After hearing the Solicitor-General, Crompton, and Fine of 101. and recognizances of 501. to keep the says application is to be made to a judge. There is is the usual form. GREEN v. SHARPE. The venire facias should be made returnable either "forthwith," or the first day in the following term. HUME V. LORD WELLESLEY. This was a rule obtained by Jervis, Q.C. to set Practice-Warrant of attorney. aside the issue and notice of trial in this case, on the In an application to set aside a warrant of attorney ground that in the issue delivered the return-day of and judgment thereon for defective attestation clause, the venire was left blank. it must be shewn affirmatively that it is made with the Ogle shewed cause.-Under the circumstances, this consent and by the authority of the defendant, or of is an application against good faith. Moreover, this some person representing him, as his assignees. Humfrey, Q.C. (with whom was Petersdorff) Lush, contrà.-The venire should be made returnshewed cause against a rule obtained by the Solicitor-able on the first day in the Term following the trial, General, to set aside a warrant of attorney and judg- or forthwith, according to 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 67, s. 2. ment thereon in the above cause, for a defective That authorises the word "forthwith" to be inserted, attestation, and took a preliminary objection that but not the omission of any date at all. This point the affidavit of the attesting witness shewed that the was raised in Dennett v. Hardy (2 D. & L. 434), upon warrant of attorney was executed by the defendant a writ of trial, but it became unnecessary to decide it. abroad in 1843, and none of the affidavits shewed that Where the copy of the issue varied from the roll in the present application was made by his authority or the statement of the date of the year, and in the consent. Citing Lewis v. Lord Tankerville (11 M. omission of the date of the teste and return of the & W. 109; 2 D N. S.). writ of trial, an amendment was ordered. (Watts v. Bull, 8 D. P. C. 589.) The Solicitor-General (with whom was Sir John Bayley). It is clear upon the affidavits in that case that the defendant was still abroad. Here more than two years have elapsed, and the defendant may probably not be abroad now. In fact, it is notorious he is not. It has not hitherto been usual to insert this authority in the affidavits. Lord DENMAN, C. J.-In the case cited, Lord Abinger said no process of the court is to be altered except on the motion of the defendant himself, or some person authorised by him. I think this is a It is said that in fact the defendant is in England, but we cannot Rule discharged. proper rule, and should be followed. know this. The Solicitor-General asked whether, if it turned out that the defendant was in England, and had authorised this application, a second application might be made, but the Court declined saying anything upon this point. REG. . BYNNER. In the record of a judgment upon a scire facias to repeal letters patent, it is correct to state that the Lord Chancellor delivered here "a record." Webster moved for a rule to amend the record in the writ of error in this case, by inserting the words "transcript of " before the words "the record." The proceedings upon scire facias for this purpose origi. nate in the petty bag office, but judgment having been entered up by this Court, a writ of error had been brought. The record had been made up by the prosecutor, and it stated, according to the usual form, that the Lord Chancellor had delivered here, with his own hand, the record. It was objected that, in fact, the record is in the Court of Chancery, and as the ground of error relied on was that the By the COURT.-This should be amended by insertion of the word "forthwith." Rule absolute. Saturday, Jan. 31. In Re JOHN HAGUE. JUDGMENT. Lord DENMAN, C.J.now delivered the judgment of the Court as follows:-This was an action on a written undertaking made by the defendant to satisfy a lien claimed by the plaintiff and his deceased partner on certain deeds in their possession nor the circumstances and to the extent hereafter s There were several pleas (the Statute of Limitations), as to which, on the state of facts appearing on the trial, the learned judge, Coleridge, directed the vet. dict to be entered for the defendant; however, there was some misunderstanding on that subject, and it is clear on all hands that the verdict ought to have been found for the plaintiff. On the other issues, leave was given to move the Court that it be entered for the plaintiff for the sum of 5051. 158. or such sum as the Court should think right, and the Court was to direct generally. The plaintiff sought to recover for the amount of an attorney's bill for work done partly by John Oldfield alone before the commencement of the partnership, and partly by the firm, the total being 1,1747.; the former part amounted to 476. The work had been done part for the benefit of a person of the name of Conway, a minor, and the residue for him upon his retainer after attaining his majority. He came of age in November 1807. The points for con sideration arise on the 1st plea of non assumpsit; the 4th, which denies the retainer of the plaintif and his partner; the 5th, which denies the lien alleged in the declaration; the 6th, which denies the deeds were in the possession of the plaintiff and his partner, as at torneys; and the 9th, which varies little, if at all, the the other pleas must, at all events, be found for the Habeas Corpus-Master and Servants' Act-Commit-5th, that denies the right of that lien. The issues c ment. Pashley moved for a rule to shew cause why a writ body of John Hague, a smith, now in custody, under of habeas corpus should not issue to bring up the The commitment is bad on two grounds; 1st, the a commitment under the Master and Servants' Act. contract is stated generally to be a contract by ague in the capacity of a smith;" not saying, stated to be a contract for a period not longer than a "to serve," or to do any thing. 2ndly, it is not year; and, without such statement, the case of a smith does not come within the Master and Servants' Act, a smith being incapacitated by stat. Eliz. from making a contract for a longer term than one year. Rule nisi. REG. V. THE JUSTICES OF MONMOUTHSHIRE. That Greaves moved for a rule to shew cause why a writ of certiorari should not issue to remove an order of sessions and an order of justices for the removal of a pauper. Upon the trial of the appeal a case had been reserved; but there was an objection to the order of removal which was not raised in the case. rendered it necessary to move in open court, and to state the ground of his application, instead of handing in a motion paper according to the usual practice, when a case was reserved. The additional objection which he wished to take was, that the Order, being plaintiff. The objection upon the plea of an a formed; but for this it was said the representative of sumpsit shapes itself in two ways; first, party as to the sum of 4761. due before the partnership was client. It was answered, first, that in 1918, and John Oldfield could not sue the surviving partner's eleven years after his own majority, and after the partnership had been formed, Conway had paid two sums, amounting in the whole to 2001. generaly on account, and the plaintiff claimed to apply this sum towards the discharge of the early part of the bill, which Conway might pay if he pleased, though not bound to do so. The defendant claimed to apply it to the latter part of this demand, though there was no plea of payment, because specific credit was given in the bill of particu lars. Without deciding upon this point, therefore, it ap pears to us that this payment was more successfully relied upon. Secondly, as evidence to shew that as between Conway and the two Oldfields, the whole business, whether done for the plaintiff before or after the formation of the partnership, or before or after his coming of age, was treated to be, as all the work was, for the benefit of Conway, and this was no more than just; and as the work was continued after his majority, and after the partnership was formed, it might be in consideration of his agreeing so to treat such agreement entered into as valid and binding as between them, which might give the partners alien to the extent of the whole demand. On consideration not Court of Queen's Bench had no power to enter up conditional in its terms, was altogether void, the 79th merely of this transaction, but the general effect of judgment, this statement might be