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Bavaria in her opposition. Montgelas' note, previous to his changing his tone and striking his colours, was extremely unwise and injudicious. When the Prince Royal came here, there was a great deal of diplomatic trick on all sides; but I think he left this in good humour, and with a determination to urge matters to a close, if Baden was obliged to yield what was suggested by the same phalanx of pressure that was in array against Bavaria.
I am well aware of the strict justice of much of your reasoning in your letter of the 3rd; but it has appeared to me that there are only three modes of settling this question—
1st. For Austria to recede. To this I answer—The Emperor is too far committed: his subjects, his army, would not permit him, and his Minister dare not advise him.
2nd. For Bavaria to yield, being satisfied with the indemnities in the Tableau, and giving up entirely the principle of contiguity. This, I say, nothing but force would accomplish or persuade her to.
3rd. For Baden to make a sacrifice, with a view to secure the free consent of Bavaria: this to be limited to a district, and embracing the desirable object of approximation. To this there is surely less objection than to the other two modes. If the four Allied Courts can press measures upon Bavaria, à fortiori they may urge certain cessions from Baden. What Power has not made sacrifices for the general peace we now enjoy? and I am strongly of opinion those miserable Princes of the old Confederation of the Rhine require a little discipline, and it will do them much good to be kept in order by their superiors. The conduct of Mr. Berkheim and his notes are really ridiculous and too impertinent.
The long instruction to Baron Wessenberg has been communicated to me, and sent to England. It is a correct state of the case, as far as I know. Prince Metternich quotes me, from the extracts I enclose, which it was my duty to communicate to him. Au reste, there is so much in not knowing all of a story, in the various diplomatic turns that are given to affairs, that I never feel quite sure in any concern.
I shall be glad to hear from you, my dear Clancarty, and long for news of your concerns. If I can be of use, you will not fail to point it out. The Emperor leaves this on the 6th of March for good. He will not be at Vienna before the middle of June, and the corps diplomatique are to have a conge. I am ignorant yet if Italy, England, or Germany, will contain me.
My best regards to all yours. Believe me, &c,
Lord Clancarty to Lord Stewart.
Frankfort sur Maine, February 26, 1816.
My dear Charles—Your letter of the 16th, from Milan, reached me yesterday by a courier to Wessenberg. Lord Castlereagh had previously forwarded to me the whole of his despatch to you of the 29th ultimo, of which an extract accompanied your letter; and, in the entirely new turn which the proceedings at Milan have given to the negociations, as they regard us at Frankfort, it is upon the precise part of this despatch which you have extracted that I have resolved to square my conduct, till more ample instructions, written for by me, shall have arrived from home.
Lamb has kept me very regularly informed of all that has passed at Munich, and supplied me with copies of your very excellent despatches relating to those affairs. I perfectly agree with you in thinking that the preliminary negociation was very far from being well conducted on either side; and though, at first favourable to the opening a negociation immediately with the Court of Bavaria, I very early regretted, and have never since ceased to regret, that the original design of beginning, continuing, and ending these discussions here, had ever been departed from: but these matters are past, and there is no use in further dwelling upon them.
I can have little doubt that the Prince Royal of Bavaria left you in good humour—and well he might; for, whatever appearance he might wear, his end was answered, and the incessant object of his Court, that of increasing their possessions by every means, gratified as far as it could be by proceedings at Milan, notwithstanding all the coquetry and affected coyness which MM. de Montgelas and Rechberg have since assumed at Munich, in declining to be charged with powers to carry the arrangement into effect; the true object of which is to throw all the odium of exacting sacrifices upon Austria. They well know that their acquisitions are abundantly excessive for any cession they are called upon to make, inclusive of that of contiguity. It is not necessary now to enter into the three modes of settling this matter which you state in your letter, as one of them has been finally chosen; but convinced am I that, if this business had not been extremely mismanaged, (possibly through the state of parties at the Austrian Court) you would have had Bavaria upon her knees, seeking those very exchanges proposed by the Protocol, which have now been obtained by what appears to me a very profuse misemployment of the interests of third parties.
