One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U. S. Navy, 1890-1990This powerfully argued, objective history of the modern U.S. Navy explains how the Navy defined its purpose in the century after 1890. It relates in detail how the Navy formed and reformed its doctrine of naval force and operations around a concept articulated by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan - a concept of offensive sea control by a battleship fleet, and, new to America, the need to build and maintain an offensive battle fleet in peacetime. However, there were many years, notably in the 1920's and after World War II, when there was no enemy at sea, when the country turned inward, when the Navy could not count on support for an expensive peacetime battle fleet. After 1945, especially, the inappropriateness of Mahanian principles strained a service that had taken them for granted, as did the centralization of the military establishment and the introduction of new weapons. What, then, did the Navy do? It shrewdly adapted old ideas to new technology. To reclaim its position in a general war, and avoid being transformed into a mere transport service, the Navy (with the Marine Corps) proved it was capable of power projection onto the land through seaborne bombers armed with nuclear weapons and by building a ballistic missile-launching submarine force. The growth of a Soviet sea force in the 1970's and 1980's revived the moribund sea power doctrine, but the Navy's bid for strategic leadership failed in the face of the war-avoidance policy of the Cold War. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Navy finally retired Mahan's doctrine that the defeat of the enemy fleet was the Navy's primary objective. Having proven itself in the course of the century as ever adaptable, the service movedback from sea control to a doctrine of expeditionary littoral warfare. This volume, then, is a history of how a war-fighting organization responded - in doctrine, strategy, operations, preparedness, self-awareness, and force structure - to radical changes in political circumstance, |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
ON THE | 7 |
Sea Power and the Fleet Navy 18901910 | 9 |
The New Navy 18981913 | 27 |
Neutrality or Readiness? 19131917 | 49 |
War Without Mahan 19171918 | 64 |
Parity and Proportion 19191922 | 83 |
Treaty Navy 19221930 | 104 |
Victory Drives 19441945 | 248 |
FROM THE | 273 |
Why Do We Need a Navy? 19451949 | 275 |
Naval Strategy 19501954 | 314 |
Containment and the Navy 19521960 | 332 |
The McNamara Years 19611970 | 367 |
Disarray 19701980 | 394 |
High Tide 19801990 | 418 |
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Air Force Allied American amphibious Annapolis antisubmarine arms Army Atlantic atomic bomb attack bases battle fleet battleships blockade bombers Britain British Burke campaign chief of naval China coast combat command Congress convoy cruisers decisive defeat Department destroyers deterrence doctrine enemy escort Europe fight Forrestal German invasion islands Japan Japanese Joint Chiefs King Korea land land-based limited Mahan Marine Corps maritime strategy military missiles mission naval force Naval Institute Press Naval Operations naval strategy Naval War College Navy's needed Nimitz North nuclear ocean officers Okinawa Pacific Fleet Pacific war patrol Pearl Harbor Philippines Plan Orange Polaris political position President protect Rear Admiral role Roosevelt sea power ships Soviet naval Soviet navy Soviet Union strike submarines targets threat tion treaty troops U-boats U.S. Naval U.S. Navy United United States Navy University Press victory Vietnam War Plan Orange warfare warships Washington weapons western World York Zumwalt