AND VOL. XXIV. SOLICITORS' JOURNAL. SATURDAY, JULY 12, 1890. WHAT IS A CRIMINAL CAUSE OR MATTER WITHIN JUDICATURE ACT, SECTION 50? In the present state of the law appeals in criminal cases can only be had where the judge states a case on a point of law for the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, or by a proceeding in error where there is some mistake in the proceedings-such as a defect appearing on the face of the indictment or some irregularity in empanelling the jury-or by new trial motion, on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of evidence, or of the misreception of evidence, or of misdirection or informality. Section 50 of the Judicature Act applies to every decision by way of judicial determination of any question raised in or with regard to proceedings the subject matter of which is criminal, at whatever stage of the proceedings the question arises, per Lord Esher, M.R. The words "criminal cause or matter" should receive the widest possible interpretation, and are intended to apply to all decisions in all criminal matters whatever coming before the High Court: Re Woodhall, 20 Q. B. D. 835; but still, as Cotton, L.J., lays down in Reg. v. Barnardo (23 Q. B. D. 308), the section means that no appeal shall lie when the cause or matter in which the order was made is in the nature of a criminal proceeding, not when the act which originates the proceeding in which the order was made is a crime. It has recently been held in England that an appeal lies in the following cases, which are therefore not within the words "criminal matter" in this section:— Against the refusal of a Divisional Court to make an order under section 20 of the Municipal Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Practices) Act, 1884, exempting a candidate at an election of county councillors from penalties incurred by him through inadvertence, under section 17, by reason of practices which are declared illegal by section 13: Ex parte Walker, 22 Q. B. D. 384, following Re Hall, 7 Q. B. D. 575. From orders made by the High Court of Justice, on application for habeas corpus in civil and ecclesiastical cases; Ex parte Bell Cox, 20 Q B. D. 1. But an appeal to the Privy Council is at this moment pending in this case; and, in another case, the Court held that no appeal lay where the application for a writ of habeas corpus was made on behalf of a person who had been committed to prison under section 10 of the Extradition Act, 1870, as a fugitive criminal accused of an extradition crime: Ex parte Woodhall, 20 Q. B. D. 832. In re Keller (22 L, R. Ir. 158) it was held that an appeal lies from an order of the Queen's Bench Division refusing to grant a writ of habeas corpus in certain cases. From the judgment of a Divisional Court upon a special case stated under seetion 33 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, in proceedings before justices No. 1,224 for the non-repair of a highway: Highway Board for Leicester v. Curzon, 17 Q. B. D. 345. No appeal lies where a person is convicted of obtaining any property under false pretences, and the Queen's Bench Division discharged a rule for a certiorari to remove an order for restitution (Queen v. Justices of C. C. Court, 18 Q. B. D. 314), although such an order merely gives effect to a right of property which the prosecutor may enforce by a civil action, subject to appeal in the ordinary course: Vilmont v. Bentley, 18 Q. B. D. 322. No appeal lies from the refusal of the Q. B. Division to grant a certiorari to remove an indictment to the Central Criminal Court under 19 & 20 Vic., c. 16 (Reg. v. Rudge, 16 Q. B. D. 459), nor from the taxation of costs allowed to a successful defendant in a criminal information for libel (Queen v. Steel, 46 L. J. M. C. 1), nor where the Queen's Bench Division refused a certiorari to quash a conviction for trespassing in pursuit of game: Queen v. Fletcher, ib. 4. The question as to whether or not an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from an order attaching a person for contempt of Court has recently given rise to a considerable amount of discussion Where a Judge has refused to commit for contempt, an appeal lies from such a refusal, although where that refusal has been simply an exercise of judicial discretion, the Court of Appeal, while entertaining an appeal, will be slow to alter the decision of the Court below, and Ashworth v. Outram, 5 Ch. D. 943, must not be treated as laying down a general rule that no appeal lies from a refusal to commit: Jarman v. Chatterton, 20 Q. B. D. 493; see also Bristow v. Smyth, 2 Ir. L. R. 36. In several cases it has been held that attachment for contempt of Court in a civil proceeding is not a criminal matter, and therefore an appeal lies: Re Johnson, 20 Q. B. D. 68 (where the contempt consisted in the use of abuse and threatening gestures towards a solicitor); Hunt v. Clarke, 61 L. T. 343. In Reg. v. Jordan, 36 W. R. 797, it was held doubtful whether an appeal lay from a committal by a County Court Judge, which had been upheld by the Queen's Bench Division, for an insult committed in open Court. So, too, in Reg. v. Barnardo, 23 Q. B. D. 305, where it was held that an appeal would lie from an order for