universal application. At the same time, it may safely be assumed that in the term "accident," as so used, some violence, casualty, or vis major is necessarily in. volved. Disease produced by the action of a known natural cause cannot be considered accidental. Thus, disease or death eugendered by exposure to heat, cold, damp, the vicissitu les of climate, or atmospheric influence, cannot properly be said to be accidental-at all events, unless the exposure is itself brought about by circumstances which may give it the character of accident. Thus, by way of illustration, if, from the effects of ordinary exposure to the elements such as is common in the course of navigation, a mariner should catch cold and die, such death would not be accidental, although if, being obliged by shipwreck or other disaster to quit the ship and take to the sea in an open boat, he remained exposed to wet and cold for some time and death ensued therefrom, the death might properly be held to be the result of accident. Hence, in that case the court held sunstroke a natural cause of death, and not an accident.

Those remarks apply equally to accidents in railway travelling. In Lawrence v. Accidental Insurance Company, 7 Q. B. D. 216, the policy stated that if the insured should sustain any personal injury caused by accidental and external violence, and the direct effects should occasion death, the company would be liable; but that the accidental injury must be the direct and sole cause of death. And the policy expressly said that it did not insure in case of fits or any disease whatsoever arising before or at the time, or following such accidental injury, whether consequent upon such accidental injury or not, and whether causing such death directly or jointly with such accidental injury. In that case the insured, when standing at a railway station, became suddenly ill, and fell forward in a fit off the platform on to the railway, and a locomotive engine passing at the time went over his neck and body and instantly killed him. The falling forward was in consequence of his being seized with a fit, and, but for such fit, he would not have suffered injury or death. The court held that the death was caused by the accident of falling from the platform, and was within the policy. The company coutended that the accident and the disease concurrently brought about the death, and so that they were exempt. But the court held that they could not go back to cause upon cause, but must look on the wheel as the imme. diate and proximate cause of death.

Another important case was that of Isitt v. Railway Passengers Company, 22 Q. B. D. 504. The general words of the policy were to insure against any injury caused by accident if the assured shall die from the effects of such injury. The circumstances made it of importance to know something of the medical history of the illness ending in death. The insured fell down at the railway station and dislocated his shoulder. He was taken home and put to bed, and died in a month without ever leaving his bed. The fact that the shoulder was dislocated was not detected at first by the medical attendant in consequence of the amount of Bwelling, but a week later the dislocation was discovered and was reduced by the surgeon. A few days afterwards pneumonia set in. This pneumonia was, however, not caused directly by the accident, but resulted from cold. The deceased would not have died as and when he did, if it had not been for the accident. suffered great pain as a consequence of the accident and was extremely restless and unable to bear his usual clothing or any warm clothing on him. And he was reduced by the accident to a state of debility in which he was more susceptible of cold than he would have been but for the accident, and was also less able to resist the effects of any illness that might come apon him. In short, the catching cold and the fatal effects of the cold were both due to the condition of health to which he had been reduced by the accident. In these circumstances, the company contended that they were not liable, because the insured died from pneumonia caused by cold and not caused by the accident. In other words they said that pneumonia caused by cold

He

was the proximate cause, and was in law the only cause of death. The court came to the conclusion, however, that the facts constituted a chain of circumstances leading naturally from the injury to the death, and that the chain of circumstances was the effect of the injury. The court thought it idle to contend that the cold leading to the pneumonia was caught in some way independent of the injury. The company were therefore held liable.

The very recent case of Cornish v. Accident Insurance Co., 23. Q. B. D. 453, opens up a very wide range of defences which insurance companies may take shelter under, and few people will probably now feel quite sure how they stand. The policy of insurance against death, or injury from accident contained numerous exceptions. Those exceptions relating to railways were as follows: "Injuries sustained on a railway whilst travelling otherwise than in a passenger carriage, or whilst getting into or alighting from any carriage in motion, or whilst acting in violation of the bye-laws of a railway company, or occasioned by poison, or happening by exposure of the insured to obvious risk of injury, or whilst the insured should by intoxicating liquors be rendered less capable than usual of taking care of himself."

