the account of each shareholder by substituting the compulsory withdrawal of all the members for the optional withdrawal of individuals. This language, if literally correct, would certainly bear the meaning that up to the date of the winding-up order the option of withdrawal remains. The case of Walton v. Edge, 54 Law J. Rep. Chanc. 362, appeared to be even more in point, for there the House of Lords decided that investing members of a building society who had given notice of withdrawal, and whose notices bad expired before the winding-up began, were entitled to be paid out of the assets (after the outside creditors) in priority to those members who had not given notice of withdrawal. In Auld v. The Glasgow Working Men's Building Society, 56 Law J. Rep. P. C. 57, again, the House of Lords declared a resolution of a building society deducting 78. 6d. per pound from the amounts at the credit of all the members to be void, and held that, as no proceedings for the winding-up of the society had been commenced, the members who had given notice of withdrawal after the resolution were entitled to be paid the whole amount at their credit. The Middlesbrough Redcar, Saltburn-by-Sea, and Cleveland District Permanent Building Society, No. 2, 53 L. T. 203, in which members who had given notice of withdrawal prior to the commencement of the winding-up were held entitled to be repaid the amount of their shares in priority to the other members, does not, indeed, strengthen the authority of the preceding cases, but shows the sense in which they were understood and acted upon. The strong argument founded upon these cases was met on the part of the liquidators of the societies with the suggestion that, while they clearly proved that a winding-up order puts a stop to everything, yet they by no means led to the conclusion that the same result would not be equally well brought about by a declaration of insolvency. The rules of the societies, it was argued, were framed for them as going concerns, and it would certainly seem to be altogether unreasonable and contrary to the rules of equity that, while a society is in a state of suspended animation pending a discussion as to the possibility of reconstruction or the necessity of liquidation, a part of the members should be allowed to escape their liability at the expense of their fellowshareholders. This principle was recoguised in the case of Tennent v. The City of Glasgow Bank, L. R. 4 App. Cas. 615, an application for the removal of the applicant's name from the register of shareholders, in which case Lord Cairos expressly held that, where a company has become insolvent and has stopped payment, then, irrespective of winding-up, a wholly different set of rules at once applies to the rights of shareholders from that which applies in the case of a company which, as a going concern, is assumed to be solvent. It was apon this consideration that Lord Coleridge and Mr. Justice Mathew, after consideration, disposed of the cases under discussion in favour of the liquidators of the societies. It was pointed out that all the incidents of the windingup order mentioned by Lord Selborne in Brownlie v. Russell as grounds for considering that such an order took away the right to withdraw are incidental also to the state of things which ensues when it becomes notorious that a society cannot meet its liabilities; and in Walton v. Edge the question at issue was as to the rights of members who gave notice before there was any reason to suppose that the society was about to be wound up. It may, therefore, be taken that, in the absence of special provisions in the rules of such Societies, withdrawal is only possible as long as the society is believed to be solvent, and when once it is known that such a society is no longer in a condition to fulfil its undertakings with its members, and liquida. tion is inevitable, from that date the rights of the shareholders inter se are fixed, and it is no longer in the power of any one member to escape his liability by shifting it on to the shoulders of his fellows. The grounds of the decision of the Court appear to be unquestionably sound. We doubt, however, whether they are strictly applicable to the case in which notice was given before the insolvency was known for payment at

a future date, a state of things to which we should have rather deemed applicable the observation made by Lord Blackburn, in Walton v. Edge, to the effect that: "The winding-up, no doubt, stops all things which are coming on from coming to maturity; it stops them in that sense; but when a right has been acquired in præsenti, although it is solvendum in futuro, I see no reason why it should not be enforced in a windingup."-Law Journal.

NEW LAND RULES.

