courthouse should be put in a proper sanitary condition, and the interior altered. He suggested that a meeting of the Sessious Bar should be held to consider the matter, and after that, he would reply to the letter from the Incorporated Law Society. The practitioners present agreed to act on the suggestion of the Recorder, and to hold a meeting. UNQUALIFIED CONVEYANCERS. MACROOM QUARTER SESSIONS, OCT. 3RD, 1890. (Before His Honor County Court Judge FERGUSON.) WM. GEORGE WAKELY, Solcitor (on behalf of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland), v. DENIS Creedon. 27 Vic., c. 7, sec. 3. The defendant, Denis Creedon, a solicitor's clerk, was proceeded against for £20, being the penalty for having drawn a deed and charged a fee not being a legally qualified solicitor. The defendant had drafted a deed for a man named Cremin, and when the case was called at the previous sessions the defendant stated that he was clerk to Mr. Neville, solicitor, Bandon, on whose behalf he had drawn the document. Mr. Neville now stated that he had given the defendant no authority to draw deeds. The defendant had paid him the £1 which he received, and said as the matter was a simple one he prepared it himself. Mr. Neville told him he had no right to do 80. His Honor gave a decree for the full amount-viz., £20. Mr. Purcell, solicitor, appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs, and the defendant was represented by Mr. Michael Murphy, solicitor. Notice of appeal was given. THE "LAW TIMES" TABLE OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PERSONAL INTESTATES. (a) Relatives of the Intestate at his or her death: Husband whether alone or with other relatives Wife and child Wife and children ESTATE OF Shares in which they take: All to husband. One-third to wife and the residue to the child. (b) One-third to wife and the residue equally among the children. One third to wife, and the residue between the children and grandchildren per stirpes; that is to say, the grandchildren will take equally between them their deceased parents' share only. One-third to wife, and the residue between the grandchildren per stirpes; that is to say, the grandchildren will only take their respective parents' share. Equally between them. Half to wife and half to father. Half to wife and half to mother, brother and sister equally. Half to wife and half to brother, All to children. Equally per stirpes; that is to say, the grandchildren will take only their respective parents' shares. Equally per stirpes; that is, according to the number of children of the intestate who left children. (a) For authorities in support of this Table, see 88 Law Times 59. [Reprinted 24 Ir. L. T. p. 9.] (b) Children (except an heir-at-law) who have any estate by the settlement of the intestate, or who are advanced by the intestate in his lifetime equal to the shares of the other children, are not entitled to participate in the distribution. THE CONTRACTS OF INFANTS. The legal disabilities of married women and infants form a new branch of English law whose study and whose application to the facts of ordinary life are a continual source of perplexity to student and practitioner alike. The difficulty of the subject may be said to be twofold. First of all, the language of the two modern Acts which are intended to regulate the contractual position of married women and infants respectively, is frequently-to use no stronger termambiguous; and, secondly, to the doubt which is thus engendered by a perusal of either statute must be added the bewilderment produced by an attempt to reconcile the judicial interpretation of statutory conundrums, either with one's own ideas of the true construction of English sentences, or with some previous decision of the Courts. It is not, however, to the Married Women's Property Act, and the swarm of cases which cluster round almost every one of its sections, that we desire to call our readers' attention in the following remarks. Our purpose is to endeavour to deal with the other of the two classes of disabilities referred to above, as suggested, in particular, by one or two recent cases of importance. In connection, then, with the subject of infants' contracts it may be useful to begin by giving an illustration of the danger of taking an Act of Parliament, so to speak, at its word. In the very recent case of Valentine v. Canali, (24 Q. B. D., 166) the plaintiff, an infant, had purchased, and in part paid for, the business of a restaurant keeper. After struggling along for some months without making the concern answer, he threw up his bargain with his vendor. The defendant declined to pay the balance of the purchase-money, and brought au action in the County Court for rescission of the contract and recovery of the money already paid under it. For this purpose, he relied on section 1 of the Infants' Relief Act, 1874. It was contended for the plaintiff that since an infants' contract for goods supplied (other than necessaries) was void, uo property in the goods could pass, and that, therefore, the consideration paid under the invalid agreement (c) See 88 L. T. 60. [24 Ir. L. T. 9.] A posthumous chi'd is entitled to take under the Statutes of Distribution. (See Wallis v. Hodson, 