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renounces the principle of contiguity—a renunciation which is, under no supposition whatever, to be found in Rechberg's note. The most that can be collected from thence is that the King will consent to break into his arrondissement, if you will make it worth his while; but he by no means allows that he is to be tempted even by considerable advantages, unless the territory which is to be taken in exchange shall be contiguous.
I am sure Metternich could never have mistaken the language of this note; but it suited his purpose to appear to do so; and, being such a petty affair, everybody else trusted him, upon his word. This difference, however, between the words contiguiteand arrondissement appears to me essential to a clear understanding of the case; and, if we debate the matter, will probably be put forward; therefore, pray attend to it carefully. Rechberg has never been disavowed, nor considered himself so. Montgelas said, in an interview with M. de Wacquant, that, if M. de Rechberg had renounced the principle of contiguity, he had exceeded his powers. They understand one another well, and play their game well: nobody here is a match for them. Rechberg, so far from being dissatisfied, is, in his calm way, more violent against the exchanges than anybody here. He appears to work most cordially with Montgelas, and to have almost equal influence with him in the affair.
As to the idea that the mutual exchange of Tableaux constitutes an admission of the principle, this appears to me a field for a sort of argument which never leads to anything; but I perfectly agree with you as to the want of dexterity which it has shown in Wacquant, and the advantage it has given to Bavaria. In whatever manner the negociation had been conducted, the reply of Bavaria would probably have been the same; nor do I see that any line which Wacquant could have adopted would have thrown much odium upon her. It is impossible to make the reproach of avidity to a Power who says merely—" Leave me what I have, and what you have repeatedly guaranteed to me, if you cannot give what you promised in exchange for it."
As to the odium of resisting the wishes of all Europe, the answer of M. de Montgelas will be that of everybody else— "Ce raisonnement est excellent pour les quatre Puissances, mais nullement applicable a la Bavière, ni fait pour etre adopte* par elle, dont tous les interets sont froisses par ce que les Puissances en demandent." She may yield to their power, but her attention to their wishes must depend upon the justice and the reason of them; and does it sound unreasonable that, if she renounces the advantages of a perfect arrondissement— if, besides this, she waives the right of contiguity—she should demand, not a bare equivalent, but some further advantages, to counterbalance those which she resigns? Or even suppose that she mistakes her real interest, the loss she thereby sustains is her own work and at the same time her punishment: but, to obtain possession of that which she has the right and the desire to preserve, there are but two ways—purchase, or force: persuasion goes for nothing en pareil cas, and you must not expect it to have the slightest weight here.
If Wacquant had chosen to go away, according to your view, you may depend upon it that this Court would have let him do so; nor can I think that this would have advanced the chances of an accommodation; neither can I agree with you in the principle that, he having chosen to wait and to ask for instructions, the mediators have nothing else to do but to wait also. I have always thought that he would have done better to ask for our interference much earlier, in order to establish the principle of the negociation; but, having neglected this, I am sure he could not, according to his instructions, have left Munich without claiming it, when his own endeavours had proved fruitless: and, as our intervention is in no document made to depend upon the previous renunciation of the principle of contiguity; as the Protocol of the 3rd, and your instructions of the 5th, which are in fact also mine, are both anterior to M. de Rechberg,s note of the 11th; I do not see how it was possible for the Ministers of the three Powers to have refused it when demanded; and I cannot help hoping that it may lead to the establishment of a clear basis of negociation, though I still foresee infinite difficulty in the details.
I shall be cautious how I put forward the former exchanges as having afforded advantages to Bavaria, which ought now to be taken into the scale. Wacquant allows that he was completely beat upon this point by the production of the Articles signed in June last at Vienna. I have never seen the original stipulations upon the subject between Austria and Bavaria. Can you send them to me?—for, till then, I must own that the sanction given by the Articles of the Congress appears to me to stamp the transaction as complete between the two Powers, as confirmed by the rest of Europe, and not liable to re-examination. The bargain may have been a most improvident one for Austria; but is this a reason for giving to all the acts of Congress such a character of uncertainty as this would throw upon them? No human foresight can anticipate at what period it may suit the interests of other Powers to reexamine other acts, and the principle, once established, can no more be recalled.
