explain to Mr. Adams, in a conference held with that gentleman previously to the above communication to the foreign Ministers, the necessity which the present circumstances of the world had imposed on this country of so rigorous a proceeding against the navigation of foreigners to and from that island. Mr. Adams, although lamenting the measure, seemed to look upon it as of little consequence, as far as his Government was concerned. It was, therefore, not without considerable surprise that the Note, of which the enclosed is a copy, was received by this Government, in reply to the Circular addressed to Mr. Adams.

Although it is not presumed that the American Government will on this occasion assume the tone of their Minister here, inasmuch as the Treaty in its present state is not binding on them, it may not be premature to remind you, should they, contrary to expectation, refuse to exchange the ratifications on the plea of our not fulfilling our engagements, that the American Government itself has, in more than one instance, furnished a precedent for a similar proceeding in the interval between the signature and the ratification of former treaties concluded by the plenipotentiaries of the two Govern

ments.

It may also not be immaterial to add, that the intercourse with St. Helena must be comparatively of little importance, so long as the Cape of Good Hope is open; and that, in the negociation which took place for the Commercial Treaty, the intercourse with India was liberally conceded to the United States, without any equivalent whatever.

I am, &c.,

Lord Bathurst to Mr. Baker.

BATHURST.

Foreign Office, September 7, 1815.

Sir-Your several despatches, to No. 25 inclusive, have been received, and laid before the Prince Regent. The necessity of immediately despatching this messenger with my

preceding numbers prevents my replying to the various topics which your more recent communications embrace. I shall, therefore, confine myself to convey to you the sentiments of his Majesty's Government on the one requiring the most immediate explanation with the Government of the United States, namely, the Fisheries, premising the instructions I have to give you on the subject with informing you that the line which you have taken in the discussion on that point, as explained in your No. 24, has met with the approbation of his Majesty's Government.

You will take an early opportunity of assuring Mr. Monroe that as, on the one hand, the British Government cannot acknowledge the right of the United States to use the British territory for purposes connected with the Fishery; and that the fishing-vessels will be excluded from the bays, harbours, rivers, creeks, and inlets, of all his Majesty's possessions—so, on the other hand, the British Government does not pretend to interfere in the Fishery in which the subjects of the United States may be engaged, either on the grand Bank of Newfoundland, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, or other places in the sea, without the jurisdiction of the maritime league from the coasts under the dominion of Great Britain.

Upon these principles, therefore, the case against which the American Government has remonstrated, if well founded, was not authorized by his Majesty's Government.

Note.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

[Addressed apparently by Count Nesselrode to Lord Castlereagh.] Paris, le 7 Septembre, 1815.

La Note remise le 3 Septembre à la Conférence des quatre Cabinets par son Excellence Monsieur le Vicomte de Castlereagh a été portée à la connoissance de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies. Sa Majesté Impériale y a vu avec la plus vive satisfaction, que Son Altesse Royale le Prince Regent

partage les opinions que Sa Majesté a fait connoître à ses augustes Alliés relativement aux principes qu'il semble juste d'adopter, tant pour pacifier la France que pour assurer le repos de l'Europe entière. Le double résultat ne sauroit être atteint qu'en conservant dans les negociations actuelles la même pureté d'intention, le même désintéressement, le même esprit de moderation, qui ont constitué jusqu'ici la force irrésistible de la ligue Européenne, et qui ont si puissamment contribue à ses

succès.

Le maintien de cet accord, qui identifie les intérêts politiques des grandes puissances à un intérêt général, est trop nécessaire, dans les circonstances actuelles, à l'affermissement de l'independance des nations et à leur bonheur véritable, pour que sa Majesté ne le préfère à toute autre combinaison tendante à favoriser dans des dimensions retrécies des intérêts particuliers et momentanés.

C'est conformément à ces principes et dans la conviction la plus intime que tout système de pacification avec la France, fondé sur de bases différentes ne sauroit être adopté par les Souverains alliés sans en courir une résponsabilité trop grave aux yeux de l'Europe et de la postérite, que l'Empereur a jugé convenable de se prononcer irrévocablement pour le système des garanties temporaires.