2 Atk. 115.) could be recovered. Anson, in his work on "Contracts," draws attention to the ambiguity of section 1 on this point, but considers that a transaction, such as he suggests hypothetically, but which is similar in principle to that in Valentine v. Canali, would stand; but that it should be regarded not as a contract, but as a gratuitous delivery of goods on the one side and a voluntary payment ou the other. The County Court Judge in the case we are considering appears to have taken the same view, but he held that the contract, so far as its future operation was concerned, should be cancelled, and consequently the plaintiff released from payment of the balance of the consideration money, but he declined to make an order for repayment of the proportion already paid. Against this decision plaintiff appealed. In the course of his counsel's arguments the latter was asked by Bowen, L.J., whether, if an infant buys cigars and smokes them, he may claim back the money he paid for them. The learned counsel, on the strength of section 1, boldly replied in the affirmative, adding that, however absurd it might appear, "it is not the less law as appears from the Act." The Court, however, had no difficulty in upholding the decision of the County Court Judge. The Infants' Relief Act, or, at any rate, that portion of it which seemed to support the plaintiff's case, was gently put out of the way. Lord Coleridge considered that "the old law applied that when an infant has had something for which he has paid and cannot give it back, nor put the seller in the same position as he was before, as he cannot restore the consideration for the money, he cannot recover back the money." As for the Infants' Relief Act, "no doubt," said his lordship, with great satire, "it is strong in its general terms; but they must be so construed as to give them a sensible and reasonable construction, and so as, if possible, not to make it in almost every case effect a gross injustice." But there is a considerable class of infants' contracts which, not by judicial dilution of the too strong language of the Act, but by au express proviso of its first section, is declared to be outside its operation, and to be governed by the old common law rules. For instance, it has always been permissible for an infant to enter iuto a contract of service with an employer, and the Courts will uphold such a contract provided that it is beneficial in its terms to the infant. A week or two ago, a case of some importance upon this exception to an infant's contractual disabilities, illustrating, moreover, their effect upon third parties, was decided by Fry, L.J., sitting as a Chancery Judge of first instance. We allude to the case of De Francesco v. Barnum and others (The Times, August 6th, 1890). The plaintiff in this action was a teacher of stage dancing. In 1886 he entered into two identical indentures of apprenticeship with the defendants, Ada and Helen Parnell, aged respectively twelve and fourteen years, and their mother, a widow. In each deed plaintiff covenanted to instruct the apprentice "in the higher branches of choreographic art" and to pay them for "choreographic engagements at a certain rate of pay per night. Plaintiff also had the right to engage the apprentices for performances abroad at a somewhat higher rate of pay. It was further agreed that the services of the apprentice should be entirely at plaintiff's disposal, and that the apprentice should not during the term of seven years enter into professional engagements without the permission in writing of the plaintiff. On failure of compliance with any provision of the deed the sme might be determined by plaintiff, and the mother be liable to pay him £50 as liquidated damages. It did not appear that any premium was to be paid to plaintiff. The defendant, De Paravicini, theatrical agent for the remaining defendant, the celebrated Mr. Barnum, engaged the apprentices at one guinea a week each (considerably more than they could earn in plaintiff's service) for two daily performances at Olympia. Thereupon the choreographic professor brought the present action, claiming, against the infants, an injunction to prevent their performing at Olympia or otherwise, without his leave, against the mother an injunction to prevent her allowing the infauts to perform, and against all the defendants, except the infants, damages for enticing the girls to break their apprenticeship engage ments. The case first came before the Court in Novembr last, when application was made to Chitty, J., for an interlocutory injunction to restrain defendants, until trial of the action or further order, from allowing the infants to perform without plaintiff's permission. For the plaintiff, reliance was placed on a case decided so recently as in 1888, viz., Fellows v. Wood (59 L. T., 513). There defendant, when an infaut, contracted with plaintiff, a dairy man, to enter his service at a salary of £1 a week, for which defendant was to serve plaintiff, and not to serve plaintiff's customers for his own benefit during the time he remained in plaintiff's employment or for two years afterwards. Two week's notice on either side was to put an end to the employment. The defendant broke the