prejudicial. H. Hill shewed cause in the first instance. The application is too late, but even if not, the record is right. It is in accordance with all the precedents. There is a duplicate of the proceedings made out, and one is left in the petty bag office, and the other is brought into this Court. Proceedings out of the petty bag office have always been treated as records. section of the Poor Law Amendment Act giving no In Rule nisi. the correspondence between Conway and the partners, are to be considered as passing from and to the firm, assuming for the present the letters from Conway and not from and to each partner, it appears clear this was the understanding between the parties; no distinc tion, however, occurred to them between the different parts of the work or the retainer. This action, it is to an action upon an undertaking to satisfy an attor-Conway; the present question is only to the extent of be remembered, is not brought on the billitself against ney's lien for costs; held, that the attorney being only the undertaking to Conway sued on. Secondly, it admitted, and practising in the Courts of Great Ses- was objected the undertaking was given to John Oldsions of Wales, could not recover in respect of that field alone, and that the terms of it are satisfied by part of his bill which related to business transacted confining it to the lien which he had for a separate in the superior courts at Westminster. OLDFIELD T. DALRYMPLE. (Palmer, 323; Bastell Eat. 461; Steward's case, 9 Rep. 996; Digge's case, 1 Rep. 157; Molyneux v. Layton, Cro. Jac. 12; Fitzherb. Abridgment Petition; Prince's case, 8 Rp. 23; K. v. Holland, 1 Roll. Abridgment, Court G. pl. 3, &c.) The proceedings in various cases now in the Crown office shew the same thing. (R. v. Turner, in 1826; R. v. demand, consequently the action for the whole ought Assumpsit by the surviving partner of an attorney's to have been brought, if at all, by his personal repre Tubb, 1834.) There is nothing to amend by. (Green v. firm on the following undertaking, dated 24th March, sentatives. The declaration of course states the pro Miller, 2 B. & Ad. 781 ; Puddon v. Bartlett, 3 A. & 1844, and directed to John Oldfield, the deceased mise to be made to both, and extends to the las E. 884.) partner:-"In compliance with your letter to Mr. which they claim for the money due. The proof was Webster in reply.—It is a misprision of the clerk.. I, the undersigned, being the surviving trustee a letter dated 1834, written to Old to one (Viner Abridg. Amendment, I. 2.) Lord DESMAN, CJ are not satisfied that this is wrong. It seems indeed to be right. There is no power in the Court to strike out counts in under a deed executed by Mt. Conway for the benefit North, a solicitor, in the first person, and requiring under a Mr. the benefit quence of one addressed by John Oldering expedite, by all means in your power, the completion that this undertaking, before that date, should be pro of the sales of the estates in the county of Denbigh duced. Evidence was given to shew that both th and elsewhere, pending at the time of his insolvency, partners were in the habit of writing on the business of was assigned by the said deed to me, undertake, on solcly, and an and as for large att answer would naturally be adthe partner who wrote, and the The thereout, or so far as the same may extend, such circumstances here shewed that the only reasonable Sir J. Bayley shewed cause against a rule cbtained title-deeds of the said estates now in your posses- ration gives. The partnership had been in existence for sum as you may be entitled to claim a lien for on the understanding of the question is that which the decla second counts in a declaration in this action. He Pleas, first, non-assumpsit; second, fraud; third, by fat the nearly thirty years; the deeds between them were objected that the affidavit verifying the pleadings did Statute of Limitatious; and various other pleas tra- proportion of the work had been de ea coguina not shew that the application was made with the versing all the material allegations of fact in the the defendant was not shewn to have been cognizant of the work done before, and he only knew of the work The case was argued on Thursday, December 11, done since the formation of the partnership; and, -We did not decide that as a general proposition. by Welsby for the defendant, and by Townsend and therefore, John Oidfield only demanded an undertak It is made by the clerk to the defendant's agent.] Unthank for the plaintifi; but as no important ques-ing with reference to the whole demand, at least, with Then there is no authority in the Court to make this tions of law are decided by the judgment, it is not reference to the partnership demand; so that the dethought necessary to give any further statement of fendant must have understood he did so, and must be the argument than that which the judgment itself taken to have understood it in that sense; nor is rule; it should be to a judge at chambers. J. Addison, contrà. By the COURT.-We have no power. The rule contains. Cur, adv. vult. there any force in the argument upon the undertak Although by stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 20, the prosecutor of REG. v. THE JUSTICES OF GLAMORGANSHIRE. Lord DENMAN, C. J.-We understand that before the Act the old practice was to require an affidavit; but we think, clearly, that although the Act authorises the prosecutor to reply, he must do so in the usual form; and that it is not necessary that the replication should be brought before the Court. Martin, Q.C. was then called on as to the necessity for an affidavit. He relied upon the Act itself, and the 19th rule of court made in pursuance of it; which authorises the signing judgment, without any mention of an affidavit. (Corner's Crown Office Forms, p. 4.) Lord DENMAN, C. J.-We had better consider whether the rule of Court should not be amended. Martin, Q.C. then consented to join issue and proceed to trial. Rule discharged. MARTIN r. DORE. (Second application on fresh materials.) A rule having been discharged on the ground that the rule and affidavits were wrongly entitled, the Court discharged a second rule obtained for the same object, a new affidavit having been filed in further explanation of the law of Scotland, as applicable to the case. ing given, making it appear to be two distinct demands, | for the plaintiff treats them, and, as we think, reason. ably, as having been previously consolidated between the firm and Conway, and to be so understood as between them and the defendant. This objection therefore fails. On this same issue another objection has been insisted on, namely, that the action is brought too soon; to understand which, the language of the undertaking must be referred to, and a few facts of the case in evidence that Conway had assiged his property to certain trustees, of whom the defendant is the survivor, for the benefit of the creditors. At the date of this transaction in the course of the completing several leases of the different estates specified in the schedule B., a part of the purchase-money had been paid, and part remained due. Among the es-gular replication in the name of the Queen's coroner tates in the second schedule was one called Place and attorney was delivered; and it is submitted, this Meredith; the undertaking refers to the balance of being the first proceeding under the new stat. 6 & 7 the purchase-money due, and it is to be made on re- Vict. c. 20, and the replication not being brought be ceipt of such balance. But it was said Place Mere- fore the Court, that the Court will not make this dith had not yet been finally conveyed, nor was the rule absolute. balance, stated at 9001. yet received. Yet it would seem at the trial, it was supposed the Place Meredith was not included in the deeds in the sche. dule; in the argument it was admitted to be there, but it was urged that previously to the contract of sale it had been mortgaged for 18007. at first, but that he had contracted to buy it for 9501. consequently no balance could ever be forthcoming at the completion of the purchase. Assuming these facts, which are not denied, we think the answer appears to be valid and sufficient. The objections taken on the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 9th, issues are, first, that at the date of the undertaking, in March 1834, neither the plaintiff nor his partner had ever been admitted to practise in any of the superior courts of Westminster-hall, but much of the work was done by their agents in the Courts of Chancery, Queen's Bench, and the Exchequer. For