A set of new rules dealing with appeals in cases under the Land Acts of '81 and '87 have been issued by the Land Commission. These orders provide that every notice of appeal shall specify definitely the ground upon which the appeal is intended to be prosecuted, and a form is supplied for the purpose. It is further provided that any person aggrieved by any order of the Commission, or by any order of a Sub-Commission, may within two months after the date of the order serve on the other side a notice of appeal, and a form for this purpose is also furnished. The new rules likewise pro. vide for the lodging of particulars, with the notices of appeal, of the valuation and boundaries of the premises comprised in the holdings which are the subject of the judicial investigation, and for the stamping of the documents.

"JUNIOR" BUSINESS.

In these days of struggle for existence among the junior Bar, any professional move which intensifies that struggle ought to be deprecated. We hear that the latest hardship they are called on to endure is a growing practice among solicitors to hand over their pleadings to Q.C.s. This, of course, cannot be done directly, but it can be accomplished by a subterfuge, and, according to our information, is so accomplished. Some solicitors, who lose their experienced and long-tried pleaders by their "taking silk," manage to retain their assistance, by drafting the pleadings themselves, and then sending them to their favourite quondam pleaders for their opinion. The result is pateut-especially to the luckless junior.--Pump Court.

A CURIOUS case respecting the property of a slave is now pending before the Bombay High Court. An Africau slave was purchased by a Mahomedan merchant of Bombay in 1834. The slave died in 1888, having accumulated property worth 80,000 rupees, and, having no relatives he left his property by will to Mr. Tyebjee, a Parsee solicitor. Mr. Tyebjee died last year. His executors are now being sued by a son of the slave's master, on the ground that under the Mahomedan law a slave cannot bequeath any property he may acquire.

REVIEWS.

Spinal Concussion: Surgically considered as a cause of Spinal Injury, and neurologically restricted to a certain symptom group, for which is suggested the designation Erichsen's Disease, as one form of the Traumatic Neuroses. By S. V. CLEVENGER, M.D., Coneulting Physician Reese and Alexian Hospitals, &c. With thirty wood engravings. Philadelphia and London: F. A. Davis, Publisher. 1889.

IN Ireland we are not subject to the numerous railway accidents that so frequently take place in England and America, but the experience of the last few years shows that even here such misfortunes may be expected, and lawyers practising at Nisi Prius are aware that oue of the many difficult questions that arise in almost every case of railway and other accident is that of spinal shock and spinal concussion. The plaintiff, who has suffered from the accident, comes on the witness-table after an interval of rest and medical treatment and appears to the non-medical eye to be quite recovered, but his medical witnesses propound the theory that his constitution is irretrievably injured and his vital powers damaged by the occult and fagitive disease known in law courts as "shock." The defendant's medical witnesses, on the other hand, deny the symptoms, contradict the diagnosis, dispute the conclusious of their brethren, and make the decision of the jury a matter of such difficulty and uncertainty as to often cause injustice to be done to either the plaintiff or defendant by inducing a verdict which the lapse of a little time shows to be excessive or inadequate. In such cases couusel are entirely in the hands of the experts. The old and recognised law book, Taylor's "Medical Jurisprudence," is useless for the purpose of crossexamination, and a purely medical work is hardly much better. To meet such purpose the book auder review has been compiled, and while written primarily by a doctor for doctors it seems to us tolerably adapted for use by lawyers to enable them to under. stand, so far as lawyers can be expected to understand, the phases and symptons and technical descriptions of those inscrutable nervous diseases that so frequently follow upon bodily injury, and so frequently are alleged by experts to be dormant and liable to recur with terrible effect to the sufferer. The author, Dr. Clevenger, has professedly written for the legal as well as the medical profession, and lawyers will thus ficd this advantage in the book, that in it the different and sometimes antagonistic views of many authors are fully given from the writings of Erichsen, Page, Oppenheim, Erb, Westphal, Abercrombie, Sir Astley Cooper, Boyer, Charcot, Leyden, Rigler, Spitzka, Putman, Knapp, Dana, and many other European and American students of the subject. The small, but important, work of Oppenheim, of the Berlin Uuiversity, is fully translated, and constitutes a chapter of Dr. Clevenger's book, and reference is made wherever discussions occurred in American medico-legal societies. There are abundant illustrations, particlarly for Electrodiagnosis, and to enable a clear comprehension of the anatomical and pathological relations.

