μὴ ἀναχώρησις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.—John Scotus Erigena looked upon sin from the negative point of view, by comparing it to a leprosy which infects. humanity, but which is to be removed by divine grace (De Div. Nat. v. 5, p. 230), and then continues as follows: Magisque dicendum, quod ipsa natura quæ ad imaginem Dei facta est, suæ pulchritudinis vigorem integritatemque essentiæ nequaquam perdidit, neque perdere potest. Divina siquidem forma semper incommutabilis permanet; capax tamen corruptibilium pœna peccati facta est.... quicquid vero naturali corpori ex concretionibus elementorum et animæ ex sordibus irrationabilium motuum superadditum est, in fluxu et corruptione semper est. In his opinion, "Sin is only a vanishing and self-abolishing element, and therefore has not the significancy of a moral act; Baur, Versöhnungslehre, p. 135; Comp. also Baur, Trinitätslehre, ii. 305: "Sin is to him not something accidental, originating in time, but original in creation and in human nature." (A view allied to pantheism).-On the other hand, Abelard (in his treatise Scito Teipsum), attaching particular importance to the act as performed with the conscious approval of the person acting, makes sin (formally) depend on the intention with which anything is done; see the extracts given by De Wette, Sittenlehre iii. p. 124, ss. Anselm's definitions of sin are also of a negative character; Cur Deus Homo i. 11: Non est itaque aliud peccare, quam Deo non reddere debitum; De Conceptu Virginali c. 27: justitiæ debitæ nuditas; also in De Casu Diaboli, c. 1. See Hasse, ii. 394 sq. Münscher ed. by Von Cölln, i. p. 121, ss. [On Abelard, see Neander, Hist. Dogm. 511.]

According to Hugo of St. Victor (Lib. i. P. vi. c. 1-22, quoted by Liebner, p. 412, ss.), the first sin was the twofold disobedience to the law of nature and the law of discipline. Having laid that basis, he proceeds to a further scientific examination of the nature of sin. He supposed it to consist in the discord existing between the appetitus justi, and the appetitus commodi, both of which are innate. Man abandoning the right medium, desiring the higher good, rising above himself, and striving, in the pride and presumption of his heart, both to be equal to God, and to possess him before the appointed time, fell from his state of innocence. Thus it happened that he also lost the right medium in his desires after the inferior good; for as the mind of man, which held likewise the reins of the flesh, did not succeed in its higher efforts, and fell, as it were, out of the right medium, he abandoned also the reins of the flesh, and let it go without measure and precaution, in consequence of which, all external evils broke in upon him (transgressio superioris et inferioris appetitus.) The former loss was accordingly culpa, the latter both culpa and pœna; the one was a loss for the spirit, the other for the flesh, since man retained the irregular appetitus commodi without obtaining the commodum itself. Abandoning the appetitus justi, man lost at the same time the justitia, which is not only inseparable from it, but also consists in it; nothing was left to him but the unsatisfied appetitus commodi, which is here on earth a foretaste of hell, a necessitas concupiscendi, etc., c. 11-22. "From what is said above, it follows that evil does not consist either in the object desired (for man always desires a good even in the concupiscentia), or in the act of desiring, in putting the faculty of desire into exercise (for it is a gift of God), but only in

not keeping the proper medium in our desires," Liebner 1. c. Hugo of St. Victor also endeavored to give an answer to the question, how the first sin could possibly have been committed by one who was created good? Adam could not have sinned, either nolens or volens. He only ceased to desire the good (justum velle desiit), c. 121. Conformed to this are his negative definitions, c. 16: Et ideo malum nihil est, cum id, quod esse deberet, non est; and Lib. i. P. v. c. 26: Peccatum nec substantia est, nec de substantia, sed privatio boni (See Liebner, p. 415).-Concerning the views of Wessel on the nature of sin (want of love) compare Ullmann, l. e. p. 241.

