Ea enim, quæ de Paradiso in Scriptura dicuntur, per modum narrationis historica proponuntur (in accordance with his hermeneutical principle, see vol. 1. § 164, note 4). On the other hand, Scotus Erigena boldly raised doubts as to the literal interpretation of the narrative (De Divis. Natura iv. 15, p. 196.), and regarded it as an ideal description of the happiness which would have been the lot of mankind, if our first parents had resisted temptation: Fuisse Adam temporaliter in Paradiso, priusquam de costa ejus mulier fabricaretur, dicat quis potest...... Nec unquam steterat, nam si saltem vel parvo spatio stetisset, necessario ad aliquam perfectionem perveniret....... p. 197 Non enim credibile est, eundem hominem et in contemplatione æternæ pacis stetisse et suadente femina, serpentis veneno corrupta, corruisse. See Baur, Versöhnungslehre, p. 127; Lehre d. Dreieinigkeit, ii. 306, and the remarkable interpretation of Luke, x. 30, there cited. [Non ait; homo quidam erat in Jerusalem et incidit in latrones. Nam si in Jerusalem, hoc est in paradiso, humana natura permaneret, profecto in latrones, diabolum scilicet satellitesque ejus, non incurreret. Prius ergo descendebat de paradiso, suæ voluntatis irrationabili motu impulsus, et in Jericho præcipitabatur, hoc est, in defectum instabilitatemque rerum temporalium. De Divis. Naturæ, iv. 15.]

* This led to a multitude of absurd questions concerning the nature and durability of their bodies, e. g. why the man had been created before the woman? and why the latter had been made out of the rib of the former? whether, and in what manner, the propagation of the race would have taken place, if our first parents had continued in their state of innocence? whether their children would have inherited their original righteousness? whether more males or more females would have been born? "What dreams! How could men so sedate and grave as monks were, or ought to have been, waste so much time upon the examination, discussion, and defence of such questions? In the Summa of Alexander Hales, this subject fills five pages in folio." Cramer, vii. p. 493.

• The former opinion was adopted by Scotus Erigena, Sent. Lib. ii. Dist. 39.; Bonaventura, Sent. Lib. ii. Dist. 29. Art. ii. Qu. 2; comp. Brev. iii. 25. Cent. ii. § 2; Hugo of St. Victor, de Sacram. Lib. i. p. 6; Alexander Hales, P. ii. Qu. 96: comp. Cramer, vii. p. 494 ss. Marheineke, Symbolik iii. p. 13 ss. On the contrary, the position of Thomas Aquinas (P. 1. Qu. 95. Art. 9.), that man, prior to the fall, had never been in the condition of the pura naturalia, but, from the moment of his creation, had possessed the donum superadditum, which belonged, therefore, properly to his very nature, was more nearly allied to the view of the later Protestant theologians. See Cramer and Marheineke 1. c., and on the other side Baur, Symbolik, p. 34. [On Anselm's doctrine of the divine image, see F. R. Hasse, in Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theologie, 1835. On this whole distinction of pura naturalia and dona gratiæ see Neander, Hist. Dogm. 576.] • John Damascenus adhered to the distinction drawn by the Greek fathers, De Fide Orthod. ii. c. 12.-Hugo of St. Victor, De Sacram. Lib. i. P. c. 2. distinguished:......Imago secundum rationem, similitudo secundum dilectionem, imago secundum cognitionem veritatis, similitudo secundum amorem virtutis, vel imago secundum scientiam, similitudo secundum substantiam...

