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cided in favor of the spring, Heidegger gave the preference to autumn.* Calov. ij. 909, adopted an intermediate view: God created non in tempore proprie, sed in primo instanti ac principio temporis; and H llaz said, p. 359 : in tempore non præexistente, sed coëxistente. Corepare the passages quoted by De Wette, p. 61; Hase, Hutterus Redivivus, p. 152; Heppe, p. 305.-Theologians (such as Gerhard, Quenstedt, Hollaz, Alsted) further distinguished between Creatio prima seu immediata (i. e, the creation of matter), and Creatio secunda seu mediata (i. e. the creation of form.)t— The real object of the creation of the world (finis ultimus) was thus defined by Calov. iii. 900 : ut bonitas, sapientia et potentia Dei a creaturis rationabilibus celebraretur, in creaturis universis agnosceretur; the subordinate end (finis intermedius) is the happiness of the creature. Comp. Heidegger, vi. 8; De Wette, pp. 61, 62. On the Socinian idea of creation, see Fock, p. 478, sq.

It can scarcely be doubted, that Socinianism did not teach a creation from nothing, but rather a creation from preëxistent matter.De Vera Religione, ii. 4: Ideo Deus ex nihilo omnia fecisse dicitur, quia ea creavit ex materia informi, hoc est ejusmodi, que nec actu nec naturali aliqua potentia seu inclicatione id fuerit, quod postea ex ea fuit formatum, ita ut, nisi vis quædam infinita accessisset, nunquam quicquam ex ea fuisset exstiturum. (Proof-passages given are 2 Maccab. vii. 28, interpreted after Wisdom, xi. 18, and Hebrews, xi. 3.)

Sebastian Frank, Paradoxa, 332, b. (in Erbkam, p. 356): “God alone is mover and worker of all things; all creatures do their work not actively but passively. The creature acts not, but is acted on; as God works through each, so it works; the creature only holds still, and is passive to God.... For the bird does not really sing and fly, but is besung and borne up into the air; it is God that sings, lives, moves, and flies in the bird. He is the essence of all essences, so that all creatures are full of him, and do and are nothing but what God tells and wills.” Jacob Böhme, Mysterium Magnum, 1, 2 (quoted by Wullen, p. 4): “God is the one in relation to the creature, an eternal nothing; he has neither a foundation, nor a commencement, nor a place [of residence), and possesses nothing but himself. He is the will of that which has no ground, in himself he is only one; he needs no place or space; from eternity to eternity he begets himself in himself,” etc.—Theosophisches Sendschreiben, 47, 4 (in Wullen, p. 13): “In God all essences are only one essence, an eternal unity, the one eternal good ; but the eternal unity could not become manifest to himself, if there were no sundering.

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* Towards the commencement of the last century, Hogel, a rector in Gera, actually discovered that God commenced the work of creation, Oct. 26th, towards evening. See Haso, Gnosis l. C.

+ We are reminded of the old scholasticism by the question, whether lice, fleas, and suchlike vermin, quæ vel ex varia diversarum specierum commixtione vel ex putredine aut consimili quadam ratione hodie enascuntur-were created-in primo creationis sextiduo? Haffenreffer responds, that they were not on hand actu, but potentia, s. e. in aliis animalium speciebus et materiæ habilitate latuerunt, see Heppe, p. 413, note.

+ It is evident from what has been said respecting the different opinions concerning the Trinity, that Trinitarians alone would ascribe the work of creation to all the per sons, which was denied by Unitarians. But the Arminians and Mennonites also referred it to the Father in particular. Compare the passages quoted by Neudecker, p. 347 ss.

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Therefore it breathed itself out from itself in such a way, that it introduced a plurality and distinctions in its own will and in properties, and the properties in the desires, and the desires in beings."-Von der Geburt und Bezeichnung aller Wesen 16, 1, (Wullen, p. 21): "The creation is nothing but a manifestation of the all-essential, unfathomable God; is all that he is in his eternal never-beginning generation that also is the creation, but it is not his omnipotence and power." C. 11: “The being of beings is only one being, but in his generation he separates himself into light and darkness, joy and sorrow, good and evil, love and hatred, fire and light, and out of these two eternal beginnings, arises the third beginning-viz. the creation for his own delight, and according to his eternal desire.”—Von dem dreifachen Leben des Menschen, vi. 5 (Wullen, p. 23): “God himself is the being of beings, we are, as it were, gods in him, through whom he manifests himself." (The same ideas are expressed in other passages.)—The same mystical pantheism pervades the (poetical) works of Scheffler (Angelus Silesius.) Compare the passages quoted by Wackernagel, Lesebuch, ii., p. 431 ss. Hagenbach, Vorlesungen über die Reformation, iv. p. 424. These mystics widely differed from the pietists; see Spener, Theologische Bedenken, iii. 302 (edit. of Hennicke, p. 24): “Thus there remains such an infinite distinction between God and the creature,* that both beings are not one being, though they are most intimately connected with each other."