an attachment for disobedience to a writ of habeas corpus, where the subject-matter of the proceeding was not criminal. That was a proceeding to obtain the doing of something in the civil proceeding, and this is so whether the application for habeas corpus be granted or refused: Ex parte Bell Cox, 20 Q. B. D. 1. Many contempts are not criminal in their nature, as where a person does not obey an order of the Court made in some civil proceeding to do or to abstain from doing something. That has nothing criminal in it. But there is an ambiguity in the word "contempt." contempt." There are, says versing Mr. Justice Kekewich, held in The American Braided Wire Company v. Thomson & Co. that the plaintiff, in an infringement action, was entitled to recover by way of damages not only the defendants' profits at the plaintiff's original prices, but also the loss caused by the reduction in price which he was obliged to make in consequence of the defendants' illegal competition. In Duncan v. Dixon the Infauts' Relief Act, 1874, was held not to apply to a marriage settlement executed by an infant, such settlement, as against the infant, being voidable only and not void. Lawrence v. Horton decides that a mandatory injunction for the removal of a building which obstructs ancient lights may be granted, even though the building has been completed before the issue of the writ. The House of Lords, affirming the Court of Appeal in The Midland Railway Company v. Robinson, held by a majority that "minerals" in the Railway Clauses Act, 1845, ss. 77, 78, include those which are got by open quarrying. Limestone is held to be a mineral, and an owner is not justified in giving a notice under section 78 unless he has a bona fide present intention to work the minerals by himself or lessees or licensees, In Davies' Case, In re The Cardiff Savings Bank, the duties and liabilities of a trustee and manager are defined. The Appeal Court in Finck v. The London and South-Western Railway Company, affirming Mr. Justice Kay, authorised a railway company to take lands outside the limits of deviation, such land being reasonably required for the construction of the line within those limits, and the lands Lindley, L.J., obviously contempts and contempts. On The substance of the thing must be looked to. the other hand, a contempt of Court in a civil proceeding may be of a criminal character and no appeal will lie: In re Freston, 11 Q. B. D. 545. There is a kind of attachment which is the subject of an independent application against a person who is not a party to the civil suit in respect of an act done outside the suit and which act is criminal. Thus in the recent case of O'Shea v. O'Shea and Parnell, I. R. 15 P. D., the application for attachment was by the petitioner in the divorce action in reference to an attempt made by a stranger to the suit (the manager of a newspaper) to interfere with the administration of justice in the action. It was held that no appeal lay. "What gives the Court the power to act [we quote from the judgment of Cotton, L.J.] is the fact that the appellant has done something to pervert the course of justice by preventing the divorce suit from being properly tried. That is clearly a contempt of Court of a criminal nature. It is conceded that it was a wrongful act, otherwise there could be no fine or imprisonment, and when you concede that it is a wrongful act you find that, although it is headed in the divorce action, it is plans. Barre been properly described in the deposited purpose not a proceeding in the action-not a proceeding for CURRENT ENGLISH CASES. The current number of the Law Journal Reports contaius 5 House of Lords (Scotch case) aud Privy Council Cases (pages 41-56), 10 Chancery Cases (425-488), 18 Queen's Bench Division (281-344), and 6 Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Cases (57-64). The Statutes of the Realm are brought down to chapter 8-the Customs and Inland Revenue Act. In the Privy Council Booth and Others v. Ratte decides a question of riparian rights under the Canadian Statute, 23 Vict. c. 2, by which the Crown is empowered to graut water lots in navigable rivers. In Woolcott v. Peggie a vendor was permitted to annul a sale of laud in Victoria, in conformity with the conditions, on the ground of his nability to remove the objection. The House of Lords, in the Hecla Foundry Company v. Walker, Hunter, & Co., held that under the Patents, &c., Act, 1883, in deciding a question of infringment, they had nothing to do with the question whether a design was useful or not. In The Owners of the Hebe v. The Owners of the Arratoon Apear the Judicial Committee held that it had no power to absolve a vessel infringing the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, however slight the infraction might be. The Privy Counci', dealing with the scheme of the Charity Commissioners for Christ's Hospital, decide important questions with respect to the application of the Endowed Schools Act, 1869, the powers of the Corporation of London, "persons affected" by the soheme, and exemptions from religious worship and teaching. In the Chancery Division the Court of Appeal, re & Elers v. Day decides that an action to restrain threats in respect of an infringement ought not, under section 32 of the Patents Act, 1883, to proceed contemporaneously with an iufringement action, and that an action by a patentee against a licensee for royal. ties is an action, under the same section, to restrain infringement. The Bristol and Swansea Aerated Bread Company v. Maggs was an attempt, which failed, to establish a contract by correspondeuce. In Clegg v. Hands the Court of Appeal affirmed the Vice-Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in holding a covenant to be assignable which had been entered into between brewers, the lessors, and the lessee of a public-house. Whitby v. Mitchell affirms the decision of Mr. Justice Kay (reported 59 Law J. Rep. Chanc. 