...Imago pertinet ad figuram, similitudo ad naturam, etc. Hugo, however, restricted the image of God to the soul, and decidedly excluded the body; for the passages, see Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, p. 94, 95.-Peter Lombard made a somewhat different distinction (Sent. Lib. ii. Dist. 16. D.). by num bering the dilectio among those qualities which form the image (memoria, intelligentia et dilectio); he conceived the resemblance to God to consist in the innocentia et justitia, quæ in mente rationali naturaliter sunt. He also expressed himself more briefly thus: Imago consideratur in cognitione veritatis, similitudo in amore virtutis. In agreement with Hugo of St. Victor, he asserted, Imago pertinet ad formam, similitudo ad naturam.* [On the Lombard's views, see Neander, Hist. Dogm. 509: he distinguished between the dona naturalia, and the dona gratiæ; the former consist in the purity and vigor of all the powers of the soul; left to himself, however, man could do only evil. The aid originally given to man he thus defines: Illud utique fuit libertas arbitrii ab omni labe et corruptela immunis atque voluntatis rectitudo et omnium naturalium potentiarum animæ sinceritas atque vivacitas. On Aquinas and Alexander of Hales, see Neander, p. 574, sq.]

First of all was man's dominion over the earth, and over the animal kingdom: Thomas Aquinas, P. i. Q. 96; Cramer, vii. p. 499, 500. Questions were raised, such as, would Adam have possessed all virtues, and in what manner, if he had not sinned? In what respect may he be said to have possessed, e. g., modesty, since it did not exist until sin entered into the world? He did not possess it actually, but habitually (i. e., he possessed the disposition to it). Did man, in his state of innocence, possess passions and affections? Yes, viz., such as refer to that which is good; they were, however, moderate and harmonious. Could one man have ruled over others? No; nevertheless a superiority of wisdom and righteousness might have existed, etc. The definitions of the earlier scholastics, such as Anselm of Canterbury (Cur Deus Homo II. 1., rationalis natura justa est facta, ut summo bono, i. e., Deo fruendo beata esset), as well as of the mystics, both before and after the times of Thomas Aquinas, were simpler, or had, at least, regard rather to what is religious and moral. Thus, Hugo of St. Victor conceived the original excellency of man, in point of knowledge to consist, 1. In cognitione perfecta omnium visibilium; 2. In cognitione creatoris per præsentiam contemplationis seu per internam inspirationem; 3. In cognitione sui ipsius qua conditionem et ordinem et debitum suum sive supra se, sive in se, sive sub se non ignoraret; see Liebner, p. 410, note 61. In reference to the will of man, there existed, previous to his fall, two blessings, the one an earthly one, viz., the world; and the other a heavenly one, viz., God. The former was freely given to man, the latter he was to obtain by his own

*The mystics, and those preachers of the middle ages who held similar views, endeavored to point out the image of God in the outward form by the most singular illustrations. God, said Berthold (quoted by Kling, p. 305, 306., Wackernagel Lesebuch, p. 678.), has written under the eyes of man, that he has created him, "with flourishing letters." Ilis two eyes correspond to the two letters o in the word homo. The curved eye-brows above, and the nose between the eyes, form the letter m; h is a mere accessory letter. The ear is the letter d, "beautifully circled and flourished;" the nostrils form a Greek ɛ, beautifully circled and flourished;" the mouth forms an i, "beautifully circled and flourished." All together form the phrase "homo Dei."

แ

merits. In order that man might retain the earthly blessing, and acquire the heavenly one, the præceptum naturæ was given him for the one, the præceptum disciplinæ (i. e., the command not to eat the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil) for the other. He possessed the former by nature, but received the latter from without. Accordingly, man could guard against negligence (contra negligentiam), in respect to the external command, by using caution, and by his own reason; but God protected him against violence (contra violentiam). Compare Gerson, De Meditatione, Cons. 2, p. 449, ss. (quoted by Hundeshagen, p. 42): Fuit ab initio bene conditæ rationalis creatura talis ordo ordinisque tranquillitas, quod ad nutum et merum imperium sensualitas rationi inferiori et inferior ratio superiori serviebat. Et erat ab inferioribus ad superiora pronus et facilis ascensus, faciente hoc levitate originalis justitia subvehentis sursum corda.—In the writings of John Wessel we only meet with occasional and disconnected statements concerning the original condition of man; the profoundest and most important is in De Orat. xi. 3, p. 184 (quoted by Ullmann, p. 239); "In the state of innocence there existed a necessity for breathing, eating, and sleeping; and, to counteract the dissolution which threatened man, he was permitted to eat of the fruit of the tree of life;" i. e., though man was subject to certain natural restrictions, he was, nevertheless, free from pressing wants, from the necessity of suffering, of disease, and death; for the partaking of the fruit of the tree of life secured his immortality.