The Chapters are: I. Historical Introduction; II. Erichsen on Spinal Concussion; III. Page on Injuries of the Spine aud Spinal Cord; IV. Recent Discussions of Spinal Concussion; V. Oppenheim on Traumatic Neuroses; VI. Illustrative Cases from Original and all other Sources; VII. Traumatic Insanity; VIII. The Spinal Column; IX. Symptons; X. Diagnosis; XI. Pathology; XII. Treatment; XIII. Medico-legal

Consideration.

This account of the different theories of the various great masters of the surgical art will be of great assistance to counsel when Cross-examning medical witnesses, each of whom is likely to try to shape bis evidence according to the special system or school he professes or has learnt.

We can well believe, as the author states, that his work is the result of many years' special study and experience in legal circles, and as student, writer, and teacher. In conclusion, we may say that the book is printed in America, and that the plates are produced with the most perfect artistic skill and professional accuracy.

OBITUARY.

MR. EDWARD GREEN FOLEY, SOLICITOR. WE regret to announce the death of Mr. Edward Greene Foley, solicitor, which event took place on Sunday last, the 16th inst. The deceased was admitted in the year 1854, at the early age of 21 years, and practised up to the time of his death. He was a member of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society from the year 1864 to the year 1873. His funeral, which took place at Mount Jerome Cemetery on the 19th inst., was attended by a large number of his professional brethren, who held him in high esteem.

Amongst those present were:-Robt, Foley L.R.C.S.I., Murdoch Green Foley, solicitor, aud E. R. Foley (sous); Geo. Robinson, A.M.D. (nephew); William Green, Barrister-at-Law; The Rev. W. Green, Iuspector of Fisheries; W. Burroughs Stauley, President Iucorporated Law Society; R. S. Reeves, ex-President Iucor. porated Law Society; Wm. Geo, Wakely, Secretary Incorporated Law Society; T. F. O'Connell, solicitor; J. R. O'Connell, solicitor; R. Howe, solicitor; T. Merrick, solicitor; Geo. Bernard, solicitor; J. Bernard, B.L.; J. W. Richards, B.L.; A. D. Kennedy, solicitor; S. Walker, solicitor; R. H. Jephson, Local Government Board Auditor; Dr. M'Vitter, J. T. Fox, solicitor; E. O. Roper, A. Koper, H. C. Roper, M. Roper, J. O. Lindsay, solicitor; M. B. Cooper, B. L.

COURT OF BANKRUPTCY.

ADJUDICATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY.

[The dates of Adjudications are first given, the Sillings follow in italics.]

DUBLIN.

Dolan, John, of Kilargue, Carrick-on-Shannon, county Leitrim, publican and farmer. February 11; Tuesday, March 4, and Friday, March 21. Charles F. Falls, solr. Jamison, John James, trading as "John Jamison and Company," at 22 Waring-street, city of Belfast, county of Antrim, mill furnisher. February 11; Tuesday, February 25, and Friday, March 14. Bennett Thompson, solr. Murphy, Timothy, of Goresbridge, in the county of Kilkenny, general shopkeeper, trading as "Kate Murphy and Son. February 11; Tuesday, February 25, and Friday, March 11. Casey & Clay, solrs.

O'Neill, Peter, of 139 Lower Baggot-street, in the city of Dublin, grocer, trading as "S. M. O'Neill." February 14; Friday, February 28, and Tuesday, March 18. Hamilton and Craig, solrs.

Sheehan, Patrick, senior, of Bruff, in the county of Limerick, victualler. February 11; Tuesday, March 4, and Friday, March 21. Wm. H. Dunne, solr.

BELFAST.