8), that the old real property rule prohibiting the legal limitation of an estate to the issue of an unborn person as purchasers has not been merged in the more modern rule against perpetuities; and a limitation is void which offends the former, even though it does not offend the latter rule. In the Queen's Bench Division, Lord Justice Lindley and Lord Justice Bowen held, in Elder v. Carter, that there is no jurisdiction to make an order for production of documents under Order XXXVII., rule 7, against a third person not a party to the litigation when there is no trial or application to the Court pending, and the production of them is not necessary to carry out an order already obtained. In Hubbard v. Goodley the County Court was decided not to have jurisdiction to try an action for more than £50, but reduced by set-off below that sum, unless such set-off was by consent of both parties before action. In Moxon v. Sheppard it was held that a solicitor was entitled to a charging order upon money paid into Court, under Order XIV., to abide the event, as being property "recovered or preserved under the Solicitors Act, 1860, s. 28. Kearley v. Thomson decides that money paid under an illegal contract is not recoverable. A majority of the House of Lords, reversing the Appeal Court, held, in The New York Life Insurance Company v. Styles, that the surplus premium income of a mutual insurance company annually returned to participating policyholders is not assessable to income tax under schedule D. In the case of In re Spackman the Court of Appeal, reversing Mr. Justice Cave and Mr. Justice Smith, held that "assignment" in the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 4, subs, 1 (a) in order to constitute an act of bankruptcy, must be an assignment in the strict legal sense of the term, but does not include a declaration of trust or other agreement disposing of the debtor's property for the benefit of his creditors. In Story v. Rees the Appeal Court held that the plaintiff's residential address must appear on a writ, and that the business address is not sufficient. Reed v. Nutt is a decision of the Divisional Court on the limits and conflict of the civil and criminal remedies for an assault. In Blankenstein v. Robertson a bill of sale providing that a principal sum of £50 and interest thereon at the rate of £17 10s. for three years should be payable by thirty-six equal monthly instalments was held to be void, as not specifying the rate of interest; it was void also on the ground that it did not give the addresses and description of the witnesses. In Davis v. Freethy the Appeal Court affirmed Mr. Justice Mathew in holding that an assignment of the fruits of a verdict to a solicitor, which would be void as being against the policy of the law if the relation of solicitor and client existed at the time of its execution, does not become void by reason of the subsequent creation of that relationship. In Onslow v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue a settlement of contingent and reversionary juterests in stocks which were vested in trustees, with power to vary the investments. was held liable to duty within the meaning of section 3 of the Stamp Act, 1870, and the schedule thereto. In Whitney v. Moignard it was decided that in a libel action an allegation in the statement of claim that the defendant published the libel knowing that it would be published in editions of the same newspaper published in France was admissible. Snowden v. Baynes was a case under the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, in which the Queen's Bench Division and the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff was not entitled to recover, as the injury did not result from conformity to the orders of a person whose orders he was bound to obey. In Cook v. Whellock the Appeal Court, affirming Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams and Mr. Justice Lawrance, held that an undischarged bankrupt suing in respect of a cause of action arising after adjudication cannot be called upon to give security for costs. In the two cases of In re Barker and In re Jones the circumstances were considered which would determine the Court to impose conditions upon the discharge of a bankrupt. In Newman v. The London and South-Western Ry. Co. it was held that a judge or master in chambers has a diseretion under Order XXXI., r. 25, to allow a party to administer interrogatories without payment of the deposit for costs