this the charge amounted to 1391. and for this it was said they could not have a lien because they could not recover these charges themselves. It appeared that previously to 1834, and before the commencement of the work done, and during most of it, the two partners had been regularly admitted, and were practising at the court of petty session in which the residue of the work was done, but they were not admitted in the superior courts till the year 1836. The undertaking is for the payment of such sum or sums of money "as you may be justly entitled to claim a lien for on the title-deeds of the said estates now in your possession in respect of your bill of charges." If an attorney's lien must be commensurate only with his right to recover, any individual who is not an attorney or solicitor could not recover for the charges of one acting as attorney or solicitor for him, and such person if knowingly so acting would be liable to severe punishment for so doing. Nor was this much disputed; but on the facts it was said to be admitted that the plaintiff and his partners were attorneys, as is alleged, and therefore the objection is not open to the defendant. It is true, and it is alleged in the declaration and not denied, they were attorneys and solicitors carrying on business as such, and it is said this must mean of the superior Courts of Westminster Hall." Why that should be the meaning, it being alleged with reference to a time when they were also such officers of the Court of Great Session, we do not sce; or even if that were conceded, why it should mean of all the superior Courts of this Hall in particular in which the business appeared to be done, and no reason was assigned. In truth, the defendant could not have performed the original undertaking, nor was it necessary. The undertaking is to satisfy a lien, and the lien is denied. If this were the only sum in respect of which it was claimed, the denial of the lien, or the right to the lien, would cast on the plaintiff the burthen of proving all such circumstances as esta. blished it. In the present case the plaintiff can only recover pro tanto, and he will fail as to his demand, in respect to which the lien does not extend. To this extent we think the objection must prevail. But, further, it is said the possession of the deeds clearly was not such a possession as entitled Oldfield to any lien, for that they held as trustees, and may have held as such before they became the attorneys, or had any possession as attorneys. It is not necessary to discuss this objection, because, looking to all the circumstances, and particularly to the work begun to be done before the year 1806, their interests as trustees were certainly not created till 1815; we think it fails in fact; there being no evidence the other way, we cannot doubt but that the jury would have found the continuing possession of them as in them as attorneys; and as we are put in the place of a jury, we should certainly draw that conclusion; and the result of the case is, that all the issues will be found for the plaintiff for the whole demand, 1,1741; there will be a deduction of 2001.; 1391. for the work done in this court, and 391. 15s. admitted to be incorrectly charged: altogether 3791.; leaving a balance of 7911. 19s. 2d. as the amount of the damages to be recovered. The rule will be absolute to that extent. REG. v. ASHLEY. Practice on the Crown side of the Court-Signing judgment. Healon shewed cause against a rule obtained by Pearson to discharge the defendant out of custody, he claiming privilege from arrest as a peer of Scotland. There is a preliminary objection which is fatal to this rule. It is precisely the same rule as that which the Court discharged last Term because it was improperly intituled; and it has been obtained upon fresh materials, a new affidavit having been filed. (Reg v. Manchester and Leeds Railway Company, 8 Ad. & Ell. 413.) Pearson, contrà, was then called upon. This application is not made upon fresh facts; the additional affidavit is only in further explanation of the law of Scotland. [COLERIDGE, J.-The law of Scotland is a fact; this ought at least to have been the same application on the same affidavits, re-entitled and resworn.] Lord DENMAN, C. J.-The rule is quite clear; you cannot make a second application upon pew affidavits of old facts; the indulgence is always so limited. Healon applied to have the rule discharged with costs; and cited Digby v. Alexander (8 Bing. 416; 9 Bing. 412.) Pearson.-This is the case of a prisoner. Lord DENMAN, C. J.-The rule has been so well settled, that we think a party disregarding it ought to pay costs. Rule discharged with costs. Re THE LORD OF THE MANOR OF CAWLEY. Mandamus to enrol a surrender-Costs. Humfrey, Q.C. (Ogle with him) shewed cause against a rule calling on the lord and the steward of the manor of Cawley in Northamptonshire to shew cause why a mandamus should not issue, commanding them to enrol a conditional surrender of copybolds in the manor. This is a vexatious proceeding; it might and should have been made part of a former rule, calling upon the same parties to admit the present applicant. That rule was resisted on the ground that there was no surrender, without which, of course, there could be no admission; but the Court thought that that matter should be tried upon a return, and accordingly the rule for a mandamus was made absolute. The applicant now declines to proceed with the mandamus until the surrender has been enrolled. Lord DENMAN, C.J.-Mr. Whitehurst, why was not this made part of the first rule? Whitehurst, Q.C. (with whom was Hugh Hill), contrà.-We were not aware of it; but now, of course, we cannot proceed with the mandamus until it is enrolled. If we did, we should certainly be defeated. Humfrey, Q.C.-It appears that the fact was known before cause was shewn against the former rule, which ought then to have been abandoned. At all events, the Court will impose the condition of paying the costs of the former rule. Lord DENMAN, C. J.-No; the question as to those costs may be reserved; but this rule must be made absolute. Rule absolute. He cited R. v. The Justices of the West Riding (3 Gale & Dav. 170.) Rule nisi. Tuesday, Feb. 3. REG. v. THE OVERSEERS OF THE HIGHWAYS OF WESTHOE. Repair of turnpike road- Order of justices for contribution out of the highway rates. By a local Act trustees were appointed for making Turnpike Roads over and along the course of two ancient highways, and also for making one new road; on all of which they were empowered to take toll and to erect toll-gates, &c. By the Act, money was to be raised by subscription as well as by toll; and the trustees were to apply money already subscribed, in the first place to the payment of preliminary expenses and of the two ancient roads, and in the next, money thereafter subscribed to the purposes aforesaid, as well as to the making of the new road; and there was a provision for the erection of toll-gates on the old roads before the completion of the new road. The trustees were designated by the Act, Trustees of the Roads, in the plural. Held, upon the construction of this Act, that the completion of all three roads was not a condition precedent to the right of the trustees to take toll on any of them, or to derive any other benefit under the Act; that the old roads became Turnpike Roads as soon as completed, and that therefore the trustees were at liberty to apply to justices under 2 & 3, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 59 (continuing the provisions of 2 & 3 Vict. c. 81), for contribution out of the highway rates; and that an order made by justices upon such application for payment of a certain sum was good. An order of two justices of the county of Durham for the payment of 201. being a rateable proportion of the rate or assessment to be levied for the repair of the highways in and for the township of Westhoe, to the Treasurer to the Commissioners of the South Shields Turnpike Roads, was confirmed on appeal by the Sessions, subject to a case; which raised the question whether the Commissioners of the Turnpike Trust had so far fulfilled the duties imposed upon them by their Act of Parliament (7 Geo. 4, c. 17), as to entitle them to apply for such order. The Act was entitled "An Act for Making and Maintaining a Turnpike-road from South Shields to White Mere Pool, and from thence to join the Durham and Newcastle turnpike-road at Vigo-lane, with a Branch from Garrow Slake to East Boldon, all in the county of Durham ;" and various clauses were set out in the case, from which it appeared that the roads from South