M'Neilly, James, of Donegall-street, Belfast, in the county of Antrim, tailor. February 13; Monday, March 10, and Monday, March 24. David M'Gonigal, solr.

THE dastardly attempt to murder His Honour Judge Bristowe, at Nottingham Station, last month, calls to mind the murder of Sir John Tyndal, a Master in Chancery, in 1616, which is, we believe, the only instance of a successful attempt to murder a judicial officer recorded in the anuals of English law. In Monro's Acta Cancellaria there is to be found (No. clix., p. 236) a certificate, dated 4th November, 1616, made in the case of Bartram v. Symeon, by the unfortunate Sir John Tyndal and Sir John Amye, with an indorsement thereon respecting the murder of Sir John Tyndal. indorsement succinctly states: "For making this report Sir John Tyndal was killed by Bartram, the plaintiff, 12th November, 1616." He was barbarously shot dead in Lincoln's Inn. The murderer escaped public execution by hanging himself in prison.

The

Under the old Statute of Treasons (25 Edw. III. c. 2) we need hardly remind our readers that the killing of a judge of a Superior Court, being in his place and doing his office, is high treason, But a County Court judge has no special protection beyond the ordinary criminal law.-Jurist.

BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS.

BIRTHS.

MURPHY-February 15, at Parliament-street, Kilkenny, the wife of
Michael M. Murphy, solicitor, of a son.
WEIR-February 13, at English-street, Downpatrick, the wife of
Henry Crichton Weir, LL.B., solicitor, of a daughter.

MARRIAGES.

O'REARDON and LYONS-February 12, at the Cathedral, Killarney, by the Most Rev. Dr. Coffey, Lord Bishop of Kerry, assisted by the Rev. M'Carthy O'Connor, C.C., Miltown, Daniel George O'Reardon, solicitor, youngest son of the late Daniel O'Reardon, Esq, Tralee, to Sarah, daughter of the late Michael L. Lyons, Esq., Tralee.

DEATHS.

CUMMINS-February 18, at the residence of his brother-in-law, J. Simmons, solicitor, Howard-terrace, Dungannon, James Cummins, Manager Northern Bank, Clones.

DAVIN-February 12, at Carrick-on-Suir, Thomas Davin, solicitor. FOLEY-February 16, at his residence, Northumberland-road, Edward Greene Foley, solicitor, aged 56 years.

FUNERAL REQUISITES OF EVERY DESCRIPTION.

WALLER, 49 & 50 DENZILLE-STREET. [102 Telephone No. 131. Telegraphic Address-"Undertaker, Dublin."

AND

VOL. XXIV.

No. 1,205

IRISH COUNTY COURT PRACTICE. -IX.

COSTS.

FOR a long time there appears to have been considerable doubt whether a County Court Judge has any discretion as to the costs of a testamentary suit, so as to enable him to give costs to the unsuccessful party. Thus in the case of M'Conville v. M'Creesh, 12 Ir. L. T. R. 76, 13 Ir. L. T. R. 35, it was held that a County Court Judge has no jurisdi ction to deal with the costs of a testamentary suit when the decree establishes the will alleged. This decision was followed in Haire v. Haire, in which case the plaintiff, as sole legatee, established a will as against the contention of the defendant, who was one of the next-of-kin of the deceased (Lefroy, C.C.J.): 12 Ir. L. T. R. 76, n. See also Flynn v. Flynn, 9 Ir. Jur. N. S. 383, where it would appear to have been held that in cases sent to the County Court by the Probate Court, the County Court Judge must award costs according to the Civil Bill Acts to the successful party. It has, however, now been finally decided that 14 & 15 Vic, c. 57, s. 111, does not apply to probate cases, and that the jurisdiction given to the County Court in testamentary cases under 40 & 41 Vic., c. 56, s. 46, is as complete as that of the Probate Division of the High Court itself, and includes a power to deal with costs. See also Bell v. Hughes (Gamble, C.C.J.), 14 Ir. L. T. R. 77. The Court, in an administration summons, when determining whether it will send the case to the County Court or not, will not consider the fact that the plaintiff resides in one county, the defendant in another, and persons entitled to distributive shares of the assets reside in a foreign country, as a reason to retain the case in Court when of opinion that it is otherwise a proper case for the inferior Court: Semble, the costs of administration in the County Court might in certain circumstances be an element to be considered by the High Court in deciding whether it would retain a case or not (V.-Ch.): Reagan v. Flood, 12 Ir. L. T. R. 122. Where in an administration suit by an Equity Civil Bill the plaintiff is directed, under O. XIV., r. 82, to lodge the costs of a dismiss with the Clerk of the Peace, the amount to be lodged will be calculated according to the higher scale of fees, notwithstanding that it appears by the probate that the assets have been sworn under a sum (£200) to which the lower scale is applicable. A sum (1) to meet witnesses' expenses will, also, be directed to be lodged (Ferguson, C.C.J.) : Myhane v. O'Sullivan, 12 Ir. L. T. R. 110. "It may appear, upon the hearing, that the value of the assets is greater than the amount sworn to, and may come within the higher scale."