prescribed by Order XXXI., r. 26. According to Sammons v. Bailey the Court has no jurisdiction to strike out or amend any one or more interrogatories and allow others, but by Order XXXI., r. 7, can only strike out or allow all. Foot v. Hodgson defines "topmost story" in the Metropolitan Building Act, 1855. In the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division it was held in The Cashmere that rule 120 of the County Courts Act, 1888, refers only to appeals from final judg. ments, and not to appeals from interlocutory orders. In the Goods of Rebecca Miles Mr. Justice Butt refused to grant administration with the will annexed to the legatee and paramour of a testatrix who had not appointed an executor or inserted a residuary clause in her will, without citing the next-of-kin. In The Coriolanus, men in charge of cattle on board a salving ship were held not to be entitled to share in the salvage award. In the Goods of Mustapha Mustapha the President made a limited grant of administration to the guardian ad interim of an infant whose legitimacy was in dispute. In Swift v. Swift a husband obtained a decree of restitution of conjugal rights which the wife refused to obey. The Court, under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1884, s. 3, ordered her to secure him permanent maintenance out of her settled income. In Milnes v. Foden the President decided that the will of an English woman, who had been married to and divorced from a Belgian husband, which was made in Belgian form, and certain deeds-poll executed in conformity with the Wills Act, constituted together her last will.-Law Journal. "He never had but one genuine case in his life," said a lawyer of his rival, "and that was when he prosecuted his studies," INTERVIEWS WITH CLIENTS. BY A WORLDLY SOLICITOR. CLUB LAW. Ah! Major W. S.-Who did you say, Quiller! Pendennis. Ask him in (exit Quiller; enter Major Pendennis). Good morning, good morning. M. P.-Good morning to you, and how are you? W. S.-Thauk you, fairly well for a sedentary man; liver, my friend; liver a little troublesome. M. P.-Ho! ho! so's mine, but from a different cause-too much club life, and that brings me to the cause of my visit. Are you well up in the law with regard to clubs? W. S.-Well, the subject is a bit difficult; but on some points the law is clear enough. What is the point? M. P.-Well, you perhaps know that one of the many clubs I belong to is a nice sug little one-the Owlets; a nice little place where you can take a friend for & B. & S. after the theatre, and have a little écarté if you are so inclined. By the way, you came with me one night, some mouths ago W. S. Perhaps, perhaps. Go on, Major; go - M. P.-Well, I'm on the committee, and we have had a very unpleasant job to carry through. You know Rawdon Crawley? (W. S. nods) Dessay you've had transactions with him, eh? Well, well, he's a bit of a rascal, you know-something mysterious about the way he left bis regiment. Now he is a member of the Owlets, and we-the committee-have been compelled to expel him from the club. W. S.-Ho! ho! Now I begin to see what your trouble but go on. is; M. P.-It was privately suggested to him two or three times that he should resign; but he met all such suggestions with a laugh, and the answer, "No worse than other Owlets-all a bad lot." At length Capel Court you know Capel Court, a client of yours-reported him to the committee for some fishy conduct at play. Then he was warned by the Jockey Club for the in-and-outruuning of the Saint. At last the committee, acting on powers it undoubtedly possessed, called on him for an explanation. W.S.-Which he declined to give? M. P.-On the contrary, he attended at the meeting, bold as brass, gave some paltry excuse, and wound up by coolly informing us that if we didn't like that explanation we must do the other thing. W. S.-Aud what did the committee do? M. P.-Passed a resolution that the matter be referred to a general committee of the club. The members agreed to the resolution, and the secretary, Major Blazes, wrote and called on him to resign. Ultimately we had to instruct the hall porters to refuse him admissiou; and after several unseemly scenes at the doors, Rawdon Crawley has served us with a writ asking for an injunction to prevent our refusing him admission to the club. Of course the committee met at once, and they have, ou my advice, instructed me to ask you to act for the club. I have a distinct recollection of a case some years ago. W. S.-Pardon me. I must send for a report of the most recent case (rings). Quiller, bring a report of the Pelican Club case. (Exit Quiller.) M. P.-Quite so, that's the case I told the committee of at once; but I remember another case older than that-Labouchere was involved in it. W. S.-Yes, yes; but what is the constitution of the Owlets Club? I mean, is it a members' or proprietary club? M. P.-Oh! of course a little place like that is a proprietary club-old Aaron Isaacs works the whole place really, but bands over the management to us, the committee (enter Quiller). W. S. Yes, that is right, Quiller (exit Quiller): here is the Pelican Club case (Baird v. Wells) reported in the Times Law Reports, Vol. VI., p. 229. M. P.