He

In the present case the insured was a country farmer, whose farm was intersected by a railway. He was in the habit of crossing the railway to get from one part of his farm to the other, and was killed whilst so doing in broad daylight in July. He had crossed the line to get a match from a man in a field on the other side. had just got on the line of rails nearest to him, aud was recrossing when a train knocked him down and killed him. At the place in question there was no station, no proper crossing, no obstruction to prevent a person about to oross from seeing an approaching train. There was no evidence that the deceased was short. sighted or deaf. A train on the up line had passed shortly before, and the deceased, who was then on the other side of the line, had seen the train coming and had waited for it. There was no ground for imputing negligence to the persons in charge of the train.

At the trial the judge directed the jury that the case fell within the exception in the policy, the accident having happened through the insured exposing himself to obvious risk. The jury returned a verdict to the effect that they were compelled by the ruling of the judge to find that the deceased lost his life by incurring obvious risk, but that they were of opinion that it was an ordinary misadventure. An appeal was brought against the judgment, aud it was contended that exposure to obvious risk meant some wilful and foolhardy act, and there was nothing to support that view in this case. The Court of Appeal took time to consider their judgment, and we have an opportunity of reflecting over a result which must tend to make wise a great number of people who go through life sauntering and inattentive to what is passing around them. The court say: "We think it plain that two classes of accidents are excluded from the risks insured against, viz., (1) accidents which arise from an exposure by the insured to risk of injury, which risk is obvious to him at the time he exposes himself to it; (2) accidents which arise from an exposure by the insured to risk of injury, which risk would be obvious to him at the time if he were paying reasonable attention to what he was doing. Any construction short of this would be going too far in one direction, just as a literal construction would be going too far in the other. We are unable to read this policy as protecting a man against the consequences of running risks which would be obvious enough to him if he paid the slightest attention to what he was doing."

This decision is one which is well fitted to be reviewed by half-a-dozen law lords. It must put a stop to many good-natured absent-minded persons ever dreaming of any benefit from these policies. Only the shrewd, nimble, quick-witted and wide-awake people need think now of insuring themselves against accidents. Those who saunter about and smoke and chat while a train is near them must no longer aspire to the luxury of making insurance doubly assured.-Justice of the Peace.,

RAILWAY RETURN TICKETS,

For how long are return tickets good! Do they last for a whole day only, or do they last for twenty-four hours? This was the question which Judge Bayley bad to decide the other day in the Westminster County Court, in a case in which the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Company sued Sir Claude de Crespigny for a fare, and the defendant maintained that his return ticket lasted for twenty-four hours from the moment that it was issued to him, and not only for the day on which it was dated. The learned judge decided for the company; but we are by no means sure that his decision was right. The bye-law of the company appears to have imposed a penalty not exceeding forty shillings on any person using a ticket on any day for which such ticket is not available. We know of no English decision on the point, but in Scotland it has been held that a similar bye-law applies to a case of fraud on the part of the passenger only (Thom v. The Caledonian Railway Company, 17 Sess. Ca. 4th ser. 5). Supposing a ticket were taken at ten on the night of a 22nd day of a month by a passenger intending to stay only a few minutes at his station of arrival, and to return from it by a train timed to bring him back before midnight, and by reason of delay on the part of the company the return train did not bring him back till 1 A.M. on the 23rd, would the company successfully sue him then? Is not the construction of the contract that the passenger has a reasonable time to accomplish the return jouruey in, not exceeding twenty-four hours? The question is a very difficult one, and no light is thrown upon it by section 5 of the Regulation of Railways Act, 1889, which supersedes to a great extent the bye-laws upon these subjects. Perhaps the companies may think well to frame a new and more appropriate bye-law on the subject.-Law Journal.

RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE A SWORN WIT, NESS NOT EXAMINED IN CHIEF.

At the recent Taunton Assizes, before Stephen, J., with a common jury, in a dispute over work and labour done in making and saving hay, the counsel for the plaintiff called a witness into the box and had him Bword. The solicitor for the plaintiff then, having communicated something to the counsel, the latter stated his intention of not examining the witness, asked him no questions, and requested him to step down. Thereupon the counsel for the defendant asserted his right to cross-examine the witness before be left the box. The counsel for the plaintiff did not deny that the witness in question could speak as to the transaction. After hearing arguments on both sides the Court decided that, under the circumstances, the counsel for the defendant had the right to cross-examine the witness. This poiut, decided on March 3rd, at Taunton, is somewhat unusual in_practice, but apparently the decision is correct. The case which is nearest to it is that of Wood v. Mackinson (2 M. & Rob. 273). There the counsel for the plaintiff called a witness, who went into the box and was sworn in the usual way, but before any questions were put to him the counsel said he had been misinstructed as to what this witness was able to prove, and that he would not examine him at all. Lord Coleridge, C.J. (then J.), in deciding that the witness was not liable to cross-examination, said: "The learned counsel explains that there has been a mistake, which consists in this, that the witness is found not to be able to speak at all as to the transaction which was supposed to be within his knowledge. That is, I think, such a mistake as entitles the party calling the witness to withdraw him without his being subject to cross-examination. If, indeed, the witness had been able to give evidence of the transaction which he was called to prove, but the counsel had discovered that the witness, besides that transaction, knew other matters inconvenient to be disclosed, and therefore attempted to withdraw him, that would be a different Oase." The report adds that the witness was accordingly

