Duitz, in the 12th century." Dorner, p. 134; comp. his work, De Glorificatione Trinitatis, et Processione Sp. Sanct. lib. iii. c. 21; iv. 2, and Comm. in Matth. de Gloria et Honore Filii homin. lib. xiii. (Opera, Tom. ii. 164); Gieseler, Dogmengesch. 514. [Rupert says, that men and angels were created for the sake of the one man, Jesus Christ; he, the head and king of all elect angels and men, did not need sin in order to become incarnate. Alexander of Hales adopted the same view: Summa Theol. P. iii. Qu. 2, Membr. 13. Bonaventura agrees with Aquinas.]—The language of Thomas Aquinas sufficiently shows that he too felt disposed to look upon the incarnation of Christ as being in one respect the completion of creation. In his Comment. on the Sentences, Lib. iii. Dist. 1. Qu. 1, Art. 3, he said, that the incarnation had not only effected deliverance from sin, but also-humanæ naturæ exaltationem et totius universi consummationem. Comp. Summa, P. iii. Qu. 1, Art. 3; Ad omnipotentiam divinæ virtutis pertinet, ut opera sua perficiat et se manifestet per aliquem infinitum effectum, cum sit finita per suam essentiam. Nevertheless, he thought it more probable (according to P. iii. Qu. 1, 3), that Christ would not have become man if there had been no sin. This notion generally obtained, and theologians preferred praising (after the example of Augustine) sin itself as felix culpa (thus Richard of St. Victor, De Incarnat. Verbi. c. 8), rather than admit the possibility of the manifestation of the Son of God apart from any connection with sin. Duns Scotus, however, felt inclined to adopt the latter view, which was more in accordance with his entire Pelagian tendency;* Lib. iii. Sent. Dist. vii. Qu. 3, and Dist. xix. On the other hand, Wessel, whose sentiments were by no means like those of Pelagius, took the same view (De Incarn. c. 7 and c. 11, quoted by Ullmann, p. 254). In his opinion the final cause of the incarnation of the Son of God is not to be found in the human race, but in the Son of God himself. He became man for his own sake; it was not the entrance of sin into the world which called forth this determination of the divine will; Christ would have assumed humanity even if Adam had never sinned: Si incarnatio facta est principaliter propter peccati expiationem, sequeretur, quod anima Christi facta sit non principali intentione, sed quadam quasi occasione. Sed inconveniens est, nobilissimam creaturam occasionaliter esse introductam (quoted by Dorner, p. 140.)

[Comp. on the subject of this section, W. Flörke, in Zeitschrift f. d.

* This was done in later times by the Socinians. Nevertheless, the theory in question may be so strained, "that sin is made light of, and mankind exalted, rather than the dignity of Christ augmented." (Dorner, p. 137.) But whether the notion of a felix culpa, by which sin is made to appear as 0ɛoróкoç, might not lead men so far as to worship it on pantheistic grounds, and at the same time to make light of it in the moral point of view, is another question. And, on the other hand, if we, looking at sin in a serious light, regard the incarnation of Christ merely as something which has become necessary in order to repair the damage, its happy aspect will be lost sight of, and the joy we might experi ence at Christmas will too soon be changed into the weeping and wailing of the Passionweek. This is the principal defect of Anselm's theory. But with respect to the exaltation of mankind at the expense of the dignity of Christ, the latter, so far from being endangered by the theory of Wessel, is raised by the idea that Christ assumed humanity not on account of man, but for his own sake, an idea by which the pride of man is humbled. [This note is omitted in the 5th edition of Hagenbach.]

Lutherische Theologie, 1854, p. 209-249; Liebner, in his Christologie; Dorner, Lehre von der Person Christi; Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, i. 169. Aquinas denied the position, that Christ would have become incarnate even if there had been no sin, not merely on the ground that the Scripture connects the incarnation only with sin, but also, because the perfection of the universe did not require it: Ad perfectionem universi sufficit, quod naturali modo creatura ordinetur in Deum sicut finem. Hoc autem excedit limites perfectionis naturæ, ut creatura uniatur Deo in persona: Summa, Pars iii. qu. 1, art. 3. Raymund Lulli, as quoted in Neander, Hist. Dogm. 582, says that the incarnation is indeed a work of free love; and that we can not say that it was only brought about by sin, but that God owed it to himself: Alias Deus non solveret debitum sibi ipsi et suis dignitatibus.]

FIFTH DIVISION.

89.

THE ORDO SALUTIS.

§ 183.

PREDESTINATION.