agreement by leaving plaintiff's service without giving two weeks' notice, and then began serving plaintiff's customers on his own account. It was held by the Divisional Court that the contract did not come within the Iufants' Relief Act, and that being for hire and service, and not unreasonable, but, on the contrary, beneficial for the infant, it could be enforced, and an injunction was accordingly granted to restrain the defendant from coutinuing in breach of the agreement. We confess we are unable to see how this case could have supported the claim of De Francesco, As Chitty, J., pointed out, the defendant in Fellows v. Wood was not an infant at the time of granting the injunction, and, the apprenticeship having expired, the contract was one of service entered into after the infancy of defendant had determined. Moreover, the conditions and circumstances of the two services respectively were radically different. His lordship, however, in De Francesco v. Barnum, took broader ground; and on the authority of an old case, Gylbert v. Fletcher (Cro. Cas. 179), held that it was established law that "the master could not sue the apprentice on the covenants that the apprentice purported to enter into by the apprenticeship deed." But, although the master is unable by action in the civil courts to enforce the covenants in an apprenticeship deed against the infant, we must bear in mind that the apprenticeship deed is perfectly valid where its terms are, upon the whole, for the infant's benefit. Thus, in Reg. v. Wigston (3 Bain. and Cress., 484), a pauper's settlement depended upon the validity of one of two apprenticeship deeds by which, when an infant, the pauper had purported to bind himself to two different masters. The infant in question, first of all, at the age of seven bound himself apprentice for seven years. At the end of three years, owing to differences of opinion, the master offered to sell his apprentice the remaining years of his service for sixpence. The infant, chuckling over what he, no doubt, considered a capital bargain, closed with the proposal, left the service, and then bound himself for seven years with another employer. The Court held that, where it was for his benefit to do so, an infant wa perfectly competent to enter into a contract of apprenticeship; that, therefore, the first apprenticeship was binding on the infaut, and consequently that be had no power to terminate the service by any act of his own. We must be careful not to lay too much stress upon Gylbert v. Fletcher, which after all, is a case more of procedure than of principle. The master may not have a right of civil action against his apprentice, but both under the old apprenticeship Act of Elizab-tb (5 Eliz., c. 4) as well as under the Employers and Workmen's Act, 1876, the master can apply to the justices to enforce obedience by the apprentice to the terms of his service, provided the latter are for the infant's welfare. But in the action of De Francesco against his apprentices, Gylbert v. Fletcher becomes a case in point, and upon its authority Chitty, J., held that it was not necessary "to inquire whether the contract was or w48 not beneficial to the infant, but that it was sufficient to say that the infant could not he sued on the covenant; and it further followed that if the covenant could not be sued upon by law, it could not be enforced in equity by injunction." The interlocutory injunction against the infants was accordingly refused, and, consequently, at that stage in the proceedings no injuuction would be granted against the other defendants. Upon the case coming on for trial before Fry, L.J., sitting in the Chancery Division, that learned judge approved the ruling of Chitty, J., that an infant could not be sued either at law or in equity upon a covenant to serve a master; and considered that the case was thereby already determined as against the infants. It would appear, however, that in the opinion of the Lord Justice the infancy of the defendant apprentices was not material so far as regarded the injunction claimed against them, since his lordship "had a strong impres. sion and feeling that it was not in the interests of maukind that persons should be compelled specifically to perform engagements for personal service they were unwilling to continue, and there would be danger if specific performance were enforced that a contract for service would be converted into a contract of slavery." But, however this may be in reference to a claim for specific performance, undoubtedly adult defendants would be liable to be mulcted in damages, as we were reminded by the result of an action tried a few days after the present case, and brought by the same plaintiff against certain ballet-dancers for breach of their professional engagements with him. Had De Francesco proceeded merely against his apprentices it would have been needless for the Court to consider the matter any further, the case against the infants being sufficiently disposed by the ruling of Chitty, J., adopted by Fry, L.J. It was necessary for the latter learned judge, however, to consider how the contract affected the other defendants, who were alleged to have enticed the apprentices to the breach complained of. As