c. 16. (Comp. above § 172, Note 5.) From the reasons referred to, it would be unworthy of God to pardon the sinner, merely by making use of his supreme authority, in the way of mercy; (i. c. 6), and c. 12: Non decet Deum peccatum sic inpunitum dimittere...... In that case, injustice would be more privileged than justice. (Liberior est injustitia, si sola misericordia dimittitur, quam justitia.) Comp. c. 19. But man can not make satisfac tion, inasmuch as he is corrupt by original sin (i. c. 23: quia peccator peccatorem justificare nequit): nevertheless it was necessary that satisfaction should be given by a human being, i. c. 3: Oportebat namque ut sicut per hominis inobedientiam mors in humanum genus intraverat, ita per hominis obedientiam vita restitueretur, et quemadmodum peccatum, quod fuit causa nostræ damnationis, initium habuit a femina, sic nostræ justitiæ et salutis auctor nasceretur de femina, et ut diabolus, qui per gustum ligni, quem persuasit, hominem vicerat, ita per passionem ligni, quam intulit, ab homine vinceretur. But could not God have created a sinless man? Be it so; but then the redeemed would have come under the dominion of him who had redeemed them, i. e., under the dominion of a man, who would himself be nothing but a servant of God, to whom angels would not render obedience, (i. c. 5.) And besides, man himself owes obedience to God, i. c. 20: In obedientia vero quid das Deo, quod non debes, cui jubenti totum, quod es et quod habes et quod potes, debes?. . . . . . Si me ipsum et quidquid possum, etiam quando non pecco, illi debeo, ne peccem, nihil habeo, quod pro peccato illi reddam.-Nor could any higher being (e. g. an angel) take upon him the work of redemption, for so much is sure: Illum, qui de suo poterit Deo dare aliquid, quod superet omne quod sub Deo est, majorem esse necesse est, quam omne quod non est Deus..... Nihil autem est supra omne quod Deus non est, nisi Deus......Non ergo potest hanc satisfactionem facere nisi Deus, (ii. c. 6.) If therefore none can make satisfaction but God himself, and if it be nevertheless necessary that a man should make it, nothing remains but that the Godman should undertake it; ibid.: Si ergo, sicut constat, necesse est, ut de hominibus perficiatur illa superna civitas, nec hoc esse valet nisi fiat prædicta satisfactio, quam nec potest facere nisi Deus, nec debet nisi homo: necesse est, ut eam faciat Deus homo. It is, moreover, necessary that the Godman should be of the race of Adam, and born of a virgin (c. 8. comp. § 179); and among the three persons of the Trinity, it appears most seemly that the Son should assume humanity (ii. c. 9. comp. § 170, Note 6). In order to make satisfaction for man, he had to give something to God which he did not owe to him, but which, at the same time, was of more value than all that is under God. Concerning obedience, he owed it to God, like every other rational creature; but he was not obliged to die (c. 10, 11.) Nevertheless, he was willing to lay down his life of his own accord, ibid. : Video, hominem illum plane, quem quærimus, talem esse oportere, qui nec ex necessitate moriatur, quoniam erit omnipotens, nec ex debito, quia nunquam peccator erit; et mori possit ex libera voluntate quia necessarium erit; for death is the greatest sacrifice which man can offer, ibid. Nihil asperius, aut difficilius potest homo ad honorem Dei sponte et non ex debito pati, quam mortem; et nullatenus se ipsum potest homo magis