Shields to White Mere Pool, and from Yarrow Slake to East Boldon, were already existing highways; but that the extension from White Mere Pool to Vigo-lane would be an entirely new road; that the roads were to be called the South Shields Turnpikeroads; that the trustees were to take tolls, and erect toll-gates, &c., but not to take more than two full tolls in any one day along the whole line of the roads between South Shields and Vigo-lane, or more than one between South Shields and White Here Pool, or between South Shields and East Boldon; that out of the moneys already subscribed, &c. or out of the first money which should arise from the tolls, the trustees should pay the expenses of obtaining the Act, and the remainder, in the first place, in defraying the expenses of making the roads from South Shields to White Mere Pool and to East Boldon, and erecting tollgates thereon; and, in the next place, all moneys thereafter subscribed or borrowed should be applied as well for the purposes aforesaid, as for making the extension of the said road from White Mere Pool to Vigo-lane; and that the remainder (if any) of all such moneys and all moneys received from tolls should, from time to time, be applied in keeping in repair the roads to be made turnpike, by The case further stated that virtue of the Act. the Act had been carried into execution only as to the two roads first mentioned; that nothing towards making the extension had been done from White Mere Pool to Vigo-lane, and that the two roads as to which the Act had been carried into 372 execution were ancient highways, which previously to the Act had always been repaired by their respective townships, of which Westhoe was one, and upon which the inhabitants of the townships had always done statute duty. 6 Vict. c. 59, and the end of the first section of that REG. V. THE INHABITANTS OF HEYOP. HARROLD V. WHITTAKER. Part heard. BUSINESS OF THE WEEK. Knowles, Q.C. and R. Ingham, in support of the order of sessions, contended that the Act contemplated the turning the two old roads into turnpike roads as a primary object, quite distinct from the making of the new extension to Vigo-lane; that that circumstance completely distinguished this case from those of R. v. Cumberworth (3 B. & Ad. 108; 4 Ad. & Ell. 731; and R. v. Edge Lane (4 Ad. & Eil. 723), which decided that where trustees are authorised to make a turnpike-road from A to C, the entire road must be completed before the public can be compelled to repair any part, and brought it within the observations of Littledale, J. and Taunton, J. in R. v. The Justices of the West Riding (5 B. & Ad. 1003). They also cited Lee v. Milner (2 Mee. & W. 824); R. v. White (4 Q. B. 101); Northam Bridge Company v. The Southampton Railway Company (6 Mee. & W. 428). Martin, Q.C. and Greenwood, contrà.-The requirements of the Turnpike Act have not been complied with; and as the completion of the roads is one entire consideration for the privileges granted by the Act, it is also a condition precedent to the enjoyment of any of those privileges. The Act in effect establishes but one fund for the one purpose of making and repairing all the roads contemplated by the Act, and until all are complete there is no authority to take tolls upon any one of them; none of them therefore fall within the description of turnpike roads, so as to entitle the trustees, by their treasurer, to make this application, or authorise the BOOSEY U. DAVIS.-Bovill moved for a rule calling on the justices to grant it. The cases of R. v. Cumberworth defendant to deliver an amended copy of objections under and R. v. Edge Lane decide this case upon principle; the Copyright Act, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 16. That already deand the Court will not allow that principle to be de- livered failed to specify the name of the present proprietor. Rule nisi, returnable at chambers. feated by slight variations of expression in the Act of COOK v. GODFREY.-Rule for a new trial, on two grounds Parliament. The Northern Bridge Company v. The Southampton Railway Company is quite distinguish-first, the misconduct of the jury; and, second, excessive damages.-Crowder, Q.C. shewed cause. Kinglake, Serjt. able in its facts; and the definition of a turnpike road contra, admitted that the first ground was answered by the there given can only be taken with reference to those affidavits, and consented to refer the other point to the facts; but even assuming the definition to be correct, learned jude. that it is a road on which toll-gates are by law erected, and tolls taken thereat, these were not turnpike roads, because no tolls could be legally taken thereon. Sentence, the same-twelve months' imprisonment on trial. Cur. adv. vult. DOE dem. KING V. SANDELLS.-The question raised upon this rule was whether the evidence shewed that a negociation for a tenancy was going on at the time of the demise. Verdict for the defendant. Bovill, for the defendant; Petersdorf, Rule discharged. for the plaintiff. Rule discharged; the question of damages referred to Rule absolute. ASHLEY U. OSBORNE.-Rule for a reference to the Master reference. REG. . REV. J. BARTLET, ex parte TOZER.-Rule for a criminal information. Wilkins, Serjt. on the part of the defendant, retracted all the libellous imputations, which had given rise to the application. The Attorney-General, in support of the rule. Rule absolute.. BILLING . MACKENZIE.-Rule calling on the plaintiff, Rule referred to the Master. Re W. DRAKE.-By arrangement referred to the Master. CumberPATTESON, J. (a)-The cases of R. v. worth and R. v. Edge Lane raised a point which could not arise here; because here the question is as to roads not first constructed under the Act, but already existing as highways. This Act authorises the trustees to turn those old highways into turnpike roads, and also to make a new road; as to which last road, if only partially completed, the cases of Cumberworth and Edge Lane would apply, supposing any attempt to be made to cast upon the parish the burthen of repairing it. I should be sorry if anything said now should be supposed to militate against the authority or principle of these cases; our decision on this Act can have no such effect. From this Act we collect that the Legislature did not intend that all these three roads should be completed before the trustees could take tolls, or do any other act of that sort; the roads are manifestly severed by the Act itself. First, the trustees are called the Trustees of the South Shields Roads, in the plural number; and the Act then provides that one toll only is to be paid for the old roads, and not more than two for the new, in effect giving a second toll in respect of the new road to be made; and in the 18th section the Legislature has carefully provided against the appropriation of such second toll to the repair of the old road, unless under particular circumstances. But the 17th section is that upon which the construction of the Act must mainly turn. In the first part of it, it makes CLARK v. O'GRADY.-Fry had on the preceding day everything that comes into the hands of the trustees applicable to the purposes of the Act; and the use of moved for a new trial, but the Court now said they conthe said tolls in that part of the clause has no legiti-sidered the evidence as to the gambling nature of the Rule refused. mate bearing one way or the other; but then it goes on to provide that the money already subscribed shall be applied, in the first place, to defraying preliminary expenses, and the remainder in defraying the expenses of the old roads; and in the next place, all the money hereafter subscribed shall be applied as well for the purposes aforesaid, as for the making of the new road; clearly making the construction of the new road a secondary thing. The conclusion of the clause provides that "the remainder, if any, of all such moneys, and all moneys which shall arise, &c. from the tolls, &c. shall, from time to time, be applied in amending and keeping in repair the roads to be made turnpike by virtue of this Act, &c." But then it is contended that no tolls can be received after the old roads have been made turnpike, until the new roads have been made; because, it is said, the whole forms one consideration; and if that were made out the cases referred to would apply; but it seems to me that the Act of Parliament has distinctly severed the one from the other. If, then, the trustees could take tolls, upon the old roads made turnpike, though the third road has not been completed, it follows that they fall within the statute 5 & (a) Lord Denman, C. J., was absent. consideration sufficient. REG. v. HALL. This was a rule nisi for a criminal infor- Cur. adv, vult. DOE dem. REG. v. THE ARCHBISHOP OF YORK.