suffices to prove that its possessor appeared on earth thousands of years subsequently to the primordial ages of humanity; because in principio man articulated but monosyllables. Or else (what is the same thing in result, no less than more positive) the Israelite who (in some form of coin-letter) wrote the word ADM, of Genesis, lived at a philological epoch when the pristine monosyllables had already (organically through development) merged into words of two syllables; and therefore, that writer committed an egregious anachronism when he retro-leptically ascribed a triliteral proper-name, or rather noun, to his first human progenitor.

The word ADM, or with an additional vowel, ADaM, is consequently to be divided into two separate words, A and DaM; or A-DaM. Now, A, aleph, is the primeval, Semitic, masculine article A="the": 703 an article that, in Scripture, is prefixed to above forty masculine substantives; although, until recently, the fact was unperceived by Hebrew grammarians, or Jewish lexicographers.

In the next place, the word ADaM does not proceed, as the Rabbis suppose, from ADaMaH (Gen. ii. 7)—a bisyllable from a trisyllable!—but the latter is an extension of the former root, DaM (Arabicè, Dem), meaning blood; the color of which, being red, originated the secondary signification of DaM, as "red;" and "to be red."

Consequently, A, the letter "aleph," being the masculine article the; and the noun DaM meaning blood, or "red," we have only to unite these two words into A-DaM, to read theblood, or THE-RED, in "Genesis ;" which duplex substantive, applied to man, naturally signifies "the-red-man;" and, when applied to the ground, ADaMaH ("out of the dust" of which this the-red-man, ADaM, was moulded), it means the-red-earth: i. e., that rubescent soil out of which the Jehovistic writer of Genesis IId imagined Hebrew man to have been fashioned by Creative artisanship. The BeNi-ADaM also, in Psalms (xlix. 2. Comp. Ps. lxii. 9: and contrast with BeNoTt-HaADaM, Gen. vi. 2), are reputed to be patricians of the pure Abrahamic stock; whereas the plebeians (including all those who are, like AngloSaxons, mere GOIM, Gentiles) belong altogether to a different and lower level . . . in the eye of IeHQuaH.

We adopt entirely the Italian rendering of the great interpreter of Sacred Philology at the Vatican; and think, with Lanci, that il-rossicante, "the-Blusher," is the happiest translation of the old Semitic particle and noun A-DaM.

How does this interpretation bear upon ethnography?

Reader! simply thus. As no "Type of Mankind" but the white race can be said (physiologically) to blush; it follows, that, according to the conception of the writers of Genesis (who were Jews and of the "white race"), not only did the first human pair converse between themselves, no less than with God and with the serpent, in pure Hebrew, but they were essentially A-DaMites (red-man and woman) "blushers: "—and therefore, these Hebrew writers, never supposed that A-DaM and ISE (vulgaricè, Adam and Eve) could have been of any stock than of the white type-in short, Hebrews, Abrahamidæ, like themselves - these writers aforesaid.

Thus, through a few cuts of an archæological scalpel, vanishes the last illusion that any but white "Types of Mankind” are to be found in the first three chapters of the book called "Genesis."

The "Chinese" having been carefully removed further on from connection with the Mesopotamian SINIM of Isaiah (xlix. 12), nothing remains but to refer the reader to the map [supra, p. 552] we have given of Xth Genesis for the whole of Ethnography comprehended by the writers of the Old Testament: Strabo, who followed Eratosthenes about B. c. 15, furnishing every possible information upon what of geography was attainable, in the first century after c., by the writers of the New.

The present authors have asserted these results before.

"That part of the map colored deep-red includes all the world known to the inspired writers of the Old Testament; and this, with the part colored pale-red, includes all known to St. Paul and the Evangelists. As we have no evidence that their inspiration extended to matters of science, and we know that they were ignorant of Astronomy, Geology, Natural History, Geography, &c. - what evidence is there that they knew anything of the INHABITANTS of countries unknown to them, viz.: Americans, Chinese, Hindoos, Australians, Polynesians, and other contemporary races?"- (J. C. N.: Bibl. and Phys. Hist. of Man; New York, 1849; “Map" and pp. 54–67.)

"These unhistorical origines of nations are now adverted to, as a prelude to the discussion of the Xth chapter of Genesis (see Ethnological Journal, No. VI., note, page 254), whereby it will be demonstrated that, under the personifications of "Shem, Ham, and Japheth,” their fifteen sons, and seventy-one grand-children, the Hebrew geographers, whose ken of the earth's superficies was even more limited than that of Eratosthenes, about B. C. 240, have never alluded to, nor intended, Mongolian, Malayan, Polynesian, American, or Nigritian races." (G. R. G.: Otia Egyptiaca; London, 1849: p. 124,"note.")

Five years have since elapsed. Most of the conclusions advanced by the authors have been challenged. Whether those conclusions were based, or not, upon thorough investigation of each department of the subject, the reader of the present volume is now best qualified to decide.

PART III.

Supplement.

BY GEO. R. GLIDDON.

ESSAY I.

ARCHEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE XTH CHAPTER OF GENESIS.

"Scriptura primum intelligi debet grammaticè antequam possit explicari theologice.”

