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Account of Mura?s Descent in Calabria.
Transmitted by Lord Exmouth.
Extrait de la Lettre remise officiellement au Général Delaunay.
Murat s'embarqua la nuit du 28 Septembre, avec 200 hommes armés et une trentaine d'officiers sur six gondoles, avec de vivres pour huit jours. Dans la nuit du 30 au 1 Octobre, une forte tempête jetta sur les côtes toute l'expédition et sépara les six barques.
Le 4, on vit sur la côte de Sorrento une barque, que l'on crut appartenir aux Barbaresques, et qui sembloit chercher ou attendre d'autres bâtimens. Le 5 il en fut signalé une autre dans le golfe de Salerne, et ensuite on vit que deux barques se réunissoient à la précédente.
Murât débarqua avec le Général Franceschetti, un Colonel, et 50 hommes armés à Pizzo, sur la côte de Calabre, non loin de Monte Leone et environ à 40 lieues de Naples. Il laissa 40 hommes et quelques officiers sur les deux autres barques, leur donnant l'ordre de côtoyer la Calabre.
A peine débarqué, il se porta sur la grande place, réunit le peuple, et lui ordonna de crier Vive le Roi Joachim! lui disant qu'il étoit le Roi, et qu'il venait prendre possession de ses états. Il n'y avoit pas de troupes sur ce point; il y eut un mouvement d'incertitude; mais les villageois et autres braves gens des lieux voisins, ayant eu connoissance du débarquement de Murat, s'armèrent et vinrent l'attaquer. Après une longue et opiniâtre résistance, le parti de Murat fut défait; lui-même fut pris, mis aux fers et conduit au Général Nunziante, Commandant de la Calabre. Au départ du Courrier, la plus parfaite tranquillité régnoit dans cette province.
Le 10, une division de barques cannoniers prit les deux autres barques qui courroient la côte. Les patrons de ces gondoles, ainsi que les officiers, déclarent que Murat, en partant, leur avoit dit à Ajacuio, qu'il voulait aller à Tunis; mais
qu'arrivé a la hauteur du Cap Carbonara, il leur fit ordonner de faire voile vers la Calabre.
Au Consulat des Deux Siciles, a Livourne, le 18 8bre, 1815.
Received this moment from Toulon—Noon.
Exmouth. Bovne, Marseilles, 24th October, 1815.
Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.
St. Petersburgh, December 28-16, 1815.
My dear Lord—I have little to trouble your lordship with by this conveyance, in addition to my despatches. I must, however, beg leave to remind your lordship of the disadvantages under which all manner of correspondence is placed at this Court, where every letter is opened and read, with no other distinction than in the degree of care in the making them up for delivery or transmission after perusal. Everything sent through the Russian office, even by individuals, if in the service, is liable to the same scrutiny, whether forwarded from London or from hence. In the summer months, there are more frequent opportunities by ships and by travellers; but, during the winter, I cannot help urging the expediency of establishing a regular communication by messengers between St. Petersburgh and Berlin, or through Berlin to Hamburgh.
For ordinary transmission of business intelligence and documents, the periodical departure of a messenger from each of the Courts of St. Petersburgh and Berlin respectively, once a fortnight or once in three weeks, might suffice. But that arrangement would require the stationing another messenger at each Court, for extraordinary communications, which would amount to an appropriation of the services of four messengers during the winter, to the correspondence between the Foreign Office and the Courts of Berlin and St. Petersburgh.
We received yesterday, through Berlin, the account of the condemnation and execution of Ney. I most sincerely congratulate you, my dear lord, upon the treaty. I wait with impatience for the messenger you were so good as to promise me, with the copies of papers relating to that business, and such instructions in regard to the relations with France for my guidance, and for language on any part of them, as your lordship may deem necessary.
I fancy a more complicated or laborious task never presented itself to any sovereign than that now before the Emperor, of examining into the management of all the old and new provinces of this Empire and the administration of its resources. Some irregularities, to a serious amount, have, it is said, been discovered in Volhynia, and have occasioned charges of a criminal nature against the Governor, which are to be examined by a special commission. The energy with which this matter has been taken up is thought to forebode very strict investigation in other quarters.
I at present augur favourably of the Persian business; that is, as far as is recommended in the memorandum enclosed in your lordship's No. 3. But, as I have no instructions to make any communication as to the fruits of Mr. Ellis's mission, I have said nothing either of Sir Gore Ouseley's engagement, or of any other arrangement that may have been made between the Courts of London and Tehran. I have already begun to urge the expediency of clearly defining the frontier; and, as this was not objected to, I trust there will be no difficulty in regard to the employment of Captain Monteith, of the Honourable India Company's service, who has been detained for that purpose by Mr. Morier. The Emperor assured me that the frontier, being once defined, will not be violated by the Russians.
The line of demarcation of the status ad prwsentem of the territory of Talish, which had been occupied by both armies, was undefined at the period of the signature of the preliminary treaty, and was to be regulated by Commissioners, as provided in the 2nd Article; and it is in this quarter only that tbe encroachments noticed by Lord Walpole are stated to have occurred. The difficulty of dividing this territory is one of the arguments used by Mirza for the restitution of the whole to Persia.
I have the honour to remain, &c, Cathcart.
Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Rose.
Blickling, December 28,1815.
My dear Sir—I take advantage of a bad day to spare the pheasants and to send you a despatch, which I shall probably make circular to all our missions.
I perceive in more than one quarter a tendency to alarm as to the designs of particular Powers, but especially of Russia, for which I have no reason to suppose there is the smallest foundation, but of the prudence of which I should equally doubt, were I apprehensive (which I am not) that the Emperor of Russia, after making such stupendous sacrifices for a peace, which in its provisions has met his cordial concurrence, was stupid enough to meditate new convulsions to pull his own work to pieces. His language, his engagements, and his proceedings, as far as they are known to me, are in direct opposition to such a conclusion; and it must be my duty to discourage a line of conduct, which, although unauthorized, may produce distrust and alienation between two Courts, whose counsels being in unison is perhaps more essential than any other circumstance that can be stated to the preservation of that state of relations in Europe, which is best calculated to preclude any serious interruption of peace.
When I thus express myself with respect to the views of Russia, or indeed of any Court, I must be understood as not indulging that species of blind confidence which does not belong to the politics of any foreign State; but I wish to guard our missions abroad against the danger of accelerating, if not producing, a conflict for influence between the two States. The existing state of European relations may possibly not endure beyond the danger which originally gave them birth, and which has recently confirmed them; but it is our duty, as well as interest, to retard, if we cannot avert, the return of a more contentious order of things: and our insular situation places us sufficiently out of the reach of danger to admit of our pursuing a more generous and confiding policy.
In the present state of Europe, it is the province of Great Britain to turn the confidence she has inspired to the account of peace, by exercising a conciliatory influence between the Powers, rather than put herself at the head of any combinations of Courts to keep others in check. The necessity for such a system of connexion may recur, but this necessity should be no longer problematical when it is acted upon. The immediate object to be kept in view is to inspire the States of Europe, as long as we can, with a sense of the dangers which they have surmounted by their union, of the hazards they will incur by a relaxation of vigilance, to make them feel that the existing concert is their only perfect security against the revolutionary embers more or less existing in every State of Europe; and that their true wisdom is to keep down the petty contentions of ordinary times, and to stand together in support of the established principles of social order.
I have every reason to hope that the advantage of this course of policy is justly appreciated by the Allied Cabinets. The negociations at Paris were terminated with the utmost cordiality—whatever differences of opinion had existed either at Vienna, or in the early stage of our discussions at Paris, had ceased to disturb the general harmony; and there appeared