The Political Economy of Regulation: The Case of InsuranceThis is the first comprehensive study of the history, politics, and economics of the insurance industry in the United States. It is designed as a theoretical challenge to the conventional wisdom in political economy which says that regulation benefits the regulated. In fact, Meier shows that because the insurance industry is far too divided to impose its will on the regulatory system, the political economy of regulation is actually the product of a complex interaction of industry interests, consumer groups, insurance regulations, and political elites. Using both historical and quantitative approaches, the author examines a variety of insurance issues including the development of insurance regulation; the impact of regulation on the availability and price of insurance; the stringency of state regulation; and the product liability insurance crisis of 1985-86. The book concludes with a series of recommendations for reforming the regulation of insurance. |
Contents
The Insurance Industry | 1 |
The Property and Casualty Industries | 7 |
Summary | 17 |
A Theory of Government Regulation | 18 |
Political Theories of Regulation | 27 |
Summary | 32 |
Federal and State Government Roles in Insurance Regulation | 33 |
Direct Federal Regulation of Insurance | 35 |
Federal Issues in Insurance Policy | 109 |
MailOrder Insurance | 110 |
The Federal Flood Insurance Program | 114 |
NoFault Automobile Insurance | 118 |
The Unisex Issue | 122 |
Federal Taxes | 126 |
A Theoretical Recapitulation | 134 |
An Empirical Examination of State Insurance Regulation | 137 |
Federal Government Insurance Programs | 36 |
State Regulation of Insurance | 43 |
Summary | 48 |
State Regulation of Insurance From Free Markets to Cartels to Free Markets Early Regulation of Insurance | 49 |
The Beginning | 57 |
Regulating Investment Decisions | 61 |
Property and Casualty Insurance The SouthEastem Underwriters Case | 64 |
The McCarranFerguson Act | 67 |
The Growth of Competition | 77 |
A Theoretical Recapitulation | 84 |
The Liability Insurance Crisis of 19851986 | 88 |
Causes of the Crisis | 90 |
Industry Internal Responses to the Crisis | 93 |
External Demands on the Political System | 95 |
The Opposing Coalition | 96 |
Actions of Public Officials | 98 |
Actions of Policyholders | 99 |
Politics at the Federal Level | 100 |
The Results of the Tor t Reform Effort | 101 |
Cash Flow During the Liability Crisis | 102 |
A Theoretical Recapitulation | 107 |
Industry | 138 |
Potential Consumer Groups | 139 |
Bureaucratic Resources | 140 |
Political Elites | 141 |
Regulatory Stringency | 143 |
Taxing Insurance Companies | 147 |
Regulating Insurance Prices | 150 |
The Impact of Regulation on Price | 156 |
Litigation and the Price of Insurance | 158 |
NoFault Automobile Insurance | 159 |
Other State Restrictions on Automobile Insurance | 162 |
The Impact of Price on Availability | 163 |
Access to Insurance | 164 |
Conclusion | 166 |
The Political Economy of Insurance Regulation | 167 |
Policy Recommendations | 171 |
Conclusion | 178 |
Notes | 179 |
201 | |
221 | |
Other editions - View all
The Political Economy of Regulation: The Case of Insurance Kenneth J. Meier No preview available - 1988 |
Common terms and phrases
agents All-Industry ance antitrust Appleton rule assets Association auto automobile insurance banks benefits Best's bill billion bureaucrats casualty companies casualty insurance Chapter claims coalition competition consumer groups corporate costs direct writers economic federal government filed fire insurance companies firms flood insurance fund health insurance impact increase individuals industry's insurance commissioners insurance crisis insurance industry Insurance Information Institute insurance market insurance policy insurance prices insurance rates insurance regulation interest investment income issue legislation liability insurance licensed lines of insurance litigation major McCarran-Ferguson Act medical malpractice medical malpractice insurance Meier multi-interest model multiline NAIC National no-fault automobile insurance no-fault laws operating paid panies percent policyholders political elites premium taxes profits property and casualty protection rate bureaus rate laws regu regulation of insurance regulatory policy reinsurance relationships reserves result risks salience Stigler Supreme Court Table theory of regulation tion tort reform underwriting variables York
References to this book
Politics and Public Outrage: Explaining Transatlantic and Intra-European ... Erika Meins No preview available - 2003 |
The Political Power of Business: Structure and Information in Public ... Patrick Bernhagen No preview available - 2007 |