As to the comparative value of the exchanges proposed, I have not so decided an opinion as you: they are both thieves, though Bavaria is the greatest thief of the two. Montgelas assures me that he is willing to submit his proofs to examination, and says that a better administration has increased the revenues of the provinces demanded by Austria since the Bavarian Government has possessed them. Wacquant answers that, if they administer so well, they may go and do the same in the countries which are offered to them. These, however, are the difficulties which it is not yet worth while to think of.
I suspect that you are not much amused at Frankfort, and eager to quit it. Our feelings are similar; but this negociation will last some time yet, depend upon it.
Adieu, &c F. Lamb.
Mr. G. H. Mose to Lord Caetlereagh.
Berlin, January 20, 1816.
My dear Lord—Both your private letter to me of the 28th ult. and its copy reached me by Mr. L. Casamajor: you would probably wish to have the latter, and I return it. Your instructions in it, and your despatch No. 1, shall be acted upon, not only scrupulously but most cheerfully, and this I earnestly request you to believe. I fear you will think I make a sacrifice of views and opinions in so doing; but there does not exist the demerit of views repugnant to yours, which it would be in any degree a merit to sacrifice by an obedience I am bound implicitly to yield.
At the time when I informed you of the opinions generally entertained at Munich and here, in the autumn and the beginning of winter, as to the views of Russia upon Turkey, I did it reluctantly, aware of the danger I ran in transmitting it to you, who had very superior means indeed of judging the character of the policy of the Emperor, whilst the tone and character of the negociations at Paris, and their progress, could be scarcely known to me; but, without forming any determinate opinion of my own, I thought I had best fulfilled my duty in apprizing you of what I heard on every side, and unsolicited by me. The mistrust the Emperor Alexander inspired arose much, I believe, from temporary and local circumstances, and much from reasonings as to what his conduct would be by analogy from the past. The unanimity of the opinions determined me to transmit them; they were offered on every side, and I never had to seek them. I lived in friendship and confidence with the Russian Envoy at Munich —here, particular circumstances will render it more difficult to me to do so: I am an old friend of the elder Alopeus, formerly Russian Envoy here, and once in England. He, too, is an old friend, and a very valued one, of Prince Hardenberg: he resides here, and it would be a great and natural object to him to be again Russian Envoy, which, too, would be very grateful to Prince Hardenberg; but his younger brother is the actual Envoy here, and he is certainly neither well with Prince Hardenberg nor with his brother. His brother's friendship with the Prince, and his being employed by the Emperor in some minor negociations, displease him, and inspire him with no brotherly feelings.
Him I am doing all I fairly can to conciliate, but he is not of a disposition which renders it easy, and his brother's regard for me is to my disadvantage with him; but I have the thing at heart so much as to have gone out of my way twice in the last three days to mark attention to him. He is harsh, rough, and mistrustful, and his mind is soured by disappointment at not being removed from this Court, and annoyed by the ill state of health of his wife, who is mqst anxious to go to a climate that is, she thinks, more favourable to it. Such being the case, I have not thought it prudent to make to him advances so marked, in communicating with him on public affairs, as might lead him, minded as he is, to mistrust; but 1 am endeavouring to give to his mind a generally friendly impression. I fairly state thus what I have not attained, what you would naturally wish me to attain, but which I have reason to think can be attained by no man—his confidence: but I trust he has not imbibed, nor will imbibe, any unfavourable impression as to my views or feelings towards himself.
I am living on the most satisfactory footing with my other colleagues, and I hope to be able to improve it. I have always had a strong opinion of the mischief done by foreign Ministers meddling and intriguing; I have always, too, applied it peculiarly to British foreign Ministers, and it appears to me more true than'ever in our present situation towards the rest of the