withdrawn, and was subsequently called and examined in chief by the defendants as one of their witnesses, The rule seems to be, that if a person other than the person intended, through some mistake or other, steps into the box and is sworn (Clifford v. Hunter, 3 C. & P. 16; Simpson v. Smith, Notts Summer Ass. 1882, MS, referred to by Lord Coleridge, C.J. (then J.), in Wood v. Mackinson); or if a witness under simply a subpoena duces tecum steps into the box and is sworn unnecessarily by the officer of the court (Rush v. Smith, 1 C. M. & R. 94); or if counsel calls a witness who is sworn, and then learns that the witness is unable to speak as to the transaction in question, and that therefore there has been a genuine mistake in calling him (Wood v. Mackinson, 2 M. & Rob. 273); in all these cases, if there has been no examination-in-chief, the opposite side bas not a right to cross-examine. But if, as was apparently the case in the recent Taunton incident, counsel, after calling a witness and allowing him to be sworn, then changes his mind, and puts no question to him, though he knows he can speak to the transaction, then the counsel on the opposite side oan successfully assert his right to cross-examine.

In practice, therefore, the course would seem to be that the counsel who called the witness, allowing him to be sworn and refusing to examine him, would, if called upon by the other side, have to state his reason for not doing so. Then the court would have to decide whether the reason advanced brought the case within the exceptions.-Law Times.

CONTRACTS OF PAWN.

To that large class of her Majesty's subjects who are perpetually in a state of guerilla warfare with poverty, and are driven periodically to seek temporary assistance from the pawnbroker, the case of Jones v. Marshall will, if it comes to their knowledge, be an unpleasant sur prise. A Liverpool pawnbroker, with less prudence or, it may be, with more benevolence than is usually credited to the craft, advanced to the defendant on a watch pledged at his shop a larger sum than he was subsequently able to obtain on the sale of the watch, and brought his action in the County Court to recover the deficiency. The parties had entered into a special contract under the provisions of section 24 of the Pawn. brokers Act, 1872, and the contract and duplicate followed the form in schedule 3, form 7, to the Act. There is nothing in the section or in the schedule to make any difference in respect of the liability of the pawner between a special and ordinary contract of pawning It is singular that there is nothing in the Act to provide for the case of loss arising to the pawnbroker on sale of the pledge. Section 22 enacts that the defi ciency on one pledge may be made up by the surplus ou another belonging to the same pawner; and there is a clause to the same effect in the form of special contract. The County Court judge decided in favour of the defendant on the ground that the section and the contract precluded the broker from suing for a deficit. But the Divisional Court, consisting of the Lord Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Mathew, reversed his decision. It is a pity that the Act does not expressly deal with the case which the section itself suggests; but it is difficult to see how the silence of the Legislature on this point could be interpreted as excluding a creditor from his common law right of suing for a debt, which is not the less a debt because it is secured. At the same time it might have been better if the Legislature, which from the days of James I. to the present time has deemed it necessary to subject this particular business to statutory control, had expressly enacted that the pawnbroker should have recourse to the pledge only for the repayment of the money advanced. In this connection we may offer a suggestion to the Chancellor of the Exchequer for his forthcoming budget. It is said that jewels and other articles of great value but small bulk are not infrequently the subjects of special contracts of pawn. Why should such contracts be exempted from stamp duty, as they are by section

24 of the Act? In the great battle which is perpetually waging between those who say that personalty is undertaxed and those who would lay heavier burdens on real estate, this might be taken as an illustration by the former class of combatants of undue favour to personalty.-Law Journal.

