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so much, since the French Revolution, as Baden, and that, subsequently to the recès de l'Empire, she has gained more than double her population, at that period amounting to 434,000, and now (reckoning the circle of Maine and Tauber, at 948,000) to 949,000. But has she been called upon for no sacrifices ? In the first place, as I have been given to understand, when all the other Princes were called upon for a year's produce of their revenues in support of the war, Baden advanced, I believe, the double ; and, though the excess was under a promise of repayment, Wessenberg states there is not a chance of its amount being ever, either in the whole, or in part, repaid.

In the second place, is not the disposal of two of her finest provinces in reversion dependent on the failure of heirs male in the existing branch, while there are actually in existence legitimate collateral heirs male, a sacrifice? The sacrifice of part of the Baillage of Wertheim, stated in the Protocol, I will admit to be too trifling for consideration, although unindemnified. Without, therefore, dwelling on this, or on the part taken by this State in the last war, of which you are a more competent judge than I can be, let us see how she stands under her treaty.

By the first separate and secret Article, she engages to lend herself "à toutes les cessions qu'exigeront les arrangemens futurs en Allemagne, calculées pour le maintien de la force et de l'indépendance de ce pays.” Is the cession of the province of Maine and Tauber one calculée pour le maintien ou de la force, ou de l'indépendance de l'Allemagne, so as to authorize its oecupation without the consent of the proprietor? To this question it is for you to answer. For my own part, I should conceive the proposition of M. de Pfeffel, and which is not new to us here, having been stirred both at Munich and Milan, however objectionable in other points of view, far more

defensible under the provisions of this treaty, because the con. tiguity afforded by the cession of this lisière would certainly contribute to the force, and consequently to the independence of Germany.

When the discussions open here, if Baden shall send a Minister, I mean to make use of the argument which the cession of this lisière would afford, to induce consent to the lesser cession of Maine and Tauber. But then comes the second secret and separate Article, by which an engagement is taken “par contre à s'employer à procurer à son Altesse Royale en retour de ces cessions, si elles devenoient, nécessaires une indemnité compatible avec la masse des objets qui seront disponible à l'époque de la pacification, et avec le but énoncé ci-dessus, et la plus rapprochée des dimensions actuelles des Etats de son Altesse Royale.” If, then, the cession of Maine and Tauber was requisite for the maintenance of the force and independence of Germany, could it be exacted under this stipulation, without some effort to procure indemnity for Baden of the nature recited ?

Such, shortly, are the difficulties of this case. To me, however, up to a certain extent, there exists none subsequent to your late instructions. Nothing can be easier than my task, so clearly marked out, to act in concert with Wessenberg, and I shall do so with the best efforts I can, for the purpose of bringing this business to a satisfactory conclusion. But when, as I apprehend, it shall come to forcible occupation, I throw myself upon you to know the countenance it is fitting I should assume.

I send you a private note from Wessenberg, transmitting to me Krusemark's instructions from Hardenberg respecting Mayence, with the Austrian proposition. Any direction you shall give me upon these papers I shall cheerfully obey.

The King of the Netherlands has not yet answered Gagern's reference, made now a month since. I cannot help suspecting, neither can I blame him, (if it shall so turn out) that his Majesty will not forward any treaty with Prussia, till she shall have fulfilled that of Vienna respecting the enclares and limits designed by that treaty for the Netherlands, and which, notwithstanding all the efforts which have hitherto been made, and all the solemn assurances afforded to you, to me, to his Majesty, by Prince Hardenberg and the King of Prussia himself, still remain in Prussian possession.

I send you a separate letter respecting the Saxe Coburg territories : my despatch No. 13, of the 20th February, was entirely upon this subject, and pointed out the most effectual means (if, where Prussia is concerned, any means can prove effectual) of having justice done upon this subject. Pray, when you shall have some leisure, call for that despatch, and read it.

I wish I could spare you more at the present moment, when, Heaven knows, you have quite enough upon your hands. Farewell, and be well !