• The statements of Anselm have more direct reference to the nature of the devil, but are also applicable to the will of created beings in general (Hasse, ii. 441), De Casu Diaboli, c. 2-6. Hasse, ii. 399, sq.

7

Hugo of St. Victor assumed the existence of three or four kinds of liberty: 1. Man, in his original state, possessed the power to sin, and the power not to sin (posse peccare et posse non peccare); in this is included assistance to do good (adjutorium in bono), but an infirmity to do evil (in-, firmitas in malo), though in such a manner as neither to compel him to do good, nor forcibly to restrain him from evil. 2. In the middle state of man* after the fall the case is as follows:-a, Prior to his restoration (ante reparationem), man lacks the divine grace (assistance) to do good, and the infirmity to evil degenerates into a propensity to evil, i. e., posse peccare et non posse non peccare. (Though the idea of liberty is not thereby entirely set aside, it is at least greatly weakened.) After his restoration (redemption), but before he is established in goodness, man possesses grace to do good, and infirmity to do evil, i. e., posse peccare et posse non peccare (the former because of his liberty and infirmity, the latter because of his liberty and by means of assisting grace.) 3. In the highest state of perfection, there is both the possibility not to sin, and the impossibility of sinning (posse non peccare et non posse peccare), not because the liberty of the will, or the lowliness of nature, is abolished, but because man will never be deprived of confirming grace, which admits no sin; Cap. 16 (see Liebner, p. 403). In the first condition God shares with man, in the second man shares with the devil, in the third God receives all: Cap. 10, ibid.-In Raimund of Sabunde, too, the ab

* We here anticipate (for the sake of the connection, and to give all he says at once) points considono 31.

stract notion of (or destination to) freedom is distinguished from its actual use (connected with the distinction between the image of God, and resemblance to God, comp. note 4), Tit. 239: Item quia homo debuit ita formari, ut posset acquirere aliquid bonum, quod nondum sibi datum fuerat. Quamvis enim perfectus esset in natura, tamen nondum erat totaliter consummatus, quia aliquod majus adhuc habere poterat, sed non nisi voluntarie et non per violentiam.... Si enim homo fuisset totaliter completus et transmutatus et consummatus in gloria, ut amplius nihil posset ei dari, jam per ipsum liberum arbitrium non posset aliquid lucrari nec mereri sibi. Et sic in natura hominis perfecta duo status sunt considerandi; scilicet status, in quo posset mereri et lucrari per ipsum liberum arbitrium, et status, in quo esset completus et consummatus in gloria; et sic est status meriti et status præmii. ....Et ideo convenientissimum fuit, quod Deus dedit homini occasionem merendi, nec in vanum esset creatus in statu merendi. Et quia nihil est magis efficax ad merendum, quam pura obedientia seu opus factum ex pura obedientia et mera.... convenientissimum fuit, quod Deus daret præceptum homini, in quo pura obedientia appareret et exerceretur....Et quia magis apparet obedientia in præcepto negativo, quam affirmativo, ideo debuit esse illud mandatum prohibitivum magis quam affirmativum....Et ut homo maxime esset attentus ad servandum obedientiam et fugiendum inobedientiam, et firmiter constaret ei de voluntate Dei mandatis, conveniens fuit, ut Deus apponeret pœnam cum præcepto, et talem pœnam, qua non posset cogitari major, scilicet pœnam mortis. Comp. Matzke, Theol. des Raim. von Sabunde, 79.—John Wessel defined the liberty which man possessed in his original state, so as to ascribe to him the unlimited power of attaining and performing, without the assistance of others, or the influence of education, that which the idea of humanity implies, viz., such a perfection as elevated him to communion with God: see Ullmann, p. 240, 41.

§ 176.

THE FALL OF MAN, AND SIN IN GENERAL.