BANK ACCOUNTS AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

It is certainly not a well-known point of law that money left with a banker, and not drawn upon for six years, becomes at the end of that time the absolute property of the banker. Special attention is rightly called to this fact in the new edition of Chitty's Contracts as a "point of contract law seeming to require remedial legislation." Money deposited with a banker on current account is in law money lent to him. The contract between banker and customer is simply that of borrower and lender, with an obligation on the banker to honour the cheques drawn by his customer. If there is no payment of interest by the banker, nor any other acknowledgment by him that the debt is due, the right of the customer to recover the moneys which he has deposited with the banker will be barred after six years by the Statute of Limitations. This statute has no application to Scotland, and there large sums of money are avowedly held by the banks or banking companies which are accounted as "unclaimed." The provost, magistrates, and town council of one of the Scotch burghs have just drawn the attention of Parliament to this subject by way of petition. The petition sets out "the important necessity of bringing forward a measure to compel all chartered and incorporated banks in Scotland to publish the name, description, and address of every person who may have lodged moneys or securities which have not been operated upon for fourteen years." Probably the provost, magistrates, and town council above referred to think that unclaimed moneys would be better applied to the diminution of rates than to the swelling of bank dividends.-Law Times.

RECOMMENDATION TO MERCY.

The Crewe murder trial has, as might have been expected, ended in a verdict of guilty, accompanied by a recommendation to mercy on the ground of the youth of the prisoners, who are seventeen and nineteen years of age respectively; and this recommendation, together with the ground of it, was no doubt at once "forwarded to the proper quarter." The recommendation to mercy is entirely outside the law of Eugland. The judge has no judicial duties in respect of it; and, as far as we have been able to discover, text-writers are silent both as to its history and general practical effect. Sir James Stephen, however ("History of Criminal Law," vol. ii. p. 89), makes the wise suggestion "that improvements might be made in the definition of the offence of murder which would diminish the proportion of cases in which an interference with the law would be necessary," and "is convinced that in regard to capital cases the judge should have a discretion analogous to that which he bas in cases not capital," though he says "no one is more opposed than I am to the abolition of capital punishment." In many foreign countries the question whether or not the punishment of death should be awarded in doubtful cases rests entirely and expressly with the jury. This is notoriously the case in France, Italy, and Russia, while in Geneva the law goes so far as to recognise a distinction between a verdict of guilty "under extenuating circumstances," and one with the words "auder very extenuating circumstances," the effect of either being to prevent the sentence of death or imprisonment for life being passed, and the punishmeut being, of course, slighter in case of the latter verdict. In the United States a solution of the difficulty appears to have been pretty generally attempted by a division of murder into murder in the first and murder in the second degree. From the appendix to the report of the Capital Punishment Commission it appears that

the youth of the prisoner is recognised as a reason for mitigating the sentence of death in Spain, Saxony, and one of the Swiss cantons; but it has never been expressly recognised in this country beyond the application of the common-law rule that below the age of seven no criminal offence can be committed, and between the ages of seven and fourteen & prisoner is presumed to be incapable of felonious intent until the contrary be proved.-Law Journal.

UNDUE INFLUENCE BY BENEFICIARIES UNDER WILLS.

The case of Parker v. Duncan (ante, p. 326) should be known by all who prepare wills under which they benefit themselves. the testatrix was the inmate of a workhouse infirmary. The chairman of the board of guardians obtained a form of will, filled up in pencil, from a solicitor, and took it to the testatrix, who put her mark to it, a friend of the chairman's and an infirmary nurse acting as witnesses. The testatrix died, and the chairman propounded the will. It was objected, however, that the propounder had exercised undue influence over the testatrix, and that she did not under. stand the contents of the will. The learned President informed the jury that there were two rules for their guidance. First, that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff, so that he must satisfy them that the instru ment which he was setting up was the last will of a free and capable testatrix. Secondly, that the fact that the party setting up a will, under which he benefits largely, is the person who took the instructions for it, and prepared or caused it to be prepared, is a circumstance of grave suspicion, and unless that suspicion is removed, and the court and jury are judicially satisfied that the terms of the document actually express the true wishes of the testatrix, undue influence is established, and the will should be pronounced agaiust. The Court decided against the will, as the jury found that it had been obtained by undue influence, and that the testatrix did not know and approve of the contents. In Wingrove v. Wingrove (11 P. Div. 81) the same judge, after referring to the general misapprehension which existed on the subject of undue influence, said that, "To be undue influence in the eye of the law there must be-to sum it up in a word-coercion . . . It is only when the will of the person who becomes a testator is coerced into doing that which he or she does not desire to do, that it is undue influence. The coercion may of course be of different kinds, it may be in the grossest form, such as actual confinement or violence, or a person in the last days or hours of life may have become so weak and feeble that a very little pressure will be sufficient to bring about the desired result, and it may even be, that the mere talking to him at that stage of illness and pressing something upon him may so fatigue the brain, that the sick person may be induced, for quietness' sake, to do anything. These illustrations will suffi ciently bring home to your minds that even very immoral considerations, either on the part of the testator, or of someone else offering them, do not amount to undue influence unless the testator is in such a condition that, if he could speak his wishes to the last, he would say, 'This is not my wish, but I must do it.'" His Lordship also told the jury in the last-mentioned case that in order to prove undue influence it was also necessary to show that the will in question had been produced by its exercise, and that mere proof that a person had the power unduly to overbear the testator's will was not sufficient.