dare Deo, quam cum se morti tradit ad honorem illius.* But it was because it was voluntary, that the act had an infinite value; for his death outweighs all sins, however numerous or great, c. 14. A: Cogita etiam, quia peccata tantum sunt odibilia, quantum sunt mala, et vita ista tantum amabilis est, quantum est bona. Unde sequitur, quia vita ista plus est amabilis, quam sint peccata odibilia. B. Non possum hoc non intelligere. A. Putasne tantum bonum tam amabile posse sufficere ad solvendum, quod debetur pro peccatis totius mundi? B. Imo plus potest in infinitum. (On this account Christ's atonement has also a reacting influence upon our first parents, c. 16, and upon Mary herself, ibid. and c. 17, comp. § 178, note 2.) But the offering, thus voluntarily made, could not but be recompensed. As the Son, however, already possessed what the Father possesses, the reward due to him must accrue to the advantage of others, viz. men (ii. 19.) Thus the love and the justice of God may be reconciled with each other, c. 20: Misericordiam vero Dei, quæ tibi perire videbatur, cum justitiam Dei et peccatum hominis considerabamus, tam magnam tamque concordem justitiæ invenimus, ut nec major nec justior cogitari possit. Nempe quid misericordius intelligi valet, quam cum peccatori tormentis æternis damnato, et unde se redimat non habenti, Deus pater dicit: Accipe Unigenitum meum, et da pro te; et ipse Filius: Tolle me, et redime te?..... Quid etiam justius, quam ut ille, cui datur pretium majus omni debito, si debito datur affectu, dimittat omne debitum ? And lastly, we should not pass by his caution at the close of his treatise (c. 22.): Si quid diximus, quod corrigendum sit, non renue correctionem, si rationabiliter sit. Si autem testimonio veritatis roboratur, quod nos rationabiliter invenisse existimamus, Deo, non nobis attribuere debe mus, qui est benedictus in sæcula. Amen. [On Anselm's view compare Neander, Hist. Dogm. 514 sq., viz. he affirms the necessity of an active (rather than passive) vicarious sacrifice.]

Notwithstanding all its appearance of logical consequence, the theory of Anselm, as has been remarked, is open to the charge of an internal contradiction. For though Anselm himself admitted, that God could not be deprived of his honor objectively, he nevertheless founded his argument upon this objective fact, and made it necessary that, after all, the love and compassion of God should come in, accept the satisfaction voluntarily made by another and an innocent being, and for his sake remit the punishment due to actual transgressors, who, on their part could not retrieve their loss. Comp. Baur, p. 168-179. Schweizer, too, in his Glaubensl. d. reformirten Kirche, ii. 391, says, that the theory of Anselm hovers between the fœdus operum and the foedus gratiæ. To this it has been replied, that Anselm clearly distinguishes between the immanent and the transeunt (declarative) honor of God, and that his argument starts with this; see Hasse's Anselm, ii. 576.-But, further, the subjective (moral) aspect is put too much into the background by the objective (legal) one; and the rest of the redeeming work of Christ, as seen in his life, almost vanishes out of sight (comp. however, ii. c. 18.) Nor can it be denied, that the reconciliation spoken of is rather one made on the part of God with men, than a reconciliation of men with God; see Baur, p. 181. Ullmann (Nicolas of Methone, p. 93.) We should, however, be careful not to confound the theory of Anselm with its development by later Protestant theologians. On the question, whether the satisfaction

Comp. also i. cap. 9: Non coëgit Deus Christum mori, in quo nullum fuit peccatum, sed ipse sponte sustinuit mortem, non per obedientiam deserendi vitam, sed propter obedientiam servandi justitiam, in qua tam fortiter perseveravit, ut inde mortem incurreret.

referred to by Anselm is, properly speaking, not so much a suffering of punishment, as merely an active rendering of obedience? inasmuch as he makes a difference between punishment and satisfaction (i. 15. necesse est, ut omne peccatum satisfactio aut poena sequatur) see Baur, p. 183 ss. Nevertheless, it is certain, that the satisfaction made by Christ, in the view of Anselm, consisted, if not exclusively, at least principally, in submitting to sufferings and death; it can not, therefore, be said with Baur, "that the idea of a punishment, by which satisfaction is made, and which is suffered in the room of another, does not occur in the scheme of Anselm." [Baur, Dogmengesch. 260-61, finds the nerve of Anselm's theory in Cur Deus Homo, i. 23: Nullatenus debet aut potest accipere homo a Deo, quod Deus illi dare proposuit, si non reddit Deo totum, quod illi abstulit, ut sicut per illum Deus perdidit, ita per illum Deus recuperet.-The honor of God is to be restored, not merely negatively by punishment, but positively by satisfaction: the satisfaction, as such, is a moral act and desert.] On the other hand, it must be admitted that Anselm rests contented with the idea of the suffering of death: in his writings nothing is said of the Redeemer being under the burden of the Divine wrath, of his taking upon him the torments of hell, or what is called the anguish of the soul, etc. The chaste and noble, tragical style, too, in which the subject is discussed, forms a striking contrast with the weak and whining, even sensuous "theology of blood" of later ages.-Respecting the relation in which Anselm's theory stood to the doctrine of earlier times, see Baur, p. 186 ss. Neander, Church Hist. (Torrey's transl.), iv. 500-7. [On Anselm's theory, see British and Foreign Quarterly Review, Edinb. 1859. The best and fullest account is in Hasse's Anselm. Comp. also Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, iii. 217-228: "We can not say, that here the love of God is sacrificed to his justice, nor that the love of the Father recedes behind the love of the Son, nor that the relation between guilt and satisfaction is viewed merely quantitatively; but yet it is true, that the love of God is not made sufficiently prominent, and that the passive obedience of Christ does not come to its full recognition, since the death of Christ is not viewed as the suffering of a divine judgment, but as a gift to the honor of God, hence it is not strictly vicarious, but rather supplementary." Yet "the idea of satisfaction has been made by Anselm the inalienable possession of the church."-Neander, Hist. Dogmas, p. 521: "From the time of Anselm, two opposing views of redemption were developed: the one viewed its method as objectively necessary, and derived its efficiency from this necessity; the other assigned rather a subjective connexion to the two, as if it had been merely the pleasure of God to connect the price of redemption with the sufferings of Christ, because these were best adapted to effect the moral transformation of man." Comp., also, Ritschl, in Jahrb. £. deutsche Theologie, 1860, p. 584, sq.]