(The Controversy of Gottschalk.)

Cellot, L., Historia Gotteschalci. Par. 1655, £ +Staudenmaier, Scotus Erigena, p. 170, Gfrörer, on Pseudo-Isidore in the Tübingen Theol. Zeitschrift, xviii. 274, sq. Wiggers, Schicksale d. Augustinischen Anthropologie, in Niedner's Zeitschrift f. hist. Theol., 1857-8. [Weizsäcker, Das Dogma von der göttlichen Vorherbestimmung im neunten Jahr. in Jahrb. f deutsche Theol., 1859. Archb. Ussher, Gottschalcus et Prædest. Controvers. ab eo mota, Dublin, 1631, and in Ussher's Works, 16 vols., Dublin, 1837-40. The Predestination Controversy in the Ninth Century, F. Monnier, De Gottschalci et Joan. Scoti Erigenæ Con

Princeton Review, 1840. troversia, Paris, 1853.]

GREAT as was the authority of Augustine in the West, the prevailing notions concerning the doctrine of Predestination contained more or less of the Semipelagian element.' Accordingly, when in the. course of the ninth century Gottschalk, a monk in the Franciscan monastery of Orbais, ventured to revive the rigid Augustinian doctrine, and even went so far as to assert a twofold predestination, not only to salvation but also to damnation,' he exposed himself to persecution. He was in the first instance, opposed by Rabanus Maurus,' and afterwards condemned by the Synods of Mayence (A. D. 848), and of Quiercy (Cressy, Carisiacum, A. D. 849).* Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, took part in the transactions of the latter Synod. Though Prudentius of Troyes, Ratramn, Servatus Lupus,' and several others, pronounced in favor of Gottschalk, though under certain modifications, John Scotus Erigena, by an ingenious argumentation contrived to preserve the appearance of Augustinian orthodoxy, by maintaining, on the basis of the position borrowed from Augustine, that evil was something negative, and therefore could not, as such, be predestinated by God." The objections advanced by Prudentius and Florus (Magister) were as little heeded as the steps taken by Remigius, Archbishop of Lyons, in behalf of Gottschalk. On the contrary, the second Synod of Quiercy (Cressy, A. D. 853) laid down four articles, in accordance with the views of

Hincmar;" then several bishops at the Synod of Valence drew up six other articles of a contrary tendency, which were confirmed by the Synod of Langres (A. D. 859)," but zealously opposed again by Hincmar." Gottschalk, the victim of the passions of others, bore his fate with that fortitude and resignation, which have at all times characterised those individuals or bodies of men who have adopted the doctrine of Predestination,

1

The theologians of the Greek church retained the earlier definitions as a matter of course. John Damasc. De Fide Orthod. ii. c. 30: Xpǹ yıνwOKELV, ὡς πάντα μὲν προγινώσκει ὁ θεὸς, οὐ πάντα δὲ προορίζει προγινώσκει γὰρ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, οὐ προορίζει δὲ αὐτά. (Comp. § 177, note. 1).—Respecting the opinions entertained by the theologians of the Western church; see vol. i. § 114. The venerable Bede (Expositio Allegorica in Canticum Cantic.) and Alcuin (de Trinit. c. 8) adopted, in the main, the views of Augustine, but rejected the prædestinatio duplex. Comp. Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, pp. 121, 122. They were, however, unconscious of the difference between themselves and Augustine; see Neander, Church History, iv. p. 472, sq. Wiggers, ubi supra.

Respecting the history of his life, and the possible connection between it and his doctrine, see Neander, l. c. p. 414, ss.; Staudenmaier, l. c. p. 175, [and Gieseler, ii. § 16.] His own views, as well as those of his opponents, may be gathered from Guilb. Maugin, Vett. Auctorum, qui sæc. IX. de Prædestinatione et Gratia scripserunt, Opera et Fragmenta. Paris, 1650, Tomi. ii. 4to (in T. ii.: Gotteschalcanæ Controversiæ Historica et Chronica Dissertatio.) In the Libellus Fidei which Gottschalk presented to the synod of Mayence, he asserted: Sicut electos omnes (Deus) prædestinavit ad vitam per gratuitum solius gratiæ suæ beneficium......sic omnino et reprobos. quosque ad æternæ mortis prædestinavit supplicium, per justissimum videlicet justitiæ suæ judicium (after Hincmar, de Præd. c. 5). In his confession of faith (given by Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, p. 122) he expressed himself as follows: Credo et confiteor, quod gemina est prædestinatio, sive electorum ad requiem, sive reproborum ad mortem. But he referred the prædestinatio duplex not so much to evil itself, as to the wicked. Compare the passage quoted by Neander, iii. 475: Credo atque confiteor, præscisse te ante sæcula quæcunque erunt futura sive bona sive mala, prædestinasse vero tantummodo bona. On the connection subsisting between his views and those of Augustine, sce Neander, 1. c. p. 474. [The fundamental idea of Gottschalk was that of the divine immutability......He does not speak of a predestination to evil, but to death. See Baur, Dogmengesch. 215. Comp. Neander, Hist. Dogm. 448, sq.]