-The Attorney-General, Ellis, V. Williams, and Townsend shewed Cur. adv. vult. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. Wednesday, Jan. 28. It is not necessary under 2 Geo. 2, c. 23, that an at- ciently indicated the court and cause in which the It was held (Maule, J. dissentiente) that the bill sef business was done. This was an action of debt for work and labour as an attorney and solicitor, in which the is, infer alia, were on the Statute of Limitations, and on a plea that no bill of fees and disbursements subscribed by statute. the plaintiff had been delivered according to the At the trial before Maule, J. at the Northampton summer assizes, the plaintiff sought to recover, in respect to two bills of costs for business done by him as attorney and solicitor for the defendants. As to one of the bills, the learned judge was of opinion the t the same was barred by the Statute of Limitations; and as to the other, it was objected on the part of the defendants that the name of the cause and the court in which the business was done did not sufficiently in it. The bill was not headed in any court, appear or with the name of any cause, but commenced thus: "Mrs. and the Miss Falkners, "To Benjamin Martindale. "1835, Dec. 22.-Attending on you, cheferring and advising respecting your suits in Chancery, and as to the order for dismissal, &c. when you left me the papers to peruse, and promised to call to morrow. "23.—Attending on you, conferring and advising further on your affairs, and explaining to you the mode in which I thought you might be reinstated in your proceedings before the Court, when it was de cided that you should bring me a retainer, &c. sa Saturday next. "24.-Perusing decrees and report at the Report Office, and sundry other papers intrusted by you to me, and paid, &c. 29.-Attending on Mr. Ridgway this morning, discussing your suits and the best mode of proceeding with him, and again on you this evening, when it decided that I was to see Mr. Ridgway again with you to-morrow." Then followed in the bill various other itama, among which was "attending at the Six Clerks Office, searching for record, and paid." Afterwards the bill proceeded thus: The bill then contained, inter alio, the following items :-"Copy title of cause, and prayer of bill; "copy minutes as wished to be settled for the Lord paid for Chancellor;" "attending court;" cree;" "warrant to consider decree, copy, and service;" "instructions for interrogatories;" rant to settle draft, interrogatories, copy, and service," "drawing and engrossing petition for leave to set down cause for hearing on further directions;" "copy decree for the Master of the Rolls;" "July 17, attending court on cause ;" "July 18, the like;" "paid for copy minutes ;""attending Mr. Bull, explaining to him the situation the parties were placed in by the decision of the Master of the Rolls." Under the direction of the learned judge, a verdlet was found for the plaintiff for 6341. leave being given to the defendants to move to enter a verdict for them if the Court should be of opinion that no bill had been delivered sufficient to satisfy the statute, or to reduce the amount by such of the items as were beyond six years' date. A rule nisi to that effect having been obtained in Michaelmas Term last, Channell, Serjt. (Hayes with him) now show cause. It is submitted that the bill sufficiently plies with the statute. The statute of 3 Jac. 1, © has been expressly held in Lester v. Lazarus (2 C. M. & R. 665) not to require the name of the court which the business is done to be stated. Then as to the statute 2 Geo. 2, c. 23, that does not either in express terms require the court to be named in the bill, but as it gives a power of taxation upon application of the party chargeable by such bill unto Lord Chancellor, or unto any of the courts afore said, or unto any judge or baron of any of the said courts respectively, in which the business contained in such bill, or the greatest part thereof in amount or value, shall have been transacted," it has been considered that the statute requires such a bill to be delivered as will enable the party charged to know to which court to apply to get the bill taxed. It is not, therefore, necessary that the bill should be headed in any court or in any particular ner, and if it give such particulars as intin to the party the cause and the court in which the b siness was done, it does all in that respect tha required by the statute. Here the bill does es with such requisites; it shews that the business in a cause of Falkner v. Matthews, and that the was in the Court of Chancery, for the ite dently relate to equity proceedings, and not t mon law. The case of Lewis v. Primrose ( N.S. Q.B. 269), which will be relied on by t side as an authority that the name of the cause should be stated, is distinguishabl present, as it did not then appear that the court was ever mentioned or referred to in any of the bill. Moreover, the retainer is headed in Chancery, and with the name of the cause, and that for this purpose other than the bill of costs may be looked to. Taylor v. Hodgson (14 Law J. N.S. Q.B. 310) is an authority. [The COURT said, however, that the case cited was very different from the present, and that they could here look to nothing but the bill.] With regard to the point reserved as to the Statute of Limitations, some of the early items being for business done more than six years before the action, the answer is that the whole account is a continuing one, the business not being completed until the occurrence of the matters charged in the latter items, which are within the six years. The following cases upon this point were cited: Harris v. Osbourn (2 C. & M. 629), and Nicholls v. Wilson (11 M. & W. 106). 373% there is just before an item of attending court, and BUSINESS OF THE WEEK. Shee, Serjt. in support of rule. rule to shew cause why taxation of costs should not be reviewed. REGISTRATION APPEALS. Thursday, Jan. 29. Rule nisi. WEST RIDING OF YORKSHIRE. The Splitting Act-Purchase of 40s. freeholds. ALEXANDER, Appellant, v. NEWMAN, Respondent. tenants in common, with a full knowledge on the part of both the vendor and the vendees that the object for conveyance of freehold property to the claimants, as which the purchase was made was to gain the franchise, and so to multiply voices at the elections for the county, without fraud on either side, does not come within the meaning of the provisions of the Splitting Act, 7 & 8 Wm. 3, c. 25, and such purchasers are entitled to vote in respect of such freeholds. ney to deliver a bill of fees, charges, and disbursements, written in a common legible hand, and in plain English, that is, not using law terms, and in words at length, except times and sums. This shews that the legislature evidently intended that it should be such as simple people might understand, and not merely for persons who had a competent knowledge of the law. Then the object for which this was thus to be done, is described to be that the party chargeable may, upon application "to a judge or baron of any of the said courts respectively, in which the business contained in such bill, or the greatest part thereof in amount or value shall have been transacted," have the bill referred for taxation. It is necessary, therefore, that the bill should inform him who are the persons to whom he may apply for that purpose, and consequently the object of the Act would be deDowling, Serjt. (Miller with him), contrà.