Sa Majesté Impériale est d'autant plus portée à considérer les principes de négociation inhérens à ce système comme les seuls qu'on puisse suivre avec l'espoir d'un prompt succès, et d'une utilité réelle, qu'ils ne semblent point exclure les modifications les plus propres à satisfaire toutes les convenances à l'égard des Puissances alliées.

La Note Britannique annonce suffisamment la possibilité de quelques arrangemens territoriaux compatibles avec le système des garanties temporaires, et indique également d'après des proportions équitables les avantages pécuniaires qui doivent être reservés à la Prusse en raison des sacrifices majeurs que cette Puissance a portée au bien général.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur pénétré de la convenance comme de la justice des principes mis en avant pour les arrangemens proposé dans la Note de son Excellence le Vicomte de Castlereagh a enjoint au soussigné d'y adhérer pleinement et sans restriction quelconque. En manifestant des vues aussi conciliatoires, Sa Majesté Impériale espère que les suffrages de ses augustes Alliés se rallieront au système appuyé de l'assentiment du Gouvernement Britannique. Dans cette persuasion l'Empereur désire que les Plénipotentiaires respectifs s'appliquent à donner à la négociation un développement final dans le plus court delai possible, et dans les formes les plus propres à obtenir ce but, sans que la confection d'un acte définitif puisse exiger des discussions ultérieures.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, September 11, 1815.

My dear Lord-In addition to what I have stated in my despatch and note on the subject of the works in the Louvre, I think it right to mention that Mr. Hamilton, who is intimate with Canova, the celebrated artist, expressly sent here by the Pope, with a letter to the King, to reclaim what was taken from Rome, distinctly ascertained from him that the Pope, if successful, neither could nor would, as Pope, sell any of the chefs-d'œuvres that belonged to the See, and in which he has, in fact, only a life interest.

The French, when they plundered the Vatican, ignorantly brought away some works of little or no value. These Canova has authority either to cede to the King, or to sell, to facilitate the return of the more valuable objects; but it is quite clear that no sum of money could secure to the Prince Regent any of the distinguished works from his Holiness's collection. The other claimants would be still less likely to sell. In taking, therefore, the disinterested line, we have, in fact, made no real sacrifice, whilst we shall escape odium and misrepresentation; and if, through the weight of the Prince Regent's interference,

the Pope should ultimately recover his property, his Royal Highness would probably feel it more consistent with his munificence to give this old man a small sum out of the French contribution, to carry home his gallery, than to see him exposed to the reproach of selling the refuse, without any strict right to do so, in order to replace what is really valuable in the Vatican.

I cannot yet judge what turn this business will take. Russia wishes for a composition between the King and the claimants; but, as you will see by Count Nesselrode's note, will not insist upon it, but will rather insist, as far as a protest goes, against any force being used. This is a little too late, after having patiently witnessed their particular Allies, the Prussians, remove by force not only all the works of art taken away from the Prussian dominions, but those plundered from Cologne and other towns on the left bank of the Rhine-possessions which have since been acquired by Prussia. The Prussians have also assisted the Grand Dukes of Hesse, Mecklenburg, and others of the minor Powers in the north of Germany, to recover in like manner what belonged to them. This proceeding of the Prussians makes it almost indispensable for the King of the Netherlands to replace in the churches of Belgium the pictures of which they were despoiled. His Majesty, I believe, feels this so strongly, that he would rather sacrifice his own family collection, now in the Louvre, than fail in this act of political duty to his new subjects, who, devoted to their religion, would receive such a mark of favour from their Protestant sovereign with sentiments of peculiar gratitude.

I cannot see, therefore, the possibility of the Duke of Wellington, as the military commander of the troops of the King, doing otherwise than giving his aid to remove by force, if necessary, these objects; and it becomes Great Britain not less to see the same measures of justice distributed to her immediate ally, as that which has been obtained by the adjacent States. The protection of the Pope and the other Italian