A County Court Judge has power to stay an action remitted to him before issue joined, until the costs in

another action by the same plaintiff are paid: Reg. v. Bayley, 8 Q. B. D. 411; 51 L. J. Q. B. 244. Where an action was brought in the Superior Courts and afterwards discontinued by the service of a notice under High Court Rules, O. XXII., but the costs were never paid, and a civil bill process was subsequently brought for the same cause of action, the County Court Judge of Waterford dismissed the process on that ground, and the Judge of Assize (May, C.J.), on appeal, refused to hear the case unless the costs were paid, exercising an equitable jurisdiction in the matter: Walsh v. Fitzgerald, 18 Ir. L. T. R. 54. See, also, Byrne v. Nixon, 1 Leg. Rep. 157. A party, however, waives his right to restrain proceedings until the costs of dismissing a former bill be paid, by postponing the application until after a decree has been obtained in a new suit: Onge v. Truelock, Beat. 339; 2 Moll. 41.

Where an action of tort has been remitted to an inferior Court and there heard and dismissed without prejudice, the plaintiff is not barred from instituting another action in the Superior Court in respect of the same cause of action. But the Court, on being satisfied that the bringing of the second action was an abuse of its process, may order that the proceedings be stayed and the writ taken off the file (Keogh and Morris, JJ.): Barnes v. Sexton, 9 Ir. L. T. R. 129.

But where an action had been abandoned or had abated, and the plaintiff commenced a fresh action by another attorney, the Court held that he could not be restrained from proceeding in the second action till the costs of the former action were paid: Mooney v Mackey, 1 Law Rec. N. S. 11. See, also, Langley v. Stapleton, Barnes, 40, and 1 Batty's Rep. 570. Neither can a Judge of Assize stop an appeal until the appellant has paid the costs of his attorney, who has been changed after the appeal was lodged: Siree v. Clifford, Ir. C. C. 95. Where a Manor Court decree had been reversed on appeal, and the plaintiff afterwards brought a civil bill against the defendant for the same cause of action, which was dismissed at the sessions, it was held that the Court had no power to refuse hearing an appeal from the civil bill dismiss until the costs of the former appeal had been paid: Poole v. Henderson, 2 Cr. & D, C. C. 225. Where cases, entered for hearing at a previous sittings in Armagh of a Land Sub-Commission, were adjourned on the terms of the tenants paying the costs of the day, it was held that the payment of the costs as ordered was a condition precedent to the cases being called on for hearing now, following the practice in the County Court, under r. 2 (Land Act, 1881), and r. 22 of 29 Oct., 1870: O'Hara v. M'Geough, 16 Ir. L. T. R. 35.

An action was brought in a division of the IIigh Court to recover possession of lands on the expiration of a lease for 31 years, at a yearly rent of £10, under