(LUTHER.)

"THE XTH CHAPTER OF GENESIS-Archæological Introduction to its Study" is the heading given, in our "Prospectus," to Part III. of this work.

To the generality of readers, educated under convictions that every process calculated to probe the historical evidences of the Hebrew Scriptures has heretofore been rigorously applied to them, an Introduction termed "archæological" may seem, to say the least, superfluous at the present day — while to not a few persons, the proposed method of examination may, at first sight, even wear the aspect of presumptuousness. Nevertheless, having announced the intention, it behooves us to justify it.

In common with other Protestants, since our earliest childhood, we have been assured that the Bible is the word of God—and that the inspiration of the writers of both Old and New Testaments rests upon testimony the most irrefragable. We have also been admonished in the language of the Apostle (1) to "search the Scriptures;" coupled with the corroborative exhortation, (2) "seek, and ye will find; knock, and it will be opened unto you."

Thus, on the one hand, asseverations the most positive fortify the inquirer who conscientiously examines whether the divine revelation of the Bible and the inspiration of its penmen are "built upon a rock;" at the same time that, on the other, the Gospels themselves invite him to search, seek, and scrutinize.

Supported by such authority, no legitimate objection can be sustained, by Protestants, against the employment of what we conceive to be the only method through which the historical validity of a given proposition can be thoroughly tested; nor will logical orthodoxy contest Vater's axiom-"Faith in Christ can set no limits to critical inquiries; otherwise he would hinder the knowledge of Truth."

(1) The good Tidings according to JOHN v. 39.

(2) The good Tidings according to MATTHEW, vii. 7; copied in The good Tidings according to LUKE, Xi. 9. We follow SHARPE: The New Testament, translated from Griesbach's Text; wherein "will" is substituted for the "shall" of king James's version.

Homo, according to Bacon, naturæ minister et interpres, tantum facit et intelligit quantum de naturæ ordine re vel monte observaverit; nec amplius scit, aut potest. A finite being, circumscribed within the intellectual horizon of the mundane age in which each individual lives, man can reason merely upon phenomena. Quicquid enim, wrote the immortal Newton, ex phenomenis non deducitur hypothesis vocanda est; et hypotheses vel metaphysicæ, vel physicæ, vel qualitatum occultarum seu mechanicæ, in philosophia locum non habent.

What is Philosophy? Etymologically, the "love of wisdom," and paraphrastically, the "love of knowledge;" multiform are the significations through which this sublime Greek word has travelled. From the ablest English historian (3) of its phases, we extract such paragraphs as will convey to the reader our individual perceptions of its import at this day.

"We shall find some obscurities cleared up, if we can master an accurate and comprehensive definition of Philosophy. The definition I have finally settled upon is this:"Philosophy the explanation of the Phenomena of the Universe. By the term explanation, the subject is restricted to the domain of the intellect, and is thereby demarcated from religion, though not from theology.

Philosophy is inherent in man's nature. It is not a caprice, it is not a plaything, it is a necessity; for our life is a mystery, surrounded by mysteries: we are encompassed by wonder. The myriad aspects of Nature without, the strange fluctuations of feeling within, all demand from us an explanation. Standing upon this ball of earth, so infinite to us, so trivial in the infinitude of the universe, we look forth into nature with reverent awe, with irrepressible curiosity. We must have explanations. And thus it is that Philosophy, in some rude shape, is a visible effort in every condition of man-in the rudest phase of half-developed capacity, as in the highest conditions of culture: it is found among the sugar-canes of the West Indies, and in the tangled pathless forest of America. Take man where you will-hunting the buffalo on the prairies, or immovable in meditation on the hot banks of the Ganges, priest or peasant, soldier or student, man never escapes from the pressure of the burden of that mystery which forces him to seek, and readily to accept, some explanation of it. The savage, startled by the muttering of distant thunder, asks, What is that?' and is restless till he knows, or fancies he knows. If told it is the voice of a restless demon, that is enough; the explanation is given. If he then be told that, to propitiate the demon, the sacrifice of some human being is necessary, his slave, his enemy, his friend, perhaps even his child, falls a victim to the credulous terror. The childhood of man enables us to retrace [archæologically] the infancy of nations. No one can live with children without being struck by their restless questioning, and unquenchable desire to have everything explained; no less than by the facility with which every authoritative assertion is accepted as an explanation. The History of Philosophy is the study of man's successive attempts to explain the phenomena around and within him.

"The first explanations were naturally enough drawn from analogies, afforded by consciousness. Men saw around them activity, change, force; they felt within them a mysterious power, which made them active, changing, potent: they explained what they saw, by what they felt. Hence the fetichism of barbarians, the mythologies of more advanced races. Oreads and nymphs, demons and beneficent powers, moved among the ceaseless activities of Nature. Man knows that in his anger he storms, shouts, destroys. What, then, is thunder but the anger of some invisible being? Moreover, man knows that a present will assuage his anger against an enemy, and it is but natural that he should believe the offended thunderer will also be appeased by some offering. As soon as another conception of the nature of thunder has been elaborated by observation and the study of its phenomena, the supposed Deity vanishes, and, with it, all the false conceptions it originated, till, at last, Science takes a rod, and draws the terrible lightning from the heavens, rendering it so harmless that it will not tear away a spider's web!