• Thus the theory of Leibnitz, his doctrine of monads, and preestablished harmony, was opposed to the scriptural (and ecclesiastical) doctrine of creation, inasmuch as by the assumption of the existence of atoms (Entelechien) the Creator was thrown too much into the shade; on the other hand, the pantheism of Spinoza (all-God and akosmic) virtually destroyed the idea of creation (i. e. in the sense of Scripture and the church.)

Concerning the Pre-adamite controversy, see § 248, note 1. • The preservation of the world was understood as a Creatio continua, perennis.—Melancthon (in Loc. de Creatione): Infirmitas humana, etiamsi cogitat Deum esse conditorem, tamen postea imaginatur, ut faber discedit a navi exstructa, et relinquit eam nautis, ita Deum discedere a suo opere, et relinqui creaturas tantum propriæ gubernationi.... Adversus has dubitationes confirmandæ sunt mentes cogitatione vera articuli de creatione, ac statuendum est non solum conditas esse res a Deo, sed etiam perpetuo servari et sustentari a Deo rerum substantias. Adest Deus suæ creaturæ, sed non adest ut stoicus Deus, sed ut agens liberrimum, sustentans creaturam, et sua immensa misericordia moderans, dans bona, adjuvans aut impediens causas secundas. So, too, Zwingle (Opera, iii., p. 156): Et natura, quid aliud est, quam continens perpetuaque Dei operatio rerumque omnium dispositio !

• In reference to the object of providence, distinctions were made between providentia generalis, specialis and specialissima; in reference to the order of nature between naturalis (ordinaria, mediata), and supernaturalis (miraculosa, immediata);t in reference to the moral actions of men between permittens, impediens, dirigens, limitans, etc. The old divines, Hutter, Gerhard,

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* By creature he understands in this place the believer, and not the world.

Concerning the idea of miracle, see Hase, Hutterus Redivivus, pp. 160, 161.

Calov, divided the providence of God, simply into the two acts of conservatio and gubernatio. To these Quenstadt added as the third act, the concursus Dei ad secundas causas (Heppe, p. 316), defining it as the actus, quo libertas agendi hominibus conservatur: thus in Qu. i., p. 231, concerning the actus providentiæ, quo Deus influxu generali in actiones et effectus causarum secundarum, qua tales, immediate et simul cum cis et juxta indigentiam et exigentiam uniuscujusque suaviter influit.- In the language of philosophers this system, developed by Cartesius, Malebranche, and Bayle, was termed the sys tem of Occasionalism. On the doctrine of the Reformed Church as to Providence, see Heppe, i. 317 sq. [The distinction of the Reformed from the Lutheran doctrine is seen in Wendelin's statement, that God concurs with human acts, constituendo fines, et in eos dirigendo actiones causarum, etiam fines illos per se non intendentium, ibid., p. 326.]

'Essai de Théodicée sur la Bonté de Dieu, la Liberté de l'Homme et l'Origine du Mal. Amst. 1710, ii. parts 12mo, often republished. The system of Optimism.

§ 265.

ANGELS AND DEMONS (DEVILS).

Protestants as well as Roman Catholics' continued to rest their faith in the real existence both of angels and demons on the authority of Scripture, and to believe in the power of the devil as something which still manifests itself in the life of men.' In the symbolical books only a passing reference was occasionally made to these doctrines, while the theologians here again adopted and carried out the definitions of the scholastics. Christian Thomasius and Balthasar Bekker, combated the belief in the devil as well as that in witches ; but the former only cautiously rejected the opinion that the devil still exerts a physical influence upon men,' while the latter, more bold and daring, represented his existence itself as very doubtful..

There was only this difference between Protestants and Roman Catholics, that the latter added the invocation of the angels. Comp. 8 257, noto 2. The Protestants did not allow this, although they believed that the angels interceded for us. Apology of Augsb. Conf., p. 311 ; Wirtem. Conf., p. 526 (in Heppe, p. 329): Angeli pro nobis sunt solliciti. Luther also believed in guardian angels, but without making it a dogma; Heppe, p. 330. Socinians (like the older divines) held that angels were created before the rest of crea: tions, see Fock, p. 484.