'Epist. synodalis Rabani ad Hincmar. given in Mansi T. xiv. p. 914, and Staudenmaier, p. 179: Notum sit dilectioni vestræ, quod quidem gyrovagus monachus, nomine Gothescalc, qui se asserit sacerdotem in nostra parochia ordinatum, de Italia venit ad nos Moguntiam, novas superstitiones et noxiam doctrinam de prædestinatione Dei introducens et populos in errorem mittens; dicens, quod prædestinatio Dei, sicut in bono, sic ita et in malo, et tales sint in hoc mundo quidam, qui propter prædestinationem Dei, quæ eos cogat in

mortem ire, non possint ab errore et peccato se corrigere, quasi Deus eos fecisset ab initio incorrigibiles esse, et pœnæ obnoxios in interitum ire.—As regards the doctrine of Rabanus Maurus himself, he made the decree of God respecting the wicked depend on his prescience, see Neander, 1. c. p. 476.

* Mansi T. xiv.-On the outrageous treatment of Gottschalk, see Neander, 1. c. p. 478.

• Prudentii Trecassini (of Troyes) Epistola ad Hincmarum Rhemig. et Pardulum Laudunensem (which was written about the year 849, and first printed in Lud. Cellotii Historia Gotteschalci. Par. 1655). He asserted a twofold predestination, but made the predestination of the wicked (reprobation) depend on the prescience of God. He further maintained that Christ had died for none but the elect (Matt. xx. 28), and interpreted 1 Tim. ii. 4, as meaning: vel omnes ex omni genere hominum [comp. Augustine Enchirid. c. 103], vel omnes velle fieri salvos, quia nos facit velle fieri omnes homines salves. Compare Neander, l. c. p. 481-89.

• At the request of the Emperor, Charles the Bald, he composed the work, De Prædestinatione Dei libri ii. in which he expressed himself as follows (quoted by Mauguin T. i. p. 94, Staudenmaier, p. 192): Verum quemadmodum æterna fuit illorum scelerum scientia, ita et definita in secretis cœlestibus pœnæ sententia; et sicut præscientia veritatis non eos impulit ad nequitiam, ita nec prædestinatio coëgit ad pœnam. Comp. Neander, 1. c. p. 482.

1 Servatus Lupus was abbot of Ferrières. Respecting his character, and the history of his life, see Sigebert Gemblac, de Scriptt. Eccles. c. 94. Staudenmaier, p. 188. He excelled as a classical scholar, and wrote about the year 850 De Tribus Questionibus (1. de libero arbitrio; 2. de prædestina. tione bonorum et malorum; 3. de sanguinis Domini taxatione). See Mau guin T. i. P. ii. p. 9, ss.-He too interpreted those passages which are favorable to the doctrine of universal redemption, in accordance with the scheme of particularism (Neander, 1. c. p. 482, ss.); but his milder principles induced him to leave many points undecided, as he was far from claiming infallibility (Neander, p. 484.)

• Probably about the year 851 he addressed a treatise entitled: Liber de divina Prædestinationo to Hincmar and Pardulus; see Mauguin, T. i. P. i. p. 103, ss. He too did this at the request of the Emperor Charles the Bald. -The idea of a prædestinatio properly speaking can not be applied to God, since with him there is neither a future nor a past. As moreover sin ever carries its own punishment with itself (de Præd. c. 6: Nullum peccatum est, quod non se ipsum puniat, occulte tamen in hac vita, aperte vero in altera), there is no need of a predestinated punishment. Evil itself does not exist at all for God; accordingly the prescience, as well as the predestination, of evil, on the part of God, is altogether out of question. Comp. Neander, p. 485. It is, however, to be noted, that Erigena only denies that the predes tination is twofold, and the idea that this is divine. In harmony with his whole speculative tendency, he could not give up the view, that, as God is the ground of all things, so, too, from eternity all is embraced in his purpose: hence he says in De Prædest. 18, 7: Prædestinavit Deus impios ad pœnam vel ad