Ever affectionately yours, CLANCARTY.

[Enclosures.]
Lord Stewart to Lord Clancarty.

Milan, February 16, 1816. My dear Clancarty-If I had possessed any means of communication with Frankfort but the common, uncertain post, I should constantly have kept up that correspondence with you, from which I ever derive so much advantage ; but I have not had a messenger at my own disposal, and all I could do was to desire Lamb to send you any of my letters to him on the Munich negociations that he conceived of the least moment. I trust he has done this, and that you are in possession of my humble ideas during the progress of these affairs. I shall, therefore, refrain from all repetition, confining myself to annex an extract of Castlereagh's last despatch to me, which points out the course Austria is endeavouring to take.

I do not think the first part of the negociations were conducted well on either side at Munich. Our Minister, before he got your Lettre corrective, had learned too much to uphold Bavaria in her opposition. Montgelas' note, previous to his changing his tone and striking his colours, was extremely unwise and injudicious. When the Prince Royal came here, there was a great deal of diplomatic trick on all sides ; but I think he left this in good humour, and with a determination to urge matters to a close, if Baden was obliged to yield what was suggested by the same phalanx of pressure that was in array against Bavaria.

I am well aware of the strict justice of much of your reasoning in your letter of the 3rd; but it has appeared to me that there are only three modes of settling this question

Ist. For Austria to recede. To this I answer— The Emperor is too far committed: his subjects, his army, would not permit him, and his Minister dare not advise him.

2nd. For Bavaria to yield, being satisfied with the indemnities in the Tableau, and giving up entirely the principle of contiguity. This, I say, nothing but force would accomplish or persuade her to.

3rd. For Baden to make a sacrifice, with a view to secure the free consent of Bavaria : this to be limited to a district, and embracing the desirable object of approximation. To this there is surely less objection than to the other two modes. If the four Allied Courts can press measures upon Bavaria, à fortiori they may urge certain cessions from Baden. What Power has not made sacrifices for the general peace we now enjoy! and I am strongly of opinion those miserable Princes of the old Confederation of the Rhine require a little discipline, and it will do them much good to be kept in order by their superiors. The conduct of Mr. Berkheim and his notes are really ridiculous and too impertinent.

The long instruction to Baron Wessenberg has been communicated to me, and sent to England. It is a correct state of the case, as far as I know. Prince Metternich quotes me, from the extracts I enclose, which it was my duty to communicate to him. Au reste, there is so much in not knowing all

of a story, in the various diplomatic turns that are given to affairs, that I never feel quite sure in any concern.

I shall be glad to hear from you, my dear Clancarty, and long for news of your concerns. If I can be of use, you will not fail to point it out. The Emperor leaves this on the 6th of March for good. He will not be at Vienna before the middle of June, and the corps diplomatique are to have a congé. I am ignorant yet if Italy, England, or Germany, will contain me.

My best regards to all yours. Believe me, &c.,

STEWART.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Stewart.

Frankfort sur Maine, February 26, 1816.

My dear Charles—Your letter of the 16th, from Milan, reached me yesterday by a courier to Wessenberg. Lord Castlereagh had previously forwarded to me the whole of his despatch to you of the 29th ultimo, of which an extract accompanied your letter; and, in the entirely new turn which the proceedings at Milan have given to the negociations, as they regard us at Frankfort, it is upon the precise part of this despatch which you have extracted that I have resolved to square my conduct, till more ample instructions, written for by me, shall have arrived from home.

Lamb has kept me very regularly informed of all that has passed at Munich, and supplied me with copies of your very excellent despatches relating to those affairs. I perfectly agree with you in thinking that the preliminary negociation was very far from being well conducted on either side; and though, at first favourable to the opening a negociation immediately with the Court of Bavaria, I very early regretted, and have never since ceased to regret, that the original design of beginning, continuing, and ending these discussions here, had ever been departed from : but these matters are past, and there is no use in further dwelling upon them.

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