• Deutsche Theologie, cap. 2. "The Scriptures, faith and truth, say, that sin is only the turning of the creature from the unchangeable good to the changeable, i, e., from the perfect to the imperfect and incomplete, and principally to himself. Now observe, when man puts himself in possession of anything that is good, or appropriates it as real being (i. e., when he imagines that he has his being from himself, and when he wants to be something, while he is nothing); or as life (i. e., when he imagines that he has life in himself); or as knowledge (i. e., when he imagines that he knows much and can do much); in short, when he endeavors to obtain all that which is called good, imagining that he is the same, or that the same belongs to him, in all such cases he rebels against his nature. For what else did the devil, or what was his rebellion or his fall, if not that he thought himself something, and presumed to be something, and pretended that something belonged to him? This presumption to be something, his self-hood [Ich], (i. e., his self-love), his me [Mich], (i. e., his self-will), his to me [Mir], (i. e., his self-esteem), and his mine [Mein], (i. e., his own good), were, and are still, his rebellion and his fall." Cap. 3: "What else did Adam do than what Lucifer does? They say, that Adam fell and was lost, because he ate the apple. I say: He fell by accepting, assuming, or appropriating to himself that which belonged to God, viz., by his ego (i. e., his self-love), by his me (i. e. his selfwill), by his mine (i. e., because of the good which he had usurped), and by his to me (i. e, for his own honor, wisdom, etc.) Though he had eaten seven apples, if there had been no appropriation or assumption, he would not have fallen; as soon as he appropriated the apple as his, he fell, even though he had never bitten it."

'De Wette, christliche Sittenlehre iii. p. 147, ss. (after Thomas Aquinas.)

§ 177.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIRST SIN. ORIGINAL SIN. FREEDOM
OF THE WILL.

The more intimate the supposed connection between the primitive state of man and the justitia originalis, the greater was the fall. The theologians of the Greek Church contented themselves with' believing in a deterioration of the moral power of man, and retained the earlier notions concerning his liberty.' In the Western Church

almost all the schoolmen followed Augustine, though some of them adopted opinions which, in many essential points, differed from his fundamental principles. Thus Abelard, among the earlier scholastics, understood by hereditariness of the first sin, not the sin itself, but its punishment. Several of the later schoolmen also, especially Duns Scotus and his followers, manifested a leaning toward Semipelagianism, while Thomas Aquinas and his school adhered more strictly to the definitions of Augustine. The mystics in general bewailed the entire depravity of the old man (Adam), but avoided indulging in subtile definitions.' And, lastly, the evangelical theologians, previous to the age of the Reformation, such as John Wessel, also looked upon the unregenerate as the children of wrath, though they made a distinction between the responsibility for original sin and for actual transgression.*

* John of Damascus, De Fide Orth. ii. c. 12, p. 178:* Εποίησε δὲ αὐτὸν φύσει ἀναμάρτητον καὶ θελήσει αὐτεξούσιον· ἀναμάρτητον δέ φημι, οὐχ ὡς μὴ ἐπιδεχόμενον ἁμαρτίαν (μόνον γὰρ τὸ θεῖον ἁμαρτίας ἐστὶν ἀνεπίδεκτον), ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἐν τῇ φύσει τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν ἔχοντα, ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει δὲ μᾶλ λον· ἤτοι ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντα μένειν καὶ προκόπτειν ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, τῇ θείᾳ συνεργούμενον χάριτι, ὡσαύτως καὶ τρέπεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦ, καὶ ἐν τῷ κακῷ γίνεσθαι, τοῦ Θεοῦ παραχωροῦντος διὰ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον. Οὐκ ἀρετὴ γὰρ τὸ βίμ γινόμενον. Comp. c. 22, p 187-88, c. 24, 27...... Further, c. 27, 194-95 : Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης παρυφίσταται τῷ λογικῷ τὸ αὐτεξού σιον ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἔσται λογικὸν, ἢ λογικὸν ὂν κύριον ἔσται πράξεων καὶ αὐτεξούσιον. "Οθεν καὶ τὰ ἄλογα οὐκ εἰσιν αὐτεξούσια· ἄγονται γὰρ μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, ἤπερ ἄγουσι· διὸ οὐδὲ ἀντιλέγουσι τῇ φυσικῇ ὀρέξει, ἀλλ' ἅμα ὀρεχθῶσί τινος, ὁρμῶσι πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν. Ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος, λογικὸς ὢν, ἄγει μᾶλλον τὴν φύσιν ἤπερ ἄγεται· διὸ καὶ ὀρεγόμενος, εἴπερ ἐθέλοι, ἐξου σίαν ἔχει ἀναχαιτίσαι τὴν ὄρεξιν, ἢ ἀκολουθῆσαι αὐτῇ. Οθεν τὰ μὲν ἄλογα οὐδὲ ἐπαινεῖται, οὐδὲ ψέγεται· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐπαινεῖται καὶ ψέγεται. C. 30, p. 198 : (ὁ θεὸς) οὐ γὰρ θέλει τὴν κακίαν γίνεσθαι, οὐδὲ βιάζεται τὴν ἀρετήν. Notice the usage of παρὰ φύσιν, and κατὰ φύσιν, ibid. p. 100, and compare it with Augustine's usage of natura.-In his opinion, the effects of the fall consist in this, that man is θανάτῳ ὑπεύθυνος καὶ φθορᾷ καὶ πόνῳ καθυποβληθήσεται καὶ ταλαίπωρον ἕλκων βίον (ibid. In the moral aspect man is γυμνωθεὶς τῆς χάριτος καὶ τὴν πρὸς θεὸν παῤῥησίαν ἀπεκδυσάμενος (Lib. iii. c. 1.) Comp. iv. 20.—John Damascenus was also followed by the rest of the Greek theologians, Theodore Studita, Theophylactus, Euthymius Zigabenus, Nicetas Choniates, and Nicolas of Methone. The views of the latter (taken from his Refut.) are given by Ullmann, 1. c. p. 86, ss. He also laid great stress upon the freedom of the will, and held that the divine image was only obscured by the fall.

