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Sa Majesty l'Enipereur penétre de la convenance comme de la justice des principes mis en avant pour les arrangemens proposé dans la Note de son Excellence le Vicomte de Castlereagh a enjoint au soussigne d'y adhérer pleinement et sans restriction quelconque. En manifestant des vues aussi conciliatoires, Sa Majesté Imperiale espere que les suffrages de ses augustes Allies se rallieront au systeme appuyé de l'assentiment du Gouvernement Britannique. Dans cette persuasion l'Empereur desire que les Plenipotentiaires respectits s'appliquent a donner a la negociation un développement final dans le plus court delai possible, et dans les formes les plus propres a obtenir ce but, sans que la confection d'un acte définitif puisse exiger des discussions ulterieures.
Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.
Paris, September 11, 1815.
My dear Lord—In addition to what I have stated in my despatch and note on the subject of the works in the Louvre, I think it right to mention that Mr. Hamilton, who is intimate with Canova, the celebrated artist, expressly sent here by the Pope, with a letter to the King, to reclaim what was taken from Rome, distinctly ascertained from him that the Pope, if successful, neither could nor would, as Pope, sell any of the chefs-d"aslivres that belonged to the See, and in which he has, in fact, only a life interest.
The French, when they plundered the Vatican, ignorantly brought away some works of little or no value. These Canova has authority either to cede to the King, or to sell, to facilitate the return of the more valuable objects; but it is quite clear that no sum of money could secure to the Prince Regent any of the distinguished works from his Holiness's collection. The other claimants would be still less likely to sell. In taking, therefore, the disinterested line, we have, in fact, made no real sacrifice, whilst we shall escape odium and misrepresentation; and if, through the weight of the Prince Regent's interference,
the Pope should ultimately recover his property, his Royal Highness would probably feel it more consistent with his munificence to give this old man a small sum out of the French contribution, to carry home his gallery, than to see him exposed to the reproach of selling the refuse, without any strict right to do so, in order to replace what is really valuable in the Vatican.
I cannot yet judge what turn this business will take. Russia wishes for a composition between the King and the claimants; but, as you will see by Count Nesselrode's note, will not insist upon it, but will rather insist, as far as a protest goes, against any force being used. This is a little too late, after having patiently witnessed their particular Allies, the Prussians, remove by force not only all the works of art taken away from the Prussian dominions, but those plundered from Cologne and other towns on the left bank of the Rhine—possessions which have since been acquired by Prussia. The Prussians have also assisted the Grand Dukes of Hesse, Mecklenburg, and others of the minor Powers in the north of Germany, to recover in like manner what belonged to them. This proceeding of the Prussians makes it almost indispensable for the King of the Netherlands to replace in the churches of Belgium the pictures of which they were despoiled. His Majesty, I believe, feels this so strongly, that he would rather sacrifice his own family collection, now in the Louvre, than fail in this act of political duty to his new subjects, who, devoted to their religion, would receive such a mark of favour from their Protestant sovereign with sentiments of peculiar gratitude.
I cannot see, therefore, the possibility of the Duke of Wellington, as the military commander of the troops of the King, doing otherwise than giving his aid to remove by force, if necessary, these objects; and it becomes Great Britain not less to see the same measures of justice distributed to her immediate ally, as that which has been obtained by the adjacent States. The protection of the Pope and the other Italian princes more immediately belongs to the Emperor of Austria; aud, though his Imperial Majesty is alive to the subject, I think he will be very reluctant to use force; and yet without force I do not believe the thing can be done, as the King, whatever he may feel of remorse as to the mode in which these works came into his possession, will be very reluctant by any act of cession, or even of composition, on his part, to take upon himself any of the responsibility of their removal from Paris.
Lord Walpole to Lord Castlereagh.
St. Petersburgh, September 11, 1815.
My dear Lord—I have letters from Dr. Campbell of the 29th of June, from Tabriz: he assures me that, whatever are the feelings of Abbas Mirza in regard to the change operated in our relations with Persia, he will in no way disturb the peace with this country. I am well informed that the Russians are daily advancing further into the Persian territory bordering upon the Caspian, notwithstanding the peace lately ratified.
Baba Pacha, appointed Seraskier of Erzerom, had been on the point of breaking with Persia; but an officer arrived within these few days at Teflis has brought the information that he is preparing to attack the Russians, unless Imeritia is restored to the Porte, according to the article in the Treaty of Peace between this country and Turkey, by which it was to have been given back to the latter.
I have nothing further to write you from this place. The Emperor has not yet mentioned any period for his return, and the delay has occasioned a more profound impression than I have ever before observed. The Empress has publicly announced (as a secret) the intended marriage of the GrandDuchess Anne and the Prince of Orange.
Sir Daniel Bayley arrived here a few days ago, but has brought me no letters. Pray have the goodness to write me a line by the post from Paris, to say when Lord Cathcart will return to St. Petersburgh.
Your obedient, faithful servant, Walpole.
Lord CastUreagh to Lord Liverpool.
Paris, September 14, 1815.
Dear Liverpool—I forward by the present courier a private letter relative to the Louvre, which ought to have gone with my despatch on the same subject sent on Sunday. I also send you a letter I have just received from Arbuthnot, with his note accompanying it. You are acquainted with his correspondent: his remarks in this, as in many of his former communications, appear to me deserving of attention; and you will observe his impression of the state of parties in France agrees pretty nearly with those I sent you a few days since. His opinion coincides with mine, that the King, by firmness, keeping the Royalists back, and a direct policy, may create out of the men whom the Revolution has bred a party capable of governing; but that, out of the Court party and the highflying Royalists, he can extract nothing at the present conjuncture but weakness and confusion.
There seems no doubt that an excellent spirit of loyalty will prevail in the new representation. If this could be moderated instead of goaded by the Court, the Ministers would be strong enough for every exertion, and they could hardly venture to fall short of their duty. Thus supported and watched, the Bonapartists and the Jacobins would sink into insignificance; but I am afraid the game will be otherwise played. The Court, that is Monsieur and the Duchesse d'Angouleme, will probably excite the Royalist members to run, first at Fouche, as the more odious object, and next at the Government generally. In both these efforts they will be assisted by the Jacobins, who wish nothing so much as to see the Royalists committed in the Government, which will soon concentrate all the weight of the Revolution against the Court, and thus render their chance of overturning the Bourbons infinitely greater, or at least of setting aside this branch of the family.
In fact, they appear to me to be creating an Orleans party, which, with a little more management, would soon die away, as the Duke has no great following from personal consideration; he is only looked to as a resource against the known or supposed views of other branches of the family.
As I stated in a former letter, I look with the more alarm to this state of things, because I am convinced it will lead to internal disturbance and a desultory warfare, which will soon turn to the disadvantage of the royal cause, unless the Allied troops are brought forward; and, although one of the great objects of a strong army on the side of Flanders undoubtedly is to support the King, in the event of a new convulsion, yet it is another thing, by intemperate management on the part of the Court, to be mixed in the police of the country. The force that would be amply adequate to the first object, as well as to cover Europe from attack, would dwindle to nothing, if spread over the interior of France.
I am, &c, Castlereagh.
Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.
Fife House, September 15, 1815.
My dear Castlereagh—I can assure you that I am fully sensible of the injurious effect which must result from the general line on present politics taken by our daily papers, and particularly by those which are supposed to be Government papers. You know, however, full well that there are papers, which are vulgarly called Government papers, in consequence of the support which they give to the Government rather than to the Opposition of the day: there are no papers over which we have any authority, or even any influence on which we can depend.
It is supposed by many at home, and, I have no doubt,