On Luther's diabology, which sometimes borders on a Manichean dualism, see Schenkel, ii. 133 sq. He even once calls the devil a “god," (Wider die Türken, in Walch, xx. 2661). His conflicts with him are well known, as also his bold confronting of him. Among other things he ascribes ubiquity to the devil : “ He can be in a whole city, and again in a box or put

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shell" (see his Grosse Bekenntniss von Abendmahl, in Walch, xx. 1187.)- Melancthon speaks of the angels in the edition of the Loci of 1535, at the end (Corp. Ref., xxi. p. 558); in the edition of 1543 in the first Appendix (de Conjugio.) Calvin and Zwingle did not trouble themselves so much with the question of Satanic agency, as Luther : see Henry, Leben Calvins, i., p. 488 se.

Schenkel, ii. 146, 156 sq.- Various rites were also observed at the exorcism, or ceremony of casting the devil out of persons to be baptized.* The trials of witches are full proof of the belief then prevailing in the continuance of demoniacal agency. Comp. on the whole section, Heppe, p. 333 sq. [Hyperius speaks of angels as ignitæ naturæ.... indolem quandam igneam illis inesse, Scriptura significat.)

E. g. Comp. Helv. II., Art. 7. For further particulars, see Neudecker,

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p. 365.

Compare the passages quoted by Hase (Hutterus Redivivus, p. 183 ss.) from the works of Hollaz and others. These scholastic definitions went be. yond what the reformers held on the simple foundation of Scripture; thus Calvin asks : De tempore vel ordine quo creati fuerint (Angeli) contentionem movere nonne pervicaciæ magis quam diligentiæ est ? Inst. i., c. 14. Nevertheless Heidegger, a Calvinistic theologian, filled 20 pages folio with his Breviarium de Angelis ! p. 279–300.

In his “ Erinnerungen wegen seiner küntftigen Wintervorlesungen," 1702, quoted by Schröck, Allgemeine Biographie, v. p. 349. He denied that the devil has horns, paws and claws, or at all corresponds to the ordipary representations of him. Nor did he admit that the doctrine concerning the devil is the corner stone of Christianity, which being removed, the whole edifice must fall.

Bekker, in his work, Die bezauberte Welte, by combating the belief of the age in witches, etc., was led to inquire into the manner in which the Scriptural accounts of apparitions of angels, as well as of the influences exerted by the devil upon man, are to be understood. Though he frequently explained away by arbitrary exegesis what did not agree with his own opinions, he correctly exposed in other places the false consequences which the advocates of a subtle scholasticism, no less than of vulgar superstition, inferred from the misinterpretation of certain passages. He endeavoured in particular to show that Scripture, so far from establishing a doctrine concerning angels and devils, speaks of them only occasionally, without fully enlightening us on their nature, as little as it gives complete information respecting the Crethi and Plethi, the Urim and Thummim. See Book ii., c. 8, § 2.

God did not intend to instruct us concerning the angels, but concerning ourselves" (8 8). This is the case also with the demons: “Neither the Saviour, nor his apostles, inform us, how the devils fell, but at most, that they fell.... this we should consider sufficient" (c. 9, § 1). “And as regards natural things [metaphysics], Scripture is not designed to teach us how they are in themselves, but it commands us to contemplate them for the

* Bekker also observes (Die bezauberte Welt, p. 112), that the opinions of the Lutherans concerning the devil resemble the views of the Papists much more than those of the Cal. vinists.

glory of God, and the salvation of man" (c. 10, 8 15.)—In reference to the angels, the final result of his inquiries is, that they are real beings, and that God employs them in his service; but they exert no direct influence upon the soul and body of man (c. 15, 8 9). He rejects the existence of guardian angels (c. 16.)— Respecting the devil many things are not to be understood literally, but figuratively, e. g. the history of our Lord's temptation (Matt. iv.), which he explains as “an interchange of dangerous thoughts." (c. 21, 8 17.) But there are also other passages which do not support the common theory. In ch. 26, he discusses the difference between Satan and his associ ates; in ch. 27, he explains the demoniacal possessions as diseases which “affected the brain,” and in which the disease itself was confounded with the devil; in support of his view he was of course led to suppose (ch. 28) that Jesus “ accommodated himself to the prejudices of the people.”— What else Scripture tells us concerning the devil, “ may easily be referred to wicked men” (ch. 31.) This much at least is to him evident," that the devil is of less consequence than people generally believe" (c. 32, 8 1.) “Let man examine his conscience, and there he will find the true beginning, the fountain and source of all his troubles and miseries” (ch. 36, § 18). He admonishes men to fear God instead of fearing the devil, and thinks that by lowering the power of the devil he “the more elevates the wisdom and might of the Saviour." (8 22.)

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