Anselm expressed himself in very strict terms concerning the imputa

*The passage in question refers, in the first instance, to the first man, but, as may be seen from the context, still admits of a general application in the case of all men.

tion of original sin, to the exclusion of all milder views, De Orig. Pecc. c. 3: Si vero dicitur originale peccatum non esse absolute dicendum peccatum, sed cum additamento originale peccatum, sicut pictus homo non vere homo est, sed vere est homo pictus, profecto sequitur: quia infans, qui nullum habet peccatum nisi originale, mundus est e peccato: nec fuit solus inter homines filius virginis in utero matris et nascens de matre sine peccato: et aut non damnatur infans, qui moritur sine baptismo, nullum habens peccatum præter originale, aut sine peccato damnatur. Sed nihil horum accipimus. Quare omne peccatum est injustitia, et originale peccatum est absolute peccatum, unde sequitur, quod est injustitia. Item si Deus non damnat nisi propter injustitiam, damnat autem aliquem propter originale peccatum : ergo non est aliud originale peccatum, quam injustitia. Quod si ita est, originale peccatum non est aliud quam injustitia, i. e., absentia debitæ justitiæ, etc.— Nevertheless it is not the sin of Adam as such, but man's own sin which is imputed to him, c. 25: Quapropter cum damnatur infans pro peccato originali, damnatur non pro peccato Adæ, sed pro suo; nam si ipse non haberet suum peccatum, non damnaretur.-He opposed the theory of the material propagation of sin (by traducianism) in what follows, c. 7. (compare above, § 173, note 4): Sicut in Adam omnes peccavimus, quando ille peccavit: non quia tunc peccavimus ipsi, qui nondum eramus, sed quia de illo futuri eramus, et tunc facta est illi necessitas, ut cum essemus, peccaremus (Rom. 5). Simili modo de immundo semine, "in iniquitatibus et in peccatis concipi" potest homo intelligi, non quod in semine sit immunditia peccati, aut peccatum sive iniquitas; sed quia ab ipso semine et ipsa conceptione, ex qua incipit homo esse, accipit necessitatem, ut cum habebit animam rationalem, habeat peccati immunditiam, quæ non est aliud quam peccatum et iniquitas. Nam etsi ex vitiosa concupiscentia semine generetur infans, non tamen magis est in semine culpa, quam est in sputo vel in sanguine, si quis mala voluntate exspuit aut de sanguine suo aliquid emittit, non enim sputum aut sanguis, sed mala voluntas arguitur.)*-On the question how far all men have sinned in Adam? compare ch. 1 and 2, and ch. 21, 22. Anselm also thought that there was a kind of mutual action between original sin, and personal sin, c. 26: Sicut persona propter naturam peccatrix nascitur: ita natura propter personam magis peccatrix redditur.-Concerning the mode of the propagation of sin, viz., whether it is communicated in the first instance to the soul, or to the body, etc., the scholastics differed in their opinions. Comp. Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, p. 132; especially the opinion of Peter Lombard, Lib. ii. Dist. 31: [In concupiscentia et libidine concipitur caro formanda in corpus prolis. Unde caro ipsa quæ concipitur in vitiosa concupiscentia polluitur et corrumpitur: ex cujus contactu anima cum infunditur maculam trahit qua

