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Aug. 25. Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh, notifying the bap-
tism of the infant son of the Prince of Orange; ad-
relative to the Bouillon affair . . .
LETTERS AND DESPATCHES
LORD CASTLE REAG H,
PEACE OF PARIS.
The Right Hon. N. Vansittart to Lord Castlereagh.
Downing Street, September 4, 1815. Dear Castlereagh— Your despatch No. 38, touching upon several points adverted to in my last letter, and relating entirely to financial subjects, which, though of less immediate urgency and importance than the great political questions discussed in your other recent despatches, are very necessary to be clearly understood, I shall state my doubts upon some points which appear to me to be connected with our former correspondence, or seem to require some further explanation.
1st. As to the Danish subsidy. Hoping that the signature of peace is near at hand, I do not suppose that, in point of expense, there could be any very important difference between the continued employment of the Danish troops under the terms of the treaty, and an amicable arrangement with Denmark for the immediate discontinuance of their services. But it appeared to me that their advance would be a heavy and useless charge on the north of Germany, and some expense to Denmark herself; and that to pay the subsidy, if they con
tinued in or near their own frontiers, could neither be easily justified to Parliament, nor very consistent with the general principles of our arrangement with the Allies. I doubt, indeed, whether that arrangement has yet been so distinctly settled as it ought to be, and with as little delay as possible, to prevent future misunderstandings; but I take the outline of it, as explained by you, to be this:
We are bound by the Treaty of Vienna to bring 150,000 men into the field, or to pay for any deficiency at the rate of £20 for each foot-soldier, and £30 for each horseman. Supposing we have 70,000 men in the field as our proper contingent, including British, Belgians, Hanoverians, (beyond the contingent of Hanover) and the corps in Genoa and the south of France, we shall have 80,000 men to account for, amounting, in the proportion of one horseman to four soldiers, to about £1,800,000. It was, however, understood as more generally advantageous to the common cause, that, instead of giving this sum to the greater Powers, to whom, under the letter of the Treaty, it would appear to be due, or of attempting to make up our quota by offering it to any minor Powers who might be willing to lend us the exact number of troops required, we should assist the smaller Powers to bring forward the greatest force they might be able to raise, by dividing it amongst them, at the rate of £11 28. a man, being the rate of subsidy received by the great Powers for their contingents.
If, in this manner, we distribute as large a sum as the compensation for our deficiency of force, I conceive we shall have fully executed the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna; and if, in carrying this plan into effect, we have inadvertently contracted engagements with the minor Powers to an extent exceeding the amount of our deficiency, I think we should be at liberty (as far as respects the Treaty of Vienna) to enter into arrangements with any of those minor Powers for dispensing with the service of their troops, and discontinuing the stipulated payments. An amicable arrangement of this kind was what I suggested with Denmark, on grounds both of economy and convenience, supposing, as I think I have reason to do, that, without the Danish troops, our contingent made up as above described will be over complete; and, with respect to Denmark herself, I thought such an arrangement might be more desirable than the actual employment of the troops, and had therefore spoken to the Danish Minister on the subject, to prepare his Court for such a proposition. But, as I before said, I hope the difference, in point of expense, will not be great, and I agree with you that such an arrangement could only be made with the consent of the party with whom we had contracted.
I should observe, that we have no means in this country of knowing the amount of the force we have actually furnished, (except the British) and that it is very material that you should, with the Duke of Wellington's assistance, procure the most accurate documents you can obtain on that subject, both for the information of the Government here, and as materials for any discussion with the Allies into which you may have to enter; and if there can be any doubt as to the construction of the Treaty, it should be cleared up as soon as possible.
Upon these principles, I think we loosely estimated, before you left England, the expense of the British army in Belgium at L350,000 a month, and the subsidiary troops at £150,000, making together L 500,000. The actual expense of the British army in July was above L 400,000, and is estimated for August at £250,000; and on the subject of the subsidiary force, our information is very incomplete, and I understand that some of the treaties are not even yet signed.
The question respecting the expense of the guardianship of Bonaparte is one of secondary, but not inconsiderable, importance, as we do not estimate it at less than L100,000 a-year, which, in a peace establishment, makes a very perceptible difference. Independently of its amount, Lord Liver