-Of course the Pelican was a proprietary club? W. S.-Certainly, and the facts, if you remember, almost precisely similar to your case; there is no doubt about the point at all; here is the decision: A member of a proprietary club has no right of property in the effects of a club which the Court can protect by injunction, so as to prevent his being improperly expelled." M. P.-Eb? Hold on! Improperly expelled, eh? improperly; but Rawdon Crawley was properly expelled. W. S.-Quite so that makes your case all the stronger; now that is the clear law as to proprietary clubs: as to members' clubs, the law may be concisely stated to be that as a rule the Court will not interfere to prevent a member of a club being expelled; the only questions which the Court will interfere on are (1) whether the rules of the club have been observed, (2) whether anything has been done contrary to natural justice, (3) whether the decision complained of has been come to bona fide. The chief cases establishing these rules are Fisher v. Keane, Labouchere v. Wharndiffe, and Dawkins v. Antrobus. M. P.-Then am I right if I take the law to be this: that if it is a proprietary club the committee can kick a man out, properly or improperly. If a members' club, they can kick a man out properly, but not improperlyI mean unjustly, or in a case and way not provided for by the rules? W. S.-My dear sir, you have at once got to the bottom of the whole affair. You see, in a members' club each member has an interest in the property of the club, and the Court will not allow him to be deprived unjustly of that interest; in a proprietary club he has 10 such right of property to be protected, and the Court will uot interfere. M. P.-Then am I right on this point, that if the committee consider a particular Owlet objectionable, they can, without valid reason, kick him out? W. S.-Certainly. Baird v. Wells shows that in a proprietor's club the Court will not even interfere to prevent a member being improperly expelled. M. P.-Good. I know another Owlet who will shortly go. But stay-didn't Baird v. Wells get appealed? I have a sort of remembrance. W. S.-You are quite right, but the appeal was dropped-it was not proceeded with; and so the law at present stands as decided by Mr. Justice Stirling. M. P.-Then if I send you the writ, you will do what is necessary? W. S.-Certainly. M. P.- By the way-happy thought-come and dine with me to-night at the " United," and we will go on afterwards to the "Owlets," and we can talk the matter over with the other committee men. W. S-Well, you are very kind, but M. P.-Oh! it's all right; you wou't see any of your highly respectable clients there, and they won't see you. Dinner at eight at the United." Good. day. W. S.-Good-day (soliloquises). That means a late night. Well, good thing I am not married.-Law Notes. THE DECLINE OF OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM. At the present moment, apparently, individual members of the Profession are indisposed to give expression to the feelings which they all undoubtedly entertain concerning the transaction of legal business. A single City solicitor writes: "I shall be glad to join in the protest against the continued scandalous block in the business of the common law courts." That is all. Consequently, in order that the Government may know the truth, and that before it is too late something may be done to restore public confidence in the courts, there appears to be but one course opeu-the appointment of a Royal Commission. There are some prominent facts about which there is no dispute. (1.) Notwithstanding the large number of substantial actions which are now remitted to the County Courts, the High Court is unable to keep pace with its work. (2.) The expense of litigation in the High Court has increased from 25 to 50 per cent. since the passing of the Judicature Acts. (3.) Commercial litigation has almost entirely left the legal tribunals. (4.) Interlocutory proceedings, and particularly appeals on interlocutory matters, vastly increase expense and delay, absorbing auuecessarily a very considerable portion of the time of the judges both of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. (5.) One of the principal objects of the Judicature Acts, ie., to secure continuous sittings in Middlesex, has been absolutely defeated by judicial arrangements for holding assizes. We might add a sixth head, which is the extraordinary conflict of judicial opinion and the absolute uncertainty which attaches to every form of judicial decision. County Court judges are very often reversed by divisioual courts; High Court judges are frequently reversed by the Court of Appeal; whilst the Court of Appeal has of late years too often had its decrees upset in the House of Lords. Now obviously a Royal Commission could have nothing to say to this sixth head. As the Lord Chancellor said the other day, judges spend a great deal of their time in differing from one another, and no more wonderful instance of how human minds can take sides ou matters of mere opinion and with reference to uncontested facts could be furnished than is to be found in the litigation just terminated between Mr. Eno and Mr. Duun. That difficulty must therefore continue to