One of the leading questions, most debated, was, in what the fall of our first parents consisted? also, in what the nature of sin in general consists? Questions of secondary moment, such as, whether Adam's sin or Eve's were the greater? were only occasionally made the subject of discussion.' Even during the present period there were some, and towards its close Agrippa of Nettersheim in particular, who asserted that the sin of the first man consisted in the awakening of his carnal' propensities, and who endeavored to establish their opinion by the aid of allegorical interpretation. But the prevailing view of the church divines was, that the sin is not to be sought in one single act, but in the disobedience of man to God, which took its rise principally in pride.' After the example of Augustine, the definitions respecting the nature of sin were for the

most part negative. Hugo of St. Victor endeavored to explain the nature of sin from the conflict of two tendencies in man, the one of which (appetitus justi) leads to God, the other (appetitus commodi) to the world. The latter propensity is not evil in itself, but the abandonment of the right medium is the cause of sin. The mystics supposed sin to consist in this, that man, as a creature, strives to obtain independence; and the author of the work entitled "Deutsche Theologie," carried this notion so far as to say, that in this respect the fall of man is like that of the devil. The further enumeration and classification of particular sins, their division into sins mortal and venial, belong rather to the history of ethics, than to that of doctrines."

1

1 Anselm, De Peccato Orig. c. 9. Though Eve first disobeyed the divine command, Adam, as the real father of the human race, is also the father of sin. Many of the reasons urged on either side, are to be found in the works of Peter Lombard (Lib. ii. Dist. 22), and Thomas Aquinas, P. ii. Qu. 163, Art. 4. Bonaventura (Brevil. iii. 3, 4) divides the guilt between the two, but says that the punishment was double in the case of the woman. On the contrary, according to Agrippa of Nettersheim, Adam sinned knowingly, Eve was only misled (Opp. T. ii. p. 528); see Meiners Biographie, p. 233. According to Tauler (Predigten, i. p. 61), theologians assert that we should have suffered no harm, if Eve alone had eaten of the fruit. Concerning the farther question of the scholastics, whether sin would have been communicated to Eve if Adam had transgressed the divine command before the crea tion of his wife, compare Cramer, vii. p. 534, ss. On the singular opinions of Pulleyn, see ib. vol. vi. p. 481, ss.

2

Disputatio de Orig. Pecc. in Opp. T. ii. p. 553, ss., quoted by Meiners, 1. c. p. 254, note 3 (he regarded the serpent as the membrum serpens, lubricum.) The opinion according to which sin consists in the first instance in sensuality was most decidedly opposed by Anselm, De Pecc. Orig. c. 4.: Nec isti appetitus, quos Ap. carnem vocat (Gal, v.)....justi vel injusti sunt per se considerandi. Non enim justum faciunt vel injustum sentientem, sed injustum tantum voluntate, cum non debet, consentientem. Non eos sentire, sed eis consentire peccatum est.

'John Damascenus De Fide Orth. ii. 30. (in calce): 80ɛv кal OεótηTOS ἐλπίδι ὁ ψεύστης δελεάζει τὸν ἄθλιον, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον τῆς ἐπάρσεως ὕψος ἀναγαγὼν, πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον καταφέρει τῆς πτώσεως βάραθρον.-Αcording to Anselm, all self-will of the creature is an injury to the majesty of God (treason); De Fide Trin. cap. 5 (Hasse, ii. 306): Quicunque propria voluntate utitur, ad similitudinem Dei per rapinam nititur, et Deum propria dignitate et singulari excellentia privare, quantum in ipso est, convincitur.— Peter Lombard, Lib. ii. Dist. 22. Thomas Aquinas, P. ii. Qu. 163. Never theless sensuality (i. e., the desire after the forbidden fruit) was also men tioned as a subordinate principle; see Tauler's Predigten i. p. 51, 79% Cramer, vii. p. 524.

• John Damascenus, Lib. ii. c. 30 : 'Η γὰρ κακία οὐδὲν ἑτερόν ἐστιν, εἰ