Anselm would not have admitted the force of the argument frequently urged in favor of the doctrine of original sin, viz., that certain moral dispositions, which may be called hereditary sins, are propagated like certain physical disorders, inasmuch as he taught, c. 23 (in connection with what has been said above), that only the sin of Adam is transmitted to his posterity, but not that of parents to their children. His reasoning was quite logical, because the idea of original sin would otherwise become too relative! Con cerning the relation of Anselm's theory to the later Lutheran (Flacian?) see Möhler, Kleine Schriften, i. p. 167.

polluitur et fit rea, id est vitium concupiscentiæ, quod est originale peccatum, Pet. Lomb. Sent. lib. ii. Dist. 31, Litt. C.]-Some of the later theologians, adhering to Augustine and Anselm, taught similar views, e. g., Savonarola; Quid autem est peccatum originale, nisi privatio justitiæ originalis? Ideo homo, conceptus et natus in hujusmodi peccato, totus obliquus est, totus curvus.... Peccatum itaque originale radix est omnium peccatorum, fomes enim omnium iniquitatum : Medit. in Psalm. p. 17, quoted by Meier, Savonarola, p. 260. [Anselm wrote a treatise De libero Arbitrio, taking the ground that liberty does not consist in freedom of choice-as this will not apply to God and the blessed spirits: as we advance in virtue the possibility of sinning diminishes. His definition is: Arbitrium potens servare rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem. Yet Anselm does not assert the total loss of freedom by the fall: De lib. Arb. cap. 3: Licet peccato se subdidissent, libertatem tamen arbitrii naturalem in se interimere nequiverunt. So too Bernard, Gratia et lib. Arbitrium, c. 8: Manet post peccatum liberum arbitrium; etsi miserum, tamen integrum. Et quod se per se homo non sufficit excutere a peccato sive miseria, non liberi arbitrii signat destructionem sed duarum reliquarum privationem. So the Lombard, II. Dist. 25: Corrupta est ergo libertas arbitrii per peccatum et ex parte perdita.... Ecce liberum arbitrium dicit [scil. Augustinus] hominem amisisse: non quia post peccatum non habuerit liberum arbitrium sed quia libertatem arbitrii perdidit: non quidem omnem sed libertatem a miseria et a peccato.-Abelard says that freedom is the power of doing what we decide to be according to reason. Comp. Neander, Hist. Dogm. 525, on the Relation of Grace and Freedom.]

Since Abelard maintained that the free consent of man was necessary to constitute sin (§ 176, note 4), he could not speak of sin, in the proper sense of the word, in the case of new-born infants; yet he did not feel disposed to deny original sin altogether. He therefore took the word "sin" in a twofold sense, applying it to the punishment, as well as to sin itself. Infants have a part only in the former, but not in the latter. Nor did Abelard see how unbelief in Christ could be imputed to infants, or to those to whom the gospel is not announced: Scito te ipsum, c. 14 (quoted by de Wette, Sittenlehre, iii. p. 131). He also praised the virtues of the better part of the Greeks, especially of the philosophers, in particular of the Platonists; Theol. Christ. ii. p. 1211; compare above § 158, note 2. Neander, der heilige Bernhard, p. 125.

This difference is connected with the one above alluded to concerning the original state of man (§ 175). As the justitia originalis, according to Duns Scotus, was not so intimately united with the nature of man, as Thomas Aquinas supposed, the loss of the supernatural gifts was less great, and might take place without such painful rupture as human nature must undergo, in the strict Augustinian view see Sent. Lib. ii. Dist. 29. On the other hand, Thomas Aquinas expressed himself as follows: Summ. P. ii. 1, Qu. 85, Art. 3 (quoted by Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, p. 134); Per justitiam originalem perfecte ratio continebat inferiores animæ vires, et ipsa ratio perficiebatur a Deo et subjecta. Hæc autem originalis justitia subtracta est per peccatum primi parentis... ....et ideo omnes vires animæ remanent quodammodo destitutæ proprio ordine, quo naturaliter ordinantur ad virtutem,