§ 181.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION AND ATONEMENT.

The contemporaries and immediate successors of Anselm were far from adopting his theory in all its strictness.' On the contrary, Abelard, taking in this case, as well as in many others, the opposite side of the question, attached principal importance to the moral aspect of the doctrine, and declared the love of Christ the redeeming principle, inasmuch as it calls forth love on our part. Bernard of Clairval, on the other hand, insisted upon the mystical idea of the vicarious death of Christ.' Hugo of St. Victor adhered more nearly to the doctrine of Anselm, but modified it so far as to return to the earlier notion of a legal transaction and struggle with the

devil; at the same time he asserted (with Abelard) the moral significance of Christ's death. The opinions of Robert Pulleyn and Peter Lombard were still more closely allied with those of Abelard, though the latter combined with it other aspects of the atonement. The later scholastics returned to the doctrine of Anselm, and developed it more fully. Thus Thomas Aquinas brought the priestly office of Christ prominently forward, and laid great stress upon the superabounding merit of his death.' Duns Scotus went to the other extreme, denying its sufficiency; but he supposed a voluntary acceptance on the part of God. Wycliffe and Wessel attached importance to the theory of satifaction in its practical bearing upon evangelical piety, and thus introduced the period of the Reformation. The mystics either renounced all claims to doctrinal precision, and, abandoning themselves to the impulses of feeling and imagination, endeavored to sink into the depth of the love dying on the cross; or they thought to find the true principle of redemption in the repetition in themselves of the sacrifice once made by Christ, i. e., in literally crucifying their own flesh." Those of a pantheistic tendency annulled all that was peculiar in the merits of Christ." The external and mythical interpretation of the doctrine, as a legal transaction, led to offensive poetical exaggerations and distortions of the truth."2

1 “If we must, on the one hand, acknowledge that Anselm's theory of satisfaction is a brilliant specimen of the dialectical and speculative acuteness of the scholastics, it must appear to us strange on the other hand, that he stands alone, and does not seem to have convinced any of his successors of the necessity of the standpoint which he assumed:" Baur, Versöhnungslehre, p. 189.

'Abelard opposed, like Anselm, but still more decidedly, the introduction of the devil into the plan of redemption: Comment. in Epist. ad Rom. Lib. ii. (Opp. p. 550), quoted by Münscher, edit. by von Cölln, p. 163; Baur, p. 191. The real ground of the reconciliation was stated by him as follows (p. 553, quoted by Baur, p. 194): Nobis autem videtur, quod in hoc justificati sumus in sanguine Christi et Deo reconciliati, quod per hanc singularem gratiam nobis exhibitam, quod filius suus nostram susceperit naturam, et in ipso nos tam verbo, quam exemplo instituendo usque ad mortem perstitit, nos sibi amplius per amorem astrixit, ut tanto divinæ gratæ accensi beneficio, nil jam tolerare propter ipsum vera reformidet caritas......Redemtio itaque nostra est illa summa in nobis per passionem Christi dilectio, quæ nos (leg, non) solum a servitute peccati liberat, sed veram nobis filiorum Dei libertatem, acquirit, ut amore ejus potius quam timore cuncta impleamus, qui nobis tantam exhibuit, gratiam, qua major inveniri, ipso attestante, non potest. "Thus the two representatives of scholasticism, in its first period, when it developed itself in all its youthful vigor, Anselm and Abelard, were directly opposed to each other, with respect to the doctrines of redemption and atonement. The one considered the last ground of it to be the divine justice, requiring an infinite equivalent for the