-The feated, unless the bill should inform the party in case of Lewis v. Primrose is an express authority in what court the business was done. And it is not favour of the defendants, and that under the statute sufficient unless it states the court in which the of 2. Geo. 2, c. 23, the name of the court and the greater part is done, as the party would not otherwise cause should be stated. In that case Lord Denman have an opportunity of knowing to what jurisdiction says, "The object of giving information is to enable to apply for the taxation of that part which he might the client to take steps to ascertain if the bill is a fair wish to be taxed; and as under the statute he is one. It cannot be said that the attorney is giving entitled to a cholce of jurisdiction, he ought to have sufficient information of what the business is, without such choice. This is the effect of Lewis v. Primrose, informing his client of the court in which it has been which I think is substantially in point in the present done. Both the court and the cause should be stated." case; and, without overturning that decision, I canThe intention of the legislature was that the informa- not but say that the name of the court must appear tion conveyed by the bill should be such, that a person in the bill of costs. In that respect, I believe there unlearned in the law might be able to know to what is no difference of opinion between the rest of the court he was to apply to get the bill taxed; but in Court and myself; the question on which we differ is the bill delivered in the present case it was only a person only as to what is a sufficient statement to shew this learned in and acquainted with the practice of the in the bill. It is said that it sufficiently appears in law who might be able to form a guess in what court this bill that all the business was done in the Court the proceedings were. That, it is submitted, is not of Chancery. The question is, what is the degree of 4 sufficient, and the reasons against it apply the stronger certainty required by the statute? To what extent in the present, the defendants being ladies, who can- is a person to be presumed to have a knowledge of not therefore be expected to draw such inferences the law? I conceive that there is no presumption in from the items in the bill as required by the plaintiff. this country that every person knows the law. Lord As to the question upon the Statute of Limitations Mansfield, in Jones v. Randall (Cowp. 46), in answer there is nothing in the bill or evidence to shew that to Mr. Dunning, then contending for such a proposition, said, "As to the certainty of the law mentioned the items are in respect of a continuing transaction. TINDAL, C.J.-The answer to the last objection by Mr. Dunning, it would be very hard upon the promade by the defendants is that the items charged are fession if the law was so certain that every body knew in respect of one continued demand from its inception it." The rule rather is, that ignorance of the law toits end and, that there was no complete cause of action shall not excuse a person so as to free him from the for the same until within the six years prior to the consequences of his acts; as punishment for his commencement of the action. As to the other ob. crime, or damages for his breach of contract. But it jection, the statute of Geo. 2 requires that there is contrary to common sense and every day's practice should appear in the bill of costs in what court the to say that every person has a knowledge of the pracbusiness was done, and also the name of the cause. tice which prevails in any particular court. Then I agree with the Court of Queen's Bench in Lewis v. taking this bill of costs, does it give that information Primrose, that although the statute does not in as to the court in which the business was done, in a express terms require it, yet it follows from the way which these defendants, possessing only such object of the Act that the party charged should knowledge which persons may ordinarily be prebe able to ascertain from the bill in what court sumed to have, could understand. The bill begins the greatest part of the business was transacted. with an attendance, and advising respecting suits in The ground of the decision of the Court in that case Chancery, but as there is no heading, it does not newas, that neither in the heading or other part of the cessarily apply to what follows. Then there are items bill in that case, did the name of the Court or cause of perusing decrees, and paid for minutes of decrees; appear by any fair and reasonable intendment. Now, and it is said that one must know that such are in looking at the bill of costs in the present case, I con- Chancery; but there are decrees, I believe, in Docfess it does appear to me by reasonable intendment, tors' Commons, and it would be too much to suppose that the name of the cause in which the business was a person, not a lawyer, to know from such items that done is Falkner v. Matthews, and that the proceedings the charges were for business in a suit in Chancery. are a suit in Chancery. The first item is attending There are a hundred other items in the bill, with reon you respecting your suits in Chancery," &c. and spect to which, though the fact may be that the busithen two days after the following-" Perusing de-ness occurred in Chancery, yet it would be impossible crees and reports in the Report Office," &c.; then, to know whether they were or not done in a court "attending on Mr. Ridgway this morning discussing where they might be taxed. Supposing that the item your suits;"" attending at the Six Clerks' Office," of "a copy of decree for the Master of the Rolls" is *&c. the charges being peculiarly in respect of Chan- sufficient (but which I think it is not) to shew that it cery matters. After these preliminary items the bill necessarily was a proceeding in the court of the contains, in Hilary Term, 1836, a charge under Master of the Rolls, yet, unless the bill shews in Falkner v. Matthews, paid for minute of decree," what court the whole or the greater part of the busi&c. and it does not appear that the name of the cause ness was done, the statute has not been complied is afterwards altered, but various items follow, such with; and therefore I am of opinion that my direction as warrant to consider decree," "instructions for at the trial was wrong, and that this rule ought to be interrogatories," copy decree for the Master of made absolute, the Rolls," &c. which, without going through, appear I think sufficient, with reasonable intendment to shew that the charges in the bill had no reference to any proceeding in a court of common law, but had reference to a suit in Chancery in Falkner v. Matthews. There is, therefore, both the name of the Court and cause. MAULE, J.-At the trial I was of opinion that a sufficient bill of costs within the statute had been delivered, and, therefore, I directed the verdict to be entered for the plaintiff for the amount of the bill, subject to leave to the defendants to move to enter a verdict for them instead, should the Court Nisi Prius was think that my direction at wrong. My lord, and the rest of the Court, are of opinion that the direction at the trial was right, but I, however, have the misfortune to differ from them, and to think that my opinion at the trial was not right, and that I ought to have directed the verdict to have been entered for the defendants. The point certainly does not go much to the justice of the case, as the business was properly done; but I think it is important that a right construction should be put on matters of law, which may become a precedent, and that we should not look to the particular convenience of any case. The act of Geo. 2 requires the attor The case was heard last Michaelmas Term. Case. At a Court held to revise the list of voters for the parish of Lockwood, Joseph Bottomley, and thirty-four other persons, claimed to have their names inserted in the register of voters, as owners, each respectively of one undivided thirty-fifth part of freehold land and buildings at Lockwood. The facts of the case are as follows:-Joseph Bottomley, being desirous of obtaining a qualification to vote in the election of members for the West Riding of the county of York, some time in the month of January 1845, called upon an agent of a political association, in the town of Huddersfield, and requested him to obtain a vote for him. Joseph Bottomley wished to obtain a qualification as cheaply as he could, but did not care about the nature or situation of the property, provided it would confer the right of voting, and did not occasion an outlay of money beyond what would give a qualification, at the same time secure the or dinary rate of interest. His motive in applying to the agent was not, however, for the investment of money in land or buildings, but only to acquire the right of voting. Some time in the month of Ja nuary, Messrs. C, manufacturers in the neighbour. hood of Huddersfield, authorised the said agent to sell for them certain lands and cottages for the sum of 1,400l. their only object being to increase the number of voters for the West Riding of York. They were not in want of money, and would not sell any portion of their real estate, but it was only for the reason beforementioned. The agent that Messrs. C. employed in this transaction was not their general attorney, but was only the agent of the before-mentioned associa placed in the newspapers inviting parties either to sell tion; he had publicly caused advertisements to be or purchase small