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having chosen to wait for instructions, the mediators having nothing else to do but to wait also," I was perfectly aware that you might be called upon, as you have been, for a joint interference, and which there was certainly no reason to refuse; but, after the full effect, whatever it might be, of the interference of other Powers had been already obtained from the communication of the Protocol of the 3rd of November, I really deemed its repetition, thus late especially, nothing, and the result has proved it; nevertheless, I perfectly agree with you, and for your reasons, that the joint representation, if requisite at Munich, ought to have been made at the very outset. If, as you seem, though rather distantly, to hope, it shall still have the result of recalling Bavaria to the only practicable basis of negociation, it will have done much, and I shall have great pleasure in making amende honorable.
I know not why General Wacquant should allow himself to be beat upon placing in the balance of indemnity the comparison between Wiirsburg and Aschaffenburg and the Tyrol. The bargain was an entire one by the Treaty of Ried, and the conveyance of these exchanges a part execution of it; and without at all shaking the Treaty of Congress, the comparative value of these exchanges may fairly be urged and relied upon in endeavours to perfect the original agreement. I have reason to think that this is not only mine, but Lord Castlereagh's opinion, because, in his despatch to me, acquainting me with your instructions, he not only compares the relative value of the exchanges remaining to be effected, but those already made.
There are no other stipulations that I know of than those contained in the enclosed treaties and the Articles in the Act of Congress—the latter conveying Wiirzburg and Aschaffenburg to Bavaria, and the Tyrol to Austria.
It is unnecessary at this time, or till we shall be sufficiently advanced for the consideration of details, to enter into any examination of the comparative value of the Tableaux. I VOL. XI. M
shall therefore only remark on this subject that, if M. de Montgelas would have looked into the heading of the Tableaux contained in the Note of the 11th instant, he would have found an answer to some of his observations therein contained. Though M. de Beauharnois has doubtless a claim, arising out of the Treaty of Fontainebleau, the proceedings at Vienna, and latterly, under the Protocol of the 21st November last, to an etablissement, I know of none he can form to a sovereignty, and consequently of none which can give him a title to the relinquishment of one over 50,000 persons. The Protocol above referred to excludes, in fact, all idea of sovereignty: he cannot, therefore, transfer to Bavaria a claim to that which does not belong to him. His prospects of an etablissement he may transfer, for they are his; and we, though no parties to an Act, said to have been framed by the other Powers at Vienna upon this point, are bound by the Paris Protocol to forward the object of an etablissement for him, and to act as mediators in obtaining this in a negociation, with the view agreed to be commenced by the other three Powers with the Court of Naples.
Adieu! I have written enough, and am always heartily tired of a subject that does not advance.
Yours, my dear Lamb, very sincerely,
Extract of a Despatch from Lord CasUereagh to Lord
Foreign Office, January 29, 1816. Your despatches of the 12th instant from Milan have been received and laid before the Prince Regent. His Royal Highness has commanded me to express to you his approbation of the judgment and discretion with which your lordship has remarked upon the views of Austria, both on the side of Turkey and of Bavaria, and also of the temperate mode in which you have endeavoured to correct erroneous alarms as to the designs of Russia; a line of policy the importance of which has been fully laid down in the instructions already transmitted, but which your own discernment had led you to anticipate.
After fully conversing with the Austrian Ambassador on the affairs of Turkey, I have addressed an instruction to Mr. Frere, the British Minister at Constantinople. I send it under flying seal, in order that you may confer with Prince Metternich upon it.
I shall again instruct Mr. Lamb to support the Austrian negociation at Munich, by every means short of the measure of war: to such a proceeding the British Government cannot be a party, because in their judgment Bavaria was left by the Treaty of Ried a free agent to accept or refuse the proposed exchange.
It is my opinion that the Bavarian negociation has been discreditably conducted; and that, were she even to succeed in defeating the exchange, contrary to the wishes of the great Powers of Europe, she would have acted upon the whole unwisely, in keeping alive a point of controversy with her natural ally. There is one facility which exists at present, which might be considered as having lapsed if delayed; namely, the right of requiring Baden to submit to some modification of territory, with a view to the settlement of this part of Germany.
I certainly should regret that it had been found necessary to complicate this question by imposing sacrifices upon a third Power, and should be extremely desirous that the arrangement could be managed upon the principle of exchange between Austria and Bavaria; but I consider that, according to the state of the treaties existing with the respective Powers, it is more competent, in good faith, for the Allies to impose some sacrifice of territory upon Baden, with a view to secure the free consent of Bavaria, than it is to farce the latter to submit to what the mediating Powers may deem a fair equivalent.
I think, however, after the part Baden has taken with the Allies, that the demand on her for cessions ought to be framed upon a very moderate scale, and, as far as possible, limited to some district, from its position calculated to approximate, if not to connect, the Bavarian territories on opposite sides of the Rhine.
Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.
Foreign Office, January 31, 1816.
My dear Clancarty—To you a private letter will be more acceptable than an instruction, because I can state in it without reserve the colour of my opinion, without embarrassing the progress of the negociations. This will be more conveniently done by sending you a copy of my last despatches to Lord Stewart, together with the short despatch I now address to Mr. Lamb.
With respect to Prince Eugene's claims, I send you my correspondence with Mr. a Court. I agree with you that the stipulation to Prince Eugene is un etablissement convenable, and not a sovereignty. I object to any territorial concession in Italy; but I think the character of the Alliance is interested in something being done for him. Perhaps it is too much to throw the whole on Naples. My motive is that he should have a round sum, suppose ,£>200,000, to provide a suitable residence for him near Munich, which, together with his estates in Italy restored to him by the Emperor, and valued at i?35,000 or i?40,000 a-year, would make him "un tree grand Seigneur." Half of this sum might be charged on Naples, as having spent little on the war; the other half on the other Powers, in the ratio of the French contributions, or, in other words, should be defrayed out of the Caisse Fran^aise. The charge would scarcely be felt; and as the Treaty of Fontainebleau, whether wise or unwise, was made with a view to a supposed general interest, it seems not unreasonable out of a general fund to rid Naples of this incumbrance which the negociations at Vienna threw upon her, but against which the Austrian treaty of guarantee has furnished her with a tolerable defence.
I have, &c, Castlereagh.
Mr. J. James to Lord Castlereagh.
The Hague, February 10, 1816.
My dear Lord—I think it right to place before you in a private letter, and in a stronger light than it may be proper to do in a public despatch, the manner in which this Government conducts its interior affairs, which, I am sorry to say, are not in the state of harmony that those who wish to see these countries united on the basis of a good understanding could desire.
The King, with very liberal ideas, has given his kingdom a Constitution that does not invest him or his Government with the requisite degree of strength. By allowing his Ministers no share of responsibility, he has placed his own popularity on a tottering foundation, without rendering them less liable to censure; and by the manner in which the Provincial States are to be organized, he will remain without power of controlling the Second Chamber, which he has reserved to himself no right of dissolving. In the First Chamber, where the members are appointed for life, and whose numbers are limited to sixty, a faction of thirty-one individuals are able to counteract the measures of Government; and the disposition which the members actually composing it have on some occasions evinced, gives reason to suppose that such a crisis may not unfrequently occur.
Without discussing the wisdom of such a Constitution for countries, the contrast of whose interests and feelings affords the prospect of a troublesome reign, we are already enabled to judge of its consequences. The King finds himself in the necessity of imposing nine millions sterling of taxes upon five