eggs which the countryman ordered to be provided for the entertainment of his son, when he returned home from the University. The father would have him boil six eggs: two for him, two for his mother, and two for himself. But the son, having an itch to show a proof of his scholastic improvement, boiled but three. When his father asked him why he had not provided six: Why,' says he, are there not here six? 'How so?' says the father, 'I can see but three.' "No!' replies the young sophister is not here

one?' (telling them out ;) and is not there two? and is not there three? And do not ONE, Two, and THREE make six?' 'Well,' says the father, then I will take two, and your mother shall have one, and you shall have the other three!' And I now think all was right and as it should be. The son, for his part, gave a true specimen of his University-learning and the father served him very well, and in his kind; that is, showed him trick for trick. As far as I could ever observe for thirteen years together, this great mystery of disputation is nothing else but a mere tossing of words backward and forward, sometimes without any meaning, which is canting; and sometimes with more meanings than one, which is punning. There are many other things [besides a knowledge of history, chronology, &c.] which the unaccountable humour of the world has turned up for learning, for which ignorance will never be the better, and which wisdom does not need. A well-read man signifies the very same as a learned man, in most men's dictionaries; and by WELL-READ they do not mean one that has read well, that has cleared and improved his understanding by his reading, but only one that has read a great deal, though perhaps he has puzzled and confounded his notions by doing so. Thus again it goes for learning, to be acquainted with

solved upon it, to quote such authors as he never read nor saw.

"Attention, or application of mind, to the intelligible world, the world of truth, is a virtual mental prayer, an act of intellectual devotion to the Father of Lights,' and such as, if more expressly uttered and unfolded, bespeaks him in the words of the royal supplicant : Give me wisdom, that sitteth by thy throne!' This is to take hold of essential truth nakedly as it is in itself; it is to fix the eye of the mind upon the Intellectual Sun, upon Him who is Substantial Truth, and the Light of the world. So a man that casts a short, careless glance upon the galaxy, sees only a confused whiteness arising from the numerous mixture of little splendours. But when the same person fixes his eye with steadiness and delay of application, he begins to discern something more distinctly; a new star ever and anon arises under his inspection, not discovered before; and still the longer and harder he looks, the more he discerns; till at length he has discovered as much as he can well attend to at once, and has satiated his faculty with the brightness and multitude of light. This was the method of the first inventors of arts and sciences, who made their way into the coasts of learning by mere dint of thinking; and this is the very method that has been used by the greatest improvers of them ever since: such as Bacon, Boyle, Descartes, Galileus, Mersennus, Digby, Malebranche, Poiret, and (whom I name with particular honour and reverence) our excellent friend Dr. More. And I dare prophesy, that, if ever any extraordinary advancement be for the future made in the world, it will be done by thinking. Whereas purity of heart and life is another method, it is a sad as well as a true observation, that this is neglected among the generality of those few that addict themselves to the cultivation and improvement of their minds. Men famed for learning are oftentimes as infamous for living; and many that study hard to furnish their heads,

K