Fry, L.J., said :-" The most important question in the case was that raised on the defence of the defendant Barnum-whether there was or not a valid Coutract between the plaintiff and the infants." The auswer to this question, as we have already endeavoured to show, is not governed by the decision in Gylbert v. Fletcher, which affects not the validity of apprenticeship deeds, but merely the method of enforcing their provisions. The Lord Justice proceeded to point out that from the earliest days an exception to the general invalidity of an infant's contracts "was that an infant could enter into a contract for being taught a profession or occupation by which he might hereafter be benefited; another exception being based on the desirability of an infant being employed was that of a contract by which he obtained employment to enable him to live." But the exception is itself in turn subject to an exception, at which, citing the case Reg. v. Wigston, we ourselves have already hinted, viz., where, as Fry, L J., said, the contract contained extraordinary and unusual terms, and it was not reasonable, or for the benefit of the infant, the contract was void. The question, therefore, was one of fact, whether the contract as a whole was for the benefit of the infants. It may be useful to remark here that Lord Coleridge, in the case of Meakin v. Morris (12 Q. B. D., 352) gave an illustration of a contract which would fall under this last exception. "The law," said the Chief Justice, "as it stands, is, as I have always understood it, that you may not make a contract with an infant containing stipulations that cannot be for the benefit, but must be to the disadvantge of the infaut, as, for instance, a stipulation for a penalty to be paid by the infant." It will be remembered that in De Francesco v. Barnum the penalty stipulated for was to be paid not by the iufants, but by the mother. Nevertheless, Fry, L.J., iu going through the various terms of the indentures, came to the conclusion that several of them were "extraordinary, unusual, and unfair," amongst which he instanced the provisions enabling plaintiff to send the apprentices to any foreign country, and binding them to accept no employment during the seven years except from the plaintiff, while there was no correlative agreement on his part to find them employment or to pay them if he did not find them such employment. The contract, therefore, upon the whole, was not for the benefit of the infants, and consequently there being no valid engagement between plaintiff and the infant defendants which the latter could be induced to break, the case against all the other defendants failed. Although the law as to the contractual disabilities of infants appears thus obscured by prejudicial decisions as well as by legislative enactments, yet the validity or otherwise of such contracts in every cas practically binges on the question whether the contract is for 'necessary" or not. The point at issue is the same whether it is the transactious of the humble apprentice or those of the spendthrift undergraduate which are being considered. Accordingly, an infant may enter into a contract of apprenticeship, because i is becessary for him to learn a trade or profession. But it can never be necessary for him that such a contract, as a whole, should not be for his benefit; and, therefore, we find that an agreement of such a description is not binding on the infant.-Law Gazette. INGENUOUS INGENUITY, The Green Bag for July states, as a fact, that the answer given by a law student to the question, What is an accommodation note? was, One which the maker doesn't have to pay until he is ready to. Actual fact is said to be stranger than fiction, and is often much more humorous on account of its reality. While we cheerfully agree that this answer is one of the funniest on recor, (and submit that daily experience lends to it the similitude of truth), we tender the following, also actual facts, for the consideration of those who read the vacation issues of this humble periodical. If anything more innocently ingenious can be produced let it be produced. If the gentlemen who originated the answers chance to see them reproduced, let them not be offended, for they have written two of the most humorous things of the century. Question.-Explain the maxim, Falsa demonstratio non nocet. Ans. If I shake my fist at a man who is within my reach that is an assault though I do not touch him, because he is within reach and I may carry out my threat and hurt him. But if he is across the street, and so out of my reach, that is not an assault, for fulsa demonstratio non nocet. Question. What duty does the owner of premises owe to one whom he invites to come upon the premises? Answer. The duty of lateral support.