The whole case seems now to have taken an entirely new aspect. As far as relates to the engagements of the Allies, they are upon the eve of being fully satisfied by the completion of those very exchanges which by the Protocol of the 3rd November they undertook to support, and which they conceived comprised indemnities not only sufficient to counterbalance the territories required from Bavaria, but to satisfy her for the sacrifice of contiguity also. Had they thought otherwise— that so large a portion of territory as that of the circle of Main and Tauber was requisite for this purpose, and that so great a sacrifice could be justifiably exacted from Baden, surely they would have said so.
The question, then, to me appears a new one, and the Allies quite at liberty to take whatever line they may deem it expedient upon it; and I believe it will be found, however the others may act, that it will not become quite a facile matter to gain over the appui of a great Northern Power to this new demand.
I agree, nevertheless, with you that, if the four Allied Courts can press measures upon Bavaria, they may (though not à fortiori) urge certain cessions from Baden. This, to a certain degree, was already done by the Protocol, and to the extent of even endeavouring to obtain some further modification of territory, bounded by the moderate scale noticed in Lord Castlereagh's despatch to you of the 29th ultimo; some of them, we know, will not be indisposed to use ulterior efforts; but really, when the demand is for one entire circle out of the nine of which the territories of Baden are composed, I should much doubt whether our Court will desire to become a party to such an exaction.
It may be true that all Powers have been, or may be, called upon to make sacrifices for the general peace: I should, however, like to know where, under the proposed arrangement, is the sacrifice of Bavaria. But surely, if the position is a true one, Baden will have the right to ask why she is to be called upon to make the sole and so great a sacrifice in the present instance, and this for the purpose of increasing the Bavarian territories. She may, and doubtless will, if urged upon this point, additionally ask why Wirtemberg is to be left untouched, and claim proportionate indemnity from this last Power as the price of her accession to the terms required; and hence will arise all that unsettlement of territory which it was the object of the Allies to prevent, that complication of negociation which Lord Castlereagh so much and so justly deprecates, and that interminable scene of irritated discussion, which I cannot but apprehend as the result of such a procedure.
Till I shall receive a full and ample communication of the views of our Government upon this new situation of affairs, my march will be guided by Lord Castlereagh's despatch to you of the 29th January, and so as not to prevent my Court from going, if they shall so please, the full length of lopping off the ninth part of Baden without indemnity, for the future aggrandizement of Bavaria.
Previously to the receipt of your letter, i.e., on the 20th instant, I sent home the whole of Wacquant's instructions, with their ten annexes, Wessenberg's Memoir only excepted.
By accounts received yesterday from Munich, we do not expect to be set agoing here in less than a week, by which time, or very soon after, I should hope, full instructions from Lord Castlereagh will reach me.
Should you go to England, I trust you will make this your road. You might afterwards go home by Brussels, where you will find James and Lady Emily.
We have not a word here worth conveying: all is at a stand, and must continue to be so, till these revirements territorially shall have been settled.
Lord Clancarty to Lord Stewart.
Frankfort sur Maine, February 29, 1816.
My dear Charles—I wrote to you so lately in answer to yours of the 16th, that I have little to add to what I then said. Prince Metternich may imagine, and probably does, that he has acted with wonderful dexterity in arranging matters with Bavaria, at the expense of so considerable a sacrifice as that of the province of Main and Tauber, the property of a third party. But measures of this kind are not so easy to accomplish as to imagine; and, however he may have succeeded in effecting his own views upon Bavaria, he will find it totally different, and, if I mistake not, an unattainable matter to satisfy the expectations he has raised at the Court of Munich, for the purpose of extracting her consent to the recent arrangements.
You know the complexion of Lord Castlereagh's feelings