In the celebrated case of Allcard v. Skinner (57 L. T. Rep. N. S. 61; 36 Ch. Div. 145), where the question of the irrevocability of a voluntary gift inter vivos was under discussion, Lord Justice Liudley said: "To protect people from being forced, tricked, or misled in any way by others into parting with their property, is one of the most legitimate objects of all laws; and the equitable doctrine of undue influence has grown out of and been developed by the necessity of grappling with insidious forms of spiritual tyranny and with the infinite varieties

of fraud. As no court has ever attempted to define fraud, so no court has ever attempted to define andue influence, which includes one of the many varieties." Presumably the Lord Justice would not consider Sir J. Hannen's statement as a definition, the forms of coercion being equally manifold. In regard to the second rule laid down in Parker v. Duncan, it is but a branch of the general equitable rule that no man should put himself in any position in which his interest and his duty conflict. Anyone who is to benefit under another's will would be well advised to insist that the will should be drawn by someone other than himself, or at least that some absolutely independent witnesses should be acquainted with the testator's intention. In Fulton v. Andrew (32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 209; 7 Eug. & Ir. App. 448) Lord Cairns laid down the two rules cited by the President as above mentioned, and Lord Hatherley says, "There is a farther onus upon those who take for their own benefit, after having been instrumental in preparing or obtaining a will. They have thrown upon them the onus of showing the righteousness of the transaction."-Law Times.

THE DRAFTING OF STATUTES.

In the recent case of Knill v. Towne Lord Coleridge and Mr. Justice Mathew concluded their judgment in these words:

"We have arrived at this conclusion with some difficulty, though without doubt. The difficulty has arisen not from anything inherent in the subject itself, which is simple enough, and might be quite simply treated, but from the mode of legislation now usual in these matters. Sometimes whole Acts of Parliament; sometimes groups of clauses of Acts of Parliament, entirely or partially, sometimes portions of clauses are incorporated into later Acts, so that the interpreter has to keep under his eye, or, if he can, to bear in his mind, large masses of bygone, and not always consistent, legislation in order to gather the meaning of recent legislation. There is very often the further provision that these earlier statutes are incorporated ouly so far as they are not inconsistent with the statute into which they are incorporated; so that you have first to ascertain the meaning of a statute by reference to other statutes, and then to ascertain whether the earlier Acts qualify only or absolutely contradict the later ones-a task sometimes of great difficulty, always of great labour a difficulty and labour, generally speaking, wholly unnecessary. It has, indeed, been suggested that to legislate in this fashion-keeping Parliament, in truth, in ignorance of what it is about-is the only way in which at the present day legislation is possible. We know not whether the suggestion is correct; what we do know is that this procedure makes the interpretation of modern Acts of Parliament a very difficult, and sometimes a doubtful matter. We, the judges, have perhaps the least cause to complain. We sit here for the purpose, among other things, of interpreting Aots of Parliament, and we bring, or ought to bring, to our task trained and experienced intellects. But in practical matters of everyday concern, such as the possession and exercise of the franchise, it is of the last importance that the law conferring it, and the rules which govern its exercise, should be easily comprehensible by the mass of the ordinary voters. We are well aware that protest as to past legislation is unavailing; but for the future to draw attention to a plain evil may perhaps be the first step towards its remedy."

UNIVERSITY INTELLIGENCE.