But long centuries of patient observation and impatient guessing, controlled by logic, were necessary, before such changes could take place. The development of Philosophy, like the development of organic life, has been through the slow additions of thousands upon thousands of years; for humanity is a growth, as our globe is, and the laws of its growth are still to be discovered. . . . One of the great fundamental laws has been discovered by Auguste Comte - viz: the law of mental Evolution . . . which he has not only discovered,

(3) G. H. LEWES: Biographical History of Philosophy; London, 1846. The substance of our remarks may be found in vol. iv. pp. 245-262, under the heading of AUGUSTE COMTE, "the Bacon of the nineteenth century," and author of Cours de Philosophie Positive. The original source of this abstract may be found in COMTE, vol. i, edit. Paris, 1830, "Exposition," pp. 3-5, 63, &c.; but we take Mr. LEWES's later definitions from The Leader; London, 1852; April 17, 24, and May 1. A profound thinker has recently done full honor to Mr. LEWES'S work. (Vide MCCULLOH: Credibility of the Scriptures; Baltimore, 1852, vol. ii. pp. 454-458.)

but applied historically. . . . This law may be thus stated: "Every branch of knowledge passes successively through three stages: 1st, the supernatural, or fictitious; 2d, the metaphysical, or abstract; 3d, the positive, or scientific. The first is the necessary point of departure taken by human intelligence; the second is merely a stage of transition from the supernatural to the positive; and the third is the fixed and definite condition in which knowledge is alone capable of progressive development.

"In the attempt made by man to explain the varied phenomena of the universe, history reveals to us," therefore, "three distinct and characteristic stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. In the first, man explains phenomena by some fanciful conception suggested in the analogies of his own consciousness; in the second, he explains phenomena by some à priori conception of inherent or superadded entities, suggested in the constancy observable in phenomena, which constancy leads him to suspect that they are not produced by any intervention on the part of an external being, but are owing to the nature of the things themselves; in the third, he explains phenomena by adhering solely to these constancies of succession and co-existence ascertained inductively, and recognized as the laws of Nature.

Consequently, "in the theological stage, Nature is regarded as the theatre whereon the arbitrary wills and momentary caprices of Superior Powers play their varying and variable parts.... In the metaphysical stage the notion of capricious divinities is replaced by that of abstract entities, whose modes of action are, however, invariable. . . . In the positive stage, the invariableness of phenomena under similar conditions is recognized as the sum total of human investigation; and, beyond the laws which regulate phenomena, it is considered idle to penetrate."

"Although every branch of knowledge must pass through these three stages, in obedience to the law of evolution, nevertheless the process is not strictly chronological. Some sciences are more rapid in their evolutions than others; some individuals pass through these evolutions more quickly than others; so also of nations. The present intellectual anarchy results from that difference; some sciences being in the positive, some in the supernatural [or theological], some in the metaphysical stage: and this is further to be subdivided into individual differences; for in a science which, on the whole, may be fairly admitted as being positive, there will be found some cultivators still in the metaphysical stage. Astronomy is now in so positive a condition, that we need nothing but the laws of dynamics and gravitation to explain all celestial phenomena; and this explanation we know to be correct, as far as anything can be known, because we can predict the return of a comet with the nicest accuracy, or can enable the mariner to discover his latitude, and find his way amidst the waste of waters.' This is a positive science. But so far is meteorology from such a condition, that prayers for dry or rainy weather are still offered up in churches; whereas if once the laws of these phenomena were traced, there would be no more prayers for rain than for the sun to rise at midnight."

We have only to reverse the order, and apply its triple classification to individuals, and in the natural arrangement of the strata, tracing backwards from the positive to the metaphysical, from the latter down to the supernatural, we shall perceive that this last, at once the oldest stage and unhappily the most common, represents the least mature, the least educated, the most antiquated, state of human intelligence. In consequence, the mere supernaturalist believes anything and everything, however impossible.

"The Metaphysician believes he can penetrate into the causes and essences of the phenomena around him; while the Positivist, recognizing his own incompetency, limits his efforts to the ascertainment of those laws which regulate the succession of these phenomena."

In the quintuple classification of those sciences into which Positive Philosophy has hitherto been successfully introduced, M. Comte (1832-40) admits only Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, and Sociology. It strikes us that, at the present day, this division is more exclusive than the progression of knowledge any longer warrants. Archæology, for instance, we claim to have arrived at its positive grade; and although its laws are by no means popularly appreciated, to have become as certain in its results as any other human science. A brief exposition of its attributes may prepare the reader for a just recognition of its utility.

Apxacos, antiquus, "ancient," and Aoyos, a "discourse," are Hellenic words-meaning, when united, in general acceptation, "discourse or treatise on the opinions, customs, and manners of the ancients." This is the definition of Archæology proposed by the sage Millin, (4),

(4) Introduction à l'étude de l'Archéologie; Paris, 1796; pp. 2, 20, 22.