freeholds, for the purpose of qualiIfying themselves, and referring to himself as agent. In consequence of such authority from Messrs. C., and from instructions received from Joseph Bottomley and many other persons similarly disposed, he arranged the purchase and sale of the said lands and cottages to Joseph Bottomley and thirty-four other persons, as tenants in common, for the sum of 1,400%. The conveyance was accordingly prepared by the agent, and duly executed by Joseph Bottomley, on the 22nd day of January last, on which occasion he paid his portion of the purchase-money, viz. 401. to the agent, on behalf of Messrs. C. and 11. towards the agent's bill of costs; on the same day a lease of the land and cottages was executed by Bottomley and dors, Messrs. C. for the period of fifteen years, thirty-four other tenants in common, to the ven a very short distance of Messrs. C.'s mill, and at an annual rent of 70l. which rent had since been duly paid. The land and cottages are within still in the occupation of persons employed at their The conveyance was bond fide, and the were before, and at the time of the purchase, and are own mill. purchase-money was the money of Joseph Bottomley, and the several other purchasers. There was no secret trust or reservation in favour of the sellers, CRESSWELL, J.-I am of opinion that the direc- す titled to have their names retained on the list. This was a consolidated appeal, and nine other names were to abide the decision of the court in the foregoing case. JUDGMENT. Cur, adv. vult. conveyance really and honestly made for the tended for on the part of the appellant, at any in nor any agreement as to the mode in which the elective franchise should be exercised by the thirty-five purpose of carrying such contract into effect was future time and between other parties than those to purchasers or any of them; nor had any of them any void. But by the common law from the earliest the original conveyance, its real motive, if brought to communication with Messrs. C. They, and the times, a conveyance, however perfect in point of form, light by accident or otherwise, might destroy the title thirty-five purchasers entertained the same public notwithstanding such may have been clearly intended to the estate in whose soever hands it might be opinion; and though there was no immediate con- by the secret act or understanding between the par- where there has been a real object on the part of the sent between them, the only objects of the transacties never to have had any legal effect as a convey. purchaser, or it may be perhaps even the conveyance tions on both sides was to multiply voices in the ance, was always held to be void, whatever the secret in part of the seller's land to one other person, if th election of members of Parliament for the West object and purpose of the parties in making such con- object above mentioned must be held to be void; Riding of York. Upon these facts, the claim of Jo- veyance might be. The old text writers lay down the that, on such a construction of the Act as this, the seph Bottomley, to have his name inserted in the maxim that "the law abhors covin, and every co- landlord of an estate could not sell any part of it bang list of voters was opposed, on the ground that the vinous act shall be void;" and it is on that principle fide for a full consideration in money to two different case came within the statute 7 & 8 Wm. 3, chap. 25, unquestionably, that a conveyance made in order or purchasers, or perhaps to one only, if the object of commonly called the "Splitting Act," as being a for the purpose of giving a qualification to vote at such sale was to give the purchaser a vote for the conveyance made in order to multiply voices, or to elections, or for any other purpose, if made with a county, for the erection of two must be, or perhaps split and divide the interest in houses, or land, among secret intention and design, that it should fail to be only one, equally within the principle, though several persons to enable them to vote at elections, evidence of a conveyance made as between the parties not an equal degree, of the multiplication and, therefore, were void and of none effect. The themselves, shall pass no interest, and have no effect, of voices at an election, splitting and dividing revising barrister decided that the statute did not would be fraudulent and void at common law. Lord the interest in houses and lands amongst several apply to this case, and that the claimants were en- Somers-and it is impossible to name an authority persons. The holding, therefore, the literal construc of greater weight on a subject of the nature of the tion of the words of the statute of William to make present-is express to this point; and in an observation such bona fide conveyances absolutely void, would very made by him on the trial of the case of Onslow v. The much fetter the full and free enjoyment of landed proBailiff of Haslemere for misconduct as a returning perty, and create insecurity in sales of estates. Upon officer, on which occasion it was proved that many of these various grounds, and for these considerations, TINDAL, C. J.-This appeal against the decision the voters claimed under franchises of very many and we think the sounder construction of the statute of of the revising barrister for the West Riding of the insignificant parts of burgage lands, that had been William, taken by itself, is that by conveyances made county of York raises the distinct question, whether lately made and fraudulently contrived to make votes in order to multiply voices, which are thereby declared a conveyance to a body of purchasers as tenants in against an election, lays it down thus: "This case to be void, are intended such conveyances only as at common is void under the 7th section of the statute should caution persons having rights of election against the time of the passing of the Act would have been 7 & 8 Wm. 3, c. 25, such conveyance being made, making votes by splitting burgage freeholds by the held to be void by the common law; that is, convey. both on the part of the vendor and the vendees, with said fraudulent conveyances, all such conveyances as ances meant by the parties not to transfer any real the avowed and only object of multiplying voices in are not made bona fide on good consideration being in interest in the land, but made for the purpose of ma the elective franchise, such, in fact, at the same time, that case held to be void by the common law," (Lord tiplying voices in elections, and for that purpose only. being a bona fide conveyance made on a contract of Somers's Tracts). He then draws a very important As to the observation made in the course of the argusale, where the purchase-money had been paid and distinction between conveyances made to give qualifi- ment, that if already void by common law, there was the land really taken and kept under the conveyance, cations when they are real and honest, and when they no necessity for avoiding them by statute, it may be a and where there was no secret trust or reservation in are fraudulent and fictitious, and making the latter sufficient answer, that it was thought beneficial favour of the seller, nor any stipulation as to the only void at common law; and as this trial took place where such baneful practices as those described by mode in which the elective franchise should be exer- only about fifteen years before the passing of the Lord Thurlow were daily practised to promigate this cised. The question is undoubtedly one of consi- statute of Win. 3, the language of Lord Somers affords doctrine of common law to sheriffs and other officers derable importance, not only as it involves the very strong evidence of how the common law stood at to whom the duty of conducting an election was general principle of election law, but as it applies to the time of the passing of the Act. Again, the very trusted, and to give it the additional weight and soa large number of cases reserved for our determina- language of the statute of William seems to point to lemnity of a legislative declaration. If, however, any tion. It has been argued before us both on the pre- the necessary conclusion that real and bona fide con- doubt exist on the construction of the statute of Wm. sent and upon other reserved cases, and we are of veyances were not intended to be abolished, although 3, when considered by itself, such doubt will be reopinion on the proper construction of the statute the motive and purpose of the parties might be that moved when the subsequent statutes made прод the above referred to, taking into consideration at