The Lodge Exhibition, University College, Oxford, of the annual value of £70, and tenable for five years, bas, after a competitive examination in classics and modern languages, open to candidates under 21 years of age, been awarded to Mr. Ernest Godwin Swifte, Barristerat-law, of Upper Fitzwilliam-street, Dublin. The successful candidate, who was educated at Shrewsbury School, is a Juuior Freshman of Triuity College, Dublin.

INTERVIEWS WITH CLIENTS.

BY A WORLDLY SOLICITOR.

NOTICES TO CREDITORS.

W. S. (reading). -"The bearer of this letter seeks your assistance. He is a worthy but unfortunate man, and from all that he tells me must arrange with his creditors or file his petition. He is particularly anxious to avoid bankruptcy if possible." (Turning to client) Well, Mr. Coates, my old friend and client tells me that your affairs are somewhat involved, and that you seek my advice. Am I correct?

Mr. C.-Quite correct, sir, I am grieved to say. It's this way, sir-but there, I won't bother you how it all came about-but arrange with my creditors I must, sir, and I do not want to be made a bankrupt. My old father-in-law will cnt me out of his will if I am made a bankrupt. I may be able to arrange with my creditors; that I don't think he'd care about; but bankruptcy-well, sir, he's told my wife he'll leave none of his little pile to bankrupts. I thought perhaps, sir, you'd tell me whether I can send out a little notice, something like this

W. S. Stay one moment. May I take it as absolutely settled, without going into accounts, that you must arrange with your creditors ?

Mr. C.-You may. I have had my affairs gone into by an accountant.

W. S.-And you particularly desire to avoid baukruptoy!

Mr. C.-Quite correct, sir.

W. S.-Then, Mr. Coates, we must take the greatest possible care-(rings). Quiller, do you or Mr. Tom find at once that recent decision there has been on sending out notices of suspension of payment of debts to creditors. Now, Mr. Coates, is this the notice you propose to send out-(reads). "Being unable to meet my engage. ments as they fall due, I invite your attendance at the 'Bull and Crown' Hotel, Brumchester, on "-yes, suchand-such a day-" when I will submit a statement of my position for your consideration and decision." You live at Brumohester?

Mr. C.-Yes, sir, I have a tailor's business there. W. S.-The "Bull and Crown" is the usual hotel, I assume, for these meetings?

Mr. C.-It is, sir.

W. S.-Ab, Tom, here you are. Yes, this is the case-I remember reading it some few days ago-In re Crook, Ex parte Crook, reported in Volume 24 of the Law Reports, Queen's Bench, p. 320. The Court of Appeal, Mr. Coates, held in this case, that a debtor who had sent out a notice to his creditora in similar words had committed an act of bankruptcy on which a creditor could make him a bankrupt. We must alter that notice of yours, Mr. Coates. I think, Tom, that with this new decision we will alter the form we have hitherto used in the office. You must know, Mr. Coates, that great care is needed in calling together a meeting of creditors; for sect. 4 (h) of the present Bankruptcy Act provides, that if a debtor gives notice to any of his creditors that he has suspended, or that he is about to suspend, payment of his debts, such notice is an act of bankruptoy; and on the ground that such a notice has been given, any creditor can file a petition asking to have him made a bankrupt. Let me think, Tom; our notice which we use was drafted ou after two decisions of-yes-one was In re Lamb, and the other was Ex parte Oastler-the practical effect of which cases was, that you were safe in using almost any form as long as bankruptcy proceedings were not threatened in the alternative.

Mr. C.-Well, sir, if I may venture a remark, my notice does not threaten any such proceedings in the alternative.

W. S.-Quite true, Mr. Coates, quite true; but you state distinctly that you are unable to meet your en gagements as they fall due, and as the Court has held that such a notice is au act of bankruptcy, we must, in

future, I assume, avoid even such a statement as that. Do you agree with me, Tom?-you do?

Mr. C.-But, sir, I only state that I am not able to pay, and leave the matter for their decision. They could make me bankrupt.

W. S.-Ah! yes! well! The Master of the Rolls, from his remarks, evidently thought that the distinct statement that the debtor was unable to meet his engagements was fatal. The debtor, said his Lordship, makes up his mind; he does not ask his creditors' opinions or advice. Here is a significant phrase in the judgment: "I do not think the fair business meaning of the word is, 'I am about to submit to your decision the question whether I am able to meet my engagements or not.' He has already told them he cannot." Hum! then, had the notice been capable of that construction, it would have been all right. Mr. Coates, let me think this out, and write you, or-are you staying in town?-yes-then call to-morrow morning at eleven, and we will by then draw up a safe form of notice for you. This new case rather alters affairs.