exist so long as humanity is what it is. All the other matters are deserving of the most patient inquiry at the hands of a Royal Commission, If the High Court cannot keep pace with its work, the causes must be ascertainable; the judges must be too few, or their arrangements must be defective. In either case the Legislature ought to interfere. The expeuses of litigation again ought not to have increased, and the questions how, and why, they have increased can only be answered by the process of a commission of inquiry. That there is no justification for such increase is perfectly certain, and no time should be lost in restricting the cost of litigation within the limits which existed before 1873. An inquiry into (3) would probably reveal all the abuses of our legal system. The evidence of some of the members of the City firms of solicitors, whose business has been almost exclusively among commercial men, would furnish a very formidable indictment of our judicial system. Cost, delay, and uncertainty, but principally we believe delay, would be alleged as reasons for leaving the constituted tribunals of the country to resort to the unsatisfactory private arbitration. If we look backwards to the days of the sittings in term and after term at Guildhall we realise at once why in those days long lists of commercial causes occupied the court, and why so few occupy them now. A most lamentable consequence of this will be a decline, we may say a decay, in the knowledge of mercautile law possessed by our judges. A gossip in an evening paper lately observed that Mr. Justice Mathew had not had much experience in breach of promise cases. He was a great commercial lawyer. But, if he were relieved from trying breach of promise and similar actions (we don't know why he should, for he does it admirably) and were left to deal only with commercial causes, we doubt whether he would find his time fully occupied. Another most important question which might fitly be inquired into at the same time, is the relation existing between the Chancery and the Queen's Bench Divisions. It is said, and we believe truly, that very many purely common law actions are now tried in Chancery. This being so, what is the reason? Is it because the scale of costs is more liberal in the former than in the latter? And is another reason that in Chancery there are no Divisional Courts, no juries, no misdirection, and only one appeal? Unquestionably there should be one central taxing office in which costs in all divisions should be taxed upon one common principle and one common scale. And in each division an action should be limited to one trial with the right of appeal. All these are matters pressing for inquiry and reform. The Profession, it is clear, will not move. Possibly some patriotic lawyer not afraid of professional or judicial criticism will see his way to bring them before the House of Cominous.-Law Times. PUBLICAN'S COVENANT FOR GOOD Though publicans, like other tenants, are subject to the usual conditions of tenure, it is obvious that in one or two particulars they stand in a class by themselves, for they are often bound to do things collateral to the safe keeping of the premises, and the carrying on of their business is liable to special risks which other tenants escape. There are covenants to carry on the business in such a way as not to cause a forfeiture of the license; there are covenants not to carry on a like business within a certain distance after sale of the goodwill; and there are covenants to take beer from a particular dealer, usually the landlord. And the owner of land is often subject to a covenant not to carry on or allow to be carried on on the land which he has bought or leased the business of a publican, beerhouse keeper, or such like. This last kind of covenant often gives rise to much litigation in the Chancery Division, the remedy of injunction being that which is resorted to. Some of these covenants, not being strictly covenants directly affecting the premises, need not at present be considered, but one of them directly bearing on the conduct of the house by the tenant is always prominent in ordinary affairs, owing to the importance of the covenant to the keeping up of the continuity, so to speak, of the licensed premises. The law bearing on that covenant is thus of vital interest. A license to sell liquor by retail on premises being somewhat precarious, it is not to be wondered that leases of premises so used should contain appropriate Covenants to keep it alive. Nevertheless, in rural places the small class of publicans often hold their premises from year to year without any special covenant at all. Hence, it is interesting to know how far the tenant is liable and to what extent, if by his own misconduct he causes the loss of the license. This point came into question in the case of Maw v. Hindmarsh, 28 L. T. N. S. 644. A landlord who had let by parol a licensed publichouse to the defendaut, brought an action agaiust the tenant, who had, owing to his misconduct, been several times fined; and ultimately the liceusing justices refused to renew the license, which thereby became lost. The plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging that the