infinite guilt of sin, that is, a necessity founded in the nature of God; the other held it to be the free grace of God, which, by kindling love in the breast of man, blots out sin and with sin its guilt:" Baur, Versöhnungslehre, p. 195. On the endeavors of Abelard, notwithstanding his other views, to represent redemption in its legal aspect, see ibidem. [Abelardi Opera, 1606, p. 590: Sed et hoc, ni fallor, contuendo nobis Apostolus reliquit (Rom. v. 12, sq.), Deum in incarnatione filii sui id quoque sibi machinatum fuisse, ut non solum misericordia, verum et justitia per eum subveniret peccantibus, et ipsius justitia suppleretur, quod delictis nostris præpediebatur...... Homo itaque factus lege ipsa dilectionis proximi constringitur, ut eos, qui sub lege erant, nec per legem poterant salvari, redimeret, et quod in nostris non erat meritis, ex suis suppleret, et sicut sancitate singularis extitit, singularis fieret utilitate in aliorum etiam salute.]

' Bernard opposed Abelard, in the first place, in respect to the point that the devil has no legal claims upon man, see Epist. 190, de Erroribus Abælardi ad Innocentem III., quoted by Münscher, edit. by von Cölln, p. 164, Baur, Versöhnungsl. p. 202. He made a distinction between jus acquisitum, and jus nequiter usurpatum, juste tamen permissum. He ascribed the latter to the devil: Sic itaque homo juste captivus tenebatur: ut tamen nec in homine, nec in diabolo illa esset justitia, sed in Deo. Bernard, moreover, urged especially the fact, that Christ as the head, had made a satisfaction for the members. [Homo siquidem, qui debuit, homo qui salvit. Nam si unus,inquit (2 Cor. v. 16) pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortui sunt, ut videlicet satisfactio unius hominis imputetur, sicut omnium peccata unus ille portavit, nec alter jam inveniatur, qui forefecit (i. e. peccavit), alter, qui satisfecit, quia caput et corpus unus est Christus.]-Satisfecit caput pro membris, Christus pro visceribus suis (see Baur, pp. 202, 203.) Bernard's views were most nearly allied to those of Augustine and Gregory the Great.

* In the system of Hugo, God appeared as the patronus of man, and the opponent of the devil. But, first of all, it was necessary to conciliate his favor. This idea is largely dwelt upon in his Dialogus de Sacramentis legis naturalis et scriptæ. De Sacram. c. 4: Dedit Deus gratis homini, quod homo ex debito Deo redderet. Dedit igitur homini hominem, quem homo pro homine redderet, qui, ut digna recompensatio fieret, priori non solum æqualis, sed major esset. Ut ergo pro homine redderetur homo major homine, factus est Deus homo pro homine-Christus ergo nascendo debitum hominis patri solvit et moriendo reatum hominis expiavit, ut, cum ipse pro homine mortem, quam non debebat, sustineret, juste homo propter ipsam mortem, quam debebat, evaderet, et jam locum calumniandi diabolus non inveniret, quia et ipse homini dominari non debuit, et homo liberari dignus fuit. The following is written rather in the spirit of Abelard, c. 10: ...... Ut in Deo humanitas glorificata exemplum esset glorificationis hominibus; ut in eo, qui, passus est, videant, quid ei retribuere debeant, in eo autem, quí glorificatus est, considerent, quid ab eo debeant exspectare; ut et ipse sit via in exemplo et veritas in promisso et vita in præmio. Comp. Liebner, Hugo von St. Victor, p. 417, ss. Baur, Versöhnungsl. 206,

208.

* Concerning Pulleyn, who in other respects was praised by Bernard on