Mr. C.-Thank you, sir, good day-I'll be here sharp at eleven.

W. S.-Good day, Mr. Coates (exit Mr. C.). Now, Tom, we will settle this notice. In re Lamb and Ex parte Oastler are not overruled, I suppose, but evidently it is no longer safe to rely on them: those cases only show that the construction of every notice depends on the facts of each case; but from this new case, it would appear, we must avoid a distinct statement that the debtor is unable to pay his debts. What did you say, Tom? Ah! quite true, the "M. R." and Bowen, L.J., agreed in Re Crooks, but Fry, L.J., dissented. Yes, and, as you say, both Lord Esher and Lord Justice Bowen think Re Fraser, Fleming & Co. not good law. Well, then, Tom, it comes to this: Re Lamb and Ex parte Oastler show the construction of each notice depends on the facts of each case; Re Fraser we can ignore. This new case shows we must avoid a distinct statement that the debtor is unable to pay-that, I take it, is the moral of this decision-eb, Tom? Then (takes up pen) here we are (writes): "Dear Sir,-I beg to request your attendance at, &c., on, &c., when I shall submit to the decision of my creditors the question whether I am able to meet my engagements or not, and shall esteem it a favour if you can kindly arrange to attend." How's that, Tom? The Master of the Rolls' phrase reproduced so it is substantially-so I intended. That will do, Tom, for Mr. Coates to-morrow. Costs? Ah! yes! You can go, Tom (exit Tom).

W. S. (soliloquises).-Chip of the old block, that nephew of mine-costa-ah! ah! practical boy-very practicalhe should get the John Mackrell Prize when he goes in for his examination.-Law Notes.

A bill of sale to be duly attested within section 8 of the Bills of Sale Act must contain the name and address, and also the description of each attesting witness, otherwise it will be void under the Act as not being in accordance with the form contained in the schedule, the name, address, and description being material parts of that form, and it is immaterial that a reference to the affidavit filed with the copy of the bill of sale on the occasion of its registration will show what that address or description may be.

Both appeals dismissed. Counsel in (1) A. E. Nelson; H. A. Forman. Counsel in (2) Channell, Q.C., and Allen; Lane, Q.C.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. CHANCERY DIVISION.

(Before NORTH, J.)

BRETT v. BOWLES.

March 14.-Title of publication-Infringement—Interlocutory injunction.

The plaintiff was the proprietor of a weekly publica. tion called The Princess's Novelettes. The words Complete Story" also appeared at the top of the title-page, This publication had been issued for more than four years in a blue wrapper, and each weekly issue contained a complete novelette, any vacant space at the end being filled up with items beaded "Boudoir Gossip."

The defendant was the proprietor of another publication, of which the first number appeared on March 1, 1890, and which was intended also to be issued weekly. The title was The Princess, and the words "A Home Journal for Maid and Matron" also appeared at the top of the title-page. The wrapper was of white paper, and the contents consisted of a part of a serial novel, with articles on various current topics aud items of news. The plaintiff now moved for an injunction to restrain the publication of the defendant's paper under its present title, contending that it was so similar to the title of the plaintiff's paper as to be calculated to cause the one to be passed off for the other.

Sir H. Davey, Q.C., and E. Ford for the plaintiff.
Swinfen Eady for the defendant.

NORTH, J., said that, whatever he might have thought of the case apart from authority, the cases which had been cited (Cowen v. Hulton, 46 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) 897; Walter v. Emmott, 54 Law J. Rep. Chanc. 1059; Borthwick v. The Evening Post, 57 Law J. Rep. Chauc. 406) precluded him from granting an interlocutory injunction. There was a considerable difference between the contents of the two publications, and it was impossible to grant before the trial of the action an injunction which, if wrong, might do irremediable injury. The costs of both sides were made costs in the action.

(Before KEKEWICH, J.)

SIMMONS V. THE LONDON JOINT STOCK BANK (LIMITED). March 18.-Stockbroker and client-Negotiable bonds— Deposit of client's securities-Purchaser for value without notice-Course of business-Notice of infirmity of titleLiability of depositees.

The plaintiff bought bonds "payable to bearer" through a firm of stockbrokers, who held them for safe