-Canadian Law Times. CONDITIONS IN TERROREM. Adams v. Adams (noted ante, p. 272) might well have been considered as savouring of the obnoxious principle of in terrorem, if real estate had not been affected aud the litigation groundless. An annuity charged on land was given by will to A., but it was provided that, if he should attempt to intermeddle with or interfere in the management of the testator's real and personal estate, the annuity should cease. A brought this action against the trustees of the will, one of whom was also residuary legatee, alleging that he had not been paid his annuity, and that the land on which it was charged had been wasted by the trustees, and asking for an account, an injunction against their occupying the trust estate for their own benefit and committing further acts of waste, and the appointment of a receiver. The residuary devisee by counter-claim asked for a declaration that the annuity was forfeited by reason of the attempted interfereuce of the annuitant in the management of the estate. Lord Justice Fry, sitting in the Chancery Division, held that the annuity had been duly paid aud the action brought without any reasonable cause, so that the annuitant had forfeited the annuity by asking for an injunction and a receiver, which was an attempted interference with the real estate. Perhaps the question of the validity of a condition in terrorem is more often raised when the testator provides that, if any beneficiary under his will disputes it, his interest shall go over or determine. Although in some cases such a condition may be inserted with a view to oust the jurisdiction of the court by providing a domestic tribunal from which there can be no appeal, of which provision the courts are very jealous, in many cases the testator is simply anxious to save the quarrelling which so frequently divides families with reference to the distribution of the testator's estate. Such a condition is in some cases void. In Jarman on Wills, 4th edit. vol. 2, p. 58, it is stated that "sometimes a testator imposes on a devisee or legatee a condition that he shall not dispute the will. Such a condition is regarded as in terrorem ouly, at least where the subject of disposition is personal estate; and therefore a legatee will not, by having contested the validity or effect of the will, forfeit his legacy where there was probabilis causa litigandi, unless, it seems, the legacy be given over upon breach of the condition. But this doctrine has never been applied to dvises of real estate." The courts have a natural dislike to say that property which in a certain event is to go to a particular person shall not go to him, and the gift over is after all merely a gift over on a contingency, that is, the contingency that the first legatee will dispute the will. This may partly account for the seeming arbitrariness of the rule that such a condition is void, unless there be a gift over, where personal estate is affected. A curious instance of the gift over taking effect is to be found in Cleaver v. Spurling (2 P. Wms. 525), where a freeman of London gave his daughter a legacy, provided that, if she or her husband should refuse to give a release to his executors, or should anyways trouble or disturb them, upon any claim or pretence by virtue of the custom of London, the legacy should go over to certain of his grandchildren. The legatee claimed her orphanage part, and this was held sufficient to canse the forfeiture of the legacy." The Master of the Rolls compared it to the case of a devise of a legacy to a child, upon condition that she married with conseut of the executor, but if she should not marry with such consent, then the legacy to go over; though this (he said) was against the rule of the civil law, according to which Maritagium debet esse liberum, yet it is a good condition by our law, and when the legacy is once vested in the devisee over, equity cannot fetch it back again." In Rhodes v. The Muswell Hill Land Company (4 L. T. Rep. N. S. 229; 29 Beav. 560) the plaintiffs brought an action of specific performance against the defendants who had contracted to purchase certain proper y, but afterwards objected that a condition was attached to it which made the title too doubtful for them to accept. The condition was, in effect, that if the devisees or legatees instituted any legal or equit able proceedings, the property given to them shouli fall into the residue. Lord Romilly pointed out that the condition was absurd and repugnant on the face of it, as it would, if valid, prevent the devisee bringing au action for rent, or instituting any proceedings in ejectment, and held that its existence formed no bar to the plaintiffs making a good title to the property. If such a condition had been held valid, a collusive arrangement between the tenants of the property aud the residuary devisees might practically have prevented the specific devisees from enjoying the rents of the property, as, if the tenants had refused to pay their reuts, the owners could not have recovered them without causing the property to go over to the residuary devisees. It is right, however, to observe that the testator may not have intended so general a condition, as Lord Romilly held him to have done, since, after providing that all disputes between the beneficiaries should be submitted to arbitration, he directed that if they or any of them took any proceedings touching or concerning, or in anywise relating to the matters and things aforesaid, or any of them," the property should go over, and it is quite reasonable to suppose that he was referring to litigation in respect of matters for which he had provided arbitration, Certain conditions in