the of multiplying voices at elections, but such convey- same subject, to effectuate more fully the same object, same time the statutes subsequently passed and re- ances only made for that purpose, as were fraudu- are taken into consideration. The next statute in lating to the same subject-matter, that the convey-lent and fictitious. The statute says all conveyances order of time is that of the 10th Anne, e. 23. That ance in question was not a void conveyance, and that in order to multiply voices are declared to be statute, it is to be observed, is not so wide in its opethe several persons claiming to vote under it were void; hence a conveyance that makes no reference ration as the statute of William; for whilst the for entitled to have their names retained on the list of whatever to any contract for sale on which a real mer statute of William, by its general terms, extends voters for the West Riding of the county of York. conveyance was granted, nor professes to deal by con- to all elections where the right of voting depended Even if the statute 7 & 8 Wm. 3 were the only sta-veyance with the estate or interest in the land affec- upon the ownership of lands in counties or boroughs, tute passed upon the subject, and that statute were ted by such contract of sale, nor provides for the re- the statute of Anne is confined exclusively to multito be construed strictly by the very letter, we think vesting of the land which passed into the possession of plying votes in the election of knights of the shire. its provisions cannot be held to extend to the case of the purchaser under that consideration, nor for the re- This statute is entitled "An Act for the more effeany conveyance made on a really bona fide contract payment of the purchase-money to the purchaser, all tual preventing fraudulent conveyances, in order to for the sale and purchase of land, but that the statute which provisions might well be expected if the convey- multiply votes for electing knights of shires to was intended to apply to fictitious conveyances that ance be not on a real bona fide contract of sale, is not serve in Parliament," the very title of the Act had nothing more than the form and appearance of a a fictitious conveyance, unless it was intended to be leading to the inference that it is directed, not conveyance the parchment and the seal only-the avoided, on account of the motive on which it was against all conveyances for that purpose, but parties thereto having unlawfully agreed and intended entered into. And this is the more striking, as in against fraudulent conveyances only. The Act then that no interest should actually pass thereby. the very same section provision is made as to the begins by reciting in terms the 7th and 8th Wm. The fast observation that arises upon the statute of estate of trustees and mortgagees, so that the mind of 3, in which this question arises, and it then farther Wm. 3, as to the provision now under discussion, is the legislature must have been awakened to the dis- recites, "that many fraudulent practices have been that the clause is declaratory only of the common tinction between pretended conveyances which con-used of late to create and multiply votes at elections." law. The first branch of the section creates a new veyed an estate, and one which was the completion The recital, therefore, as well as the title, thas pointlaw, "It is hereby enacted, that no person or per- of a real contract between the seller and the pur- ing out the distinction in the latter, that by fraudu sons shall have a vote in election of members to chaser. According to the distinction laid down by lent and fictitious is meant the making of real votes, serve in parliament for or by reason of any trust, Lord Thurlow, "if the jus disponendi remains in any the latter of which could not be considered in the, estate, or mortgage, unless such trustee or mortgagee other person, it is no longer his, and the purchaser language of the recital, to be enjoyed by those be in actual possession or receipt of the rents and conveys a right to transfer for his use an estate that persons who had just rights to elect. The inst profits of the same estate, but that the mortgagor, or remains in another;" and if the words of the statute section goes on to enact, that "all estate and cestuique trust in possession, shall and may vote for do not, in their strict and necessary construction, conveyances whatsoever made to any person of the same estate;" but the second branch of the compel us to hold a conveyance made for the com- persons, in any fraudulent or collusive man section, which is not now under discussion, is framed pletion of a bona fide contract of sale to be bad on purpose to qualify him or them to give his or thre very differently, and by this latter branch, "all con- the ground that the object and purpose was to multi-vote or votes at such election of knights of the share veyances, in order to multiply voices, or to split and ply voices at an election, there is no general principle (subject, nevertheless, to conditions or agreements to divide the interest in any houses or lands among on which these words are to be extended. The object defeat or determine such estate, or to recover the several persons, to enable them to vote at elections of of increasing the number of freeholders at a county elec same), shall be deemed and taken against those members to serve in parliament, are thereby declared tion is not an object in itself against law or morality, or persons who executed the same, as fire and try to be void and of none effect." This important sound policy. There is nothing injurious to the com- solute, and be holden and enjoyed by all and ener distinction between the two parts of the section munity in one man suying to another buy that land such person or persons to whom such contrac proves incontestibly that the latter part was in- for the purpose of giving or acquiring such qualifica- shall be made as aforesaid, freely and abused from all tended only to declare the law as it stood, giving to tion." The object to be effected is neither malum in quitted, exonerated, and discharged of and from st character. The first question, therefore, is what con ber of persons enjoying the elective franchise has been the dete per. manner of trusts, conditions, clauses of re-entry, &c. will be void at common law. The right of voting for cert many to be to the essential object of formance of such trusts shall be void, and itish one veyances made in order to multiply voices at elections held by many to be beneficial to the constitution, and goes on to enact that the securities given it imposts knights of the shire, given by the common law, is re- the legislature in passing the late Act for amending a penalty of 401, on every person excene consider this kulated by the two statutes, 5th and 10th of Henry 6, the representation of the people of England and veyances of voting under him. And we to that the but to such people resident in each shire, whereof Wales. ground, therefore, con or be a legislative exposition fast as every one of them shall have free land or tenement in tending to real and honest proceedings the words of clause in the statute of William therein to multiply the same county to the value of forty shillings by the the nature, which may be fully satisfied by giving avoiding conveyances, made in order e satute to year, at least, clear of all charges," and there was no them the force of avoiding fictitious conveyances only? voices at elections, was meant by the oths were fatrestriction or provision by the common law against It is further to be observed, that holding the statute be confined to such conveyances only dich are sch it the weight and sanction of a legislative nor malum prohibitum; on the contrary, the num any man's purchasing freeholds within the county of of William to extend to a conveyance made on a real dulent and fictitious-to conveyances which are such injury to all claiming under the purchaser. The such as were accompanied by some to extend to a or any number of purchasers, although the object object and purpose which this sale intended to the of the other hand, against any man selling the same to one of the seller and purchaser might be that the effect cannot be discovered on the to pass; trusts fir face of bonâ fide conveyance made in completion of an actual but is altogether concealed in contract of sale and purchase of land; for the be thereby the breasts of the parties themselves; so that, statute of Anne is expressly limited to fraudulent of the statute con- conveyances, and it cannot be understood that a |