defendaut had become tenant upon the terms that he, the defendant, should not permit or suffer the same to be used as a brothel or disorderly house or gaming-house or knowingly suffer the premises to be used in a manper calculated to create a forfeiture of the license, yet that the defendant did suffer the house to be so used whereby the license was lost, and by reason of the premises the plaintiff was unable to let the premises as a licensed house or at all, and the same became les. sened in value. At the trial the judge held that this head of damage could not be maintained, but the case being left to the jury, and a verdict for £50 given on this bead, it was left to the court at a later stage to say if the claim could, in point of law, be maintained. The Court of Exchequer had no difficulty in holding that there was no authority for implying a covenant of this kind, and, as counsel suggested, the court would not im ply even a covenant to repair. So the laudlord had no redress. The next important case arose where there was an express covenant to keep the premises well, and it was doubtful what amounted to a breach of that covenant. In Wooler v. Knott, L. R. 1 Ex. 265, the female plaintiff, before her marriage, let to the defendant a public-house in Yorkshire for a term of six years, at a yearly rent of £50. The lease contained a covenant that the lessee would keep the public-house in the usual and customary manner for such houses, and would not do or omit, or suffer to be done or omitted, any act, matter, or thing whatsoever that could or might affect, lessen, or make void either or any of the licenses for the time being granted to the said public-house. And there was a proviso that, in case of any breach, it should be lawful to the landlord to re-enter and expel the tenant. The landlady married some months after the lease, and a year later the tenant was convicted of permitting drunkenness, and of keeping open during prohibited hours, but neither conviction was recorded on the license. The landlord thereupon brought an action of ejectment on the ground of breach of covenant. The question was afterwards, by agreement, raised, whether the facts of these convictions amounted to a breach of the covenant. It was contended for the tenant that there was nothing which either lessened the license or affected it, for the conviction did not per se make void the license. It was said that, as the convictions were not recorded, no section of the Licensing Acts caused any loss of license. As to what effect the conviction might have on the minds of the licensing justices in future no one could tell, but it was contended that it was too indefinite to come within the words of the covenant. On the other hand, the landlord's counsel contended that the necessary effect of the conviction, whether recorded or not, was to affect the license, inasmuch as a repetition of the offence for a certain number of times would cause a forfeiture. The court, however, held that, though the effect of the conviction might render it more probable that the licensing justices would thereafter refuse to renew the license, yet this was far too fanciful and remote a consequence to come within the words of the covenant. Kelly, C.B., ingeniously suggested that, if the mere conviction worked a forfeiture, it would be a most valuable incident to the landlord's property, for when the conviction took place soon after the lease be might easily contrive to get the benefit of all the money which the tenant may have spent on the premises. The court held that, as there was nothing in the statutes to cause a decisive injury to the license, and as a covenant was to be construed most strongly against the party benefiting, the prejudice was too remote and indefinite. That case was taken by appeal to the Court of Appeal, which at that time consisted of four judges, and it is well to notice what two of those judges said. James, L.J., observed that it would be straining words to say that an inchoate act, which may influence the mind of the jastices on some future occasion and induce them to order a conviction to be recorded, is of itself an act which affects, lessens, or makes void the license. And Mellish, L.J., said that if the justices had ordered the two convictions to be indorsed on the license he thought the license would have been affected within the meaning of the clause, because, if the tenant was convicted of another offence, the license would necessarily be forfeited, and the landlord would run the risk of its never being renewed. Whether the license would have been affected if one conviction only had been indorsed on it he had some doubt, and he gave no opinion. But be was clear that, if no conviction had been recorded on the license, nothing had been done which could affect the license. Moreover, that acute judge said that the covenant there was, that nothing wonld be done that would affect the existing licenses, and not that would affect only the renewal of the license in future. Another case soon afterwards occurred as to the same covenant, which was said to be broken under some novel circumstances. In Moore v. Robinson, 48 L. J. Q. B. 157, the plaintiff was a married woman who had by |