restraint of marriage in the case of personalty are also treated as merely in terrorem, and therefore void, unless there is a gift over: (see Theobald on Wills, 3rd edit., p. 422.) There was a difference of opinion among the Judges of the Irish Court of Appeal as to the effect on this doctrine where personal and real estate were joined in the same gift (Duddy v. Gresham, 2 Law Rep. Ir. 442); the Lord Chancellor Ball being of opinion that each description of property should be allowed to continue subject to the rules applicable to itself, while Lord Justice Christian thought that the rule applicable to personal estate should apply also to the realty when there was one gift of both. The words of the Lord Justice with reference to conditions in terrorem are worth quoting here: "If the testator means that his injunction should be coercive, he must show he does so mean it by indicating the person who is to take in the event of a breach; and if he refrain from doing that, even although he should go so far as to say the legatee should forfeit, but without saying what would then become of the legacy it is reasonably deemed that he was only half in earnest, that he has shrunk from withdrawing the gift." In another recent case (Gray v. Gray, 23 Law Rep. Ir. 399) the question of in terrorem came before the Irish Courts. A testator left the residue of his property to be divided equally between his daughter "provided she shall marry with the consent of my said dear wife, if then living, or of the trustees for the time being of this my will," and a sou, aud in case the son should die as therein mentioned, or the daughter before she attained twentyone or married with the consent aforesaid, then the share or shares so appointed for the daughter and the son should go to survivor of them aud another son in equal shares. The Vice-Chancellor Chatterton held that the requirement of couseut to her marriage could be disregarded as in terrorem, but that marriage was a condition precedent to her taking the legacy, as the doctrine dispensed only with the consent and not with the marriage itself. In doing so, his Lordship professedly followed the English case of Garbut v. Hilton (1 Atk. 381).-Law Times. A Holloway's Pills. - Liver, Lungs, and Kidneys.-Most diseases of these purifying organs arise from obstructions, over the removal of which these celebrated Pills exercise the most perfect control. course of them is strongly recommended as a remedy for such chronic affections as liver enlargements, congestion of the lungs, torpidity of the kidneys, and other functional disorders which cause much present suffering, and if neglected lay the foundation of organic diseases. Holloway's Pills are specially adapted for the young and delicate; their gentle and purifying action ranks them above all other medicines. In achieved for themselves universal fame. They expel all impurities/ indigestion, nervous affections, gout and rheumatism these Pills have from the blood, and thus restore cheerfulness and vigour. SOLILOQUY ON LAW REFORM. A code, or not a code,-that is the question! The flaws and defects of numerous practiques, And by revising end them! To prune, to change, To change, perhaps DESTROY! Ay, there's the rub; For who would bear the whips and smarts of law, Old Law Magazine. 4 248 CLOSED 43 Mr. T. De Moleyus, Q.C., Chairman and County Court Judge for Kilkenny and Queen's County, has placed his resignation in the hands of the Government. COURT PAPERS. COURT OF BANKRUPTCY. ADJUDICATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY [The dates of Adjudications are first given, the Sillings follow in italics.] DUBLIN. Burke, John, of Shop-street, in the county of the town of Galway, grocer and spirit merchant. September 26; Tuesday, October 14, and Friday, October 31. Jos. P. Tyndall and P. J. Daly, solrs. Daly, Thomas, of Phibsborough-road, in the city of Dublin, shopkeeper. September 30; Friday, October 17, and Tuesday, November 4. Casey and Clay, solrs. Maher, Bridget, widow, of 1 and 2 Upper Ormond-quay, in the city of Dublin, clothier. September 30; Friday, October 17, and Tuesday, November 4. Casey & Clay, solrs. M'Carthy, William S., of Main-street, Donegal, in the county of Donegal, draper. September 30; Tuesday, October 21, and Friday, November 7. Richard Davoren, solr. BIRTHS, MARRIAGES. AND DEATHS. BIRTHS. SHORTT October 2, at Spencer Villas, Glenageary, the wife of Joseph H. Shortt, solicitor, of a son. MARRIAGES. FULTON and WASTELL-August 13, at Olinda, Maldon, Victoria, by the Rev. R. W. Cooke, M A., Incumbent, Robert Fulton, of Glenfurrie road, Hawthorn, Melbourne, formerly of Strabane, Co. Tyrone, solicitor, to Edith Agnes, fourth surviving daughter of William H. Wastell, of Shipley-street, South Yarra, Melbourne. FUNERAL REQUISITES OF EVERY DESCRIPTION. 20 City & County Building Sy 10 Guinness, Nos. 80,001 Son, & Co. ( to 250,000 100 Do., 5 p c Debenture Stock Do., 6 p c Pref. 1Ο 25 Ir. C S. Building Society.. 5 John., Mney & O'Brien, ltd Kinahan & Co., Ltd. Shares not fully paid up are given in Italics. Bank Rate Of Discount- 44 per cent. Of Deposit-11 per cent Name Days-Oct. 9th and 28th, 1890. Account Days- Oct. 10th and 29th, 1890. Business commences at 1 30 p.m. |